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Preface 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my Supervisor, The Revd Canon 
Professor David Brown, not only for the stimulating guidance, detailed attention, and 
at times challenging criticism with which he has overseen this thesis, but also for his 
generous hospitality to me on my visits to Durham, which has meant that all my 
supervisions have been accompanied by occasions of enjoyable conviviality. I am also 
very grateful to Bishop Bill Down and the Diocese of Leicester for providing me with 
a sabbatical term during spring 1999 without which this thesis would not have been 
completed; to The Revd Dr Joseph Cassidy, The Revd Dominic Barrington, and all at 
St Chad's College, Durham, for their kindness in welcoming me into their community 
during that term; and to the people of St Andrew's, Jarrom St, Fr Terence Byron, and 
my colleagues in the Team Ministry of The Holy Spirit, Leicester, who put up with a 
more than usually absent parish priest. I greatly appreciate the kindness of Fr Martin 
Court, who has guided me patiently through many hardware and software crises, of 
Mrs Penny Russell, who provided a safe home for discs at a time when our home was 
subject to recurrent burglaries, and of Dr Hugh Goddard, who spared time in a very 
busy academic schedule to discuss the medieval Islamic material with me, and then 
read through Chapter 3, making many helpful suggestions. The Very Revd Dr Gregor 
Duncan, Mr Richard Gill, Mrs Angela Jagger, Dr Ataullah Siddiqi, Fr Stephen Bould, 
and many other friends, of all faiths, have helped me (often unknowingly) by sharing 
their understanding with me, and by letting me try my ideas out on them. 
Most of all, my three sons Tom, Frank and Ben have put up amicably with their 
father's preoccupation with his `old men'; and my best support and encouragement 
throughout has been my wife Julia. In Chapter 3, rightly or wrongly, I venture to 
make some criticisms of St Thomas Aquinas; but I am convinced he was entirely 
correct when he wrote (S. C. G. III. cxxiii): 
Amicitia quanto maior est, tanto debet esse firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et 
mulierem maxima amicitia esse videtur. 
Note 
Throughout this thesis, I will seek to maintain (except when quoting others) a written 
distinction between `Trinity' and `trinity'. The former will be used as the proper name 
for the ensemble of Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the latter will serve as a generic name 
for any triadic account of divinity sharing to some recognisable extent in the patterns 
of Christian understanding of the Trinity. Similar distinctions will be made of 
`Trinitarian' / `trinitarian', `Trinitarianism' / `trinitarianism', etc, though at times the 
boundary between cases will necessarily be ambiguous. Note that this is a distinction 
between the proper and the generic; it does not imply any assessment of the orthodoxy 
or otherwise of a theology described as `Trinitarian', but merely that it concerns 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
Michael Ipgrave 
TRINITY AND INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE: Plenitude and Plurality 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD, University of Durham (Dept of Theology), 1999 
The question addressed is that of the usefulness of Trinitarian doctrine as a resource 
for inter-faith dialogue. Chapter 1, introducing the problem in modern theology 
through Tillich and Panikkar, suggests divine `plenitude' as an appropriate language 
for the debate. Six features of Trinitarian doctrine characterise orthodox Christian 
understanding of plenitude. Assertion of one God (monotheism) and inference of one 
divine principle (`monadism') are other typical patterns of religious thought; 
represented by Islam and Neoplatonism respectively, these have historically been 
Christians' partners in Trinitarian dialogue. 
Chapter 2 discusses the dialogue of patristic Christianity with Greek philosophy. The 
tension of unity and plurality in Greek thought exhibits a dynamic of transcendence 
and immanence like that in Trinitarianism. Detailed comparison of Plotinus and 
Origen shows convergences between their analyses of divine plenitude. The six 
Trinitarian characteristics [Chap. 1] are present to the same extent as in patristic 
authors of unquestioned orthodoxy. 
Chapter 3 surveys encounters of medieval Christianity with Islam in the contexts of 
Greek, Latin and Arabic. Here mutual hostilities and misunderstandings generally 
stifled dialogue, despite real parallels between the faiths' accounts of divine plenitude. 
These parallels are extensively explored with reference to the six characteristics in 
two questions: the status of the divine Word, and the subsistence of divine attributes; 
also briefly in Sufi and Hesychast spiritualities. 
Chapter 4 draws together the historical evidence to argue that Trinity is a twofold 
resource for inter-faith encounter. Firstly, a Trinitarian dynamic provides grounding 
for dialogues where each partner is open to the other, is committed to rationality, and 
values experience. Secondly, in the content of dialogue, witness projectively discovers 
in other faiths analogical references to the six Trinitarian characteristics, connecting 
these to Christian faith. The thesis concludes by suggesting how these principles 
might re-shape Trinitarian dialogue with Hindu `monadism' and Islamic monotheism 
respectively. 
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TRINITY 
Chapter 1 
The Trinity in a Multi-faith Context 
I The Trinity in dialogue: problem or resource? 
(a) `The Mystery of Salvation' 
1 
1-1 
`The distinctive understanding of God as Trinity should be at the centre 
of any inter-faith reflection' affirms a recent report of the Church of 
England's Doctrine Commission. ' In so doing, it voices a growing body 
of thought amongst Christians concerned with the theology and practice 
of inter-faith dialogue. 
However, when we ask in what way the Trinity should be `at the centre', 
divergences soon appear. Indeed, The Mystery of Salvation itself clearly 
reflects, in its ambiguities, major differences in theological assumptions 
and methods. 
For example, in the key early chapter of the report which relates `the 
gift', salvation, to `the Giver', God, we read: 
[Christians] cannot talk adequately about salvation in Christian terms without 
talking about God as Trinity. The God to whom salvation is necessarily related is 
the God of Jesus Christ: God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. 2 
The starting-point here is the Trinitarian identity of the saving God 
known by Christians; inter-faith reflection, like any other area of 
theology, as it clearly has soteriological dimensions, must be reflection on 
the basis of this Trinitarian identity. 
However, when attention is later explicitly focused on the question of the 
status of other faiths, the understanding of God as Trinity is developed 
1 The Mystery of Salvation, p176. 
2 Ibid., p40. 
TRINITY 2 
1-, 
rather differently. First, it is described as a way of reconciling `an 
exclusivist emphasis on particularity' with `a pluralist emphasis on 
universality'. ' Then, more radically still, the Commission cites with 
approval the following interpretation: 
The doctrine of the Trinity means that God, far from being difficult to locate in the 
world, can be encountered everywhere in it. One needs to take pains and be very 
adept at hiding not to encounter God. 
Rather than being primarily a defining statement of distinctively Christian 
faith, `Trinity' is here being used as a key to recognise divine presence 
and purpose in other faith contexts also. 
In seeking to bring these two approaches into some relation with one 
another, the report echoes the `paradox' identified by the 1988 Lambeth 
Conference: 
Anything that is `exclusively' true of the incarnate Lord is true of one who is 
precisely the most `inclusive' reality. 3 
If in this formulation we were to substitute the phrase `the Holy Trinity' 
for `the incarnate Lord', we would arrive at a concise expression of the 
ambiguous way in which trinitarianism is handled in the Doctrine 
Commission's report: at once a marker of Christian identity and a 
recognition of shared religious insight, at once a criterion of exclusivism 
and a pointer towards inclusivism. 
In much contemporary writing on the Trinity in dialogue, this ambiguity 
which The Mystery of Salvation holds together as paradox is developed as 
one polarity or another. Surveying a spectrum of theological opinion, we 
may identify two typical positions characterised by the respective motifs 
of `Trinity as problem' and `Trinity as resource'. 
' The Mystery of Salvation, p 176, based on D'Costa (1990), p 19. 
2 Ibid., p176, quoting from Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God's Mercy (Zondervan, 1992), p104. 
Pinnock's work is interesting in showing how one theologian remaining true to the convictions of a 
fairly conservative evangelical background has been led to a broadly `inclusive' approach. 
3 Lambeth Conference Section Report on `Dogmatic and Pastoral Concerns', pars 44 - in The Truth 
shall make you free, p93. Quoted in The Mystery of Salvation, p145. 
TRINITY 3 
(b) Trinity as problem 
The first approach emphasises the affirmation that the understanding of 
God as Trinity' is `distinctive' - that is to say, it is a characteristic of the 
unique pattern of Christian faith. On this view, The Mystery of Salvation 
is right to place such an understanding `at the centre' of inter-faith 
reflection precisely because Christians must bring to inter-religious 
encounter the authentic and distinctive insights and beliefs of their own 
tradition. 
The corollary of this approach is that the doctrine of the Trinity is 
necessarily in some sense a problem, since its particular contours are 
those which differentiate Christians from people of other faiths. In 
twentieth century theology, this view is most clearly and forcefully 
presented by Karl Barth in the Church Dogmatics: 
The doctrine of the Trinity is what basically distinguishes the Christian doctrine of 
God as Christian, and therefore what already distinguishes the Christian concept of 
revelation as Christian, in contrast to all other possible doctrines of God or 
concepts of revelation. 2 
On this basis, Barth vigorously attacked the idea that there could be any 
real vestigium trinitatis, any analogue beyond the Christian revelation 
showing `a certain similarity to the structure of the trinitarian concept of 
God, so that it may be regarded as an image of the trinitarian God 
3 himself . In particular, he repudiated any significance in parallels which 
could be drawn between the Trinity and triadic structures in other 
religions 4 Indeed, he even maintained that such exploration would lead to 
For the distinction in usage followed here between `Trinity' and `trinity', and derived words, see 
the note above in the Preface. In the quotation cited from Barth below (n3), the translator does not 
follow this convention. 
2 Barth, p301. 
3 Ibid., p334. 
Ibid., p337 - the candidates cited as examples of possible vestigia trinitatis are drawn from ancient 
religions (Babylonian, Egyptian, Canaanite and Etruscan), from `Brahmanism' (the Trimurti), and 
from Buddhism (the `three jewels'). 
TRINITY 4 
1-1 
a denial of the authentic Trinity, as it would be seeking to root 
Trinitarianism in some ground other than that of Christian revelation: 
Let us suppose that someone seriously wanted to prove the truth of the divine 
Trinity from its attestation in the history of religion. What would he or could he 
prove? ... We only step 
into the void if we try to plant our feet here. ' 
Barth's influence on subsequent Protestant theology has of course been 
immense; with regard to the question of the place of the Trinity in inter- 
faith dialogue, this has had two mutually opposed effects. On one hand, 
sharing Barth's strong assertion of Trinitarian belief as a uniquely 
Christian position, many have viewed dialogue as something to be 
resisted, in that it compromises the distinctiveness of that position. On the 
other hand, Christians committed to dialogue, sensing that such assertion 
in this way is endangering the inter-religious process, have often felt 
sufficiently embarrassed by the problems raised to suggest that 
Trinitarian doctrine should be either abandoned2 or at least radically 
reinterpreted: 
In order to continue to be Christians in a religiously plural world, we do not have 
to reject any of the great traditional themes of Christian thought; but we do need to 
use them in ways that are appropriate to our own situation ... We 
do not need to 
reject the idea of the Trinity, but to understand it in its modalistic rather than its 
ontological sense. 3 
However, Barth's rejection of the idea of vestigia trinitatis was 
inextricably linked to his general rejection of any divine disclosure 
beyond the Word of God in Jesus Christ. A vestigium would be for him a 
creature illegitimately being used as a cosmological or anthropological 
basis for revelation: 
Barth, p342. 
2 D'Costa (1990), p27n1, points out that, of the twelve essays in Hick & Knitter, The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness, only three discuss the Trinity - Stanley Samartha, `who denies the 
ontological import of the doctrine' (cf further below, pp54f), John Hick (see following note), and 
Raimundo Panikkar - who is discussed in detail in Section 3 below. 3 Hick (1990), p101. Hick develops his reconstructed account in conscious opposition to `social' 
models of the Trinity; though Barth repudiates `modalism' in his Trinitarian exposition, he 
interestingly shares with Hick an objection to any understanding of the divine personae as 
analogous to `personalities' in the modem sense. Cf also Hick (1987), p32 - `the three persons are 
not three different centres of consciousness, but three major aspects of the one divine nature'. 
TRINITY 5 
I"I 
The concern here was with an essential trinitarian disposition supposedly 
immanent in some created realities ... It was with a genuine analogia entis, with 
traces of the trinitarian Creator God in being as such, in its pure createdness. I 
If, though, one does not share Barth's ferocious objections to the very 
possibility either. of an analogia entis or of some knowledge of God 
beyond the Christian revelation, the question of the significance of the 
vestigia remains open. That is to say, there appear to be hints of 
interesting parallels, within other faiths as in other areas of experience, 2 
to the Trinitarian faith confessed by Christians. It will be our contention 
that many of the distinctive features of Trinitarian doctrine deemed to be 
problematic in inter-faith dialogue can in fact be identified within non- 
Christian accounts of the divine. To clarify the nature of these `Trinitarian 
problems', we must first explore the second form of theological approach 
to the Trinity - that which values the doctrine as a resource for inter- 
religious encounter. 
(c) Trinity as resource 
According to this approach, the Trinity, rather than being seen as an 
emphatically and exclusively Christian tenet of belief, is understood to be 
in some sense a universal pattern which can be traced in all religious 
traditions. Because of this, it is maintained, Trinitarianism serves as a 
useful, perhaps even an indispensable, tool both for charting the varieties 
of the human religious story and for encouraging and interpreting meeting 
and mutual understanding between different strands within that story. 
Within this general approach, we may distinguish between a weaker and a 
stronger claim. The weaker restricts itself to commending the usefulness 
of Trinitarianism to the Church, the claim being that an understanding of 
God as Trinity has a part to play in formulating a Christian `theology of 
' Barth, p334. 
2 Barth's list of possible vestigia also includes, alongside religions, the fields of nature, culture, 
history, and `the human soul' (op. cit., pp336-8). 
TRINITY 6 
1a 
religions' and in guiding Christian encounter with people of other faiths. 
This is presumably the view behind the words of the Doctrine 
Commission document quoted at the outset. It is certainly a position 
explicitly adopted in other recent official church reports. For example, the 
British Council of Churches' 1989 Study Commission on Trinitarian 
Doctrine recognised the difference of approaches which, we have 
characterised by the respective motifs of `problem' and 'resource': 
The question remains of whether the doctrine is simply a given to be taken account 
of and, where necessary, modified as the result of conversations with others [of 
other faiths]; or whether it has positive implications for the way in which the task 
of conversation is to be approached. ' 
It concluded that at least the anthropological implications of the Christian 
understanding were a resource for inter-religious encounter: 
We believe that conceptions of our co-humanity, grounded in the community of 
Father, Son and Spirit, have much to contribute to the great questions of our time 
about relations between the sexes and between members of different religious 
communities. 2 
A more directly theological application of Trinitarian doctrine is found in 
the influential Anglican report Towards a Theology for Inter-Faith 
Dialogue. Here we find a clear affirmation of the general principle that: 3 
The Bible provides essential pointers in the unfolding witness to the Triune God, 
Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer, and in its testimony to the inner life of God, the 
Trinity, which can guide us in inter-faith relations. 4 
The most specific application of this principle appears in the section 
entitled `God as Spirit'. The report refers to Orthodox complaints that the 
doctrine of double procession had tended to devalue the status of the 
Spirit in comparison with that of the Son, whereas, the authors explain: 
I The Forgotten Trinity, p40 pars 6.4.2. In the preceding paragraph (6.4.1), the report had considered 
and dismissed the view that the doctrine was so problematic that `particularly in relation to other 
monotheistic faiths, it should be kept in the background or even abandoned as positively harmful'. 2 Ibid., p43 pars 7.3. 
3 Originally published by the Church of England's Board of Mission and Unity (Inter-Faith 
Consultative Group) in 1984 and debated by General Synod that year, this report was re-issued by 
the Anglican Consultative Council in 1986 for discussion at the 1988 Lambeth Conference. This 
second edition included an appended critical essay by Michael Nazir-Ali, That Which Is Not To Be 
Found But Which Finds Us. 
4 Towards a Theology, for Inter-Faith Dialogue, p 14 pars 31. 
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For many modern Orthodox writers, the `economy' or dispensation of the Spirit is 
not simply a guarantee that the Christian Church or the Christian Scriptures carry 
the direct authority of the Word Incarnate; it is whatever is now driving us and 
challenging us and nurturing us into a lived Christlikeness. 1 
From the heart of Trinitarian theology, these words clearly open up the 
possibility of a generous appreciation of the place of other faiths within 
the dispensation of the Spirit; the report concludes: 
Whatever the justice of Orthodox strictures upon the alleged results of the Filioque, 
there is no denying that this vision of tension and complementarity between the 
historically visible, `named', determinate presence and memory of God the Son 
and the more unpredictable, culturally and historically indeterminate witness of the 
Spirit provides a possibly fruitful vehicle for a `theology of religions'. 2 
This points in summary fashion towards a theology which roots both the 
understanding of other faiths and the practice of inter-faith dialogue 
within Trinitarianism, and particularly within the relation of the second 
and third Persons of the Trinity. 
This recognition of pneumatology as a resource allowing `the 
particularity of Christ to be related to the universal activity of God in the 
history of humankind' has become a repeated theme in contemporary 
reflection on inter-faith encounter. 3 The report's expression of this is 
clearly directed to Christians, but some of the most important theological 
work lying behind the development of this and other Trinitarian resources 
makes the stronger claim that its application need not be limited in this 
way: according to this more ambitious programme, trinitarian patterns 
can serve as a foundation for a world theology which would provide 
patterns of interpretation for all religious traditions, or at least for the 
more significant faith communities. 
I Towards a Theology for Inter-Faith Dialogue, p20 pars 44. 
2 Ibid., p20. This statement is strongly criticised by Michael Nazir-Ali, who describes it as an attempt 
to `regard the Holy Spirit as somehow distanced from Sacred History, working as a kind of benign 
spiritual influence'; he goes so far as to say: `But this is not the Holy Spirit of the Bible' (Nazir-Ali, 
p48). 
3 The quotation is of the second `Thesis' in D'Costa (1990), p19 - this immediately follows the 
passage cited with approval by The Mystery of Salvation (above, p2nl). On the Trinitarian 
grounding for dialogue implied by D'Costa's thesis, see further below, pp305f. 
TRINITY 
(d) Trinitarian problems 
8 
1.1 
If in this way `trinity' is to be used as an interpretative key for the world 
of religious diversity and inter-faith encounter, it is all the more important 
to ask about the distinctive features of the Christian doctrine. For, while 
trinitarianism might still conceivably be a useful resource for Christians 
even if there were no evidence of these features in other faiths, it would 
hardly be credible to expect it to be taken up for use as a resource within 
the wider religious world if it appeared to be a wholly Christian 
phenomenon. Before looking at two influential explorations of the pan- 
religious use of trinitarian resources, therefore, we must first clarify what 
are these trinitarian problems which must be addressed. 
It is important to be clear about the meaning of `distinctiveness' in this 
context. The content of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity shows 
orthodox Christian faith in God as distinctive among many other religious 
understandings in that it maintains some element of differentiation at the 
heart of divinity, it counts the measure of this differentiation as no more 
and no less than three, it holds that this differentiation is of ultimate, 
permanent, and irreducible status, it characterises this differentiation by 
equality rather than subordination, and so on. 
Now, all these points are logically separable from a further distinctive 
characteristic of Christian faith: namely, the confession that the 
Trinitarian identity of God is made known in Jesus of Nazareth. So it is 
theoretically possible to make a separation between a structural 
distinctiveness of the Trinity - telling what kind of God it is whom 
Christians affirm - and an evidential distinctiveness - telling where 
Christians affirm this kind of God to be found. 
The coherence of this separation is shown by the possibility in principle 
of imagining a religious faith which taught that God was an eternal and 
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co-equal `trinity', differentiated as three persons and undivided in one 
substance, yet which made no reference to the event of Jesus Christ. 
Encounter with such a faith would certainly pose theological problems for 
Christians, but they would not be `trinitarian' problems in the sense in 
which I propose to use that term. In my usage, `trinitarian' problems are 
those which can be logically separated from the specifically 
Christological issues which alone encounter with such a faith would 
generate. They could, for example, be described as those questions which 
refer directly to questions of differentiation, diversity and unity in the life 
of God. 
With this background in mind, from considering the structure and content 
of the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity there can be compiled a 
checklist of such `trinitarian problems' : we can identify six distinctive 
features of that doctrine which can theoretically be separated from the 
specific Christological context out of which it has arisen. These 
characterise the doctrine as officially defined; in practice, individual 
theologians do not always and equally maintain all six, so we must ask 
also about the influence of dialogical involvement on the Christian 
treatment in context of these features of orthodoxy. 
The six problems or characteristics are as follows: 
1. Plurality - the divine reality embraces a diversity of some kind, rather 
than being undifferentiated simplicity. 
2. Personality - the constituent entities of this diversity are persons, in 
some sense of that word, rather than merely abstract qualities. 
3. Threeness - there are precisely three such entities, neither more nor 
less. 
4. Equality - this is a diversity among entities mutually equal, rather than 
involving any one being subordinated to any other. 
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5. Necessity - this diversity is the way God always has to be, rather than 
being a contingent state of affairs which has come about at some point. 
6. Immanence - this diversity is the way God ultimately and irreducibly is 
at every level of the divine existence, rather than being just an external 
('economic') mode of presentation. 
So our task is to ask to what extent the proposal that trinitarianism is a 
pan-religious resource is given credibility by the occurrence of these six 
features in Christian dialogue with people of other faiths. These are 
perhaps the kind of questions referred to as follows in the BCC Report: 
If monotheism - not simply the matter of the unity of God, but of what kind of 
unity - is an important question for our understanding of the kind of world in which 
we live and of the values we espouse within it, then it is essential that we face 
openly the differences between different conceptions of the divine unity. ' 
Framing the question like this, though, represents only part of the multi- 
faith context: trinitarian belief must be considered in relation not only to 
monotheism, but also to other accounts of divine unity. Particularly 
important is what could be called `polytheistic monadism' 2- patterns of 
belief which insist on an ultimate unity in the divine while recognising a 
diversity of gods at lower levels. 
We shall argue that monotheism and polytheistic monadism are two of 
the most influential forms of contemporary religious thought engaging 
with Christian theology, and we shall discuss in detail the trinitarian 
problems in each engagement in the context of two historical examples. 3 
First, though, we may introduce the issues by looking at two influential 
modem trinitarian theologies resourcing inter-faith dialogue, asking how 
they relate to the above checklist. 
I The Forgotten Trinity, p40 para 6.4.2. 
2 Cf below, pp63f, for explanation of the term `monadism'. 
3 Below, pp56-66. 
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The two modem theologians whom we will consider are the Protestant 
Paul Tillich (1886-1965), as he expounds his position in the three 
substantial volumes of his Systematic Theology (1951-1963) and the 
Catholic Raimundo Panikkar (1930-), principally his short but dense 
study The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man (1973), but also 
with reference to the later essay Jordan, Tiber, and Ganges (1987). 1 
Though writing in different generations and out of different backgrounds 
(Tillich a systematic theologian formed by encounter with western 
secularism but at the opening of a new era of inter-religious encounter, 
Panikkar with long personal experience of immersion in spirituality 
across faith boundaries in India), they share a concern to relate belief in 
the Trinity to contexts of religious pluralism - or more precisely, to 
develop trinitarian patterns of faith which are both meaningful maps of 
multi-faith situations and fruitful resources for inter-faith encounter. 
Rowan Williams describes Panikkar's book as `one of the best and least 
read meditations on the Trinity in our century', 2 while a recent study by 
Pan-Chiu Lai concludes that Tillich's trinitarianism `can serve as a 
signpost pointing to a viable and promising way of constructing a 
theology of religions'. 3 After considering each writer in turn, we shall 
draw together themes which they share, and also identify outstanding 
questions common to their approaches - this will enable us to consider 
how they deal with the trinitarian problems mentioned above. 
Although the Anglican report introduces the Son-Spirit complementarity by referring to Orthodoxy, 
and parallels have been drawn between Panikkar and Vladimir Lossky (Williams (1990), p14n2), 
Orthodox writers do not in general support the extension of trinitarian principles to a `world 
theology' ä la Panikkar - but cf Khodr (cited below, p306n4) for pneumatological universality. 2 Williams (1990), p3. 
3 Lai, p171. 
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2, Trinitarian resources: Paul Tillich 
(a) Trinitarian principles 
Tillich's theology of the Trinity finds its most sustained exposition in Part 
IV (`Life and the Spirit') of his Systematic Theology, ' though there are 
also important references to the doctrine in earlier parts. He begins Part 
IV with a strong statement of the ontological grounding of trinitarianism 
as an account of the way God is: 
These [trinitarian] aspects are reflections of something real in the nature of the 
divine for the religious experience and for the theological tradition. They are not 
merely different subjective ways of looking at the same thing. They have a 
fundamentum in re, a foundation in reality, however much the subjective side of 
man's experience may contribute? 
However, it must be remembered that, as for Tillich ontology can never 
be abstracted from human encounter with Being, so the trinitarian 
symbols `become empty' if they are separated from their experiential 
roots. 3 Therefore his emphasis is consistently on the trinitarian patterns 
displayed in the self-manifestation of God. In terms of the `trinitarian 
problems' we have identified above, 4 this means that, even in the 
Christian context, he is treating of the `economic' rather than the 
`immanent' Trinity; we may therefore expect that this will be all the more 
true when he seeks to trace trinitarian patterns in other faiths also. Indeed 
Tillich's whole theological `method of correlation' precludes any interest 
in theologising about God in his inner reality rather than in relation to the 
human situation: 
Like every theological symbol, the trinitarian symbolism must be understood as an 
answer to the questions implied in man's predicament. 5 
I ST3, pp301-314. 
2 Ibid., p301. 
3 ST2, p165. 
Above, pp9-10. 
5 ST3, p304. 
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The positioning of these statements within the overall system of Tillich's 
theology is significant, since it is expressive of his conviction that the 
trinitarian pattern is a necessary implication of the acknowledgement of 
God as `living'. It is on this acknowledgement that Tillich bases his 
description of the doctrine of the Trinity as `dialectical' :' as life itself 
involves a `going beyond itself and a `returning to itself , so the 
2 trinitarian symbols express the same dialectic within God. 
Now, clearly, such an understanding need not be restricted to the 
Christian tradition: other religions too can display an identical dialectical 
pattern, and indeed this is evidenced by the manifold forms of trinitarian 
3 symbolism throughout the history of religions. Tillich thus freely 
acknowledges a recognisably trinitarian pattern of plurality to be found in 
other faiths - not only so, but this is for him in some sense a necessary 
feature of religion, as it arises from the dialectic of the divine life. 
Tillich's use of the categories of dialectic here shows the influence of 
Hegel; 4 Hegelian too is his related identification of `spirit' as the primary 
category within which to encompass this understanding of the Trinity: 
God's life is life as spirit, and the trinitarian principles are moments within the 
process of the divine life. ' 
Tillich recognises that there is involved here an ambiguity in the status of 
`spirit', which arises from the fact that the spiritual functions both as 
itself one of the three `trinitarian principles' and also as in some sense the 
overarching category of interpretation within which the character of God 
as living is to be apprehended: 
This `dialectical' account, where the influence of Hegel is apparent, goes back as far as Tillich's 
early lecture on Schelling - cf Nuovo, pp69ff. 2 ST2, p105; d ST 1, p63. 
3 ST2, p143. 
Thatcher, p96, describes the doctrine of the Trinity as `the best example of the influence of 
dialectical philosophy on Tillich's thought', but is severely critical of Tillich's approach: `the 
Persons of the Trinity are not helpfully re-expressed as `moments' in an Hegelian synthesis of 
Spirit' (ibid, p97). 
5 ST I, pp250f. 
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The third principle is in a way the whole and in a way it is a special principle. ' 
This stress on the primacy of Spirit naturally raises a question as to the 
relative status of the other two divine Persons within Tillich's account of 
the Trinity. From the perspective of orthodox theology, this is a criticism 
which has long been levelled at Hegelian versions of trinitarianism, and 
by implication therefore at accounts like Tillich's which are heavily 
influenced by Hegel: 
According to Hegel's exposition, the Father and the Son are the Thesis and 
Antithesis of a Triad of which the Holy Ghost is the Synthesis. It will follow from 
this that the Holy Ghost is the sole reality of the Trinity. 2 
Certainly Tillich describes `God as spirit' as `the most embracing, direct, 
and unrestricted symbol for the divine life'; 3 the. consequently ambiguous 
status of Spirit vis-a-vis the Father and the Son is not seriously explored. 
This is surely indicative of a general lack of interest in one of the classical 
dimensions of Trinitarian doctrine - the principle of the co-equality of the 
divine Persons: at no point in his exposition of the Trinity does Tillich 
consider this problem. 4 We shall see later a similar disregard for the 
traditional enumeration of the Persons as precisely three. 5 
This has led to some critics claiming that Tillich is not so much 
expounding as re-writing the doctrine of the Trinity in such a way as to 
make it unrecognisable to the data of Christian faith: 
Tillich so allows dialectical thinking to shape his doctrine of the Trinity that the 
orthodox conception of it and his revised dialectical account of it are almost 
incompatible. 6 
But Tillich does in fact evince considerable concern to establish 
continuity between his formulations and the traditional Christian doctrine, 
and this can be seen both in the various ways he uses to characterise his 
1 ST1, p251. 
2J McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1918), p204, quoted by Thatcher, p93. 
3 ST I, p249. 
4 Dourley, p 169 - comparing and contrasting Tillich with St Bonaventure, who gave a primacy within 
the Trinity to the persona of the Father. 
5 Below, p19. 
6 Thatcher, p89. 
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`trinitarian principles' and in the explanation he gives of the various 
factors lying behind trinitarian thinking. 
Thus, in analysing the meaning of God as living, he produces a threefold 
formula of God as `ground, form, and act. ' In considering the structure 
of revelation, he interprets the different personae as different characters 
of the divine life: respectively, `the abysmal, the logical, and the 
spiritual', which together structure its self-manifestation. 2 In his final 
consideration of Trinitarian dogma, though, he definitely identifies the 
`trinitarian principles' by their received Christian names of Father, Son, 
and Spirit. 3 
Lying behind these various formulations is Tillich's recognition that there 
are different factors which have led to the formulation of trinitarian 
thinking; he singles out three in particular: 
first, the tension between the absolute and the concrete element in our ultimate 
concern; second, the symbolic application of the concept of life to the divine 
ground of being; and third, the threefold manifestation of God as creative power, as 
saving love, and as ecstatic transformation. 
Of these, only the last relates specifically to the Christian revelation; we 
have seen that the second applies to any consideration of God as living, 
while the first is in principle an equally universal tension within human 
religious experience. 5 The relation between the first two factors and the 
third will therefore clearly be important for understanding how Tillich's 
trinitarian theology might function in a situation of interreligious 
encounter; yet this is an area of some considerable and significant 
ambiguity in the Systematic Theology. 
I ST3, p302. 
2 ST1, p157. 
3 ST3, p303. 
° Ibid., p30 1. At other times, Tillich partners `ultimate' (rather than `absolute') with `concrete' as the 
factors generating the first tension. 
In practical terms, Tillich sees the concreteness of ultimate concern producing a tendency to 
polytheism, while its absoluteness pushes towards monotheism; trinitarianism is therefore the 
reconciliation of these two - ST1, pp227ff. 
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On the one hand Tillich insists that the first two, universally applicable, 
factors are a necessary part of any serious theology: 
It is the last of the three which suggests the symbolic names, Father, Son, and 
Spirit; but without the two preceding reasons for trinitarian thinking the last group 
would lead only into a crude mythology. ' 
On the other hand, though, Tillich equally clearly sees the specifically 
Christian revelation in the event of Jesus Christ as the decisive factor 
leading to the formulation of Trinitarian thinking: 
The christological problem gives rise to the trinitarian problem. 2 
This tension means that Tillich has to distinguish between the `trinitarian 
principles' (abysmal, logical, spiritual) - which he refers to as 
`presuppositions' of the Christian doctrine' or, equivalently, as a 
`pretrinitarian formula which makes trinitarian thinking meaningful'4 - 
and the named persons of Father, Son, and Spirit. Pan-Chiu Lai shows 
how this distinction is made clear in a 1963 lecture Tillich gave 
comparing his doctrine of the Trinity with Schleiermacher' S. Here, he 5 
explicitly distinguished two `stages' in his approach - first, the doctrine of 
the living God, and second, that arising from the revelation in Jesus 
Christ. 6 
Although Tillich does not explicitly develop the point, it seems that it is 
in this theory of `two stages' also that we should look for an answer to the 
question of the significance of personality within Tillich's trinitarian 
ST3, p301. With specific regard to the first two factors, cf respectively ST1, p228 (the need to 
express the concrete element within the absolute `posits the trinitarian problem') and ibid., p251 
('the trinitarian principles appear whenever one speaks meaningfully of the living God'). 
2 ST3, p303. Cf also ST1, p250 ('The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a corroboration of the 
christological dogma'). 
3 ST I, p250. 
4 ST3, p302 (the reference here is to the triad of ground-form-act mentioned above). 
5 Lai, pp154-5. The lecture dates from the same year as Volume 3 of the Systematic Theology, and 
appears to develop brief remarks in that volume where Tillich records as his primary criticism of 
Schleiermacher's derivation of the doctrine from analysis of the Christian consciousness the 
contention that: `It is not the Christian consciousness but the revelatory situation of which the 
Christian consciousness is only the receiving side that is the source of religious knowledge and 
theological reflection, including the trinitarian symbols' (ST3, p303). 
6 Tillich, History of Christian Thought, p408, quoted by Lai, p155. Lai compares this approach to 
Abelard's Theologia Christiana, which affirms knowledge of a triune God among non-Christians. 
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theology. In the second stage, that reliant on Christian revelation, the 
constituents of trinitarian diversity are clearly acknowledged as the 
personae, in one of whom indeed the personal God meets us in human 
history. ' In the first stage, however, the `principles' are described as 
`moments' or `characters' of the divine life. These are titles which 
indicate their abstract status; as it is this first stage which is applicable 
across the world of religious diversity, `personality' cannot appear as one 
of the trinitarian characteristics universally recognised by Tillich. 2 
It is interesting to note that one reason Tillich gave for his `two stages' 
theory was that of being able meaningfully to commend faith to possible 
spiritual beings who might be found in some other part of the universe: 
People who have an exclusively christologically orientated conception of the 
Trinity would say that we must bring them the message of Jesus of Nazareth as the 
Christ. For Tillich, this attitude is absurd. He would prefer to say that the eternal 
Logos appears in their history as he has appeared in the centre of human history. ' 
It is not hard to see how parallels could be drawn from this hypothetical 
extra-terrestrial scenario to the actual situation of living humans of other 
religions; the suggestion of a two-stage approach would then imply that 
trinitarian categories might be available to interpret both the faiths of 
non-Christians and the inter-religious encounter which involves them 
with Christians. And in fact, though this is not a theme prominently 
developed in the Systematic Theology, 4 there seem to me to be three areas 
in which Tillich is able to use . his trinitarian thought as a basis for 
approaching the questions raised by other faiths; in what follows, we will 
briefly consider each in turn. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
Nuovo, p112 - though Tillich's lecture on Schelling is an early work, Nuovo points out (p28) that 
its themes are echoed in his last public lecture also. 
But cf also Tillich's discussion of the Hindu Trimurti (below, ppl8-19) where `personalised deities' 
appear as one factor within a `trinitarian question'. 
Lai, p155, referring to Tillich, History of Christian Thought, pp408-9. 
Volume 3, though, shows more concern with inter-faith issues than its predecessors. Thus Tillich 
signals `increasingly significant exchange between the historical religions' as one of three key 
contextual factors (with secularisation and ecumenism) for contemporary theology (ST3, p6). 
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(b) Trinitarian thinking in another faith 
In discussing the first two factors which lead to trinitarian thinking, 
Tillich makes two explicit references to particular non-Christian 
traditions. One arises in the analysis of God as living spirit: the roots of 
this, in the distinction between the `abysmal' and the `logical' characters 
of revelation, are traced back to Parmenides, or even Heraclitus. l 
A more significant statement occurs in connection with Tillich's 
discussion of his second universal trinitarian factor. In introducing the 
meaning of `God' as a reality addressing the human question of being, he 
gives a brief typological survey of the history of religions, in which 
different forms of polytheism and monotheism are identified on the basis 
of their expression of the concrete and the absolute respectively as that of 
ultimate concern. 2 He then identifies this tension as one of the motives of 
trinitarianism: 
The trinitarian problem is the problem of the unity between ultimacy and 
concreteness in the living God. 3 
This is illustrated by an interesting example drawn from Tillich's 
understanding of Hindu tradition - the relation between the god Brahma 
and the principle of brahman. 
The former is a personalised deity, traditionally associated with the 
anthropomorphically conceived gods Shiva and Vishnu in the triad 
known as the trimürti, sometimes called the `Hindu trinity'; the latter is 
the impersonal form of the ultimate principle of the universe, which 
Tillich here refers to as the `divine substance'. 4 Tillich cites the relation 
of these two as being within the terms of his system a trinitarian issue: 
I ST1, p251. 
2 Ibid., pp218-230. 
3 Ibid., p228. 
4 From the same Sanskrit root brahm-, Brahma is a masculine form, bralnnan a neuter. On the 
trimürti, cf further below, pp3 35ff. 
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The question of the ontological standing of Brahma and the others in relation to 
Brahman, the principle of being-itself, is a genuine trinitarian question, analogous 
to the Origenistic question of the ontological standing of the Logos and the Spirit 
in relation to the abyss of the divine nature. ' 
This is a genuine attempt to relate the categories of divinity used in a 
different faith to Christian Trinitarian thinking - Tillich is seeking to 
establish some kind of correspondence between two quite different 
religious contexts. It is also important, though, to note what he does not 
attempt to do: namely, he shows no interest in either correlating or 
contrasting the three Persons of the Christian Trinity with the gods of the 
trimürti. In fact, though he recognises the `triad' which Brahma forms 
with Vishnu and Shiva, he explicitly denies any particular importance to 
this enumeration: 
Here again the number three is not important. 
The `again' of this sentence refers back to a slightly earlier denial of any 
`specific significance' to the number three in the case of the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity. 3 That is to say, Tillich's drawing of trinitarian 
parallels sits quite loosely to potentially important features of the content 
of the religious doctrines he is discussing, in this case the number of 
divine Persons or gods. As he says elsewhere: 
It is not the number "three" which is decisive in trinitarian thinking but the unity in 
a manifoldness of divine self-manifestations. 4 
We have earlier seen a similar lack of interest in another key dimension 
of the traditional content of Christian Trinitarian doctrine, namely the 
principle of mutual equality among the divine Persons. 5 It is important to 
notice that Tillich's disregard for both these trinitarian problems 
(threeness and equality) applies equally to Christianity and to other 
religious contexts. 
' ST1, p229. Cf also above, p17n2. 
2 Ibid., p229. 
3 Ibid., p228. 
ST3, p312. 
5 Cf above, p14. 
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(c) Generic and proper in Christology and Trinity 
When he introduces his third trinitarian factor - the specific recognition of 
the appearance of the Logos in the revelation to which Christian faith 
bears witness - Tillich is again concerned to make space for recognition 
of other patterns of divine self-manifestation also. He seeks to do this by 
introducing a `sharp distinction between the eternal Logos and its 
manifestation in the history of Jesus of Nazareth' 1-a distinction which is 
made possible by his `two-stage' approach to trinitarian doctrine: 
One cannot attribute to the eternal Logos in himself the face of Jesus of Nazareth 
or the face of "historical man" or of any particular manifestation of the creative 
ground of being. But certainly, the face of God manifest for historical man is the 
face of Jesus as the Christ. The trinitarian manifestation of the divine ground is 
Christocentric for man, but it is not Jesu-centric in itself. The God who is seen and 
adored in trinitarian symbolism has not lost his freedom to manifest himself for 
other worlds in other ways. 2 
Three points must be noted about this important passage. First, the 
distinction between `Jesu-centric' and `Christocentric' points to a wider 
generic interpretation of the title `Christ' in contrast to the proper name 
'Jesus'. While Tillich repeatedly speaks of the `appearance of Jesus as the 
Christ', 3 and the christological sections of the Systematic Theology 
identify this as having happened once only in human history, 4 his system 
does at this point appear to leave space for other christophanies. 
Second, Lai claims to detect an ambiguity in Tillich's phrase `historical 
man'. Whereas, he says, this could have the rather vacuous meaning of 
`human with a history' (from birth through life to death), it could also 
mean `human being with historical consciousness'. In the latter sense, it 
is possible to imagine `non-historical human beings', and in particular 
humans with non-historical views of revelation (such as the `religions of 
I Lai, p157. 
2 ST3, pp308-9. 
3 `The Christ' means in Tillich's system `the bearer of the New Being' (e. g. ST2, pl 12). 
4 E. g. ST2, pp115f. 
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the East'). Tillich might then appear to be opening up the possibility of a 
`non-historical revelation' to such people; but this is not clear. ' 
Third, while Tillich's distinction in itself implies the possibility of other 
manifestations of the Logos, he does not develop this point here; rather, 
as in the lecture on Schleiermacher quoted above, 2 it is the possibility of 
spiritual beings in `other worlds' which appears to be exercising him. Yet 
it is not clear what Tillich's final sentence means in this case. If the 
`trinitarian symbolism' which does not exhaust God's reality means the 
specifically Christian doctrine of Trinity, then the existence of some kind 
of trinitarian pattern still coheres with the first of Tillich's `two stages'. 
A more natural reading of the sentence, though, suggests that for Tillich 
no form of trinitarianism whatever need be a feature of the divine reality 
`for other worlds' : the `trinitarian manifestation' is only valid for 
`historical man'. This raises in acute form the question of that relation 
between the `economic' and the `immanent' in Tillich's account of the 
Trinity on which we have touched previously. 3 For it implies that in such 
a context even the `economic' Trinity might be absent: any plurality 
immanent in the divine would thereby be excluded. 
(d) Trinitarianism in inter faith encounter 
Tillich uses his `trinitarian principles' not only as an interpretative 
framework, but also for guidance in inter-religious encounter. The 
practical import of the principles for religion is clearly spelt out as 
follows: 
If the abysmal character of the divine life is neglected, a rationalistic deism 
transforms revelation into information. If the logical character of the divine life is 
neglected, an irrationalistic theism transforms revelation into heteronomous 
I Lai, pp 158-9. Lai is here reading too much into Tillich's phrase, which in any case is put in inverted 
commas in the original, and probably just means `human being as found in history'. 
2 Cf above, p16. 
3 Cf above, p12. 
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subjection. If the spiritual character of the divine life is neglected, a history of 
revelation is impossible. ' 
As the principles Tillich here uses are those shown by analysis of the 
divine life in any revelation, 2 these warnings apply not just to Christianity 
but to any faith; we may expect them to apply with all the more force to 
those engaged in inter-faith meeting. This point is interestingly developed 
by Lai's suggestion that the `abysmal' and `logical' characters correspond 
respectively to the shared awareness of divine mystery and the rational 
communication in dialogue which mark authentic inter-faith encounter. 3 
For Tillich, `history of revelation' here refers to the continuing context 
within which the decisive revelation of Christ must be situated: the 
history of revelation is not simply to be equated with the history of 
religion, but the latter is an arena within which the former is enacted. 4 
This history of religion, universal in scope, 5 is part of the spiritual aspect 
of trinitarianism. 
Thus the Spirit in Tillich's trinitarianism can be identified as the principle 
which makes inter-faith dialogue possible, the means by which the 
revelation in Jesus Christ is located within a history of revelation. Tillich 
developed this theme in his last public lecture6 - tracing the `spiritual 
principle' of a tradition's theological development through its relation to 
that which lies beyond its particular revelation, he argued that each faith 
could in this way express itself more fully through dialogue: 
It is possible to argue that the doctrine of the Trinity provides not only a 
theological basis for inter-religious dialogue, but also a theological basis for a 
world theology. ' 
I STI, p157. 
2 Cf above, p13. 
3 Lai, pp160-162. 
4 ST1, p138. 
Ibid., p138. 
6 Tillich, `The Future of Religions' (1966), summarised by Lai, p163. 
Lai, p163. 
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3 Trinitarian resources: Raimundo Panikkar 
(a) Forms of spirituality 
Panikkar's account of the Trinity in a multi-faith context is prefaced by a 
threefold classification of human religious experience into three `forms of 
spirituality', which he names as iconolatry, personalism, and mysticism 
respectively. He explains the significance of this categorisation as 
follows: 
Let us start by defining any given spirituality, pragmatically and even 
phenomenologically, as being one typical way of handling the human condition. 
Next let us put this in more religious terms by saying that it represents man's basic 
attitude vis-4-vis his ultimate end. ' 
This may seem reminiscent of Tillich's language of `ultimate concern'; 
Panikkar in fact certainly follows the latter in linking ontology 
indissolubly with human experience. While as a Catholic theologian he 
formally acknowledges the distinction of `economic' and `immanent' 
dimensions in. Trinitarian doctrine, he makes it clear that his interest lies 
in the latter: 
The doctrine of the Trinity, in point of fact, is not there for the sake of satisfying. 
our curiosity about the `immanent' Trinity as an internal affair of the Divinity (ad 
intra) alone. It connects the immanent mystery with the `economic' God (ad 
extra), in which the destiny of the whole world is at stake. 
This can only be understood against Panikkar's overall vision of reality, 
which he describes as `cosmotheandrism' - 
To put it simply, that: 
There is no God without Man and the World. 
There is no Man without God and the World. 
There is no World without God and Man. 
In such a vision, it is hard to see how any level or depth of divinity can be 
isolated as the locus of immanent, rather than economic, plurality. 4 
' TREM, p9. 
2 TREM Prefacea pxii. ii. 
3a 
Allstrand, p134. 
TREM, Preface, pxiii, accordingly suggests that the Trinity shows that `God' is a name `designing 
[sic] a function of power and not an ontological attribute' (nomen potestatis non proprietatis). 
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Like Tillich's also, Panikkar's discernment of trinitarian patterns in 
religious experience is in principle universal in its scope; for him, the 
Trinity expresses an `intuition of the threefold structure of reality" as 
such, and so cannot be restricted to or possessed by Christianity alone. 
Indeed, the threefold traces of the Trinity are by no means restricted even 
to the world of religions - Panikkar sees a `triadic oneness existing on all 
levels of consciousness and reality', and cites as an evidence of this the 
alleged fact that `no known language' lacks the pronominal forms `I, 
Thou, He/She/It'. 2 Panikkar is wrong in the specific example he chooses, 3 
but his argument is important in showing how strongly he endorses the 
idea of the vestigia trinitatis which Barth had repudiated. 4 So trinitarian 
plurality is certainly a characteristic recognised by Panikkar in a very 
general context; we must consider later the problem posed by the relation 
between such general structures and the specifically Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity. 
Although they are to be found among all religions, Panikkar identifies the 
three `forms of spirituality' as particularly clearly exemplified in certain 
different traditions. The first, `iconolatry', the adoption of a controlling 
image which is understood as directing human life, is described as the 
characteristic religious attitude of Israel. 5 Panikkar's second genre of 
spirituality, the `personalism' which orientates the human personality in 
I TREM, Preface, pxi. 
2 Ibid., pxiv. 
3 E. g. Harre, pp85-89, discusses Inuit languages which separate pronominal roles only in terms of 
location relative to the speaker - `over there' or `over here' - rather than as the three personal forms 
Panikkar has in mind. As D Brown, p105, points out, the Inuit evidence raises interesting questions 
for Trinitarian theology in terms of the overall understanding of personal differentiation, as well as 
specifically in terms of the distinction of the second and third persons. 
Above, p3. Cousins, p 148, traces this tradition in Panikkar back through Bonaventure to Augustine. 
TREM, p11. Panikkar sees this, paradoxically, as confirmed by the consistent warnings against 
idolatry in the Old Testament - what was at stake here, he insists, was the question of which image 
was to be the controlling one: `Rivalry does not come into existence except between realities of the 
same order' (ibid., p12). Though Islam is not a prominent theme in Panikkar's writings, he 
generally identifies Muslim spirituality as being of this form also - e. g. TREM, p18. 
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love towards a divine person, he sees as developed pre-eminently within 
the Christian consciousness. ' 
Yet it is the third spiritual category, `mysticism', which he sees as in 
some sense penetrating furthest into the mystery of being, for this is the 
approach which takes seriously the understanding of `divine 
immanence', 2 seeking to find God through all beings beyond any 
distinctions of affirmation and denial; and Panikkar clearly indicates the 
Hindu affinities of this type of spirituality through the preferred name by 
which he identifies it: advaita, i. e. `non-dualism' .3. 
Panikkar's general approach ostensibly differs from Tillich in attempting 
in this way to ground his tripartite classification in observation of the 
actual patterns of recorded human spirituality. Whereas Tillich 
acknowledged that his `trinitarian principles' were derived by deductive 
analysis of the idea of God as `living', Panikkar asserts that his `schema' 
is generated inductively from the data of religious experience: 
[It] does not proceed from an a priori construction but emerges from an empirical 
assessment of the situation. 4 
But this is in fact disputable. Rowan Williams,. for example, draws 
attention to the way in which Panikkar takes for granted the developed 
structures of Trinitarian theology, particularly in its Augustinian and 
scholastic formulations, without exploring too closely the origins of those 
structures in actual religious experience. ' 
TREM, p21. Panikkar acknowledges, however, that a strong tradition of `iconolatry' also survives 
in Christianity, as part of its Semitic inheritance - it is, he suggests, `an iconology merely purified 
and corrected by the personalism to which the evolution of the western world has given rise' (ibid., 
p25). 
2 `Immanence' here refers, of course, to the immanence of the divine within the world, rather than to 
any immanence of plurality within the divine. 
3 TREM, pp29ff. Panikkar identifies advaita as `the central message of the Upanisads interpreted in 
their fullness (sensus plenior)' (ibid, p36); he seeks, though, to distinguish this from monism: 
`What advaita maintains is that God and the world are not either one thing or two different things, 
in short, neither one nor two: an-eka, a-dvaita' (ibid, p37). 
4 TREK p9. 
5 Williams (1990), p6. 
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From another angle, it is interesting that Panikkar aligns the three `forms 
of spirituality' of his classification with the classical Indian exposition of 
three marga or `ways' leading to salvation: thus iconolatry, personalism, 
and advaita are respectively equated to the marga of karma ('action'), 
bhakti ('devotion'), and jnana (`knowledge'). ' Panikkar describes this 
correlation as a `parallelism', 2 but does not further expound its overall 
significance. The precision of these alignments suggests that his 
trinitarianism is, like Tillich's, built on the systematic integration of 
patterns of religion into prior triadic structures which are reflective of the 
way reality necessarily has to be, rather than just empirically observable 
contingencies. In the relating of these structures to the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity, Panikkar's approach again shows a number of resonances 
with Tillich's; we may pick out three themes as particularly significant. 
(b) The christic dimension - universal and particular 
Firstly, though not as explicitly stated as Tillich's, Panikkar's 
trinitarianism could also be described as a `two-stage approach'. 3 Thus, 
insisting that the trinitarian mystery is to be found, differently expressed, 
in other faiths also, he relates this to his tripartite analysis of spiritualities: 
The Trinity, then, may be considered as a junction where the authentic spiritual 
dimensions of all religions meet. ' 
But there is an obvious objection to this: either such a reformulated 
trinitarianism will be unrecognisable as traditional Christianity; or it will 
be of no use in a multi-faith context since its terms are so closely bound 
up with a Christian background. Panikkar makes a double response: 
The principle of the three ways finds its most influential expression in the Bhagavad Gita, which 
uses the more philosophical term yoga rather than marga. While the Gita's 3rd and 4th chapters are 
entitled, respectively, karmayoga and jnanayoga, the discussion of bhaktiyoga is saved until the 
twelfth discourse, immediately following the revelation of Krishna's cosmic form. This reflects the 
devotional emphasis of this scripture: unlike Panikkar, who tends to emphasise jnanamarga as the 
ultimate form of spirituality, the Gita teaches the superiority of bhakti - e. g. 12.1-5. 2 TREM, p16. 
3 Cf above, p16. 
4 TREM, p42. 
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In the first place, there is, despite the developing or deepening that takes place, a 
very real continuity between the theory of the Trinity that I outline below and 
christian doctrine. In the second place, I am convinced that the meeting of religions 
cannot take place on neutral territory, in a `no man's land' ... 
It can take place only 
at the very heart of the religious traditions. ' 
Thus, on one hand, it is important for Panikkar that his trinitarianism is 
genuinely universal in scope; on the other, he recognises that it must grow 
from the heart of Christian tradition and remain in `continuity' with that 
tradition. Now, as he maps out his trinitarian thought in correlation with 
the tripartite classification of spirituality, Panikkar sees the development 
of `personalism' as corresponding to the emergence of `the Son', the 
personal God of theism, from `the Father', the unnameable and absolute 
source of being. 2 Indeed, he exclusively associates `personality' in the 
Trinity with this emergence: 
Only the Son is Person, if we use the word in its eminent sense and analogically to 
human persons: neither the Father nor the Spirit is a Person. 3 
There seems to be an awkwardness in Panikkar's thought here, in that in 
this section he refers to the spirituality corresponding to `the Father' as 
one of deep apophatism, 4 and associates `iconolatry' with the emergence 
of this `christic', personalised dimension of divinity, whereas his initial 
scheme would lead one to expect iconolatry to be linked to the Father. It 
may be that for Panikkar `iconolatry' means the spirituality which regards 
a personalised account of divinity as being the ultimate form of the 
Absolute, rather than itself a pointer to something beyond. 5 This would 
then cohere with his understanding of a `person' as always being such `in 
a constitutive relation, a pros ti-)6 so that the Son as Person introduces 
personality into the whole of the Trinity. However, we must also 
I TREM, p43. 
2 Ibid., pp5lff 3 Ibid., p52. 
Ibid, p48. 
5 I. e., rather than recognising the iconic character of personality - this at least would explain his 
allocation of `Jahweh, Allah, and so on' to this level (TREM, p54). 
6 Ibid., p54. Ahistrand, p150, correlates Panikkar's view here with his inheritance from Madhyamika 
Buddhism of the logic of pratityasamutpada, `radical relativity'. 
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recognise that Panikkar is at this point strongly influenced by the Hindu- 
Christian Trinitarian theology of his mentor Abhishiktananda, ' who had 
written: 
In the procession of the Son, God gives himself a name and makes himself known. 
In the second [procession, of the Spirit], he reveals himself as unknowable. The 
first procession is a manifestation. The second, beyond all manifestation, attains to 
that in God which is not and never could be manifested. 2 
There is a clear sense here that it is the `second procession', and so the 
Trinitarian dynamic of the Spirit, which is ultimate; the corollary of this 
is, that personality is only partly constitutive of the Trinitarian mystery. 
Even in this limited way, though, the (second) Trinitarian Person is 
unambiguously recognised by Panikkar as the object of all personalist 
spirituality. We could then expect him to redefine the word `Son' in such 
a way that it could accommodate the tension of the particularly Christian 
with the universally pan-religious; but in fact he prefers to identify these 
two levels of reference within the expression `the Christ', explaining that: 
Christ is an ambiguous term. It can be the greek translation of the hebrew Messiah, 
or it may be the name given to Jesus of Nazareth. One may identify it with the 
Logos or equate it with Jesus. 3 
Panikkar makes the tentative suggestion that alternatively the formula 
`Lord' could less ambiguously be employed to refer to this principle, but 
he does not further develop this usage. Instead, he insists that in 
continuing to speak, without either `polemic or apologetic', of Christ as 
the divine figure enabling a spirituality of personalism he is not claiming 
a Christian monopoly on this: while Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the 
Christ cannot be simply identified with Jesus of Nazareth. 
, 'Abhishiktananda' was the Indian religious name chosen by the French monk Henri le Saux, to 
whom TREM is dedicated. On Abhishiktananda's Trinitarian theology, cf below, p333. 2 Abhishiktananda, p88. Ahlstrand, p147n17, also quotes from Abhishiktananda's diary the striking 
parallel to Panikkar: `Il n'y a qu'une Personne ä vrai dire dann la Trinitd, c'est le Christ, le 
Purusha'. 
3 TREM, p53. 
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The parallels of this approach with Tillich's `two-stage' trinitarianism, 
and with his distinction of `Logos' and `Jesus', are apparent in the 
proposal Panikkar here makes of multiple christophanies. l He goes 
further than Tillich, though, in widening the meaning of 'Christ': while in 
the Systematic Theology this always has a salvific connotation ('bearer of 
the New Being') Panikkar expands his `christic' dimension to encompass 
all that mediates between the abyss of the Father's divinity and the 
contingency of the world: 
Even by definition the unique link between the created and the uncreated, the 
relative and the absolute, the temporal and the eternal, earth and heaven, is Christ, 
the only mediator. Between these two poles everything that functions as mediator, 
link, `conveyor', is Christ 
... 
2 
We see here indications of an enlargement, from the salvific sphere to the 
cosmological, of the scope of that christic principle which is, in 
Panikkar's system, the main generator of trinitarian diversity. 
Nevertheless, the principal motive leading his theology to engage with the 
mystery of the `emergence' of this principle remains `salvation' in its 
broadest sense: `the Christ' as a focus of spirituality appears within the 
context of a personal quest for relationship with the divine; the three 
marga by which Panikkar orientates his work are, in their Hindu context 
of origin, soteriological categories; and the salvific process reaches its 
culmination for him in the third stage, the advaita realisation of union 
with the immanent God, which Panikkar interprets by the symbol of the 
Spirit. 
(c) Non-differentiation in the ultimacy of the Spirit 
Panikkar's language in describing the Spirit is particularly difficult, and 
he himself acknowledges this to be the case: as the Spirit is the dimension 
of total divine immanence, it is impossible to speak of this reality with 
' Cf above, p20. 
2 TREM, p53. 
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any clarity. In this sense the spiritualities of total immanence and of total 
transcendence must be marked by the same reticence: 
Transcendence ceases to be when it reveals itself: immanence is incapable of 
revealing itself, for that would be a pure contradiction of terms; an immanence 
which needs to manifest itself, to reveal itself, is no longer immanence. Hence the 
extreme difficulty of using all these categories outside their own terms of 
reference. Therefore I am using here the language appropriate to meditation, such 
as springs from the intelligence by a contemplative affinity. ' 
This faith in the immanent Spirit, beyond formulation and most 
appropriately marked by the silence which advaita teaches beyond every 
distinction, 2 is thus a spirituality contiguous with the apophatism 
appropriate to the pure transcendence of `the Father'. 3 In this contiguity is 
embraced the overall cyclic structure of Panikkar's trinitarianism: 
For the Father the Spirit is, as it were, the return to the source that he is himself... It 
is what christian theologians used to call the perichoresis or circumincessio, the 
dynamic inner circularity of the Trinity. 4 
Against such a background, it is clear that the Spirit, as the `Return to 
Being', 5 must be in some sense the ultimate category in Panikkar's 
theology. He does indeed insist that it is essential for authentic spirituality 
that the proper trinitarian balance between the different divine dimensions 
should be maintained; nevertheless, he also clearly states: 
When one seeks to plumb the final secret of God, one finds that at the deepest level 
of the Divinity what there is is the Spirit. 6 
This recognition of the Spirit as the ultimate category might be thought 
reminiscent of Tillich, and Panikkar does in fact at one point describe the 
dimension of the divine immanence in Tillichian terms as `the final 
' foundation, the Ground of Being as well as of beings' . However, while 
' TREM, P59. 
2 Ibid., p65. Cf also p63: `Indeed what is the Spirit but the atman of the Upanisads, which is said to 
be identical with brahman... ' 
3A certain dialectical quality is introduced to Panikkar's theology at this point in that the Father is 
associated both with apophatism (which, when viewed within the whole trinitarian scheme, is also 
characteristic of the Spirit) and with `iconolatry' - cf above, p27n2. 4 TREM, p60. 
5 Ibid., p68 - where Panikkar also refers to the Spirit as the `Ocean of Being'. 6 Ibid., p60. 
TREM, p59. 
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Tillich interpreted divine `spirit' through the analysis of God as `living', 
and therefore as diverse, ' Panikkar's point is rather that the Spirit is the 
aspect of divinity which goes beyond and behind all distinction. Indeed, 
his whole trinitarian vision, a circle emerging from and returning into the 
apophasis of mystery, emphasises the unfolding of the divine unity rather 
than any presentation of the divine diversity. 
Consonant with this dynamic emphasis is Panikkar's reluctance to speak 
of the divine persons as in any way a denumerable ensemble of realities 
related to one another in a recognisable pattern: 
Neither the plurality nor, consequently, the equality is real. In the Absolute there is 
no plurality, no multiplicity, nothing which, multiplied or added, could be three 
('He who starts to number starts to err', St Augustine says). For the same reason 
there is nothing in the Absolute that could be called equal or unequal. 2 
Thus, the ultimacy and dynamism of the category of `Spirit' in Panikkar's 
theology lead him to invalidate the distinctive trinitarian patterns of both 
threeness and equality, whether in the Christian or in any other context. 
(d) Transparency and opaqueness in trinitarian dialogue 
Panikkar states in his `Preface' to The Trinity and the Religious 
Experience of Man that he writes in the hope that: 
The deepening into the trinitarian structure of religious experience and of human 
beliefs may here again offer a possibility of fecundation, agreement and 
collaboration not only among religions themselves, but also with modern man at 
large, so often torn apart by religious subtleties which he does not understand. 
The furtherance of interreligious encounter, then, was clearly one of his 
principle motives in producing this exploration of the Trinity. in 1973; 
moreover, the book reflects his own personal history as a Catholic 
theologian profoundly immersed in the thought world of Hindu advaita. 
' Cf above, p13. 
2 TREM, p45. The quotation from Augustine: 'Qui incipit numerare incipit errare' is repeated by 
Panikkar in his 1987 essay The Jordan, the Tiber, and the Ganges (see below), though there to 
support rather the christological application of advaita: `The saving power - which Christians call 
Christ - is neither one nor many' (JTG, pl 11). 3 TREM, `Preface', pxiv. 
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Yet the discussion itself at this stage remains largely a survey of the 
theology (or spirituality) of religions; it is in his contribution to the 1987 
collection The Myth of Christian Uniqueness that we find more developed 
reflections on the practical application of his trinitarian patterns to inter- 
faith dialogue. 
The general aim of the 1987 collection was to propose `a pluralistic 
theology of religions'; the editors, describing this as a `paradigm shift' 
equivalent to the `crossing of a theological Rubicon', offered three 
`bridges' to make the journey `from the shores of exclusivism or 
inclusivism to pluralism'. ' Not surprisingly, Panikkar's essay, entitled 
The Jordan, the Tiber and the Ganges: Three Kairological Moments of 
Christic Self-Consciousness, formed part of the second section - `The 
Theologico-Mystical Bridge: Mystery '. 2 However, a critic was quick to 
point out that the `pluralism' advocated by Panikkar was very different 
from that propounded by his fellow essayists - specifically, that his was a 
pluralism grounded in a trinitarian ontology. 3 
Building on the methods formulated in his earlier book, Panikkar's essay 
develops this ontology in terms of the relation of the second and third 
dimensions of the Trinity, for which he here uses the terms `Logos' and 
`(free) Being' respectively. In a key passage, he restates his doctrine of 
the ultimacy of Spirit within the cyclic dynamism of trinitarian life: 
Being is not exhausted in its image. If the Logos is the transparency of Being, the 
Spirit is, paradoxically, its opaqueness. The Spirit is freedom, the freedom of Being 
to be what it is. And this is, a priori as it were, unforeseeable by the Logos. The 
Logos accompanies Being; it does not precede it; it does not pre-dict what Being 
is. It tells only what Being is. But the is of Being is free. The mystery of the Trinity 
is the ultimate foundation for pluralism. 4 
' Paul Knitter, `Preface', pvii-ix, in Hick & Knitter. 
2 Panikkar, JTG, in Hick & Knitter, pp89-116. 
3 `A quite different variety of religious pluralism from that shown in the rest of the book' - Williams 
(1990), p3. 
4 JTG, p109. 
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The final sentence signals Panikkar's intention to build on this trinitanian 
ontology his paradigm for inter-faith encounter: the `non-exhaustion' of 
Being in the transparency of the Logos means that the total intelligibility 
of God is not an achievable goal in dialogue, the `freedom' of Being in 
the opaqueness of the Spirit means that space must be made for 
acceptance of a plurality of truths. 
Following his advaitin train of thought, Panikkar therefore insists that it is 
equally wrong to affirm that truth is one or that it is many. A trinitarian 
pluralism will indeed acknowledge the quest for mutual transparency 
(dimension of the Logos), but equally it will insist on the apophatic 
limitations of such a quest (dimension of the Spirit): 
Pluralism does not shun intelligibility. The pluralist attitude tries to reach 
intelligibility as much as possible, but it does not need the idea of a total 
intelligibility of the real. It "knows" that we have to stop somewhere lest we 
corrode Being (the "originality" or independence of Being) by reducing it to (self-) 
intelligibility. 1 
This grounding of religious encounter in the tension of Logos and Spirit 
means, on one hand, that Panikkar can speak of the `christic principle' as 
a dimension potentially present in any tradition, on the other, that 
freedom is also reserved for `incommensurability' between different 
religions. These two poles of encounter are held together in a trinitarian 
dynamism: 
This very incommensurability ... 
does not preclude the fact that each religion may 
be a dimension of the other in a kind of trinitarian perichoresis or circumincessio. 2 
Panikkar's approach here is reminiscent of Lai's interpretation of 
Tillich's trinitarianism, in which the role of the Spirit is similarly 
emphasised as the principle which makes space for the other in its 
otherness. 
1 Ibid., p110. 
2 Ibid., p112. 
TRINITY 34 
1-4 
4 Trinity and Plurality 
(a) Trinitarian resources and problems for inter faith dialogue 
For both Tillich and Panikkar, trinitarian doctrine is a resource for 
Christians in a multi-faith context in two ways. Firstly, it provides a 
conceptual map which helps them to understand the diversity of the 
world's religious scene. Secondly, it gives guidance to them as they 
engage in inter-religious encounter. 
Both these points are being taken up with enthusiasm by many involved 
in inter-faith dialogue today. For example, we noted above the influence 
of the thought of Gavin D'Costa on the Church of England Doctrine 
Commission's recent report. ' Of the explanatory role of Trinitarianism 
for a theology of religions, D'Costa writes: 
The Trinitarian theology of Christianity helps to explain why the presence of 
God's Spirit in other religions is the presence of Christ. 
Of the stance to be adopted in dialogue by those following a Trinitarian 
approach, he declares: 
In reconciling this polarity [between exclusivism and pluralism], such an approach 
commends itself in its committed openness regarding the world religions. 3 
As these words show, D'Costa writes consciously as a Christian 
theologian for Christians - and, moreover, as one holding to an 
`inclusivist' position. 4 Yet we have seen that both Tillich and Panikkar 
further suggest that trinitarianism is in principle a resource available to 
people of other faith backgrounds also, so that it can form the basis for a 
`world theology' and for a world-wide dialogue. 5 
I Above, p2. 
2 D'Costa (1986), p135. 
3 D'Costa (1990), p26. 
D'Costa (1986), p117: `An inclusivist approach to other religions provides the most satisfactory 
Christian theology of religions'. 
5 Above, pp22,33. 
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We can sense different emphases in the ways our two authors see this 
resource. First, while Panikkar's tracing of trinitarian patterns is 
integrated with his classification of `types of spirituality' in a timeless 
scheme, Tillich is rather concerned to relate the dialectical unfolding of 
his `trinitarian principles' to the appearance of `New Being' in human 
history. 
These contrasting attitudes to history can in turn be related to the two 
theologians' respective backgrounds of involvement with other systems 
of faith and thought. Panikkar moves with ease among the categories of 
an advaitin `monadism' 1 which coexists happily with a multiplicity of 
Hindu cults. Tillich shows, in his typology of the history of religions in 
particular, the influence of a western evolutionary account in which 
monotheism is seen as a higher stage of development than polytheism. 
The two religious types of `monadism' and monotheism will provide the 
contexts in which we shall explore historical uses of trinitarianism as a 
resource for dialogue. 2 This exploration will refer to the `trinitarian 
problems' (plurality, personality, threeness, equality, necessity, and 
immanence) identified above. 3 
In now preparing for this task by evaluating the achievements of Tillich 
and Panikkar, we shall therefore relate these six problems, two by two, to 
three themes which we have identified as of paramount importance in 
both writers: first, their acknowledgement of the universal occurrence of 
trinitarian patterns; second, their emphasis on the category of `spirit' as 
basic to those patterns; and third, their restriction on the recognition of 
trinitarian diversity to the `economic' dimension of interaction with the 
divine. 
' For the meaning of `monadism' and its distinction from `monism', cf below, p66. 
2 See further below, pp61-66. 
3 Above, pp9f. 
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(b) Plurality and personality 
For Tillich and Panikkar alike, trinitarianism can be traced throughout 
human experience of the divine. Tillich sees trinitarian principles as 
implicit in the analysis of God as `living'; Panikkar maintains that 
trinitarianism is a way of co-ordinating the diversity of forms of 
spirituality; both repudiate any restriction of trinitarian doctrine to the 
domain of Christian faith. It is this universal occurrence of trinitarian 
patterns that supports the universal application of trinitarian methods as 
an interpretative and dialogical guide: the usefulness of the trinity as a 
resource derives from its unrestricted occurrence. 
Some clarification of the word `plurality' is in order here, for there are 
two distinct senses in which it is used of non-Christian accounts of the 
divine. 
The first, and less significant, sense follows from the fact of religious 
plurality: that Christians, Hindus, Muslims, and others all make differing 
claims about God might be taken to point to a plurality of aspects of the 
divine life. It is this sense of `plurality' which is assumed in most 
Christian writing on Trinitarian theology of religions. ' 
But a second and more important sense of `plurality' is that which is 
recognised in the divine within the understanding of one particular faith. 
It is in this sense, for example, that Tillich describes the relation of 
Brahman to brahma as a `genuine trinitarian question'. This is the sense 
of plurality we consider in more detail later. In both `monadism' and 
monotheism, such plurality may be explicitly negated; yet we shall seek 
to identify themes in both these contexts that convincingly resonate with 
the trinitarian acknowledgement of diversity in God. 
1 Cf e. g. the title of D'Costa's 1990 contribution: `Christ, the Trinity and Religious Plurality'. 
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To enable their recognition of trinitarian patterns beyond Christianity, 
Tillich and Panikkar have to abstract to some extent from the specifically 
christological grounding of the historical Christian doctrine of the Trinity. 
In tracing trinitarian motifs in non-Christian contexts, they are bracketing 
the specificity of the event of Jesus of Nazareth in the way suggested in 
our introduction above; that is to say, they are engaging in discussion of a 
pure `trinitarian' problem in the sense we there defined. ' As they also 
have a concern to maintain a continuity between their universal 
formulations of trinitarianism and traditional Christian doctrine, it is 
understandable both that their accounts should be characterised by a 
certain tension between the particular and the general and that this tension 
should be felt most acutely in their interpretation of the second trinitarian 
principle or Person. Thus, while for Tillich and Panikkar alike the first 
and third trinitarian categories (respectively, Father as `abysmal 
principle' or `absoluteness of Being', and Spirit as `spiritual principle' or 
`freedom of Being') appear to be fairly easily recognised in different faith 
contexts, it is mainly within the second category (Son as `logical 
principle' or `transparency of Being') that the more difficult process of 
cross-faith correlation and comparison must be accommodated. 
We have seen how this leads Tillich to speak of a `two-stage' approach to 
Christology, and Panikkar to seek the occurrence of a `christic principle' 
beyond historic Christian faith. These approaches can be partly 
understood as consequences of the abstraction mentioned above of 
specifically christological concerns from more generally trinitarian 
problems. But they also pose a further question: given that the evolution 
of Trinitarian faith in its historical Christian context has primarily taken 
as its point of departure the salvific work of the Son, how far will salvific 
1 Cf above, p9. 
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concerns continue to remain those which govern the recognition of divine 
diversity in this more universal context? This is a question, not about the 
identification of the second trinitarian category with a specific historical 
person, but about the general kind of category this is before any specific 
identification is made. Both writers hint at a recognition that 
soteriological issues may not be the only way of understanding the 
unfolding of trinitarianism: in the former, the interplay of `absolute' and 
`concrete' suggests a principle of diversity built into the structure of 
human experience in general, while in the latter the `christic principle' is 
described in terms of any mediation of the one and the many. ' On the 
other hand, we have also seen that for both writers the language and logic 
of salvation still seem to play a privileged role above other categories 
such as the experiential or the cosmological. 2 
Yet it is important to realise that such hints of alternative Christian 
foundations of divine diversity relate to a long tradition of philosophical 
theology, and that they have potentially profound implications for our 
understanding of divine personality. For while in Christianity, salvation 
issues have ensured the personal status of the plurality acknowledged in 
God as Trinity, there have also been other strands of theological 
exploration of plurality apart from soteriological Trinitarianism - for 
example, in the West the question of the divine attributes and in the East 
that of the divine energies. We must therefore ask how these Christian 
instances of non-Trinitarian plurality relate both to the personalist 
plurality of the Christian Trinity and to (non-soteriological) accounts of 
plurality in other faiths. At the same time, we must inquire whether we 
can detect any implications of personality in those non-Christian accounts 
of plurality. 
1 Cf above, pp15,28f. 
2 Cf above, pp16,29. 
TRINITY 39 
1-4 
(c) Threeness and equality 
For both theologians, the most important category in the exposition of the 
Trinity is that of spirit. In Tillich, this is not only a `moment within the 
process of the divine life', but also an overall symbol of that life itself: ' 
spirit is the primary reality, the unfolding of which lies at the root of the 
divine differentiation into three principles or personae. In Panikkar, spirit 
is the ultimate dimension within which the `freedom of Being to be what 
it is' completes the return of the divine life to itself and so guarantees the 
irreducibility of the trinitarian differentiation. 2 
Both Tillich and Panikkar, as we have seen, develop this primacy or 
ultimacy of spirit in methodological terms to create space for a diversity 
of truths to be held together within inter-faith dialogue while remaining 
related to the integrity of the Christian tradition concentrated in the 
second Person. Their suggestions here have proved attractive and 
influential, for Christians have been in danger of being polarised between 
two positions. 3 
On one hand, there are those - generally labelled (by themselves or 
others) as either `exclusivists' or `inclusivists' - who have maintained a 
`Christocentric' theology, seeking to interpret other religions in terms of 
their relation to the figure of Christ: 
The normativeness of Christ must always be the implicit or explicit criterion when 
reflecting upon and evaluating the insights from other religions concerning the 
nature of God, the human person and the world. 4 
On the other hand, those describing themselves as `pluralists' have called 
for a `Copernican revolution', to allow for a theological vision of the 
religions of humanity revolving like so many planets around God: 
I Cf ST1, pp250f - p13 above. 2 Cf above, pp 30,32. 
3 Cf Schwöbel, p31, who calls for a Trinitarian mediation of this polarisation, though he is quite 
critical of Panikkar's particular development of trinitarianism in this context. 
4 D'Costa (1986), p132. 
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We have to realise that the universe of faiths centres upon God, and not upon 
Christianity or upon any other religion. He is the sun, the originative source of 
light and life, whom all the religions reflect in their own different ways. ' 
In such a context, Tillich's and Panikkar's trinitarianism could offer a 
welcome basis for dialogue avoiding the two polarities of 
`christomonism' and 'theomonism': 
The Trinitarian approach can affirm not only the universality of revelation or 
salvation but also the need for an attitude of openness. 2 
Yet, helpful as it is in providing a resource for inter-religious encounter, 
this kind of approach still leaves substantial theological questions to be 
answered about the account it offers of the divine life. The emphasis on 
spirit is intended in both writers to underline the dynamic character of 
that life in its trinitarian patterns: spirit is that which enables the 
unfolding of the divine reality into its interrelated moments or 
dimensions. Both stress this actual process of unfolding itself, rather than 
the ensemble of three dimensions or personae of which that process is the 
generator - the movement of differentiation, rather than the state of 
diversity. But then a logical next step surely must be for this diversity of 
an ensemble of three divine persons to become in turn itself a problem to 
be raised within inter-faith encounter: the dialectic of plurality and unity 
advocated as a methodological principle for dialogue will inevitably 
become part of the content of that dialogue. 
Tillich and Panikkar seem ill-prepared for such a development. For we 
have seen that their accounts sit quite loose to some of the things which 
orthodox Christians have wanted to affirm as significant truths about that 
ensemble; it is therefore hardly likely that they will be ready to go on to 
explore the possibility of parallels to those truths in other faith contexts. 
1 Hick (1980), p52. 
2 Lai, p43. 
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In particular, in both theologians we have observed a lack of interest in 
the enumeration of the divine persons as being precisely three, ' and in 
their mutual relations as being those of equality; 2 within their trinitarian 
theologies, neither of these issues is of intrinsic significance. 
We may expect that, as candidates for features of divine plurality to be 
examined in other faiths, threeness and equality will in fact fare rather 
differently the one from the other. On one hand, the vestigia tradition in 
Christian theology already suggests some instances of triplicity both in 
other faiths and in `natural religion', ' and this is likely to be 
supplemented by more recently encountered instances. The question here 
in another faith context is about the grounds for exactly three constituents 
of an ensemble of divine plurality to be identified as significant. 
On the other hand, equality is likely to prove much more elusive - at least, 
this is surely to be expected given the extreme problems that Christians 
themselves have experienced in maintaining the principle that: 
In this Trinity none is afore, or after another: none is greater, or less than another; 
But the whole three Persons are co-eternal together: and co-equal. 4 
Tillich and Panikkar, with their emphasis on the primacy of the Spirit, 
certainly do not appear to conform to this teaching; the traditional 
vestigia trinitatis are distinguished by their threefoldness rather than by 
their evidence of equality; `subordinationism' of one type or another has 
been a constant theme in Christian Trinitarian exposition. And in fact we 
shall see that attempts to relate that exposition to patterns of plurality in 
other faiths have tended to reinforce the difficulties experienced in 
maintaining a position of co-equality within the Trinitarian ensemble of 
plurality. 
t Cf above, pp19,31. 
2 Cf above, pp14,31. 
3 Above, pp3,24. 
Quicunque vult, the so-called `Creed of St Athanasius', as appointed for use `At Morning Prayer' in 
the Book of Common Prayer. 
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(d) Necessity and immanence 
We have seen pointers in both Tillich and Panikkar to the idea that the 
plurality discerned in God is a necessary feature of his life. ' It is 
important to clarify the meaning of `necessity' in this context. It certainly 
does not refer to the much-discussed question in the philosophy of 
religion of whether God is a `necessarily existent' being; nor does it even 
mean a strong sense that God has certain properties the absence of which 
would make the concept of his existence incoherent. 2 Rather, our use 
simply indicates a state (of plurality) which is the way God always has to 
be, rather than happening to have come about for some contingent reason. 
In fact, the necessity both writers see in trinitarian plurality is a necessity 
in terms of the distinctive generating features of their own theological 
systems - respectively, the dialectical unfolding of Being, and the 
spiritual dynamic of apophasis. Given these two methodologies, it is 
inconceivable to think of God as not being constituted in some way as 
trinity. 
In the same way, acknowledgements of the necessity of plurality in other 
faiths will surely be conditioned by their generative theological and 
philosophical approaches. For example, the triplicity of the trirnürti of 
Brahma, Visnu and Siva might at first appear to be an entirely contingent 
affair of the bringing together of three personalised forms of deity as a 
political compromise between their different sects of devotees, but we 
shall see that Hindu thought grounds their differentiation in a deep-seated 
3 theory of the threefoldness of divine attributes (triguna). So in general 
we may expect the respective boundaries of contingent and necessary 
divine plurality in our exploration to be heavily context-dependent. 
Above, pp13,26. 
2 Cf Swinburne, pp233ff. 
3 Cf below, p335ff. 
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A further distinction made in the tradition is that between the `immanent 
Trinity' and the `economic Trinity. ' The former refers to the inner life of 
the triune God independently of external issues, such as creation or 
salvation; the latter denotes the dispensation of the divine towards the 
world. The immanent Trinity is constituted by the `processions' of Spirit 
and Son from the Father and the substantive relations between the 
Persons so differentiated; the economic Trinity is manifested in the 
`missions' of Spirit and Son to creation and the relations these establish 
with creatures. ' 
The blurring or abolition of this distinction has been a consistent trend of 
modem theology; most influentially, Karl Rahner has insisted on the 
identity of the two. For him, this is guaranteed by the possibility of 
moving in either direction from one to the other. On one hand, he writes: 
The economic Trinity is not merely the means of gaining knowledge of the 
immanent Trinity, but is the same thing. 2 
In other words, the self-communication of God in the `economy' means 
that the presentation of divine diversity. ad extra is a real exposition of the 
diversity which constitutes God in se. On the other hand, Rahner contests 
the influence of the western axiom indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis ad extra3 
in isolating this inner diversity from its outward manifestation: 
Since St Augustine, the `immanent' Trinity has been so much to the fore in 
theological discussions of it, and the `economic' Trinity has been so obscured ... 
by 
the principle that all actions ad extra in God are common to all three persons or 
belong to God as one, that it is hard to see what Christian existence has to do with 
the Trinity in actual life .4 
On the contrary, he insists that the inner diversity of God is precisely that 
which is expressed outwardly in the economy. 
I Cf Rahner (1970), Sacramentum Mundi, p298. 
2 Ibid., p305. 
3 The formula became accepted in the Middle Ages as part of the corpus of Trinitarian faith - of 
Denzinger-Schönmetzer Nos. 491,531, etc (the seventh-century Councils of Toledo), and No. 3326 
(Leo M's encyclical Divinum illud munus of 1877). It derives from Augustine - De Trinitate 
1.4.7. 
4 Rahner (1970), p304. 
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Both Tillich and Panikkar share Rahner's concern to ground Trinitarian 
doctrine in the actual experience of the divine unfolding in the world - 
thus emphasising the importance of the economic Trinity. But we must 
question for two reasons whether they also share Rahner's balanced 
assertion of the two-way identity of the economic and the immanent. 
Firstly, we have seen that neither shows interest in God `in himself' 
rather, the Trinity has meaning only in relation to us. This implies, not an 
identity of the economic with the immanent, but a stress on the former to 
the exclusion of the latter. Secondly, both writers' prioritising of one 
trinitarian category (Spirit) above the others suggests that this category is 
the true reality of God, with the distinction of the other persons as 
secondary. A `reconstruction' of Trinitarian belief along these lines is in 
fact proposed by James Mackey, as a theory of economic 'binitarianism': 
The `Binity' would then consist of Jesus and his Father, and Spirit would name that 
one and the same divine being or essence. ' 
Mackey's suggestion, as it is arguably a logical development of Tillich 
and Panikkar, highlights a problem of their `trinitarianism' : namely, that 
the connection between their universal theology and the Christian Trinity 
seems too tenuous to justify application of the same term. On the other 
hand, `trinitarian' language also seems inadequate to establish a context 
for dialogue, as its Christian background appears to make it inaccessible 
to other faiths. What is needed, then, is some more general term, 
intimately linked to the Christian Trinity, but resonant with other 
understandings of God, to provide a conceptual framework within which 
trinitarian resources can be deployed and trinitarian problems discussed 
in dialogue. In the following section, we propose to this end the idea of 
divine 'plenitude'. 2 
1 Mackey, p246. 
2 Cf also Additional Note `A', `The "Principle of Plenitude" in Arthur Lovejoy's "Great Chain of 
Being"' - below, pp67ff. 
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S Divine plenitude 
(a) Divine plenitude in the New Testament 
In three significant passages in the New Testament, the word rr i rjpwpra 
(`fullness') is used to express the abundance of God's life which 
overflows to the created order through Christ. As this process in some 
way involves the replication of the Father's n-Arjpwpa in Christ, we can 
argue that the New Testament begins to establish an interpretation of 
plenitude implying a differentiation within the divine. Thus, first, the 
Gospel of John says of the incarnate Word: 
From his fullness (t'K Toü rraqpt Paros) we have all received, grace upon grace. ' 
The nArjpa pa here is predicated of Christ directly, rather than by 
derivation from the Father. However, John's statement follows the 
description of the Word's glory as being that `of the Father's only Son, 
full (rrarjprrs) of grace and truth', 2 so the idea of `plenitude' does in fact 
link Father and Son, while its communication to believers suggests the 
role of the Spirit also. 
Secondly, in Ephesians there is the prayer that the faithful may be `filled 
with all the fullness of God (iva rrATJpWOrjTE dc n- v rd iTArjpwpa roil 
Oeou-)' through the indwelling of Christ and the power of the Spirit. Here, 
the rrarjpagia is referred to God (the Father), but its communication is 
expressly linked to the other two members of the Trinity. ' 
Jn 1.16. The use of the preposition here is to be interpreted as partitive, i. e. meaning that the 
nrirjpwpa is in part transmitted to Christians. 
Z Jn 1.14 (to which the avroü of v16 refers back). Barrett, p166, rightly remarks that `potiroycvrfgand 
rrar4o are words too characteristic of the Johannine writings, and too theological in use, to permit 
us to render in general terms, "the glory as of a father's only son". The latter is the interpretation 
adopted by, e. g., NRSV. 
Eph 3.16-19. Elsewhere in this epistle, Paul refers to the trirjpwpa of Christ (Eph 1.23,4.10) in an 
active sense as being the one who `fills all', but the variant reading of 3.19 as irirfpwpa Toi 
Xpwo'roü (MS 18811 is undoubtedly erratic - Metzger, p604. 
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Thirdly, most significant of all are the verses referring to `plenitude' in 
Colossians. It is possible that Paul was writing to the church at Colossae 
against the background of an early variety of Gnosticism in which 
MAgpaua was some kind of technical term for an aspect of the deity; ' in 
any case, his theme of rrirfpwpawas to be adopted by later Gnostics such 
as Valentinus to express the theme of divine `fecundity'. 2 Paul twice 
asserts that the divine plenitude is fully presented in the Son: 
In him all the fullness (iräv rd nagpwua) [of God] was pleased to dwell. 3 
In him the whole fullness of deity (To W qp' wjra Toü BEörnrog) dwells bodily. 4 
We may make three observations about the concept of `plenitude' in 
these verses. Firstly, if Paul here is indeed engaging in dialogue with 
Gnostics, this shows an inter-faith context where plenitude language is 
accessible to those influenced by non-Christian thought. 5 Secondly, the 
replication of the Father's rrarjpwpa in the Son suggests that Valentinus 
was right in seeing a connection between the idea of fullness and that of 
divine variety: we can trace at this early stage an interpretation of 
plenitudinal language in terms of Trinitarian6 plurality. Thirdly, Paul 
intends the idea of fullness to express the very heart of divinity: Christ 
presents the rrirjpwlra of God in the sense that there is nothing else left in 
God. So this plenitudinal plurality refers to the immanent life of God, not 
merely to the 'economy'. 
Schweizer, pp125-135, suggests `Jewish Pythagoreanism' as the background to the Colossian 
nrirfpwpa. Dunn (1996), p100, challenges the commonly received view of a `proto-Gnostic' 
syncretistic teaching current in Colossae, though he acknowledges direct influence `from the 
undeveloped usage here to the much more developed language of Valentinian Gnosticism'. 
2 E. g. Gospel of Truth 16.33 - Layton, p253. The theme of `fecundity' was - through Origen's 
encounter with Valentinianism - to play an important part in the development of Trinitarian 
theology in the formulation of the idea of eternal generation: below, p146. 
3 Col 1.19. Though irarjpwpa is not here expressly attributed to God, the exact parallel with the next 
citation makes it certain that this was Paul's meaning. 
4 Col 2.9. 
5 We should also note 0cdTgs in Col 2.9. This is an hapax legomenon in the New Testament, but the 
variant Oeiörrlsoccurs at Rom 1.20, expressly in the context of `other faiths' (i. e., Greek religion). 
6 Or, at least, Binitarian plurality: the more properly Trinitarian themes develop from reflection on 
the communication of the irirjpwpa in turn through the Spirit from Christ to believers. 
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The scriptural range of `plenitude' can be further amplified through 
exploring cognate themes in the New Testament such as divine `richness' 
or All these serve to express a `generosity', ' `abundance', 2 and `glory'. 3 
reality which is rooted in the heart of God, which is fully and without 
remainder presented in Christ, and which is transmitted to believers (in 
some cases, with the Spirit explicitly identified as the agent of that 
transmission). This dynamic repeatedly leads the New Testament writers 
towards Binitarian or Trinitarian formulations, according to which the 
Son, as he is a locus of the same plenitudinal qualities as the Father, must 
be seen as in some way an ontological reproduction of the primal 
divinity. Particularly interesting is the Christology of Heb 1.3: 
He is the reflection of [God's] glory (drio. yaopa rnS 8drgg) and the exact 
imprint of His very being ( ctpox-rjp Tffq'ITOCTäaws) a 
Whereas the first phrase of this formula could be interpreted in a merely 
`economic' sense, the second part surely implies an ontological 
foundation to the appearance of divine plenitude in Christ - indeed, its 
vocabulary prefigures later patristic formulations of Trinitarian doctrine. 5 
The legitimacy or otherwise of those patristic formulations as accurate 
expressions of the diverse theological approaches to be found within the 
New Testament is a much-discussed question, but we cannot hope to 
summarise the issues here. Nor need we do so, since our concern is to 
explore the ways in which developed Trinitarian doctrine in Christian 
tradition relates to other faiths. Having established the scriptural roots of 
the idea of `plenitude', we must now clarify its role in that exploration. 
n-ioürog- e. g. Rom 10.12; 2 Cor 8.9; Eph 1.7,3.8 etc; Col 1.27 etc. 
z imprvaEfa - e. g. Rom 5.17; 2 Cor 1.5; 1 Tim 1.14 (6impnifovth w) etc. 
3& fa- e. g. Jn 17.22-23; Heb 1.3. 
4 Attridge, pp44f, points out that öiröo-raai has no technical Trinitarian sense in Heb, but suggests 
`a philosophical denotation that ultimately derives from Stoicism', indicating the actuality or 
fundamental reality of a phenomenon. Cf also 2 Cor 4.4 and Col 1.15: Christ as `image (eiKWV)' of 
God; Phil 2.6: Christ in the `form (popg5z))' of God implying `equality with God (Toa OE q-))'. 
5 Cf below, ppl27ff. 
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(b) Plenitude and Trinity 
We have seen that Tillich and Panikkar offer universalising theories of 
`trinitarianism' as interpretative of the variety of religious approaches to 
God, and we have also proposed divine `plenitude' as a scripturally 
rooted idea of general application which could provide a meaningful way 
of discussing Trinitarianism in a dialogical situation. We must now 
clarify the relationship we intend between these two, as this will clearly 
be crucial for our methodology. We can pose two alternatives. One 
choice would be to prioritise the general principle of `plenitude', as a 
feature of divinity present in many different faiths. This universal 
attribute would then find particular expression for Christians in the 
doctrine of the Trinity, which could be described as one faith's way of 
imaging or describing a universal truth. Alternatively, we could 
emphasise the specific primacy of the Christian understanding of God as 
Father, Son, and Spirit, with `plenitude' a derivative abstraction of certain 
consequences as having universal. application. This can be put in Kantian 
vocabulary as the contention that `the Christian Trinitarian God 
represents the Ultimate Reality an sich'. 1 
Briefly, our approach will be closer to the latter position. More 
specifically, we will seek to show that the idea of `plenitude' provides an 
appropriate language for a discourse within which the distinctively 
Christian approach of Trinitarianism can be meaningfully proposed in 
terms of the six criteria we have distinguished. Our choice arises both 
from the belief that the alternative approach suggests a modalist form of 
Trinitarianism, 3 and from the recognition that its universalising 
tendencies unduly strain the coherence of `trinitarian' language. 
I Dupuis (1977), p259 - cf ibid., p263: `not a penultimate sign of the Real an sich'. 2 Cf also Additional Note `A' - below, pp67ff. 3 Cf below, p55, for DiNoia's criticisms of Hick on this point. 
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Clearly this methodological choice has far-reaching consequences for our 
approach to Trinitarian dialogue with other faiths. It suggests a recasting 
of the `trinitarian' theologies proposed by Tillich and Panikkar, even if 
we shall see that such a recasting can incorporate in a new context many 
of their fundamental insights. More radically, it represents an alternative 
approach to the kind of `pluralism' advocated by John Hick and others, 
and this means that we must carefully define the way in which the motif 
of `plenitude' is to function within the context of religious plurality. ' We 
must also, though, indicate and respond to possible objections which 
might be raised to our prioritisation of Trinity over plenitude. 
Firstly, it might be argued that regarding the Trinity as the non-negotiable 
reality of God would unduly circumscribe, or even render completely 
pointless, Christian participation in dialogue. For, it could be said, if 
Christians are bound to maintain an orthodox Trinitarian theology in their 
dialogue, then at all times they must be careful not to transgress the six 
criteria we listed as marking the boundaries of that orthodoxy. Such an 
objection, if valid, would entirely remove the usefulness of Trinitarian 
doctrine as a resource for inter-faith dialogue, leaving it only as a 
problem to be either overcome or ignored. However, we shall hope to 
resolve this impasse by showing that, historically and theologically, the 
criteria of Trinitarian orthodoxy need to be applied - particularly in a 
situation of dialogue - in a flexible and creative way. We shall do this by 
exploring the meaning of `faithfulness' to the Christian understanding of 
God as Trinity; when interpreted alongside other dialogical imperatives 
such as openness and rationality, this encourages rather than prohibits the 
development of Trinitarian thought as an inter-faith resource. 
Hick (1989), pp241ff, bases his `pluralism' on the Kantian distinction between the noumenal (the 
`ding an sich') and the phenomenal, locating Trinitarianism on the latter level - cf below, pp54f. 
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Yet even if the possibility of dialogue is allowed on this basis, it might 
still be claimed that insistence on the primacy of Trinitarian reality as a 
norm for Christians unreasonably and unhelpfully privileges their 
perspectives over those of their dialogue partners from other faiths. But 
this is surely fundamentally to misunderstand the purpose and parameters 
of inter-faith encounter. It cannot be expected that participants in a 
dialogue must have the expectation that their own perspectives are to be 
regarded by themselves as merely particular instances of a more general 
truth which is to be discovered as shared; this may in fact be the attitude 
of some dialogue partners, but it cannot be required of all. What must be 
sought is rather a common language of discourse, which does not 
privilege in advance the perspectives of any one faith, and which provides 
a shared framework within which the distinctive positions of each 
tradition can be presented and discussed; it is our claim that the language 
of `plenitude' provides just such a shared dialogical context of discourse. 
Finally, within Christianity it might be argued that there are theological 
insights which could plausibly be subsumed under the motif of divine 
`plenitude', yet which are not to be explained in Trinitarian terms. For 
example, eastern Palamite theology recognises a multiplicity of divine 
`energies' distinct from the Trinitarian hypostases of Father, Son, and 
Spirit. ' Our response to this will be to claim that in fact such an 
interpretation of plenitude may be misconceived, and can be more 
helpfully recast in Trinitarian terms; we shall seek to show this in the 
specific case of the Palamite distinction. 2 If Trinitarianism then provides 
the normative Christian interpretation of plenitudinal themes, we must 
next ask about the occurrence of parallel themes in other faiths also. 
' E. g. Lossky (1957), p85; `the theology of the Eastern Church distinguishes in God the three 
hypostases, the nature or essence, and the energies'. 
2 Below, pp28Off. 
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(c) Divine plenitude in other faiths 
In the final section of this chapter, we shall identify Greek philosophical 
religion and Islamic monotheism as the two traditions in whose 
interaction with Christian faith we shall trace trinitarian themes. ' To show 
that plenitude is a suitable context of discourse within which to analyse 
that interaction, then, it is sufficient at this stage to point to its 
significance in these two traditions. Such a demonstration, which will 
also help further to enrich the meaning of the term as we are using it, will 
be made by reference to two passages, from Plotinus and the Qur' än 
respectively. 
In one of his most vivid uses of imagery in the Enneads, Plotinus traces 
back the origin of living beings to a fecund source: 
This is the same as where life comes from, and universal life and universal Soul 
and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource there 
(p, &piäs 1KE1 rreviag pq(5' diropiag oürnyc), but all things are filled full with 
life, and, we may say, boiling with life (rrcfvrcjv i uijs rrerrArlpcwIcvwv Kai oTov 
4cövrcjv). They all flow, in a way, from a single spring, not like one particular 
breath or one warmth, but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all 
the qualities in itself (moron-!; pia rräaag Zv aürrj KXouua Kai of fýouaa Tors 
norörlrac), of sweetness along with fragrance, and was at once the quality of 
wine and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours and all the awarenesses 
of touch, and all that hearings hear, all tunes and every rhythm. 2 
The themes which Plotinus here evokes in that which is the source of all 
things are some of those we have already seen in the New Testament idea 
of `plenitude': the vocabulary of `fullness' expressed with the root 
rr i repo-, the theme of `riches' or `abundance' emphatically presented as a 
denial of divine poverty, and the imagery of `overflow' from the source 
to other beings. The idea of `undiminished giving' which Plotinus here 
offers is central to his work, 3 and it is an undoubtedly plenitudinal idea. 
Below, pp 56ff. 
2 Ennead V1.7[38). 12.20-30. 
3 Cf also below, Additional Note `A', pp67f, and p97. 
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We must also notice another feature of Plotinus' writing at this point: 
namely, the complexity of the language he uses to convey this idea of 
plenitude. Thus, within this short passage he employs a highly 
paradoxical formula relating one rroio i7sto all rroi ri7rac, he alliterates 
the verbs 4rjv ('to live') and CETv ('to boil'), and at the end he brings 
together a series of metaphors drawn from a range of senses. This 
linguistic complexity betokens an effort to convey an underlying 
complexity in the subject-matter: the plenitude Plotinus is seeking to 
express is multi-layered, richly inter-related, a harmony of immensely 
diverse elements. 
However, it is important to realise that, within the context of his overall 
system, the level of reality of which Plotinus is here speaking is not the 
ultimate: beyond the complex riches of Intellect lies the ineffable and 
simple One. One of the issues which must be faced in dialogue with the 
Greek tradition, then, is that of the extent of plenitudinal imagery applied 
to the divine: while Christian Trinitarianism sees this as immanent to the 
heart of God, Plotinus maintains the existence of a primal divinity beyond 
any distinction whatever. ' The fact that we can frame the question in this 
way, though, surely shows that `plenitude' language has a meaningful 
place at some level within this tradition, and so is dialogically helpful. 
Secondly, the Qur'an declares of God: 
He is the first and the last, and the manifest (az-zähir) and the hidden (al-bätin), 
and He is knower of all things. 2 
Like other verses of the Qur'an which link the divine names in antinomic 
pairs, this has been much commented upon by the Sufis, who have seen 
in such a formulation an indication of the paradoxically contradictory 
qualities to be simultaneously attributed to God - for example: 
Cfbelow, pplOlff. 
2 Suw'ah 57.3. 
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He is nearer to the servants than the jugular vein, and further from them than any 
distance that comes to mind. His relationship of nearness to the majestic Throne is 
the same as His relationship with the bottom of the earth. He is hidden because of 
extreme evidence, and evident because of extreme hiddenness. He is the first and 
the last, and the manifest and the hidden, and He is knower of all things. ' 
A modern Islamic writer heavily influenced by this tradition of exegesis, 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, declares that Surah LVII. 3 indicates that for him 
the very heart of the Qur' anic message is `the full and plenary doctrine of 
God as both transcendent and immanent'; he goes on to explain that this 
involves the divinity as embracing both unity and multiformity, and being 
both `supra-personal Essence' and `personal Deity'. 2 Again we note here 
the plenitudinal themes, which are particularly expanded by Nasr's 
interpretation of the divine name `the rich one (al-ghanI)' as referring to 
God as the one who `contains all possibilities within Himself ,3a concept 
which in turn can be linked to the acknowledgement of Allah as the 
`knower of all things'. 
Two further points can be seen in this Islamic understanding of divine 
plenitude: firstly, it provides a locus for the reconciliation of divine 
attributes which apparently stand in contradiction to, or at least tension 
with, one another; and secondly, the reference to both `the manifest' and 
`the hidden' highlights an issue identified in Plotinus: does the range of 
plenitudinal language apply to ultimate reality (in Kantian terms, to the 
noumenal), or is it to be relegated to penultimate phenomenality? 
From Plotinus and the Qur'an alike, then, we see that the New Testament 
language of divine plenitude finds assured resonances at certain points 
within non-Christian traditions also. We may fairly extrapolate from this 
its usefulness as a dialogical tool for trinitarian discourse, but we must 
first clarify the use of the language in the context of religious pluralism. 
' From the 13th century text The Easy Roads of Sayf at-Din - Chittick (1992), p 121. 2 Nasr (1989), p311. 
3 Ibid., p315 - cf Surah 63.7: `Unto God belong the treasures of the heavens and of the earth'. 
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(d) Plenitude and pluralism 
`Pluralism' in modern theology has a double meaning: it can refer simply 
to the serious acceptance of a plurality of religions as a significant fact; or 
it can specifically mean the inference from such an acceptance of a 
particular theological stance as to those religions' status -a stance notably 
associated with the writings of John Hick and his colleagues. ' While our 
idea of `plenitude', to be of any use, must clearly relate to the first sense 
of `pluralism', we have insisted that it is not to be identified with the 
second: in the Christian context, we have interpreted plenitude as a 
consequence of the primary Trinitarian reality of God; in the pluralist 
context, we have been careful not to define it closely as an attribute 
univocally recognised across faiths, but rather to indicate a variety of 
themes which together make it a suitable context for trinitarian dialogue. 
It is important to realise the significance of this different approach for the 
very structure and content of trinitarian dialogue. Hick proposes human 
awakening to `reality-centredness' as a common soteriological core of all 
faiths. 2 Similarly, Samartha adopts the Hindu concept of satyasya satyam 
(literally, `Truth of the Truth' - he interprets this as `mystery'), referring 
by this to `the transcendent Centre that remains always beyond and 
greater than apprehensions of it or even the sum total of those 
apprehensions" - including the total of a plurality of faiths. Turning to 
the question of trinitarian language, Samartha points out that Hindus call 
this `Mystery' sat-cit-änanda ('truth-consciousness-bliss'), and suggests 
that this is an appropriate response in the Indian cultural setting, just as 
Trinitarian language is in the categories of Greek thought. He writes: 
' Cf the essays in Hick and Knitter - though Panikkar has a different theology (above, p32 and n3). 2 Hick (1989), p240: `the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and 
correspondingly different responses to, the Real'. 
3 Samartba (1987), p75. 
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Neither sat-cit-änanda nor Trinity could, in linguistic terms, adequately describe 
the inner ontological working of Mystery. One could ask, therefore, on what 
grounds it can be claimed that the trinitarian formula offers a `truer' insight into 
the nature of Mystery than does sat-cit-dnanda? At best, the two formulations can 
only be symbolic, pointing to the Mystery, affirming the meaning disclosed, but 
retaining the residual depth. ' 
From the perspective we are adopting, there are two problems with this 
approach. Firstly, Samartha explicitly disowns any attempt to introduce 
criteria of discrimination based on truth into the `trinitarian' dialogue; and 
this would seem to render that dialogue rather otiose. This is particularly 
odd since there is a long tradition in Indian Christian theology of seeking 
critically to relate the sat-cit-ananda theme to Trinitarianism; 2 but this is 
effectively undermined from the outset if both formulations are declared 
to be incommensurably different `responses' in different cultural settings. 
Secondly, Samartha's (and Hick's) theology inevitably affect the very 
structure of Trinitarian thought, by implying that no `apprehension' of 
divine reality can in fact express its ultimate nature, and so that there 
exists a residual and primal level of divinity beyond that expressed in 
their formulations - with consequences identifiable in Christian theology: 
Pluralist accounts of religious predications are reminiscent of modalistic 
explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity... For modalism, Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit finally constitute a practised concealment rather than, as the Gospel was 
understood to proclaim, a full disclosure of God's identity and purposes. ' 
`Plenitude', then, for us is not to be construed in terms of a modalist 
common essence, but as affording a genuinely open language for 
dialogue in plurality. Next we outline the other patterns of understanding 
plenitude which will provide counter-themes for that dialogue. 4 
I Samatha (1987), p76. 
Z Cf below, pp332ff. Samartha, however, refers in his 1987 essay only to Hindu accounts of sat-cit- 
dnanda. 
3 DiNoia (1990), p130. This argument is extended in DiNoia (1992), ppl50f, to criticise pluralism as 
a `neomodalism' teaching that `the diverse doctrines by which each religious community designates 
the otherwise ineffable "X" (Nirvana, the Blessed Trinity, Allah, etc. ) embody only partial and 
possibly complementary descriptions of something that finally eludes them all'. 
" Cf also below, p313f, for further criticisms of Hick's `pluralism' in relation to its implications for 
dialogue. 
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6 Divine unity and plurality in world faiths 
(a) Divine unity: assertion and inference 
We have introduced the theme of divine `plenitude' as a context within 
which the accounts of divine richness, variety, and complexity offered by 
world faiths can be brought into dialogue with the beliefs of Christian 
Trinitarianism. As the latter proposes in particular a way for reconciling 
plurality with unity in God, we must now develop these issues by asking 
to what extent in fact trinitarian resources have been developed, and 
trinitarian problems have been faced, in Christian encounter with other 
faiths conducted in terms of these plenitudinal motifs. 
In these sections, therefore, we shall briefly consider the themes of divine 
plurality and unity in the general context of religion, before identifying 
the two particular instances of Christian inter-faith encounter which will 
provide our historical examples. Thus, we consider in turn the general 
patterns by which faiths might affirm, firstly, divine unity in relation to 
divine plurality, and secondly, divine plurality in relation to divine unity. 
In a situation where there are a number of potential candidates for 
divinity, affirmation of the unity of God could in principle rely on one of 
two methods. ' On one hand, it could be the result of an assertion: that it 
simply was the case that, despite the multiplicity of alleged gods, only 
one was real. In particular, such an assertion might be presented as a 
claim advanced by this one real God himself: divine unity to be believed 
as part of the content of self-revelation. Alternatively, the affirmation of 
Cf Stead, p181, who refers to these as `ways in which a monotheistic belief can replace an earlier 
polytheism' (though it is questionable whether his first category, of belief in `the one God ... in the 
sense of the unitary being who transcends the apparent plurality' is best referred to as monotheism - 
we use below the expression `monadism'). The distinction between assertive and inferential 
affirmations of divine unity drawn here has some resemblance to the common distinction drawn 
between `prophetic' and `mystical' religions (e. g. M Barnes (1991), pp23ff). Here, however, we 
restrict ourselves to the single question of divine unity; and we do not follow a simplistic 
identification of the two types with `west' and `east' respectively (e. g. Nakamura, pp166f). 
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unity might be as the result of a process of reasoned inference. For 
example, it might be argued that logical ordering of the bewildering 
variety of an apparent pantheon, or metaphysical consideration of the 
underlying causes of the cosmos, or theological analysis of the necessary 
character of divinity, all implied that behind and beyond plurality stood 
ultimate unity. 
The distinction of assertion and inference is drawn more easily in theory 
than in practice; in the actual history of religions, both approaches may be 
combined. For instance, the origins of Christian monotheism lie in the 
divine self-assertion of the Hebrew scriptures, yet in the subsequent 
tradition there are also attempted proofs of divine unity and simplicity 
reliant on natural reason. ' In later Neoplatonic religion, by contrast, the 
centrality of the One is primarily established by philosophical analysis of 
the many, yet it is also endorsed by oracular revelations. 2 Still, within a 
given tradition it is generally possible to identify either assertion or 
inference as the more important basis of the affirmation of divine unity. 
Now, this distinction of assertive and inferential will affect both the style 
and the content of that affirmation. As to style, assertion is typically 
rhetorical, challenging in the name of the one true God the claims to 
authentic divinity of the many so-called gods. Faith properly called 
`monotheistic' - recognising the existence of only one God - may be 
preceded by an attitude described as `henotheistic' - allowing worship of 
only one god while leaving open the status of other gods. 3 Monotheism 
can inherit from this a fierce intolerance of any hint of open plurality in 
the context of the divine, as this is immediately suspected of implying 
I CfMascall, pp116ff. 
2 Cfbelow, pp101ff. 
3 It is likely that Hebrew faith passed through this stage before achieving authentic monotheism - Sperling, pp23-28 traces this `monolatry' to the exclusive demands of the covenant. 
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rival claimants of divinity set alongside the one true God, whose 
`jealousy' is such that this cannot be permitted. 
By contrast, affirmations of divine unity based on inference can be 
comparatively relaxed about such suggestions on one level, relying on the 
proposition that any manifestation of divine plurality is only a superficial 
feature, not to be found on the level of ultimate reality. ' The style here 
will typically be one of re-interpretation: plurality is a feature of the 
divine realm to be reasonably explained rather than forcibly denied. 
Assertion and inference respectively can also lead to differences in the 
content of the affirmation of divine unity. Thus, if the existence of one 
God is asserted in contradistinction to the existence of many gods, what is 
being affirmed is the divine unity ad extra: that one is the number 
measuring the class of beings to which divine status may rightly be 
ascribed. Conclusions might be drawn from this about the internal 
character of that one, but the primary affirmation remains that of unity as 
uniqueness: God is the only god, there is no god but God. 2 
If the unity of the divine is being inferred, however, for the inference to 
reach a term the final inferand must be completely free of multiplicity. 
For if the argument is that complex and diverse situations must have an 
explanation in simpler and more unified causes, 3 then a final explanation 
is only found in a situation of total simplicity and unification ad intra. In 
this approach, therefore, the affirmation is of divine unity as simplicity: 
the ultimately real is understood to be the ultimately One, lying beyond 
all plurality. 
I E. g. Nakamura's account of `Brahmanism' (p166): `In the Indian concept, the gods are beings 
lower than the Absolute and the Absolute stands high above the gods'. 
2 Stead, p181: "`The one God" in the sense of the only being who can rightfully claim this dignity'. 3 O'Meara (1995), p44, identifies this axiom in Plotinus' work, and gives it the useful name of the 
`Principle of Prior Simplicity', which he formulates in the following terms: `everything made up of 
parts, every composite thing, depends and derives in some way from what is not composite, what is 
simple'. 
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(b) Divine plurality: acknowledgement and interpretation 
What accounts of divine plenitude are given within faith systems 
affirming unity in the two different ways outlined above? We may 
identify two different approaches as the `acknowledgement' and 
`interpretation' of plurality, respectively correlating with the `assertion' 
and the `inference' of unity. 
If a strong assertion of unity rules out the existence of other beings with 
divine status, any plenitude must be located somehow within the context 
of the one, unique God - it might derive, for example, from analysis of 
His internal life or His relation to the world. Within that context, the 
admission of plurality will of course not be permitted expression in the 
discredited language of `gods'. Rather, it will be a more or less hesitant, 
perhaps slightly embarrassed, acknowledgement of the reality of plurality. 
Indeed, in some traditions the hesitation or embarrassment may mean 
even that acknowledgement cannot be made, despite clear evidence of 
plurality. In such cases, the rhetorical pressure of the arguments leading 
through henotheism to monotheism severely inhibit further developments 
towards exploration of the implications of plenitude. 
The situation is very different when divine unity is inferred, for example 
from reflection upon the freely admitted existence of a multitude of gods. 
The task facing the theologian here is to complete the pattern of inference 
which led to the unity of the divine by interpretation, with reference to 
that One, of the multiplicity apparent within the pantheon. Distinct 
subjects of plenitude in this case are neither ruled out of existence nor 
denigrated, but rather brought into relation to one another and to the 
ultimate One by denying ultimate significance to their distinction. 
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We may make two brief comments on these respective ways of 
recognising divine plurality. Firstly, of the two approaches, the assertion 
of divine unity ad extra in a sense creates more opportunity for the 
recognition of plurality, since in emphasising the uniqueness of the one 
God its content does not foreclose the possibility of internal plurality 
within that God as does the inference of unity ad intro. Christian faith in 
the Trinity itself arises precisely from the context of a monotheism based 
on rhetorical denial of a plurality of gods. We may thus anticipate that 
assertion-based theologies of unity need not exclude plurality a priori. 
Secondly, qualifying this theoretical point in practice, the typically 
interpretative, non-rhetorical style of inference has in general the more 
receptive attitude to divine plurality. While its logic insists that this 
plurality has no ultimate significance, open recognition of plurality is 
more easily achieved in this approach than in an assertive atmosphere 
marked by ingrained suspicion of any hints of possible rival candidates 
for divinity. 
We may conclude in general, that in both approaches the full recognition 
of plurality as a feature of divinity will be possible but difficult. In the 
first, the stylistic atmosphere of a rhetorical suspicion of plurality means 
that at the most a hesitant acknowledgement of plurality will be made. In 
the second, the content of the doctrine of divine simplicity means that any 
manifestations of plurality will be subject to an interpretation designed to 
relegate them to a level of at most penultimacy. 
With these expectations in mind, we move on to identify two key 
historical episodes in which Christians have engaged with other faiths 
using these respective approaches. These examples, developed at some 
length in Chapters 2 and 3, will provide the historical background for the 
patterning of Trinitarian dialogue in the contemporary multi-faith context. 
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(c) Islamic monotheism 
There can be no doubt that Islam is one of contemporary Christianity's 
most significant dialogue partners. This is true quantitatively, in terms of 
the numbers of Christians and Muslims meeting, in a variety of ways, 
with a variety of motives, and with a variety of assessments of one 
another; it is also true qualitatively, in terms of the profile of the issues 
involved in such meetings. Nor is this just a recent phenomenon: the two 
faiths have been deeply involved with each other from the first preaching 
of Muhammad onwards, in situations ranging from daily contact within 
the same society to the armed confrontation of rival civilisations. 
Christian-Muslim encounter today is often depicted in political, 
economic, and cultural terms, yet its deepest dimension undoubtedly is 
the religious, and on this level the unity and plurality of God are among 
the most important questions which both unite and separate the two 
faiths. On one hand, there is agreement on the importance of monotheism. 
For example, the chapter devoted to Islam in Vatican II's `Declaration on 
the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions' begins like this: 
The Church has a high regard for the Muslims. They worship God, who is one, 
living and subsistent, merciful and almighty, the Creator of heaven and earth, who 
has also spoken to men. ' 
On the other hand, Christian belief in the Trinity has generally been 
comprehensively repudiated by Muslims. In one very influential popular 
account of Islam, for example, we are told: 
Another major point of difference between Islam and Christianity is the doctrine of 
the Trinity. If God is One, as Christians profess to believe just as Muslims do, 
there is no way by which He can at the same time be Three; even a very young 
child can grasp the obvious truth of this... To Muslims this makes absolutely no 
sense, and even if it is explained as being a "Mystery" too high for any human 
mind to grasp, belief in the Trinity is regarded by Islam, as we have seen in the 
Qur'änic verses just cited, as a form of polytheism. 2 
1 Nostra Aetate, iü (Flannery, p739). 
2 Haneef, pp183f. 
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This passage is interesting as indicating how deeply embedded in the 
popular Muslim mind are the attitudes described above as characterising 
the `assertive' approach to divine unity. Thus, we see in the reference to 
Qur'änic revelation' the grounding of belief in divine unity in the self- 
attestation of the one true God. Associated with this is a rhetorical 
equation of any suggestion of divine unity with the proposal of rival 
claimants to divinity - hence finally comes the identification of 
Trinitarian belief as a form of polytheism, which in Islamic understanding 
is the worst of all sins. 2 Nevertheless, like Vatican II, the writer concedes 
that this disagreement lies within a shared monotheistic belief; citing 
Surah 29.46 ('We believe in that which has been revealed to us and 
revealed to you, and our God and your God is one'), she concludes: 
Such differences in viewpoint should not be taken as grounds for antagonism or 
heated theological arguments between Muslims and Christians. For what is 
common between the followers of the two faiths is many basic beliefs and the vast 
legacy of moral injunctions and principles of behaviour inspired by belief in the 
same God ... which should 
inspire in them friendship, sympathy and appreciation 
for the others' sincerity, simply "agreeing to disagree" on their differences. 3 
The injunctions to friendship and respect are of course to be applauded 
but `simply agreeing to disagree' is not an attitude likely to generate 
much of theological interest. Fortunately, this was not a policy widely 
adopted by either Christians or Muslims during the medieval period. On 
the contrary, from the eighth to the twelfth century vigorous debates on 
issues of divine unity and plurality were conducted both between the two 
faiths and within the Muslim tradition. It is from these debates that we 
will draw the material of Chapter 3, where we consider trinitarian 
resources and problems in relation to the assertive monotheism of Islam. 
' The passages cited are those apparently attacking some form of Trinitarianism - especially 4.171 
(`Believe in God and His messengers and do not say "Three") and 5.72 ('They indeed disbelieve 
who say, "Lo, God is third of Three", when there is no deity except the One God'): Haneef, p178. 
2 Cfbelow, p175. 
3 Haneef, p184. 
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(d) Hellenic monadism' 
While Islam is the obvious candidate to consider as an example of a faith 
tradition owning an assertive affirmation of divine unity, there are several 
possibilities which could be explored as instances of the inferential 
approach. From the earliest strata of Indian religious thought, for 
example, the Vedas intimated that the multiplicity of divine beings could 
be understood as manifestations of a single Absolute: 
Vedic seers, desiring to understand the One, the underlying and hidden Reality, 
have found the oneness of the gods within the realm of beings most assuring. 2 
In the subsequent development of the Hindu tradition, this is elaborated 
into the principle that all the gods are to be interpreted as equivalent 
representations of the one ultimate reality, though from an individual's 
perspective one or another may appear to be more significant than 
another. Such an understanding was expressed in memorable imagery by 
the contemporary saint Sri Candrasekharendra Sarasvati (1894-1990): 
A bridge across a river has a number of arches. To a man standing under one arch, 
all other arches will appear smaller than the one he stands under. This arch will 
appear biggest to his eyes. Even so, to a votary of a particular deity all other deities 
will appear inferior. But the truth is that all deities are manifestations of the one 
God. All arches are similarly constructed and have the same dimension. 3 
It would seem possible, on the basis of religious thought like this, to 
consider issues of trinity and plurality in some strands of the Hindu 
tradition as exemplars of an inferential approach: Sarasvati's image in 
particular invites reflection on the fourth of our identified trinitarian 
problems - that of equality among the subjects of divine plurality. 
We must return in Chapter 4 to the major issue of trinitarian resources 
and problems in Christian dialogue with Hinduism. However, to provide 
a historical background for that discussion, it will be more appropriate to 
I See below, p66, for an explanation and justification of this term. 
2 Pandeya, p16. 
3 Sri Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, The Discourses of the Acarya, I, (Madras: Kalaimagal, 1980), 
pp4lf - quoted in Balasubramanian, p384. 
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draw our examples from an earlier encounter - that of patristic 
Christianity with the philosophically-inspired religious traditions of later 
Hellenism (third to fifth centuries). Such a choice is guided by several 
factors. 
Christians and pagan Greeks shared intimately in a common linguistic, 
cultural, and conceptual tradition during this period; of the examples we 
shall consider later, Plotinus and Origen were taught by the same teacher, 
while Pseudo-Dionysius' work is a wholesale adaptation of that of 
Proclus. It would be difficult to show such depth and continuity of 
sharing in the ambient culture, attended by genuine learning on the part of 
Christians, within the Indian Church, at least until very recent times. ' 
Moreover, the patristic experience of sharing took place at a critical 
juncture in the evolution of Christian thought: the period when the 
doctrine of the Trinity was being for the first time explicitly formulated. 
The intimacy and profundity of the dialogue meant that significant 
insights from Greek thought were incorporated into that formulation - 
consequently, the trinitarian resources and problems to be identified in 
the encounter with Greek. philosophy have a persistent relevance in the 
subsequent theological tradition. 
It is also easier to gain an overall picture of the earlier encounter, for a 
number of reasons: the strong sense among the Fathers of belonging to 
one Church, as compared to the denominational fragmentation of Indian 
Christianity; the absence of significant Christian influence on pagan 
philosophy, in contrast with the catalytic effect of nineteenth-century 
Significant interaction has occurred between Indian Christianity and Hindu traditions 
(Brahmabandhab Upadhyaya, AJ Appasamy, et al, Panikkar himself). Yet a comprehensive survey 
assesses the situation thus: `Does the Church in India today provide the kind of framework in which 
theology of this kind can flourish? The answer must be a reluctant negative ... 
in many Indian 
theological colleges the names and ideas of Barth and Brunner are more familiar than 
Brahmabandhab and Chenchiah' (Boyd, p259). 
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missions on contemporary Hinduism; the perspective afforded by fifteen 
hundred years of scholarship and reinterpretation of patristic teachings. 
Our choice of the patristic period as the first of our two historical 
examples will demonstrate that Christians' dialogue partner then 
demonstrated in its reflection on issues of plurality and unity features 
found also in Hinduism, which we have identified as characteristic of an 
`inferential' affirmation of divine unity. Thus, there is a stress on the 
ultimacy of the One, beyond all multiplicity or distinction. There is a 
relaxed attitude to recognition of plurality within the divine realm on a 
penultimate, or lower, level. There is a concern to interpret manifestations 
of such plurality - for example, a multiple pantheon - in terms of an 
overall understanding of the One. The evolution of these characteristics 
has been well summarised as follows: 
Hellenic monotheism was a theology of divine ultimacy. As a spiritual tradition 
rooted in ancient polytheism, its understanding of the divine began with the 
multiple divine powers and then focused on a primordial divine unity and a final 
principle of order and value for the sacred cosmos. Throughout this tradition the 
gods were not rejected, although they were superseded as theological interest was 
concentrated upon that absolute and transcendent principle into whose fecund unity 
all gods and divine powers could be resolved - for they were its manifestations at 
derivative levels of reality. ' 
However, the description of this as `monotheism' seems unfortunate, for 
this term must surely refer to acknowledgement of one God (Ocdq) as 
only existent. Here, by contrast, the One is to be found above and beyond 
all the gods, who remain essentially characterised by multiplicity. 
The term `monism' is sometimes suggested to describe this kind of 
religious thought. Etymologically, this usage would be unexceptionable, 
but the way in which the word is actually used means that it would be 
misleading in this context, for monism has come to indicate the teaching, 
not only that there is one ultimate Absolute, but also that in the final 
1 Kenney, p289. 
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analysis all things, or the totality of things, are identical with that One. 
While such a view might develop from the inferential affirmation of 
divine unity explored here, this would not be a necessary consequence. ' 
For all that is being affirmed is that inference from multiplicity points to 
the causal origin of all things as being ultimately simple; yet a causal 
origin need not be identical with that which it originates. 
Instead of either `monotheism' or `monism', therefore, we shall coin the 
term `monadism' to indicate this type of religious thought. 2 Such a 
coinage can be justified when we consider the way in which both Greek 
philosophy and the religious traditions affected by it indicated an 
understanding of unity as simplicity by the word monad: 
The popular use of the word `one' makes no distinction between the senses 
`undivided' and `unique'; the sense `unique' is uppermost in the adjective pdvoq, 
but once its by-form povdr came to mean `unity' or `unit', the notion of 
`indivisibility' came to attach to it; thus Aristotle speaks of the monad as 
indivisible, and Philo is only exploiting this line of argument when he contends 
that the biblical profession of one God points to a being who is absolutely simple. 3 
Like Philo, patristic Christian writers adopted the concept of `monad' as 
one way of expressing their understanding of divine unity. This then 
required them to explore the relation of that unity to the Trinitarian 
plurality which was part of their inheritance of biblical faith. 
In that exploration, it is possible to establish interesting connections with 
parallel discussions of divine unity and plurality in the contemporaneous 
tradition of Hellenic monadism. It is to the identification of trinitarian 
resources and problems within this parallelism that we now turn in 
Chapter 2. 
' Cf Copleston, pp255ff. 
2 Monadism, here used in a theological sense, is of course not to be confused with the system of 
monadology developed by Leibniz as a variety of cosmic spiritual atomism. 
3 Stead, p182 - the references mentioned are to Aristotle, Metaphysics, xiv. 2,1089b35f, and to Philo, 
In Met. 985b30. 
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The `Principle of Plenitude' in Arthur Lovejoy's `Great Chain of 
Being' 
`Plenitude' is not a concept which has been extensively developed in modern 
theology, but the word plays an important part in Arthur Lovejoy's influential 1933 
William James Lectures, published in 1942 as 'The Great Chain of Being: A Study of 
the History of an Idea' [subsequent page numbers in this note refer to this]. As this 
title indicates, Lovejoy's concern in these lectures is historical rather than strictly 
theological; within this history, however, his starting-point is the same as ours will be 
- namely, the philosophical theology of the Platonist tradition. It will be instructive, 
therefore, to note both similarities and differences between Lovejoy's usage and ours. 
Lovejoy introduces his `Principle of Plenitude' through a discussion of the Timaeus 
cosmogony. He describes it as an answer to the two closely-related questions `Why is 
there a World of Becoming in addition to the eternal World of Ideas? ' and `What 
principle determines the number of kinds of being that make up the sensible and 
temporal world? ' (p46) To both questions alike he suggests that Plato's answer 
depends on the `strange and pregnant theorem of the "fullness" of the realisation of 
conceptual possibility in actuality' (p52), i. e. that all the Ideas must be expressed in 
concrete existence. This assumption, which has `never been distinguished by an 
appropriate name', is the Principle of Plenitude, more fully defined as follows: 
Not only the thesis that the universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable 
diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deductions from 
the assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the extent and 
abundance of the creation must be as great as the possibility of existence and commensurate with 
the productive capacity of a `perfect' and inexhaustible Source, and that the world is the better, the 
more things it contains. (p52) 
It will be noted immediately that Lovejoy's principle is in its subject-matter as much 
cosmological as theological - indeed, it expresses a particular understanding of 
cosmological consequences to be deduced from theological presuppositions. As 
Lovejoy traces the ramifications of his principle through history, it is these 
consequences which come to prominence, but in the earlier lectures in particular we 
find an emphasis on two particular features of the process of deduction. 
Firstly, he relates plenitude to perfection: that which possesses to the highest degree 
the qualities after which all seek cannot be an impediment to the existence of others: 
Unless it were somehow productive of them, it would lack a positive element of perfection, would 
not be so complete as its very definition implies that it is. (p49) 
Although it can be encapsulated as the medieval axiom omne bonum est diffusivum 
sui, or - in Plato's own terms in the Timaeus - as the absence of 08övos ('envy') in 
the One, Lovejoy rather stresses the paradoxical nature of what he calls this `bold 
logical inversion' whereby `Self-Sufficing Perfection' is converted into `Self- 
Transcending Fecundity'. (p49) When he moves his discussion of perfection and 
plenitude into the medieval period, he distinguishes the two as, respectively, `the Idea 
of the Good', and `the Idea of Goodness': 
The one was an apotheosis of unity, self-sufficiency, and quietude, the other of diversity, self- 
transcendence, and fecundity. (p83) 
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Indeed, he discerns not just a tension but even a contradiction between these two 
conceptions, going so far as to describe them as `not one God but two'. (p82) 
Secondly, Lovejoy maintains that the principle of plenitude reflects a `dialectical 
necessity' on the part of the Good: 
The goodness of God is a constraining goodness; he is not `free to create or not', nor free to choose 
some possible kinds of beings as the recipients of the privilege of existence, while denying it to 
others. (p54) 
This `absolute cosmical determinism' is very different from the Christian insistence 
on the liberty of the divine will, and Lovejoy accordingly identifies in medieval 
Christianity the belief that: 
God's freedom of choice must be maintained by denying that ... the actual exercise of the creative 
potency extends of necessity through the entire range of possibility. (p70) 
How does Lovejoy's `Principle of Plenitude' relate to our own use of the word? It is 
clear that there is a considerable amount of overlap, both in his starting-point - the 
dialogues of Plato and particularly the Timaeus - and also in the way in which 
Lovejoy explores the distinction between `good' and `goodness' to demonstrate that 
an account of God solely in terms of perfection has been found to be wanting if that 
perfection is not seen to carry with it an implication of fecundity or super-abundance. 
We may more precisely define our own use of the term `plenitude', however, by 
observing three significant differences from Lovejoy's `principle'. 
Firstly, while plenitude arises for Lovejoy as an implication of divine perfection, i. e. 
as a consequence of a strictly theological statement about the nature of God in se, it is 
then extrapolated in a cosmological direction. Moreover, that extrapolation is seen to 
have a character of necessity about it. Our own use of the concept of plenitude, by 
contrast, while correcting the inadequacy of a simplistic or unitary model of 
perfection, does not necessarily incorporate cosmological implications within that 
correction. Indeed, as Lovejoy rightly says, any constraint of cosmological necessity 
is certainly to be denied of God as understood in Christian tradition "- yet, of course, 
`plenitude' is a term which we seek to apply in the case of a God who can be spoken 
of in personalist and voluntarist language. We can perhaps express the matter by 
saying that, in our use of the word, some accounts (as the Platonist) of God in relation 
to the world will include necessary cosmological implications as part of their theory 
of plenitude, while others (as the Christian) will not. 
Secondly, this diversity in regard to the question of cosmological necessity is a 
particular instance of a more general difference between Lovejoy's use of the word 
and ours. His is explicitly a `principle' (he elsewhere refers to a `theorem' or an 
`axiom') - that is, a proposition expressing an identifiable claim about the way God is 
in relation to the world. For our usage, however, `plenitude' is rather a cluster of ideas 
about God, within which and among which various different interpretations are 
possible; indeed, it is this very variety which provides the conceptual framework 
within which we can examine the whole question of trinitarian resources and 
problems in the situation of a variety of different religious understandings. 
Thirdly, while Lovejoy develops his `Principle of Plenitude' from an analysis of 
Plato's theology, he does not apply the concept to either the Christian understanding 
of God as Trinity or the accounts of the divine to be found in other faiths. The latter 
omission is not surprising, since his concern is with the history of western thought 
only; but the former is more significant, since it will be our contention that it is 
Trinitarianism which provides the primary locus for Christian theories of divine 
plenitude. 
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The Trinitarian dialogue between Greek philosophy 
and patristic Christianity 
1 Transcendence and immanence in the Greek tradition 
(a) Religion and Science 
Trinitarian dialogue in this period arises from attempts of Christians and 
non-Christians to reconcile divine transcendence and divine immanence. 
We shall see that in later Hellenistic thought this was expressed in terms 
of unity and plurality respectively; yet the same tension appears early in 
Greek philosophy from efforts to explain the way reality is. ' Much 
modem interpretation of pre-Socratic thought identifies that quest for 
explanation as evidence of a scientific world-view emerging as distinct 
from religious ways of thinking. However, such attitudes perhaps say 
more about twentieth-century preconceptions than about ancient Greece: 
throughout the philosophical tradition, powerful religious motives were at 
work. Exemplifying the view of early philosophy as a scientific 
endeavour to explain the world, Lloyd Gerson proposes that `natural 
theology' had its origins as part of this explanatory theorising: 
For the Greek philosophers a god frequently functions as a hypothetical entity, 
analogous to the hypothetical entities of modern science such as black holes, 
neutrinos, or the unconscious ... natural theology arose 
because science, at least as 
many of the Pre-Socratics conceived of it, needed god or gods 2 
Gerson here relies on a traditional distinction of theology into three parts 
- C. 3 civic', `mythic', and 'natural'. He highlights as central to the latter the 
quest for an ap if, a primary principle which in a given situation will 
foreclose further questioning by providing a full and convincing 
' E. g. Guthrie (1965), pp119-122. 
2 Gerson, pp2f. 
3 The first two categories refer respectively to the cultic practices of different communities, and to the 
stories of the gods in Homer and Hesiod. The tripartite scheme, reported by St Augustine (De Civ. 
Dei V1.5) to date back to Varro, probably has Stoic antecedents - Gerson, p239nn1-2. 
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explanation of that situation. Clearly, the dpXrj concept matches well the 
theological approach we described above as `inferential', and we have 
seen that such an approach certainly can be expressed in religious 
language. ' It is true that some traditions of Greek philosophy could 
identify dpXai of an entirely material nature - Democritus in the fifth 
century, for example, insisted that atoms and void together provided an 
adequate explanation of the cosmos. However, when Gerson asserts that 
`natural theology does not assume the subject matter of Greek myth or 
religion', 3 he draws too sharp a distinction between these different 
methods, for the pre-Socratics in fact repeatedly made connections 
between these categories. For instance, Anaximander's description of the 
dpXif as divine cross-references scientific and religious discourses; 4 the 
Pythagorean theme of the unit as apXrj similarly shows the implausibility 
of separating out religion and science at the origin of mathematics. ' To 
give one more example, Xenophanes explicitly links his philosophical 
theology to myth by using it to criticise Homer and Hesiod for `ascribing 
to the gods all deeds that among humans are a reproach and a disgrace' .6 
It is this tradition which provides the background to the famous proposal 
in Book III of Plato's Republic to purge Homer of passages describing the 
gods in terms deemed to be false or unworthy of the Platonic theory. ' 
Informing Plato's proposal was the conviction, running through his 
dialogues, that the contexts of metaphysical reasoning and religious 
Above, p57. 
Z Guthrie (1965), pp389ff. Belief in `gods' was for Democritus a misinterpretation of mental images - 
ibid., pp478ff. 
3 Gerson, p2. 
4 Anaximander, DK A15 - Guthrie (1962), p88. 
5 Guthrie (1962), p244. 
6 Xenophanes, DK B11 - Guthrie (1962), pp373ff, sets this in the context of his constructive 
theology. Xenophanes' is the first known attack (6th century BC) on poetry; Asmis, p340, traces the 
lineage of anti-Homeric criticism from him to Plato. 
Rep. III, 386A-392C. The discussion follows the assertion in Book II (382E) that `from every point 
of view the divine (rd öarpdviov) and the divinity (Td & ov) are free from falsehood'. 
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sensibility are inseparable: `religion, as rite, conception, motif, and 
vocabulary, is integral to his thinking. " With different emphases, that 
conviction was to remain an important theme throughout the Platonic 
tradition, and this is particularly important for us for two reasons. 
Firstly, that a succession of Christian theologians were able to adapt 
Platonism as a congenial aid to the interpretation of their own faith can be 
seen to mirror the concern of Platonist philosophers, from their founder 
onwards, critically to relate their `natural theology' to the `mythical 
theology' of popular religiosity. St Augustine in particular insists: 
There are none who come nearer to us than the Platonists ... The teaching of both 
these theologies, the `fabulous' and the `civil', must yield place to the doctrine of 
the Platonists. 2 
Like other contemporary writers, Augustine found that the theological 
structures of Platonism were helpful in allowing space for cultic and 
confessional religion (in his case, Christian; in others', pagan). 
Secondly, the critical connection established in the Republic between 
`natural' and `mythical' theology can be related to a more general theme 
in the Platonic dialogues: the emergence of motifs of religious 
transcendence. In the tradition after Plato, these motifs came into tension 
with other themes, which we could describe as pointers to divine 
immanence; 3 the rather complex phase of philosophy known as `Middle 
Platonism' in particular sees these two tendencies interacting closely with 
one another. This interaction is relevant for us, both because the polarity 
of transcendence and immanence is in Greek thought closely aligned to 
the tension of unity and plurality, and also because in itself it generates an 
analogue of Trinitarian theology. 
I Morgan, p227. 
2 De Civ. Dei VIII. 5. 
3 `Immanence' here is used in its more common theological sense (opposed to `transcendence'), to 
indicate a close involvement of the divine with the world, rather than in the technical Trinitarian 
sense of Chapter 1(opposed to `economy') to define a plurality integral to God's inmost being. 
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(b) Transcendence in the Platonic dialogues 
We can expect any indications of transcendence in Plato's thought to be 
developed in relation to his principal focus of interest, the Forms, which 
alone possess full authentic reality. Later Platonists saw three passages 
from the dialogues as clearly supplying such indications - in likely order 
of composition: the analogy of the sun in Book VI of The Republic, the 
`hypotheses' in the second part of Parmenides, and the cosmogonic 
narrative of Timaeus' - this also gives the concept of the `World Soul' as 
another starting-point for reflection on divinity in relation to the world. 
Republic Vi" 507A-509B. 
Plato's aim in this passage is to demonstrate the hegemony of the Idea of 
the Good over the other Ideas; this follows on from the discussion in 
504E-506E where it has been shown that the Good is that for which 
people most deeply seek in pursuing other goals. Plato then goes on to 
extend this supremacy of desire to a supremacy of status by developing 
an analogy between the physical light by which sensory objects are seen 
and the Idea of the Good as the reality `which gives their truth to the 
objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower' (508E). 
As Plato is here speaking of the authentic knowledge constituted by the 
mind's recognition of the Ideas, 2 he is here propounding a transcendence 
over the other Ideas on the part of the Good. This transcendence is 
definitively established, according to the later commentators, 3 at the end 
of this passage, when Plato develops the imagery of light further by 
identifying the Good as the analogue of the sun, which is supreme over 
There are also hints in other dialogues - for example, Sophist 248E6-249A2 has been interpreted as 
identifying the Idea of the Good with God - but this view is rejected by Ross, pp108-111. 2 Ross, p41. 
3 Some deny Plato intended transcendental reference - e. g. Shorey, II, pmv: `plain common sense ... the central core of meaning without which Plato's transcendentalism is only a rhapsody of words'. 
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all things. Thus, just as light and vision are `sunlike (i/Aioei&fj )', but are 
not in themselves to be equated with the sun, which is causative of them, 
so even the highest Ideas, those of Knowledge and Truth, are `like the 
Good (ayaooetörjs)', but `to think that either of them is the Good is not 
right'. ' He concludes: 
In like manner, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from 
the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is 
derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends 
essence in dignity and surpassing power (ouk ououias ovrog roü cýyaBoü thU' Erg 
ZrreKE1va rrjs odc7 ag rrpEoßeigx Kai Suvap£r ürr£pFXovroc). 2 
The primacy of the Good as here presented begins from a natural 
development of Plato's epistemology: as beings are intelligible to the 
extent to which they are `good' at being what they are, so all the Forms 
strive to participate in the Good which must transcend them all. The 
recognition of this transcendence remains rather tentative in the Republic, 
and its implications are not fully thought through by Plato, not least 
because, wishing to maintain the traditional Hellenic association of 
goodness with limit, balance, and restraint, he was faced with a problem 
in making sense of the transcendence of `a finite being in some way 
beyond other finite beings'. 3 
Nevertheless, the passage quoted above provided the starting-point for a 
transcendentalism marked by insistence on a subsistent reality `beyond 
(11rixet va)' the level of being, by the implication that this reality is also 
beyond the realm of the intelligible, by interpretation of this trans- 
cendence as a causal relationship, and by use of the imagery of light to 
describe that causality. These four notes recur throughout the subsequent 
tradition; we shall see their prominence in both Plotinus and Origen. 
1 Rep. VL509A. 
2 Ibid., 509B. 
3 Rist, p24. 
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Parmenides 137C-166C. 
Whereas the Republic spoke of the transcendental Form as `the Good 
(rdyaüdv)', the Parmenides focuses on `the One (rö iv)'; there is in fact 
some evidence that Plato equated goodness and unity in his analysis of 
the world of Forms. ' The latter part of this dialogue consists of 
exploration of the consequences of a series of `hypotheses'; in each case, 
pairs of antinomic consequences are derived from these hypotheses - as 
may be seen from the first two arguments: 
1. [137C-142A] If the One exists, nothing whatever can be asserted of it: 
It is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing 
thing perceive it .2 
2. [142B-155E] If the One exists, everything can be asserted of it: 
It has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes 
which pertain to other things pertain also to the One. 3 
The remaining hypotheses likewise are developed to paradoxical 
conclusions through displays of virtuosic reasoning; not surprisingly, the 
import of these curious passages has puzzled interpreters throughout 
history. 4 Many modem commentators regard the whole sequence of 
hypotheses as a mere destructive tour-de-force designed to establish a 
reductio ad absurdum of the views of the Eleatic school represented by 
the figure of Parmenides. 5 This interpretation was found also in classical 
exegesis, 6 alongside an account which saw the dialogue as an expository 
exercise providing training in logic through examples of various 
E. g. Philebus 23C-26D, where harmonious unification of disorder is what makes things good. This 
coheres with the view (Rep. IV 426A-B) of unity as the greatest civic good - Kraut, p336n27. 2 Parm. 142k 
3 Ibid., 155E. 
4 There has also been difference of opinion as to how many hypotheses can be identified in the 
second part of the dialogue - Proclus insisted on nine, but recognised that his predecessors such as 
Syrianus had enumerated the hypotheses differently (Saifrey & Westerink, I, pplxxix-lxxxix). 5 E. g. Allen, passim. 
6 No positive evidence survives, but this may have been the earliest type of interpretation (having 
presumably been developed by the sceptics of the New Academy), as it is first in the list of those to 
be explicitly rejected by Proclus (In Parm. 1.631) - cf Morrow & Dillon, pxrv. 
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syllogisms. 1 Far more influential, though, was that reading, to be 
developed by the Neoplatonists, which found in the text's obscurity deep 
teachings of a transcendent One: 
[Such a view] finds a positive metaphysical suggestion even in the first hypothesis. 
It takes the hypothesis to refer to a `One beyond being' which can be characterised 
only negatively, an ultimate principle of unity `beyond' other forms, like the `Idea 
of the Good' in the Republic. 
This `theological' interpretation is particularly relevant for us, since there 
can be detected in the successive hypotheses a movement through 
successive levels of plurality. Thus, while the first hypothesis refers to an 
entirely undifferentiated One, at the end of the second hypothesis 
Parmenides in Plato's dialogue is represented as eliciting from Socrates 
the following admissions: 
We say that the One partakes of being (odafas pereXE-i v) because it is? 
Yes. 
And for that reason, the One, because it is, was found to be many (To ¬v öv rro i iä 
Yes. 3 
Subsequent hypotheses then continue this movement by speaking of `the 
things other than the One (rc . 4a rou Zvd57)', 4 at which level the 
characteristic of plurality has become fully explicit. 
The Parmenides was believed in the classical tradition - at least by those 
who adopted some form of the `theological' interpretation - to contain 
Plato's deepest metaphysical teaching, 5 and the perception of a gradation 
from unity to plurality gained added conviction when combined with the 
suggestion in the Republic of a hierarchy among the Forms. In particular, 
the `Good' of the latter could plausibly be identified with the `One' of the 
former, since both were described as lying beyond knowledge. 
' E. g. Alcinous, Did. VI. After Proclus' death, his successor Marinus abandoned the `theological' 
interpretation of the dialogue in favour of the `logical' - Saffrey, III, pplxxii-lxxvii. 2 Ross, p96 (where this type of interpretation is severely criticised). 
3 Parm. 143A. 
° Ibid., 157B. 
5 Wallis, pp2Off. 
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Timaeus 27D-37C. 
In this late work, Plato develops hints scattered elsewhere in his 
dialogues' to speak of the fashioning of the universe by a `craftsman' or 
8,7prtoupyös, who is described in anthropomorphic imagery: 
Now to discover the Maker and Father of this universe (r(3 v rroIIJrrjv Kai irarepa 
roUSE- roü rravrös eöpe v) were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to 
declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible. 2 
The status of this figure in a metaphysical hierarchy is not entirely clear, 
though it seems certain that Plato in some way subordinated the demiurge 
to the Good. 3 In Timaeus 27D-29E, interest is focused on the way in 
which the demiurge effects the production of the world: 
After which of the models (rrapaöel y/rara) did its architect (b Texrai vöIrevos) 
construct it [the cosmos]? Was it after that which is self-identical and uniform (rö 
Karin ravrä Kai woauTwg ixov), or after that which has come into existence? ... 
Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor (5771uioupy49) good, 
it is plain that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal (zrpds rd dfSiov). 4 
Plato places among the changeless Forms the rrapd8a ypra providing the 
cosmogonic pattern; this led later Platonists to identify, among perceived 
ambiguities in the Timaeus' account, two unresolved questions relevant to 
us. First, given that in Platonism generally it is the Intellect (voig) which 
contemplates the Form, what is the relation of the Timaean &Jploupydq 
to voü Second, in the relation of demiurge to paradigm, what is the 
relative status of intellectual perception to the existence of the Forms? 
Behind these questions lie more general methodological issues of the 
interpretation of the cosmogony: is this a factual description of the 
world's origination in time, or a myth symbolising eternally valid 
structures of cosmic causality? 5 
I E. g. Rep. VI 507C, 530A; Sophist 265C; Politicus 273B. 
2 Tim. 28C. Danielou, ppl08ff, points out the popularity of this particular text both in Middle 
Platonism and among the second-century Christian apologists. 
3 Gerson, pp79ff. 
4 Tim. 28C-29A. 
5 Cf below, pp83f, for the differing answers to this question proposed by Atticus and Alcinous. 
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The problem of exegetical method is significant in approaching Timaeus 
29E-37C, where Plato gives an account of the formation of the world and 
its soul. Acting out of complete `lack of envy (¢8övog)', that is, as a 
consequence of his overflowing goodness, `God (d Ocdq)' 1 makes a 
cosmos marked by rationality, which in turn implies ensoulment: 
So He constructed reason within soul (voUv !v cbvx-) and soul within body 
(buxrjv ev ouiprarr) as He fashioned the all (rö Iräv). 2 
The World Soul's existence is thus explained as a result of the fact that 
the world as a whole is a `living being (4"wov ev)'. 3 Yet this does not 
imply that soul is secondary; on the contrary, when Plato comes to the 
details of soul's formation, 4 he asserts that it is `older than body and prior 
in birth and excellence (Kai yEV¬c EI Kai dpETriý', 5 and in fact reverses 
the sequence of the language of origination used earlier as he now writes: 
When the construction of the soul had all been completed to the satisfaction of its 
Constructor, then He fabricated within it all the corporeal. 6 
Significantly for the subsequent elaboration of hierarchical systems of 
metaphysical reality, he adds at this point that the soul is a `participant in 
reasoning (Aoyto7toü perexouaa)', suggesting its own intermediate status 
betwen the corporeal and the rational. 
There is apparently a question in this passage regarding the relation of the 
`World Soul' (or `Soul of the All') to the various souls of individuals. 
This issue was to be important for later Platonism, 7 but Plato's own 
position is far from clear. Indeed, the question itself may not have been 
intelligible to him if he understood ciuXrj to mean a quality of `soulness' 
Timaeus 29E. The divinity here is presumably to be identified with the demiurge, but his aphthonic 
motivation was in later tradition to become a central metaphor for `undiminished giving' from the 
highest reality, i. e. the Good or One - below, p98 and n3. 2 Tim. 30B. 
3 Ibid., 30D. 
4 Ibid., 34B-37C. This follows an account (30C-34B) of the elemental creation of the physical world. 
5 Ibid, 34C. 
6 Ibid., 36E. 
Cf below, p91. 
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as much as an individual 'soul'. What we should note, though, is that two 
features of the understanding of soul in the earlier dialogues also mark the 
World Soul in Timaeus - namely, divinity, and vivifying power. 
It has been suggested that Plato adopted themes from ecstatic Greek 
mystery cults in his belief in the soul's divinity, ' but modified these by 
`replacing the emotional character of the ritual process with cognitive 
content'. 2 However, arguments for the immortality of the soul in the 
Phaedo are religiously informed in a broader sense than this. Plato relies 
on a spiritual insight centrally important to him: namely, that the 
immaterial is the indestructible since it cannot be broken up into parts. 
Hence, the soul is distinguished as `divine (rd OE ov)' from the body as 
`mortal (rd Ov, iröv)'. 3 This is then amplified in various ways, 
particularly by a long `affinity argument', seeking to show that the 
immaterial Forms can only be cognised by an immortal psychic reality .4 
Soul's divinity is thus dependent on the existence of higher levels of 
divine reality. Phaedo further defines the immanence of the soul's 
divinity by describing it as `that which causes the body in which it is to 
be alive (w äv ri eyyevgrai owüarr 4-j v eo rai)' .5 This vivifying role 
of soul, as a self-moving principle capable of initiating and sustaining 
movement in the lifeless, is developed in Phaedrus, 6 and is the 
background to the creative significance assigned by the Timaeus account 
to Soul in relation to the whole world. 7 
I Morgan, p235f, links this to an `Orphic-Pythagorean conglomerate' of worship, but his further 
proposal of influences from the cult of Dionysos is implausible. 
2 Morgan, p232. As this `cognitive content' allows the soul to realise its true nature, Morgan goes on 
to suggest that, for Plato, `The soul, in a sense, crosses the divide that separates the human from the 
divine; already divine to a degree, it seeks to perfect its divinity'. 
3 Phaedo 80A. 
° Gerson, p66. 
5 Phaedo 105C - cf also 105D: `If the soul takes possession of anything, it always brings life to it'. 6 E. g. Phaedrus 245C. 
Skemp, p117. This in turn raises the question of the relation of the world soul to the demiurge - cf 
below, ppl12f. 
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(c) God and the world in the philosophical tradition 
Plato's double distinction of the Forms, on one hand from the immanence 
of Soul, on the other from the transcendence of the One, already implies 
an outline threefold structure to be developed in the later tradition. To 
understand this development as exemplified by second-century Middle 
Platonism, we first consider the contributions of Aristotle and the Stoics. 
Aristotle 
Aristotle, by criticising the Platonic theory of Forms, ' implied a more 
immanent emphasis: to question the reality of Ideas separable from their 
instantiation in individual entities was to cut at the foundations of the 
structures of transcendence outlined above. Aristotle may have been 
aware of this implication, as he describes Platonism in hierarchical terms: 
The Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause 
of it in the Forms. 2 
Aristotle's own ontology, as it involved recognition of the specific reality 
of individuals, assigned to plurality a greater significance than that given 
it by Plato. 3 However, in subsequent Platonism another aspect of 
Aristotle's teaching was to prove more significant than this criticism of 
the theory of Forms: namely, the natural theology outlined in Book 
XII[A] of the Metaphysics. Here God is presented as the necessarily 
existing unmoved mover of the universe, 4 that reality whose potentiality 
is wholly realised in perfect actuality. For Aristotle, this means that God 
is best described as an eternal mind engaged in self-contemplation: 
Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of 
thinking (&rrv 4 vö, criq vorjCEwc v017o19). 5 
I This has been elegantly summarised thus: `In Aristotle's opinion, white things are prior to whiteness 
... 
In Plato's opinion, whiteness is prior to white things. ' (J Barnes (1982), p46). 
2 Metaphysics I[A]. vi. 9,988a11-12. 
3 For this, he was to be criticised by Plotinus - cf below, pp88,105. 4 Metaphysics XII[A]. vii. 2,1072a25. 
5 Ibid., ix. 4,1074b35. 
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Though he insisted that this God was not only eternal and immovable but 
also `separable (Kexwprcpevoq)i1 from the sensible realm, Aristotle used 
neither the language nor the concepts of Plato's transcendentalism as 
developed in Republic VI. Indeed, a passage towards the end of 
Metaphysics XII even appears to equivocate over the question of divine 
separability: 
We must also consider in which sense the nature of the universe contains the Good 
or the Supreme Good; whether as something separate and independent, or as the 
orderly arrangement of its parts. Probably in both senses, as an army does; for the 
efficiency of an army consists partly in the order and partly in the general. 2 
This suggestion is certainly ambiguous, and could be read as asserting a 
totally immanent sense of divinity alongside and balancing any 
transcendence. However, such an interpretation would scarcely cohere 
with the general teaching of the Metaphysics, and it is probable that 
Aristotle here merely intended to say that the effects of God, the Supreme 
Good, are to be likened to the orderliness of an army. In any case, it is 
important not to build too much on one passage; Aristotle's principal 
contribution to the philosophical tradition in theology was undoubtedly 
his theory of God as a self-regarding intellect causative of all motion. 
Stoicism 
When we turn from Aristotle to the Stoics, though, a more decidedly 
immanentist theology is to be found. The Stoic doctrine that God is to be 
identified within the processes of the world, and in particular to be 
discerned within humanity, is strikingly expressed in the words attributed 
to the early second-century teacher Epictetus: 
When you eat will you not remember who it is that is eating and whom you are 
feeding? 
... 
Don't you know that you are feeding God, exercising God? You carry 
God around with you, miserable creature, and do not know it. 3 
I Metaphysics 3f1[A] vä. 12,1073a7. 
2 Ibid., x. 1,1075a11. 
3 Discourses 11.8.11. 
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The background to such imagery was the belief that God was the 
principle of life activating every part of the cosmos, which was conceived 
as a giant organism bound together by a `sympathetic' affection of the 
parts and the whole. In particular, as God could be described as Adyog, 
the rational and shaping force of the cosmos, it was natural to emphasise 
His relation to human beings, who were His `offshoots' or kin. ' However, 
the Stoics did not link this to a belief in plurality - on the contrary, they 
stressed that, to the extent that beings shared in divinity through 
alignment to the divine l oyog, they shared in unity also. 2 So God was 
wholly and determinatively involved in the world as causal agent and 
moral arbiter, 3 and could be analysed materially as four basic elements - 
air, fire, earth, and water. Yet this did not imply a simple equation of God 
and the world, since within this fourfold scheme fire, the element of 
divinity, was the rjygiovzK v, the principle which permeated, organised, 
and vivified the inert elements of earth and water; present in pure form as 
A yos, its admixture with air constituted the rrvtüua ('breath' or `spirit'), 
which shared in divinity to the extent that it acted in accordance with the 
Aoyos Thus God, though wholly located in the world, was not entirely 
subject to the way the world is. It might be more appropriate to describe 
Stoicism as `panentheistic' rather than pantheistic: 
Nothing occurs on the earth apart from you, God, nor in the celestial realm nor on 
the sea, except what bad men do in their folly. 4 
Moreover, this theology could easily be linked to Platonism through the 
Stoic identification of the rrveüua in living beings with the bu, Yrj, that 
which penetrates tissues to make them live. This applied not only to 
I E. g. Epictetus, Discourses I. 14.6. 
2 Sandbach, p174, complains: `None of them attempts to meet the obvious psychological difficulty of 
a self that is one and yet divided'. But this is unfair - the Stoics had considered the issue of unity 
and plurality, and decided to emphasise the former as the marker of ultimate (divine) reality. 
3 Long, p137. 
Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus - cited in Long, p147. 
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individuals but also cosmically: `a breath penetrating and controlling and 
unifying the whole of the world. This unifying breath was the world's 
ciuXrj the world was a living being, as it had been for Plato in Timaeus'. ' 
Middle Platonism 
It is in Timaeus interpretation that we most easily trace the interplay of 
transcendence and immanence in `Middle Platonism', the eclectic phase 
of philosophy begun by Antiochus of Ascalon early in the first century 
BC. Turning from the prevalent scepticism, Antiochus was greatly 
influenced by both Aristoteleans and Stoics. 2 Two second-century Middle 
Platonists must be briefly discussed: Atticus and Alcinous. 
A `literalist' reading3 of the Timaeus as a description of the formation of 
the world in time was provided by Atticus, who explicitly rejected 
Aristotle while propounding a deeply Stoicised Platonism. According to 
the admittedly hostile witness of Proclus, Atticus `identified the demiurge 
with the Good itself :4 this suggests a fairly straightforward cosmological 
view, in which God Himself is directly responsible for the world's 
fashioning. 5 Moreover, Atticus apparently maintained that the `paradigm' 
on the basis of which God worked was outside, and inferior to, Himself - 
later, Porphyry was to criticise him for allegedly presenting the Platonic 
Ideas as `inert objects'. 6 Atticus' cosmogony, with its materialistic 
Sandbach, p75. However, Sandbach is misleading in describing this breath simply as 'God', which 
in Stoicism is rather to be identified with the fire of AdyoS 
2 Antiochus maintained that both Stoicism and Peripateticism were adaptations of Plato's teachings 
(Dillon (1977), pp20n), though he seems to have had little interest in metaphysics, and to have 
abandoned belief in the transcendentalism of Plato's Theory of Forms (Sandbach, p120). 
Atticus' approach has been described as `fundamentalist' (Wallis, p32), an assessment which dates 
back to P Henry in 1960, though he also pointed out the deeply religious, almost mystical, side of 
his work, characterised by its emphasis on 'faith (lriorlo' - Des Places (1977), p29. 
4 Proclus, Commentary on Timaeus' = Atticus, Fr. 12 (Des Places (1977), p7 1). Cf also Fr. 9.35 
(Des Places (1977), p69 = Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio Evangelica, XV. 13.5). 
5 O'Meara (1975), p31 describes Atticus' view as 'une cosmologie plus simple, une comprehension 
des relations entre les causes premieres ... 
fondle sur une interpretation plutöt litterale du Timee: 
Dieu apparait comme un artisan'. 
6 Porphyry describes the Ideas as being, for Atticus 'like the models of the statuette-makers' - quoted 
by Proclus, In Tim. 1.394.6 = Atticus, Fr. 28 (Des Places (1977), p77). ' 
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tendencies derived from Stoicism, ' was to have little direct influence on 
either Plotinus or Origen, but is nevertheless significant, both in that he 
was criticised by subsequent Neoplatonists and in that he provided a clear 
contrast to the transcendentally oriented philosophy of Alcinous. 
Two factors govern the interpretation of the Timaeus Alcinous presented 
in his Didaskalikos. First, there is an insistence on the transcendence of 
what he calls `the primary God (6 rrpwrog 0FÖs)'. 2 Developing Plato's 
remark that God is `more or less beyond description', 3 Alcinous declares: 
The primary God, then, is eternal, ineffable, `self-perfect' (deficient in no respect), 
`ever-perfect' (always perfect), and `all-perfect' (perfect in all respects). 4 
Naturally, Alcinous is unwilling to assign to this exalted `primary God' 
the menial task of fashioning the world: `teile est la perfection de 1'&e de 
Dieu qu'elle exclut de 1'activite divine les fonctions artisanales rapportees 
au Dieu-Demiurge'. 5 So he prefers a mythical reading of the narrative 
sections of Timaeus, 6 setting out the relation of. the demiurge and the 
world soul to the first God as follows: 
He [the first God] is Father through being the cause of all things and bestowing 
order on the heavenly Intellect and the soul of the world in accordance with 
Himself and His own thoughts. By His own will He has filled all things with 
Himself, rousing up the soul of the world and turning it towards Himself, as being 
the cause of its intellect. It is this latter that, set in order by the Father, itself 
imposes order on all of nature in this world. 7 
While some details of interpretation are unclear here, there is certainly a 
hierarchical scheme, in which the primal reality, referred to as `the 
Father', is distinguished from lesser levels of divinity, the demiurge and 
world soul, who are more intimately involved in the world. In Alcinous' 
Wallis, p31, cites as examples of Stoic influence: identification of `Nature' with `rational soul'; 
emphasis on a pre-existing World-soul; insistence on a temporal beginning of the current cosmos. 
2 Dillon (1993), p103, points out that Alcinous' theology here relates both to Aristotle's Unmoved 
Mover and to the Sun simile of Republic VI - cf above, pp79,72. 3 Did X. 164.8; cf Timaeus 28c - above, p76. ° Did X. 164.31-34. Cf also XIV. 16.35ff, where creation in time is denied. 
5 O'Meara (1975), p30 - cf Dillon (1977), pp283f. 
6 Tim. 26E itself distinguishes `invented fable' (piOog) from `genuine history' (dAriOi vöc Ai yoc). 
Did. X. 3.164.40-165.4. 
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near-contemporary Numenius of Apamaea, these elements of 
transcendence were yet more pronounced, the demiurge being marked off 
from the first God by the significant title `second god (8eürcpos (kds)'. 1 
The other important feature of Alcinous' (and Numenius') theology was 
their understanding of the primary God as being, or having, a mind. Here 
the influence of Aristotle's `thinking thinking thinking' is evident: 
Since the primary intellect is the finest of things, it follows that the object of its 
intelligising must also be supremely fine. But there is nothing finer than this 
intellect. Therefore it must be everlastingly engaged in thinking of itself and its 
own thoughts (Ta fauroü vorjyara de/ vooi rj), and this activity of it is Form. 2 
It was then inevitable that Alcinous should interpret the `paradigm' of the 
Timaeus, according to which the world was fashioned, through an 
understanding of the Forms as the `thoughts of God'. Indeed, so 
convinced is he of the causal dependence of the paradigm on this God's 
thinking that he even supplies a proof of the existence of the Platonic 
Forms by deduction from the givenness of a thinking divinity: 
Whether God is an intellect or is possessed of intellect, He has thoughts, and these 
are eternal and unchanging; and if this is the case, forms exist. 3 
For Alcinous, then, divine transcendence - for which the symbol of 
paternity is used - is associated with God's supra-paradigmatic status, so 
that this phase of Middle Platonism involves a transfer to the primal 
divinity of the transcendent motifs first found in Plato's theory of Forms: 
Quelles sont les proprietes que le moyen platonisme attribue ä son Dieu supreme? 
... avant tout 
les proprietes par lesquelles Platon caracterisait le royaume des Idees. 4 
Both Plotinus and Origen were heirs to this complex Middle Platonist 
inheritance, developing transcendentalist tendencies alongside the themes 
of immanence. How this involved them in a trinitarian dynamic is seen 
from comparing their analysis of dpxai to that of the earlier tradition. 
I Fr. 15 - Des Places (1973), p56. 
2 Did. X. 3.164.27-31. 
3 Did. IX. 3.163.31ff. 
Nemeshegyi, p 19. 
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(d) First principles in Plotinus and Origen 
The second-century Middle Platonists were in general content to propose 
from the tradition before them a plurality (generally three) of dpXai as 
primary explanatory principles for reality. ' Alcinous, for example, lists 
them as follows: 
Matter constitutes one principle, but Plato postulates others also - the paradigmatic, 
that is the forms, and that constituted by God the father and cause of all things. 2 
In contrast to this simple, unranked enumeration of different senses of 
4 rj, by the late third century philosophy generally prepared to 
recognise only one final cause of reality. This change in thinking can be 
seen from both pagans' and Christians' criticisms of their predecessors. 
So, for example, within the philosophical tradition, Plotinus' disciple 
Porphyry strongly attacks Atticus for incoherently proposing `a 
multiplicity of interconnected dpXar' .3 
Equally, from the side of Christian theology, Eusebius of Caesarea has to 
defend Origen against his critic Marcellus of Ancyra by insisting: 
[He] knew only one ingenerate cp, '4, without beginning and above all things - one 
principle, who is the Father of the unique Son by whom all things were made'. 4 
This contrast of attitudes a century apart highlights the philosophical and 
theological tension within which Origen and Plotinus were both 
operating. 
A triad of (1) God, the cause by whom all things were made; (2) matter, the substance from which 
all things were made; and (3) the Forms (Ideas), the exemplary patterns accor ' to which all 
things were made, can be traced back at least to Eudorus of Alexandria (mid-1st century BC) - 
Dillon (1977), p136, quoting also the view of Theiler that it goes back to Antiochus of Ascalon. 
2 Did. IX. 1.163.11 - Dillon (1993), pp93ff suggests that Stoic theories may have influenced the 
formulation of the three-archai system as a response to criticisms of Plato by Aristotle. The three 
principles could be expressed thus: oü (matter) - KaO'b (ideas) - 6q'o5 (God), yielding a so- 
called `metaphysic of prepositions' - also in Latin, in Varro's schema: a quo - de qua - secundum 
quod. Cf Augustine, De Civ. Dei VII. 2, and comments of Dillon (1977), p95. 
3 I. e. `Matter, the Demiurge, and the Ideas' - In Tim. 1.391.6ff - quoted in Dillon (1977), p255. 
4 Eusebius, Contra Marcellum 1.4, quoted by Crouzel & Simonetti, I, p13. Marcellus had claimed 
that Origen's öpXaf were none other than the several philosophical causal principles described 
above (p85 n2) - cf below, p123. 
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On one hand, their pupils Eusebius and Porphyry express a metaphysical 
culture marked by a recognition of transcendence which could ultimately 
allow space for only one cause of reality. This fact emphasises the extent 
to which, for pagans and Christians alike, the third century was a period 
of increasing emphasis on divine transcendence. 
On the other hand, Plotinus and Origen had both themselves inherited a 
phase of Platonism which, as a result of its eclectic conjunction of 
different understandings of causality, had been markedly more pluralist in 
its approach to first principles. It is important to understand the character 
of this pluralism: despite the hostile imputations of Porphyry and 
Marcellus, the Middle Platonists had at no stage really propounded a 
simultaneous multiplicity of causes, which could be construed as 
potentially competing causal principles Rather, they had used the 
methodology of three dpXcri as providing alternative and complementary 
analyses of causality. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that both Plotinus and Origen, in different 
ways, seek to make explicit the implications of the tradition, through 
bringing these complementary analyses into an ontological ordering in 
terms of hypostatic relations. It may be that this reflects the fact that they 
shared (at different times) in receiving instruction from a common 
teacher, the distinguished Platonist Ammonius Saccas. 1 It is certainly 
tempting to try to trace detailed influences of his teaching in his two 
pupils' thought, but a survey of modem scholarship on this question 
concludes pessimistically concerning Ammonius: 
We know almost nothing of him, and efforts to reconstruct the content of his 
teaching in any significant detail have repeatedly met with shipwreck. 2 
1 Eusebius, Hist. Eca XIX 12; Porphyry, Vita Plotini iii. 
2 Dillon (1977), p380. 
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In any case, both writers do explicitly seek to reconcile three principles 
having in some sense the status of dpxaI with a belief in one final source 
of reality; both of them also use the terminology of `monad' to refer to 
this ultimately undifferentiated first principle. In the case of Origen, there 
is the additional complication of a dual source of pluralist language: 
besides the prepositional triad of causes proposed by philosophical 
tradition, biblical and ecclesial faith spoke of a personal Trinity of Father, 
Son, and Spirit. It is in the exploration of these tensions that we may look 
to find the key to the development of Trinitarian thinking in Origen, and 
of such analogues of trinitarianism as there may be in Plotinus. 
In Plotinus, this agenda of the reconciliation of plurality and unity is 
evident in the title of Ennead V. 1,17Ept TWv TplalV dpXIK v 
ürrooTdcrewv, and we will focus particularly on that treatise; but, as the 
structures presented there underlie the whole of his system, we will also 
draw on other parts of the Enneads. In the case of Origen similarly, the 
most important text is the IIFpi dpXwv (or De Principiis), but 
interpretation of this requires reference to other parts of the corpus, 
especially the apologetic treatise Contra Celsum, in which Origen 
engaged in sustained debate with a distinguished practitioner of `Middle 
Platonist' philosophical paganism. So, while no detailed structural 
correspondence can be established between De Principiis and the 
Enneads, ' we may expect the working out of the themes of transcendence 
and immanence, of one absolute dpXrj and several qpXIKO'g realities, of 
unity and plurality, to generate parallels in thinking suggestive of the 
possibilities for trinitarian dialogue between Christianity and any 
religious system built, like the Platonist philosophical tradition, on 
inference around the idea of an ultimately simple monad. 
' Cf Crouzel & Simonetti, I, p19, on Kübel's attempt to establish such a detailed correspondence. 
PATRISTIC 88 
2-24 
2 Plotinus: the three primary hypostases 
(a) Soul in the hypostatic hierarchy 
The theory of a three-layered hierarchy underlying and causative of all 
reality, implicit throughout Plotinus' thought, is clearly presented in 
Ennead V. 1[10], 1 in three stages. First, through philosophical exposition 
Plotinus rises from humanity's state of alienation here below to recognise 
the true nature of Soul (Chs 1-2), beyond this Soul's `upper neighbour', 
Intellect (3-4), and finally the One which is the source of Intellect (5-7). 
Second, a doxographical section (8-9) justifies Plotinus' theory as the 
authentic teaching of Plato and Parmenides, and criticises the errors of 
Aristotle. Third is an exhortation (10-12) to turn inwards, where Soul, 
Intellect, and the One may be found within the self. 
V. 1.9 shows how the system grows from the tensions outlined above of 
unity and plurality, transcendence and immanence. Aristotle is rebuked for 
suggesting several intelligible dpXai, as this would lead to chaos: 
If each is [a] primary principle, the primary principles will be a random assembly; 
and why will they be a community and in agreement on one work? 2 
Rather, Plotinus insists, the äpxai must derive from one first principle; as 
Aristotelean voüs for him implies plurality, he then relegates Intellect to a 
level subordinate to this first principle. ' The criticism of Aristotle here may 
be unfair, but it shows the essential dynamic of Plotinus' thought in 
relation to the tradition before him. Rejecting any suggestion of archic 
plurality, his emphasis on transcendence leads him to develop a 
hierarchical account of reality. 
It is probable that Porphyry put V. 1 at the head of his fifth Ennead because he felt that it provided 
a good introduction to the system of the three hypostases (Atkinson, px). 
2 Enn. V. 1 [1O]. 9.23-26. Plotinus is here criticising Aristotle's arguments in Metaphysics XII[A]. 
3 Ibid., 7.28. 
4 Cf above, p86. 
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In the doxography of V. 1, Plotinus justifies such a hierarchy by several 
references to Plato. First, there is an obscure phrase from Epistle II: 
Related to the King of All are all things, and for His sake they are, and of all things 
fair He is the cause. And related to the Second are the second things; and related to 
the Third the third. ' 
This is a favourite text with Plotinus to confirm the validity of a three-fold 
metaphysical system. 2 Then follow citations of Timaeus and Republic 
justifying the distinction of the first principle (here called `the Good') from 
Intellect, 3 before Plotinus returns to textual support for the whole triadic 
scheme. This he finds in the tradition of `theological' interpretation of 
Plato's Parmenides, 4 identifying three levels of divine reality marked by 
increasing plurality. Verbal phrases are drawn from the subjects of the 
dialogue's hypotheses to show on successive levels a successively greater 
admixture of multiplicity with unity: 
But Parmenides in Plato speaks more accurately, ' and distinguishes from each other 
the first One, which is more properly called One (To 17Pwrov ev, ö Kupcwrcpov 
tv), and the second which he calls `One-Many' (1v rro Aa), and the third, `One and 
Many' (v Kai rro Ad). In this way he too agrees with the doctrine of the three 
natures (Ouavg rpcis). 6 
In this passage, Plotinus refers to the different levels of reality as `natures', 
but they are more commonly denominated (as in the title) 'hypostases'. 
This does not have a technically precise meaning for Plotinus - as it was to 
come to have for his disciple Porphyry' - but apparently means just a 
reality existing in a defined way clearly distinguished from the existence of 
' Bury, p411. 
2 It is cited on at least nine occasions in the Enneads: cf in particular 1.81511.21-32, where it is 
applied to Intellect which `moves around' the Good, and Soul which `dances round' Intellect. 
3 Enn. V. 1[10]. 8.4-12. Cf below, p101. 
4 Cf above, p74. 
5 I. e., more accurately than the historical Parmenides, whose text rd ydp aJTd voet v Zo-rl TE- Kai 
,J vat (Diels B8 - see further below, p116) he has just quoted, and criticised on the grounds that 
this Parmenidean `One' is in fact affected by plurality. 
6 Enn. V. 1[10]. 8.24-27. 
Corrigan, p123n11. 
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other hypostases. ' Plotinus indeed seems to have emphasised the 
sharpness of the hypostatic distinctions differently at different points in his 
thinking. For example, the short treatise next after V. 1 speaks more freely 
of continuity between levels of reality2 but later Plotinus seems to have 
written a short work specifically to reinforce the importance of 
distinguishing clearly between first and second hypostases. ' In general, 
though, whatever degree of precision be evident in the boundaries he 
draws, the terminology of `hypostasis' shows the substantial reality of 
differences between the constituent parts of his system, and thus implies a 
`theology' positing the existence of multiple and distinct divine entities. 
So there is a twofold significance to plurality in Plotinus' hierarchy: 
degrees of internal plurality are the criteria by which one hypostasis is 
distinguished from another, while the clarity of those distinctions show the 
hypostases themselves to be plural to the number of three. To explore this 
double plurality, we turn to the content of the three hypostases system - 
respectively, Soul (bux, f), Intellect (vouc), and the One or the Good (To 
ev or ra'yaOov). As our subsequent discussion of Plotinus' account of 
plenitude will focus mainly on Intellect and the One, in what follows now 
we will consider Soul at greater length than the other two. 
In terms of the history of ideas, these can be plausibly related to different 
strands in the eclectic philosophical tradition which Plotinus inherited - 
Soul in its immanence influenced by Stoicism, Plotinus' account of 
Intellect building on a critique of Aristotle's `self-thinking mind', the 
' Cf the discussion of the üirocrräcErs of different numbers in Enn. V1.6[34]. 5. 
2 E. g. Enn. V. 2[11]. 1.22: `Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it'. This follows 
V. 1 [ 101 both chronologically and in Porphyry's arrangement. 
3 Enn. V. 6[24]: `On The Fact That That Which Is Beyond Being Does Not Think, And On What Is 
The Primary And What The Secondary Thinking Principle' - Armstrong, V, p200 suggests this 
was written to counter `immanentist' misunderstandings of its predecessor, VI. 4-5[22-23]. 
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supreme One justified by the transcendentalism of Plato's dialogues. ' In 
Plotinus' own understanding, though, the teaching of three hypostases was 
central to Plato's thought, which he naturally approached as a philosopher 
formed by the concerns and assumptions of `Middle Platonism'. 
Soul 
The lowest of the three spiritual realities to be accorded the status of 
`hypostasis' in the Enneads is Soul (Iiuxrj), which may refer either to 
individual souls or to the World Soul - in this context, Plotinus refers to the 
latter as the `Soul of the All' or `the great soul (rj pEycM 17 cbuxrý)'. 2 The 
relation between these two is discussed extensively by Plotinus. He argues 
against the suggestion that our souls `come from (tK)' or `are part of 
(Erzpos)' the Soul of the All, 3 on the grounds that such formulations would 
imply divisibility, and hence materiality, on the part of soul. Rather, their 
relationship as rational entities must be described thus: 
That which is called a part will be the same as the whole, not a part of the whole 
(TC7ÜTOV (M, 4, OÜ 1! £poS TOÜ ÖAOU) 4 
In bodily existence, things are separated from one another, `one here and 
another there', 5 but cbuXrj has omnipresence, so the World Soul is present 
entire in each individual soul. In other words, precisely because they are 
not on a -corporeal level, the souls of individuals and the World Soul `are 
really all one and can be seen as manifestations of what one might call the 
general stock of soul'. 6 In developing his account of this hypostasis, 
Plotinus emphasises two features which we earlier observed to be 
' Henry, plv. Cf above pp8l, 79,73. 
2 Enn. V. 1[10]. 2.14 
3 Enn. IV. 3[27]. 1.17,26. 
4 Ibid., 3.30. 
5 Enn. V. 1[10]. 2.33. 
6 Blumenthal, p28. 
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prominent in Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and Phaedrus: namely, 
Soul's vivifying power and its divinity. 
Having in mind the powerful account in Phaedrusl of the soul's 
immortality and its role as the source of life and movement in the universe, 
Plotinus insists that the soul which comes to know itself truly will 
recognise its innate dignity: 
[It] grants life in the whole universe ... all soul 
is present everywhere. 2 
This life-giving function of the soul is developed by Plotinus in the very 
early treatise IV. 7[2]. 3 Here he argues at length against the Stoic view that 
soul is itself material, on the grounds that the production of life by the 
`coming together (oz voöog)' of lifeless elements would be absurd. Yet it 
is possible that the Plotinian theory of World Soul was in fact significantly 
influenced by Stoic psychology, which he fairly summarises as follows: 
Breath has a mind in it and fire is intelligent (evvouv rd rrveüpa Kai Pup voEpov), 
as without breath and fire the higher part of reality could not exist. 5 
Plotinus indeed rejects this pneumatology, which would imply that soul 
arose from the natural `life principle (Oudis)', 6 as this would reverse the 
actual priority of soul over matter. He concludes: 
Soul, then, is not like breath or like body (oüx äpa oürws ybuXrj ws rrvvü)ia ouö' 
ais ouifra). 
However, while disowning the aspect of materiality, Plotinus emphasises 
Soul's universally vivifying power: it `permeates passive matter, giving it 
structure, cohesion, order in every respect and detail'. 8 This language may 
Phaedrus 245C2-246A2 (Fowler, pp469ff). 
2 Enn. V. 1[10] 2.13,38. 
3 `On the Immortality of the Soul'. Armstrong, IV, p336, describes this as the most `scholastic' of 
all Plotinus' writings. 
4 Enn. IV. 7[2]. 2.16-17. 
5 Ibid., 4.3-6. Cf above, p81. 
6 Blumenthal, p11n7, summarises the Stoic schema, presupposed here, of rs- ia[S ýiuxrj, an 
ascending sequence of the structural principles of inorganic, organic and animate matter 
respectively. 
7 Enn. IV. 7[2]. 83.23. 
8 O'Meara (1995), p18. 
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show direct influence from the Stoa, or it may merely reflect the 
ambiguous character of soul in the Phaedo and other Platonic texts. ' In 
any case, `Soul' is for Plotinus an animating principle intimately integrated 
into the world; although it is the lowest of his `Three Hypostases', he 
insists that its status is divine. Soul is `more honourable than everything 
which is body' - indeed, as it is the cause of the gods' own being, it is `a 
divinity senior to them (rrpwQßuTepav Oedv aiTwv)'. 2 Intellect in turn is 
then described as Soul's `upper neighbour, more divine than this divine 
thing (TOD Bß'1 oÜ TOUTOU B£t ÖT£pov), after which and from which Soul 
comes". 3 This must be understood within the context of Greek thought, in 
which sharp divisions were not drawn between a Creator God and His 
creation; still, it suggests that Plotinus' whole tri-hypostatic system is one 
of hierarchical plurality `immanent' (in the trinitarian sense) to the divine. 
Situated on the boundary of the intelligible and the sensible worlds, Soul 
shares to a certain extent in both: 
It occupies a middle rank among realities (Er¬arig rags tv To-is odcrzv), belonging 
to that divine part but being on the lowest edge of the intelligible, and having a 
common boundary with the perceptible nature. ' 
This sense of `dual citizenship' is a significant feature of Plotinus' account 
of his third hypostasis; we may identify several aspects as having 
particular consequences for our understanding of his overall system. 
While Soul's involvement in the material world points to an immanent 
dimension of divinity, its contemplation of the Forms sets alongside this an 
element of transcendence. This tension of transcendence and immanence is 
reflected in some of the language Plotinus uses to describe the constitution 
I Cf above, pp82,77. 
2 Enn. V. 1[10]. 2.43-47. 
3 Ibid., 3.5-6. 
4 Enn. IV. 8[6]. 7.6-8. 
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of the soul, though this is an area of great complexity. ' When speaking 
figuratively of soul's `descent (KaOööoq)' into bodies, he insists: 
Our soul does not come down altogether, but there is always something of it (Ti 
az3Tffc) in the intelligible. 2 
In later Neoplatonism, Plotinus' theory of the semi-transcendence of the 
soul was to be abandoned because of the difficulties it was felt to raise; 3 
yet, however those difficulties are to be resolved, in the context of his own 
thought his emphasis on only a partial descent seems to be a consequence 
of the strong doctrine he holds of the soul's divinity. 
Plotinus' language of `descent' is more guarded in relation to the World 
Soul than in speaking of individual souls. Thus, he says: 
That which is called the Soul of the All has not become engaged in the worse kind 
of work, and, having no experience of evils (diTaOe Kam v), considers what lies 
below it contemplatively (Oewpfg). 4 
It is thus particularly in speaking of the World Soul that he stresses the 
status of divinity; this status both guarantees the creativity of the third 
hypostasis - it can `receive from There (txei9Fv) and at the same time 
distribute here (! vra(Oa)i5 - and also protects it, as we shall see, from too 
much involvement in that artisanal activity which Plotinus consistently 
ranks below contemplation in dignity. 6 
In the case of individuals, the haziness of the boundary between Soul and 
Intellect raises a question expressed by Blumenthal thus: `Does the 
individual exist as such only at the level of the Soul, or can he be found in 
the world of Nous as well? '7 He points out that this is equivalent to asking 
whether Plotinus believed in Ideas of individuals as well as of species. In 
I Blumenthal, pp20-45: Plotinus sometimes uses a bipartite, sometimes a tripartite, analysis. 
2 Enn. IV. 8[6]. 8.4. 
3 E. g. Proclus, Elements of Theology Prop. 211. 
Enn. IV. 8 [61.7.27. 
5 ibid., 7.32. 
6 Cf below, p113. 
Blumenthal, pp112. 
PATRISTIC 95 
2-1A 
so far as we can associate the idea of `personality" with that of 
individuality, an affirmative answer suggests personality as a significant 
component of the second hypostasis; otherwise, its primary locus remains 
the third hypostasis. Unfortunately, the evidence of the Enneads is 
contradictory: ideas of individuals are affirmed in some texts2 but denied in 
others; 3 nor is it possible to trace a consistent pattern in the movement of 
Plotinus' thought either towards or away from such an affirmation. To 
assess the status of `personality' in Plotinus' system, we need to realise 
that this is a modern concept, grounded in two functions - action and 
thought - which for him are quite distinct. Thus, if personality is expressed 
in terms of `doing', then it reaches no higher than the level of Soul. We 
5 return later to his view of personality as constituted by 'thinking. 
Intellect and the One 
The first level of divine reality higher than Soul is Intellect. Corresponding 
to the definition of the Parmenidean third as `one and many (Ev Kai 
rroAAa')', Plotinus identifies this as the `one-many (v rroaaa)': compared 
to Soul, Intellect has a greater degree of unity. We examine later how the 
relation of this unity with plurality is conceived at the noetic level; at this 
point it is important to note the mediating position occupied by Intellect's 
symbiosis of unity and plurality, between Soul's plurality-with-unity and 
the unqualified unity of the One. The difference of Intellect from Soul 
appears in that, while the vision of the world afforded by the latter 
constantly changes from one focus to another, the former embraces the 
The senses of `personality' which interest us are of course those used in a Trinitarian context (cf 
above, p38) - while some form of individuation is necessary for this, personality conveys more 
than just individual existence, though for Plotinus it is not an ultimate category (below, p120). 
2 Especially Enn. V. 7[181.1. 
3 E. g. Enn. V. 9[5]. 12, V1.5[23]. 8. 
° Blumenthal, ppl31ff. 
5 Below, p117. 
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whole intelligible world in one single timeless vision. ' Correspondingly, 
Intellect's perception is of the Forms of beings (for a Platonist, of their true 
reality), rather than Soul's limitation to images - indeed, Intellect itself is 
described by Plotinus as the `Form (ei8os)' of Soul. 2 This in turn means 
that Intellect's relation to what it perceives is different from that of Soul to 
its corresponding objects; it is in this very difference that Plotinus 
characteristically locates the greater degree of unity of the noetic level. 
Having explained Intellect as the source of Soul's existence, Plotinus goes 
on to ask of the former: `Who begat this god? ', to which he answers: `the 
One'. His argument is that, as Intellect is to some degree `plural (rroaüs)', 
it must derive from some `simple (drraoüs) god' prior to and causative `of 
this multiplicity (rrpd rorociTOU rra l Ooug)' .3 
This first and simple reality, 
the One, is the generative principle at the heart of Plotinus' tri-hypostatic 
system. To assess how well that system is described as `trinitarian', we 
look first at relations between hypostases before going on to consider the 
characteristics of trinitarian pluralism for individual hypostases. Having 
already outlined the hypostatic constitution of Soul, we will in both cases 
focus on the One and Intellect; in their relations with one another and in 
their internal life, all the critical questions of plurality will appear. How 
then does Plotinus depict the relation between his first two hypostases? 
Emanation 
We cannot here survey the complexities of Plotinus' account of so-called 
`emanation', nor assess its overall coherence. This would in fact be a 
difficult task, since the Enneads describe the process through a series of 
' Enn. V. 1[10]. 4.17ff. 
2 Ibid., 3.21. 
3 Ibid., 5.4-6. 
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metaphors - light emerging from the sun, 
' a spring feeding a river, 2 a root 
spreading life through a great tree, 3 and so on - rather than in the technical 
language of philosophical analysis. Whatever metaphor is pressed into 
service, however, the transcendent simplicity of the One is safeguarded 
through what has been described as the `principle of undiminished giving'. 
Plotinus' assumptions are summarised by Bussanich as the two axioms: 
(i) That as source or root the One remains in itself as a self-abiding, transcendent 
reality that is undiminished by what proceeds or derives from it, and 
(ii) That the One as a great power generates lesser realities, but does not function as 
a spermatic beginning which evolves into a greater reality. 4 
The latter part of the thesis distinguishes Plotinus from a Stoic-derived 
viewpoint which would have the implication that the diverse and plural 
levels of reality further removed fr om the root or spring were to be 
understood as actualisation of earlier potentialities, i. e. that multiplicity 
was of higher, because more developed, status than unity. For Plotinus, by 
contrast, the valency of the relationship is reversed: the rivers which flow, 
the branches which spread, in different directions continue to depend for 
their life on the spring, the root, which feeds them; meanwhile, the water, 
the sap, of the latter remain unreduced in quality and potency, and the 
spring, the root, can be clearly separated from the river, the branches. Thus 
we see that the relationship between the hypostases is inherently unequal: 
the second is subordinate to the first, from which it is clearly distinguished. 
Communication 
Viewed from the perspectives of giver and of receiver, `undiminished 
giving' is seen as `communication' and `participation' respectively. The 
former - expressed by the verb I-t, raöiö vat - marks reality at every level: 
I E. g. Enn. V. 3[49]. 12. 
2 Enn. III. 8[30]. 10.5-10. 
3 Ibid., 11-13. 
4 Bussanich, p108 (on Enn. I11.8[30]. 10). 
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When anything comes to perfection, we see that it produces, and does not endure to 
remain by itself, but makes something else. ' 
It follows of course that the same productive communication will pre- 
eminently characterise the very first principle of all: 
How then could the most perfect, the first Good, remain itself as if it grudged 
(bOovrjcav) to give of itself... when it is the productive power of all things? 2 
This refers to Plato's vision in the Timaeus of God shaping the world from 
the abundance of His bounty, the divine goodness implying a complete 
absence of `envy (08övos)' .3 Plotinus' particular contribution is, to 
explain the freedom which entitles the higher power to express this 
absence of gOövoq through a theory of `double activity'. In a context 
where he is addressing specifically the question how Intellect comes into 
being from the unchanging One, he explains this as follows: 
In each and every thing there is an activity ( vFpyera) which belongs to substance 
(Tjjs odoldg) and one which goes out from substance (ZK- rrTs oüQfaq); and that 
which belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing, and 
the other activity derives from the first one, and. must in everything be a 
consequence of it, different from the thing itself. 4 
To illustrate this distinction, Plotinus cites the example of the heat which 
remains in a fire as opposed to the warmth which goes out from it. This 
model allows him to depict plurality issuing out of the very activity of the 
One without affecting the latter's unity. It also suggests that the hypostatic 
processions of the Plotinian trinity have about them a certain necessary 
character. However, alongside this must be set the discussion in Ennead 
VI. 8 of the `will (ßodAgoiS)' of the One, in which Plotinus acknowledges 
that the idea of a will in the first hypostasis raises complex issues of 
freedom and constraint. On one hand, to allow for the possibility of choice 
I Enn. V. 4[7]. 1.27. 
2 Ibid., 35. 
3 Tim. 29E2 - cf above, p76. Plato may here be expressly contesting the archaic Greek commonplace 
rd 6eiov «IovEpdv, that the divine is `grudging' in the bestowal of good things (Taylor, ad loc., 
p78). Plotinus takes up the theme of the absence of 00dvosin Enn. IV. 8[6], an early treatise. 
4 Enn. V. 4[71.2.27. 
PATRISTIC 99 
2-24 
for the One is to permit an unacceptable element of duality into its primal 
unity. ' On the other hand, the determination of the One which an absence 
of choice implies must be understood `not in any sense of being under 
compulsion (oüx dvdyxrjS)'. 2 Rist suggests that the solution of this 
problem lies in saying that `the One is as it is because it wills to be so', 
and hence that `emanation is necessary because the One wills it to be so. 
So it seems that - in common with much ancient thought - Plotinus' 
concern is not so much to safeguard an absolute freedom as to insist on the 
absence of any external compulsion. `Will' as applied to the One can only 
be a metaphor, as it relates to the level of choice in activity lying beneath 
the One; so Plotinus always uses the phrase `as if (oiöv)' in speaking of 
the first hypostasis4 - his voluntaristic language cannot be taken as a 
personal attribute. Meanwhile, the model of communication by evepyeta 
shows that his hypostatic system has a strong sense of internal necessity: 
the nature of reality is such that its structure could not be otherwise. 
Participation 
From the perspective of the lower reality, `communication' corresponds to 
`participation', for which Plotinus uses the synonymous verbs , u, -ra- 
Acx pßävei v and prEreXEl v. 5 These are terms originally used by Plato to 
bridge the gap between a Form and the particulars which are its objects - 
for example, something is `small' by participating in `smallness' .6 
Even at 
this level, `participation' has about it a structure paralleling the unipolar 
, Enn. VI. 8[39]. 8.1-11. 
2 Ibid., 9.11. 
3 Rist, p82, where he criticises the suggestion of Henry that Plotinus is basically a pantheist. 
4 Enn. V1.8[39]. 13.50. 
5 These occur 83 and 77 times respectively in the Enneads, the corresponding nominal forms 
pETdA, 7 bIsand peOf f rs/pEroxrj31 and 11 times respectively - Sleeman & Pollet, pp648-654. 
6 Phaedo 102B1-2 - Fowler, p350, using jieTthl op/3d vety. The form peOe iris found in the opening 
sections of the Parmenides, where it forms the basis of a series of dilemmas propounded to 
Socrates by the older philosopher - cf Allen, ppl 13-127. 
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dynamic of giving noted above -a `formative principle which has 
descended from the Idea while leaving its source undiminished'. ' 
However, Plotinus extends the concept of participation beyond its original 
Platonic scope to make it serve as a general pattern for the involvement of 
all reality in the unifying power of the divine. This theme, later emphasised 
particularly by his disciple Porphyry ,2 
is most developed in Ennead VI. 4- 
5.3 Here, Plotinus' point of departure is as follows: 
If one were to consider the participation of matter in the Forms (rrj v rrjs AA rjq Tw v 
c18cuv/JETdAr, 7(prv), one would be more inclined to have confidence in what is being 
said and not to disbelieve it as impossible or continue to be puzzled about it. 4 
He then ascends from this to the dependence of all things on the First, 
which, retaining the integrity of its perfection, is yet immediately present 
to them. This is so if the first hypostasis is to be described as the One: 
[It] would not come to be in another; but those other things hang from it as if by 
their longing they had found where it is. And this is `Love camping on the 
doorstep', even coming from the outside into the presence of beauty and longing for 
it, and satisfied if in this way he can have a part (pETaqXETv) in it. ' 
It is equally true if the first is described as the Good: 
With our souls we touch the Good. For I do not touch one good and you another, 
but the Same .6 
In this way, `participation' becomes a general term for the `reception of 
unity by lower entities' .7 The polarity of the 
language shows that, even in 
stressing the continuity between the hypostases, Plotinus still emphasises 
their mutual inequality. This follows for him from the One's trans- 
cendence; so we next look at what he says about this first hypostasis in its 
own reality, as distinct from considering it in its relation to the second. 
' Meijer, p65. 
2 Armstrong, VI, p271. 
3 `On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole'. Porphyry records that this 
is the first treatise written by his master after he joined him - Vita Plotini v. 
Enn. VI. 5[231.8.1-3. 
5 Ibid., 10.1-5. The quotation is from Plato, Symposium 203C6-D3. 
6 Ibid., 10.26-32. 
Meijer, p95. 
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(b) The transcendence of the One 
Though Plotinus is reverentially hesitant about the application of any 
language to the ineffable One, ' Ennead V. 1 in fact provides a convenient 
thesaurus of the titles by which he refers to this hypostasis, in his remarks 
on the text quoted above2 from Plato's Epistle II: 
Plato says that all things are threefold `about the king of all' - he means the primary 
realities ... But 
he also says that there is a `father of the cause', meaning Intellect by 
`the cause' ... And the 
father of Intellect which is the cause he calls the Good and 
3 that which is beyond Intellect and `beyond being'. 
As the first hypostasis is generative of the entire Plotinian tri-hypostatic 
system, so analysis of these titles will be critical for an assessment of how 
far the hypostases exhibit trinitarian characteristics. In particular, we will 
see that they raise issues of the scope of personality within the hypostases, 
of the absence of plurality as a marker of transcendence, and of the 
designation of the One as infinite, with the implications this raises of 
inequality within the primary triad. 
`King' and `Father' 
Plotinus begins by using two apparently anthropomorphic designations for 
his first hypostasis - `king' and `father'. The former, derived in this 
instance from its occurrence in the text of Epistle II, is clearly designed to 
serve as a metaphor for the supreme position of the One as ultimate Ruler 
of the hierarchies of being, beginning with Intellect, which derive from 
Him - elsewhere, for example, freely adapting Plato's description in 
Republic VI" of the Good's transcendence over the world of the Forms 
and of Being, Plotinus writes: 
Often, he reverentially avoids direct naming of it, using instead some merely grammatical referent 
as t`KEivos, `that one'. 
2 Above, p89. 
3 Enn. V. 1[10]. 8.1-8. 
4 Rep. VI 509B - cf also above, p72. = !''. 
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The first activity, which, so to speak, flows from it [the One] like a light from the 
sun, is Intellect and the whole Intelligible nature, but he himself [the One], staying 
still at the summit of the intelligible, rules (ßaulAEÜEI v) over it. ' 
If kingship is for Plotinus an expression of metaphysical supremacy, 
fatherhood symbolises causality. In the text from V. 1 we are discussing, he 
introduces the fatherhood of the One as the end term in a causal chain 
which stretches down through Intellect. Again, his thought shows the 
influence of Republic VI, 2 and also of the Platonic epistles. 3 In fact, as an 
image of causality, paternity in the Enneads can be used both - as here - to 
express the relation of the One to Intellect, and also - as probably at the 
beginning of the treatise on the `Three Hypostases'4 - to represent the 
generation by Intellect of Soul. We may therefore say that it represents not 
only causality as such but also the inequality implicit for the classical 
world in the relationship of Father to Son. We saw earlier how this 
enabled a Middle Platonist like Alcinous to use paternity as a symbol of 
divine transcendence; 5 in a passage in V. 1 where he interprets the myth of 
Zeus' birth from Kronos in terms of the generation of Soul from Intellect, 
Plotinus makes explicit the assumption underlying this attitude: 
Offspring could not be better than it [parent] (this is not so even here below) but 
had to be a lesser image of it. 6 
Kingship and fatherhood, then, both function within the hypostatic 
hierarchy as metaphors for the inequality implicit in metaphysical 
superiority and causation respectively. Nevertheless, it is striking that, 
despite his repeated insistence on the irreducibly indescribable and 
I Enn. V. 3[49]. 12.42. 
2 Rep. VI 508B: the sun, the cause of sight, is itself child of the Good. 
3 Atkinson, p188, cites Ep. VI 323d3-6. 
4 Enn. V. 1[101.1.1, ybuXdg irarpds OEoü 17r6ia8¬a8ai. Atkinson, ad loc., refers rrarrfp here to 
voüs, but it could equally mean ro IN Other passages in Plotinus, though, clearly describe the 
Intellect-Soul relationship by the imagery of Father-Child - e. g. see n6 below. 
5 Above, p84. 
6 Enn. V. 1[10]. 7.39 and Armstrong, note ad loc. Plotinus is here talking in the context of Intellect's 
generation of Soul, ciu ,)v ycvvg voü5-. 
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nameless character of `the One', Plotinus should, equally repeatedly, refer 
to It by such powerfully personal images as those of `King' and 'Father'. 
It is natural then to ask whether, in addition to their metaphorical use, 
these titles also point to the presence of personality within the One. Such a 
view would appear to gain some support, for example, from Ennead 
VI. 8[39], where Armstrong suggests that the One `appears as something 
more like a "personal God" than he does elsewhere in the Enneads'. 1 
Referring to this treatise in particular, Gerson also contends: 
Since the One is established as a cause of being, there is an appropriateness in his 
use of a metaphor like `father' that would ring hollow elsewhere. Thus the personal 
is in a way already constitutive of the One as an inferred cause of being. 2 
However, these assessments of Ennead VI. 8 are surely based on an unduly 
Christian reading of Plotinus. We have already seen that this treatise's 
central concept of `will (ßodArjuts)' is not to be understood as an 
indication of personality, but as a mere metaphor, the inadequacy of which 
Plotinus frankly acknowledges. As to Gerson's argument, although this 
relies on the principle that a cause must contain within itself every 
perfection present in its effects, he has to concede that his reasoning is `not 
explicit in the text, perhaps because it would seem so obvious to Plotinus'. 
In any case, even if we do accept Gerson's principle, his argument based 
on it would not be strong enough to prove personality in the One. Because 
the first principle, the ßaat&ug or rrarrfp, is the ultimate cause of all 
perfection in being, it would indeed follow that that which is perfect in 
human persons must find its origin at this highest of hypostatic levels. But, 
for Plotinus, perfection in persons reaches beyond `personality' in its 
modem sense: the best. of human lives for him is that of the `earnest 
Armstrong, VII, p223. He also repeats his proposal that Plotinus is here engaging in dialogue with 
a Christian viewpoint, though conceding that this view `has not been generally accepted' (ibid., 
p224). 
2 Gerson, p217. 
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(orroubai'os)' philosopher, as such a person has a direct relationship with 
the One, the `god above intellect (ürrnp voüv)', who is his `guardian spirit 
(8aiýrwv)'. 1 However, this is the case precisely because the o7rouöaios 
follows `his better part (7-j ý3ra rIwv), 2 which is Intellect (voüs) within 
him'. Now, Intellect for Plotinus either wholly transcends or ambiguously 
encompasses personality, according to the definition given to the latter. 3 
Still more, then, is the relation of the personal (however conceived) to the 
One necessarily a relation of inferiority, as the One is superior to Intellect. 
Rather than developing any analogical line of reasoning to justify the 
application of personal language to his first principle, then, we might 
expect Plotinus to stress an austerely apophatic approach in his treatment 
of personal attributes which might be applied to the One. This is in fact 
evident when he discusses `thinking' in relation to this hypostasis. 
`Beyond Intellect' 
One of the most significant developments Plotinus makes by comparison 
with the earlier philosophical tradition is in his insistence that the 
requirement of total and undivided unity implies that the first principle 
must be located beyond the realm of Intellect. This insistence rests on his 
contention that the act of intellection (v0170rs) necessarily involves a 
distinction between the subject (voüs) and the object (voi pa, or TO 
vooüpC vov); 4 but such a distinction is absolutely inadmissible within the 
realm of the first hypostasis, which must therefore transcend Intellect. 
Enn. III. 4[15]. 6.4. Porphyry (Vita Plotini iv) connects the writing of this treatise, `On Our Allotted 
Guardian Spirit', to an incident in which a conjuration in a temple of Isis revealed Plotinus' own 
öa1'wv as a god rather than the expected inferior grade of spirit. 
2 Enn. III. 4[15]. 6.1. 
3 Above, p95 for personality as `doing'; below, p117, for personality as `thinking'. 
4 Cf also below, ppl 14f. 
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In this doctrine, Plotinus distances himself from many of his Middle 
Platonist predecessors who, under Peripatetic influence, had been content 
to describe the highest reality as an Intellect. ' In the doxographic section 
of V. 1, there is the following succinct comment on Aristotle: 
When he says that it the first principle] knows itself (voc v zavro), he goes back 
again and does not make it the first principle. 
In other words, as Aristotle's voig can be analysed into two components, 
the subject and the object of thought, it is characterised by a plurality 
which disqualifies it from the highest metaphysical status. The polemic 
against both Aristotle and the Middle Platonists, though, is more fully 
developed in other parts of the Enneads, particularly V. 6[24], entitled `On 
the Fact that That Which is Beyond Being does not Think, and on What is 
the Primary and What the Secondary Thinking Principle'. Here, Plotinus 
begins by accepting that Aristotle's conception of the divine mind's self- 
contemplation does imply some degree of unity: 
There is a difference between one thinking (voei v) another and something thinking 
itself-, - the latter goes further towards escaping being one. 3 
However, he goes on to maintain that nevertheless the very act of thinking 
introduces an element of duality: 
Because it thinks it is two and because it thinks itself, one. 4 
But if the thinking principle can only be described as at best `one and two 
(v Kai' Silo)', then it cannot be the first principle, whose simplicity and 
unity must be complete: 
If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the thinking principle, there cannot be thinking 
in what is not a multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and Intellect, then, will be 
5 in what comes after. 
Cf above, p84. 
2 Enn. V. 1[101.9.8. 
Enn. V. 6[241.1.1-2. 
Ibid., 1.24. 
5 Ibid., 3.25. 
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Plotinus' concern in separating the first hypostasis from Intellect, 
therefore, is a consequence of his wish to avoid any suggestion of 
multiplicity at the heart of his system. Even in one of the last treatises, 
V. 3[49], `On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which is Beyond', he 
was still engaging in argument on this point. The objection had been raised 
- perhaps by the contemporary Aristotelian commentator Alexander of 
Aphrodisias - that denying any noetic activity to the One implied that the 
latter was in some way defective through its lack of self-knowledge: ' 
Then it [the One] has no perception of itself (dvafot 7Tov oüv Iauroü) and is not 
even conscious of itself and does not even know itself. - 
Plotinus replies to this by insisting that we cannot attribute thought (voei v) 
to the One since this would also mean attributing to it `the need for thought 
(8eioOar roü voEi v)' . 
But the first principle has no need: 
Even if thought goes intimately with it (xäv ai)v aVrcr7 TO voei v fj ), thought will 
be superfluous (impirTov) to it. 3 
The concessive Kdv -clause here raises again the question of personality in 
relation to the One, for it surely indicates that Plotinus was concerned not 
to appear wholly negative in his insistence that the absolute simplicity of 
the One ruled out the possibility even of self-consciousness on its part. 
Occasionally he hints at an analogical account of divine consciousness 
through the application to the One of such compound expressions as 
Karavör/QCs4 or On-epvöots, yet with one exception these hints are not 
significantly developed in the Enneads. 
The exception is the proposal, in the early treatise V. 4[7], `How That 
Which Is After The First Comes From The First, And On The One, that 
the One has `a manner of thinking different from the thinking of Intellect 
Cf Armstrong, V, p69. 
2 Enn. V. 3[491.13.7. 
Ibid., 10-12. 
4 Respectively, Enn. V. 4[7]. 2.17; VI. 8[39]. 16.33 
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(vorfQct Erepws q Kara Trjv you vörjotv)'. 1 What Plotinus seems to be 
suggesting here is some kind of intuitive awareness on the part of the One. 
Such a theory would enable him to bypass his deeply-rooted objection to 
any kind of duality within the first hypostasis through linking such duality 
to the mechanism of ordinary noetic intellection, rather than to the 
phenomenon of consciousness itself. In place of the subject-object 
distinction of voüs vöryia, it proposes a context of noetic immediacy in 
which `the other' has ceased to be `other', so that awareness no longer 
implies duality. At the time of writing V. 4, Plotinus apparently believed 
that such an attribution of thinking to the One could be developed by 
extending his consistent prioritisation of contemplation over discriminative 
thought - experiences of total absorption in mystical awareness, without 
any element of self-consciousness, may have provided his personal 
starting-point for such an analogy. 2 
However, this view was advanced by Plotinus when he had not entirely 
broken free from the influence of the Middle Platonist thinking of 
Numenius; he was subsequently to abandon such theories3 in favour of the 
more radical language of moving `beyond thought' per se, insisting on the 
One's transcendence of intellection. 
Again, we may conclude that, while limited scope is allowed for the use in 
relation to the One of some metaphorical language based on the higher 
forms of personal experience, the apophatic nature of Plotinus' doctrine of 
the first transcendent principle, and his insistence on its absolute unity, 
precludes predicating personality as such of this hypostasis. 
Enn. V. 4[7]. 2.19. 
2 E. g. Enn. VI. 7[38]. 36 -'the light does not make him see another through itself, but the light itself 
was the sight seen'. 
3 Armstrong, ad loc. (V, p146n1). Armstrong's view is questioned by Rist, pp42ff. 
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`Beyond Being' 
Alongside the description of the One as `beyond Intellect', we must place 
the title `beyond Being (trrexer va oüoriaq)'; as Plotinus generally equates 
Intellect with Being, ' the two phrases are broadly equivalent within his 
system. 'ErrexcI va ouaiaq is an expression firmly rooted in the pre- 
Plotinian tradition from Republic VI, but we have seen how the constraint 
of the association of perfection with finitude inhibited the full development 
of transcendentalism in Plato. 2 In Plotinus' thought, however, with such 
constraints weakened, supra-ontic status is expressed as infinity: 
It [the One] is therefore not limited in relation to itself or to anything else; since if it 
was it would be two. 3 
However, it is important to be clear what Plotinus means by `unlimited 
(ärreipov)' here. His language at first appears to be close to Christian 
thought in speaking of divine infinity, but it functions quite differently: 
rather than expressing a direct ability of a divine person to do whatever he 
likes, 4 the ärrcipov stresses the boundless capacity of the definite One, as 
compared to the lack of definition of all which follows after. This may be 
what Plotinus means when he says that infinity is to be interpreted as 
`potentiality (öuvopt )" rather than `magnitude (ueythoq)'. 5 The One 
generates Intellect by going beyond itself: infinity for the first hypostasis is 
not an attribute so much as something produced from it. So ärrerpov 
conveys simultaneously the meanings of total definition and unrestrained 
overflowing: the paradox of the One's plenitude lies in its infinity as a 
consequence of `not being more than one'. 6 Ultimate divinity is infinitely 
I Cfbelow, p116. 
2 Cf above, p73. 
3 Enn. V. 5[321.11.1-3. 
Armstrong (1954), pp55ff. 
Enn. V. 5[32]. 10.20-24. However, pure `potentiality' - as in matter - is disparaged in Plotinus, in 
that it differs radically from the perfect seif-realisation of the One. 
6 Enn. V. 5[32]. 11.1. Plotinus' logic is that traced by Arthur Lovejoy - above, Note `A', pp67f. 
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transcendent precisely through its utter simplicity. There is immeasurable 
inequality between the One and all that comes after. Moreover, for 
Plotinus it is wrong to speak of the One's ability to choose among actions, 
as personality is not ultimate. The One's infinite transcendence excludes 
both equality and personality as trinitarian categories. 
The Good and the One 
Plato's hints of transcendence applied to the Form of `the Good 
(rdyaOdv)', singled out from all other Forms, but already in the Platonic 
corpus we find, in the Parmenides, a suggestion that the first principle 
should rather be spoken of as `the One'. ' In the Enneads, both terms are 
used. Plotinus is careful, though, to point out that neither title is to be 
understood as applying to the ultimate principle by way of predication, for 
the first hypostasis is beyond all description: 
We say `the Good' about him, not speaking of him nor predicating of him that good 
belongs to him, but saying it is himself 2 
So the first can be described as `the Good' as it is the `supreme object of 
aspiration to all lower realities'. 3 Similarly, `the One' cannot be construed 
as a positive description of the first, but as negating all plurality: 
Whatever is even before these, we give the name of `One' to by necessity, to 
indicate its nature to one another ... we 
do not when we call it one and indivisible 
mean it in the sense of a point or a unit ... 
but all the same these correspond to those 
higher things in their simplicity and avoidance of multiplicity and partition. 4 
So again, despite hints of the possibility of analogical language applied to 
it, the One is identified by. a transcendent simplicity which can only be 
alluded to through apophatic discourse: it is distinguished from all which 
comes after by its radical absence of plurality. This presents a contrast 
with the second hypostasis, where plurality has an acknowledged place. 
' Rist, p23: `Plato came to think of his first principle as the One rather than the Good'. 
2 Enn. VI. 7[381.38.5. 
3 Wallis, p59. 
4 Enn. VI. 9[9]. 5.39-45. 
PATRISTIC 110 
2-2C 
(c) Unity and plurality in the second hypostasis 
While plurality of any kind is excluded by Plotinus on the level of first 
reality, examination of the structure of his second - noetic - hypostasis 
shows that here, by contrast, it has an assured place. Whereas the system 
of three hypostases must be understood in `vertical' terms as a 
hierarchically ordered exposition of a vision of ultimate unity, a 
`horizontal' analysis of the order of Intellect will reveal tensions on this 
level between unity and plurality; we will see that Plotinus' most 
considered position is to accord them equal logical and ontological status. 
This is significant as Plotinus repeatedly and unhesitatingly locates 
Intellect within the boundary of that which may be called 'divinity'. Greek 
thought did not draw the sharp distinctions between Creator and creature 
which were emphasised in the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic traditions; 
nevertheless, when Plotinus can describe `this god which is over the soul' 
as `multiple (rro. W oüv oürog ö Oeös rri r( ýiux7)', ' there are clear 
implications that he recognises a real sense of immanent divine plurality. 
In one sustained passage of powerful imagery, Plotinus depicts the exalted 
divine status of Intellect as one who, in a lengthy and magnificent courtly 
procession, `goes out' immediately before the great King, who is of course 
the One. Occupying this position of splendour, Intellect is described thus: 
It is a great god; or better, not just a god, but it demands as of right that this which 
it is is universal god. This nature is god, and the second god (Oros öaürcpog) 
revealing himself before we see that other one. 2 
The Ennead from which this acclamation of divinity comes, V. 5[32], has 
the significant title `That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect (oüx 
w roil voü 7ä vorira)'; we shall see that the question of the voüs 
Enn. V. 1[10]. 5.1. 
2 Enn. V. 5[321.3.1 et seq. 
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vo. 7ra relationship is crucial to the philosophical analysis of Plotinus' 
understanding of noetic plurality. V. 5 itself, though, is just the third part of 
a continuous work describing the `ascent to the Good', which was divided 
by Porphyry and rather artificially allocated to four different 'Enneads'. In 
the second subdivision of this so-called Grossschrift, `On the Intelligible 
Beauty', V. 8[31], Plotinus vividly describes the abounding life and 
diversity of the world of Intellect, gathering up poetic allusions from the 
oldest source of the Greek tradition, Homer's Iliad. 
For it is `the easy life' there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food 
- and they see all things, not those to which coming to be (yevE-oig) but those to 
which real being (odo `a) belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all 
things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all 
things are clear to the inmost part of everything; for light is transparent to light. 
Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are 
everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded ... 
' 
In this account of a world marked by mutual transparency and 
interpenetration, we see a visionary representation of the principle which 
was to be expressed in axiomatic terms by Plotinus' successors: 
All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature. 2 
For Plotinus, this mutual coinherence is a possibility precisely because his 
vision is of the world of Intellect, the contents of which are the intelligible 
Forms of real being, rather than their shadows and images which constitute 
the material world. This is seen in the text above in the distinction between 
`being (oJar a)' and `becoming (yevaoirs)', a dichotomy established in the 
Timaeus cosmogony. Like his predecessors, Plotinus was greatly 
exercised over the interpretation of the Timaeus. It is important for us to 
clarify in particular his view of the identity and status of the demiurge - 
this figure is responsible for the production of plurality in the Timaeus, so 
his status will indicate the significance of that plurality for Plotinus. 
1 Enn. V. 8[311.4.1-10. 
2 Proclus, Elements of Theology, Prop. 103 (Dodds, p93). 
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The Timaean Demiurge 
We note firstly that his general approach to the dialogue is more along the 
lines of Alcinous rather than Atticus: ' that is to say, he reads it as a 
symbolic exploration of cosmic causality rather than as a literal account of 
a creation within time. 2 Moreover, in the final section of the Grossschrift, 
Plotinus argues against Gnostic opponents who interpreted the Timaeus as 
pointing to the existence of a demiurge `different from (öAAog)' either 
Intellect or Soul3 - this distinct entity, they believed, was responsible for 
the creation of the world of matter, which was evil. From Plotinus' retort 
that they are `a long way from knowing who the Maker is (Ti's d 
S171roupyos)', 4 it is clear that the only possible candidates for the 
demiurge in his system are the already identified hypostases: Soul, 
Intellect, the One. We review each in turn. 
It is certain, firstly, that Plotinus assigns the demiurgic functions to the 
World Soul - according to an early note, the divine planning (following the 
rrapdöer y ra) of the universe is `not the work of Intellect but of Soul". 5 He 
subsequently refined this theory in two ways, both designed to preserve his 
third divine hypostasis from too much involvement in the artisanal activity 
which he deemed inferior: by developing a model of divine making 
through `contemplation' rather than directly, 6 and by insisting even then 
that the `productive principle (To rrotoüv)' is the `last and lowest 
expression (rd coXaTov rrpdq rd Kdm))' of soul, 7 above which the higher 
part of soul remains untouched. With these qualifications, Plotinus felt able 
I Above, pp82f. 
2 E. g. Enn. H. 9[33]. 8.1, III. 7[45]. 3.35, etc. 
3 Enn. II. 9[331.6.15. 
° ]bid., 6.25. 
5 Enn. 1II. 9[13]. 1.35. 
6 E. g. Enn. III. 8[30]. 3.22: `Making has been revealed to us as contemplation (4 frorrjars Ocwp(a)'. 
7 Enn. II. 3[52]. 18.13. 
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to ascribe the performance of the Timaean creation to the work of Soul. 
Porphyry in fact seems to have taught that the demiurge was to be 
identified with Soul, ' but Plotinus' own teaching is more complex: while 
he gives the demiurgic functions to Soul, the demiurge itself he explicitly 
identifies with Intellect. So, in the passage on the two levels of the World 
Soul, Plotinus continues: 
This [i. e., the `last and lowest' part of Soul], then, is the ultimate maker (irol, -rdq 
Koxcrroc); over it is that part of Soul which is primarily filled from Intellect; over all 
is Intellect the Craftsman (voUg &ipioupydc), who gives to the Soul which comes 
next those gifts whose traces are in the third. 2 
The position is, then, that `Intellect uses Soul to carry on its own 
demiurgic activity' .3 
While insisting that Intellect must be preserved from 
the degradation of association with active `making', Plotinus also linked 
the plurality of the cosmos, reflected in the intelligible order, with the 
second hypostasis through identifying the Timaean demiurge with voüq. 
Consonant with this identification, Plotinus naturally repudiated any 
suggestion that the Timaean demiurge was to be identified with the One. 
This is one reason why he came to differ from Alcinous in rejecting the 
language common in Middle Platonism of describing the Forms as 
`thoughts of God', as this for him would imply a primal status for the 
plurality made by the demiurge. Yet even in the early treatise V. 9[5] `On 
Intellect, the Forms, and Being', he had other reservations about this 
approach - namely, that it subordinated thoughts to thinker: 
It is incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that 
when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular 
Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking. 4 
' Proclus, In Tim. I 306.32-307,2: cited by Armstrong, III, p410, nl ad loc. 
2 Enn. 11.3[52]. 18.15. 
3 Atkinson, p23. 
4 Enn. V. 9[51.7.15-17. 
PATRISTIC 114 
2-2C 
Rather, his normal view was that the Forms are in Intellect, but are not 
created by the latter: 
Intellect really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else; for they 
are neither before it nor after it. ' 
In a , comment related 
to the Timaeus text describing Intellect as `seeing the 
Ideas existing in the real living creature (ö tm-r 4"wov)', Plotinus indeed 
goes so far as to entertain the possibility that the Forms existed `before' 
Intellect and that Intellect `thinks them when they exist (övra & aurd 
voeiv Töv voüv)'. 2 Generally, however, he stresses rather the logical 
simultaneity and reciprocity of Intellect and Forms, both generally and in 
the formation of the cosmos: the demiurge and the paradigm complement 
and pair one another, and certainly the latter cannot be reduced to logical 
dependence on the thinking of the former (or of any other divine reality). 
Intellect and Being 
This question of the relation between Intellect as subject and intelligible 
objects, which are the Platonic Forms or Ideas, is central to Plotinus' 
account of the noetic world. We have already seen that he understood the 
very act of intellection (vORON) to introduce a certain element of duality. 
This is why he rejected Aristotle's and Alcinous' presentations of ultimate 
reality as self-thinking Intellect, though he does acknowledge that 
`Intellect is more one than all other things'. ' But a further plurality is 
introduced into the intelligible world through the presence in it of a 
multiplicity of Forms, even though these are mutually transparent and 
interpenetrating. On the account given of the relation between Intellect and 
Forms, voUq and v&7T , subject and objects, 
depends the status assigned 
Enn. V. 9[5]. 5.27. 
2 Enn. III. 9[13]. 1.1-5. 
3 Enn. V. 5[32]. 4.5. 
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to `personality' in the second hypostasis, for clearly this must in one sense 
be aligned with the subjective dimension of Intellect. ' 
Plotinus rejected any suggestion that the Ideas were `outside' Intellect: 
One must not look for the intelligibles outside (iicw Td voqrc 4"rlTei v), or say that 
they are impressions of the real beings in Intellect. 2 
However, this was not merely a question of ensuring the location of the 
Forms within Intellect; as the second phrase quoted above hints, Plotinus 
was also concerned that they should not be in any sense subordinated to 
the intelligising subject. His insistence on the causal irreducibility of the 
vo, 7ra to voUq arose from his concern to ensure that Being, of which the 
Forms are the true reality, is accepted in its givenness - it is that which 
Intellect contemplates, not merely something produced by Intellect. In one 
direction, this insistence can be set in the hierarchical context of the Three 
Hypostases, by recalling that the Forms owe their ultimate origin, not to 
Intellect, but to the One: 
In order that being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator of being. 3 
As we have seen, just as the One is `beyond Intellect', so also it is 
`beyond Being'. On the `horizontal' dimension of analysis of the structure 
of the second hypostasis, the same considerations lead Plotinus to 
conclude that this level could be indifferently described as `Intellect 
(voig)' or `Being (TÖ öv)' - the two can in fact be described as `one 
nature (aria Ouoriq)'. 4 He justifies this in V. l by a quotation from the pre- 
Socratic philosopher Parmenides, the Greek text of which is as follows: 
Td yap adr6 voET v ZoTI re Kai eivaz. 5 
' Cf above, p95, for different ways in which the modern sense of `personality' appears in Plotinus. 
2 Enn. V. 5.2[32]. 1. 
3 Enn. V. 2[11]. 1.7. 
4 Enn. V. 9[5]. 8.17. 
5 Diels 28B3, quoted by Plotinus in Enn. V. 1[10]. 8.17. 
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In its original context, this was probably designed simply to convey the 
meaning that the same things were capable both of being and of being 
thought, ' but Plotinus' argument requires the rather stronger sense that the 
This functions of Thinking and Being are coincidental, if not identical. 2 
text from Parmenides is one of those quoted in the central section of V. 1; 
characteristically, Plotinus criticises it on the grounds that the philosopher 
described this thinking or being as `one (Kv)', whereas at the level of the 
second hypostasis it is in fact `discovered to be many (rourou rroAAd 
cOpioxop vou)' - however, he adds, in the dialogue Parmenides, Plato 
clearly distinguished the three levels of unity and plurality. 3 Nevertheless, 
when understood as referring to this penultimate level of reality, the text is 
counted as providing authority in the tradition for arguments such as the 
following, earlier in V. 1: 
Each of them is Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, 
Intellect making Being exist in thinking it (6 voUg xarir rd vo(iv (501 o7rdS rd (5v), 
and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought (rd öv rci 
voct60ai Tij vj öiödv TO voeiv Kai Td -ivai) ... 
for they are simultaneous and 
exist together and one does not abandon the other, but this one is two things, 
Intellect and Being and thinking and thought, Intellect as thinking (6 voUg Ka-rd T6 
voei v) and Being as thought (rd öv Kara rd vooüp1evov). 4 
These balanced phrases probably express the heart of Plotinus' position, in 
which the second hypostasis is seen as one reality which can be equally 
adequately described either as the objective Forms which constitute Being 
or as the subject which enacts Intellect. 
A certain ambiguity is introduced into Plotinus' account by passages 
where he appears definitely to affirm the primacy of Being over Intellect: 
Since we must think of Being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that the real 
beings have their place in the thinking subject. ' 
IJ Barnes (1987), p132. 
2 Armstrong, V, p41. 
3 Enn. V. 1[10]. 8. 
Ibid., 4.26-31. 
5 Enn. V. 9[5]. 8.12. 
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The point, here, however, is that though Being and Intellect are 
hypostatically simultaneous and mutually equivalent, in our conception of 
their relationship we tend to give priority to Being. ' Overall, we may 
conclude that for Plotinus `Being and Thought are so closely 
interdependent that ... questions of 
logical priority are meaningless' .2 
The implication for the status of personality is that it is accorded a 
significant place in constituting the second hypostasis, but at the same time 
as subject it is not allowed to dominate over the objective ontology of the 
Forms. So the noetic world embraces personality as expressed in 
`thinking', yet does not accord it final value; meanwhile, transcending both 
personal subject and ideal object reigns the One - as we saw earlier, 
personality cannot be attributed to Plotinus' first hypostasis. ' 
Later Neoplatonists, insisting on the priority of objects of thought to their 
being thought, replaced Plotinus' balanced account by a hierarchical 
statement of the primacy of Being over Intellect. Indeed, they identified' a 
subsidiary triad of Being, Intellect, and Life within the second hypostasis, 
relying on a reference in the treatise `On Numbers', VI. 6[34]: 
If then being is an object of desire, that which is most of all being is still more 
desirable, and that which is most of all intellect, if intelligence in general is desirable, 
and the same with life. ' 
Such developments were part of an elaboration of plurality in the 
subsequent tradition. Plotinus himself was kept from multiplying 
hypostases by insisting on the reverent preservation of ultimate unity on 
the level of the One; but at the penultimate level of Intellect he saw a 
complex reality in which diversity and unity were equally significant. 
I Later he speaks of `dividing by our thinking' things that are otherwise one (Enn. V. 9[5]. 9.1). 
2 Wallis, p67. 
3 Cf above, p95. 
° Proclus, Elements of Theology, Prop. 101. 
5 Enn. V1.6[341.8.16-17. 
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(d) Plotinus: Trinitarian resources and problems 
From this outline of Plotinus' thought, it is clear that his teaching is 
`trinitarian' in the broad sense that he recognises a threefold differentiation 
within the divine and insists that this must somehow be reconciled with 
unity. We can go further, though, and describe the tri-hypostatic system as 
a trinitarian resource in a stronger sense: namely, that it corresponds as a 
whole to Christian Trinitarianism (note that this need not imply a one-to- 
one correspondence between individual hypostases in the two systems) by 
providing a way of accounting for some of the plenitudinal issues which 
for Christians are accommodated by the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. 
We see this first by recalling the issues identified by Tillich and Panikkar 
as constitutive of trinitarian thinking. The former expected trinitarianism to 
be present in other religions as a result of the dialectic he traced between 
the `abysmal', the `logical' and the `spiritual' in the divine, ' the latter from 
analysis of the tension between `personalist' and `apophatic' forms of 
spirituality. 2 Both these polarities are important dimensions of the tension 
which we have identified as central throughout Plotinus' thought: that 
between transcendence and immanence. His first principle shares the 
`abysmal' character of Tillich's ultimate divinity, evidenced, for example, 
by the facts that the `abysmal' category of infinity is ascribed to the One; 
the `logical' is clearly an appropriate designation for Intellect; and the 
`spiritual' may be applied to Soul in Plotinus' pneumatology of 
vivification. 3 Again, like Panikkar, at the lower hypostatic levels Plotinus 
I Tillich, ST1, p251 - cf above, p18. 
2 Panikkar, TREM, p42 - cf above, p26. 
3 It is interesting to ask whether a historical influence can be traced from Plotinus to Tillich through 
Hegel. Certainly, Hegel was both aware of the specific trinitarian patterning of Neoplatonist 
thought (Hodgson, p429), and also generally interested in dynamics of transcendence and 
immanence similar to those we have traced in Plotinus; Tillich in turn was heavily influenced by 
Hegel particularly in his exposition of Trinitarian doctrine (above, p13). 
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emphasises personal devotion to the exploration of Intellect, but language 
fades into apophasis before the One's ineffability. We conclude that the 
transcendence-immanence dialectic developed in his hypostatic system 
exemplifies the trinitarian patterns proposed by Tillich and Panikkar. 
In discussing the `universal theologies' offered by both these theologians, 
it was necessary to appraise in terms of Christian orthodoxy the trinitarian 
systems they offered by looking at their handling of the trinitarian 
problems-identified at the outset. So we now gather together what we have 
observed of these six features in Plotinus' system, considering first 
plurality and then briefly mentioning each of the others in turn. 
Plurality 
Plurality in Plotinus' system operates in two ways: respectively, within and 
between the hypostases. The first arises from the fact that plurality is a 
characteristic of the phenomenal world; correspondingly, absence of 
plurality serves as a marker of superiority to that world. So unity or 
simplicity is intimately associated with transcendence, the hierarchical 
system of Plotinus' hypostases being defined by the sequence (derived 
from Parmenides interpretation): (a) `One', (b) `one-many', (c) `one and 
many'. Blumenthal concisely interprets these three formulae thus: 
The One 
... contains all else 
in an indistinguishable unity. In Nous there is a unity 
that is at the same time a multiplicity, although there are no real divisions. In Soul 
the components are more fully separate, though unity is still maintained. ' 
It has been suggested that Platonist ontology can be approached in two 
ways: by `establishing what is fundamental and primary in reality', or by 
`developing an inventory of reality, sorting out the different kinds of things 
there are'. ' If in these terms the gradation of plurality summarised above 
' Blumenthal, p 114. 
2 These two approaches are so distinguished by J Moravcsilc `Plato and Platonism' (1992) - cf 
O'Meara (1996), p67. 
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belongs to Plotinus' `fundamental' ontology, it is also important to 
recognise that an ontological `inventory' would indicate a second sense of 
plurality within the divine realm: the clear distinctions Plotinus draws 
between the different hypostases mean that we can apply plurality to the 
whole ensemble: though centred on the One, his metaphysics avoids the 
collapse of one level of reality into another. 
Plotinus hints at yet another dimension of plurality in the triad of Being, 
Intellect, and Life within the second hypostasis -a hint catalytic for fu ther 
elaborations of plurality in later Neoplatonist inventories. 
Personality 
Personality is likewise an ambiguous concept in Plotinus. On one hand, we 
have seen that some of the characteristics of personality may pass beyond 
Soul into Intellect, though at the same time the latter transcends 
individuals. Plotinus' intense religious commitment to intellection also 
means that his system is addressed to, and involves, persons in a personal 
invitation. However, personality is also severely circumscribed in 
significance, as even in its highest manifestation as noetic activity it 
implies the drawing of distinctions; therefore Plotinus insists on the One 
beyond nous, and we have seen that all personal language applied at this 
level must be interpreted in a merely metaphorical sense. 
Threeness 
Exemplified in V. 1, but running through the whole of the Enneads, 
threeness clearly characterises Plotinus' system; arising from his 
interpretation of the dialectic of transcendence and immanence, the terms 
of Soul, Intellect, and the One in which it is expressed are drawn from the 
three major components of his eclectic philosophical inheritance, but he 
weaves these diverse strands together in a threefold unity. 
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Equality 
Equality is explicitly denied throughout Plotinus' work. He consistently 
describes the relations between the hypostases in imagery which stresses 
their univalent direction, and the whole system is arranged as a hierarchy, 
in which the transcendent supremacy of the One is central. 
Necessity 
The model Plotinus proposes to explain the emanation of the second 
hypostasis from the first means that the structure of reality at this level 
could be no other than it is; application of similar reasoning at lower levels 
implies that the tri-hypostatic system is necessary in the sense that, given 
his assumptions, he could not conceive of it differently. 
The narrative fragments drawn from Greek religion scattered through the 
Enneads' do not invalidate this despite apparently introducing contingent 
factors into Plotinus' logic, as they are to be seen as avowedly 
mythological symbols for metaphysical truths derived by philosophical 
reasoning. Equally, we have seen that the language of divine `will' is used 
by Plotinus only as a metaphor, with no real connotation of free choice. 
Immanence 
Plurality is acknowledged to be present in Soul, and (co-ordinated with 
unity) in Intellect also, though denied in the One. All three hypostases, 
however, fall within the boundary of divinity (however vaguely this may 
be drawn in the Greek context), and are habitually referred to and 
addressed by Plotinus as `gods' - he particularly safeguards divinity at its 
lowest level, Soul. Correlating his thought with Christian theology, we 
may thus say that he teaches the immanence of divine plurality. 
1 E. g. the birth of Zeus from Kronos -above, p102. 
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This checklist of six problems shows that, on one hand, Plotinus' three 
hypostases can be described as `trinitarian' from the overall point of view 
of theologies like Tillich's and Panikkar's: his threefold interpretation of 
divine plenitude incorporates elements of plurality in a number of different 
ways, while at the same time seeking to reconcile this with the strict 
requirements of unity. On the other hand, examined in detail his system 
shows significant divergences from the normative patterns of that which 
was to be accepted as Christian orthodoxy. These divergences spring from 
two assumptions fundamentally different from those of that orthodoxy: 
firstly, that personality is not a category which can be meaningfully applied 
to the ultimate divine reality, and secondly, that the theological realm is 
arranged according to a hierarchical, emphatically non-egalitarian, 
ordering. In fact, as we turn now to Christian plenitudinal theories, we 
shall find that, while the first of these assumptions is denied, Plotinus' 
contemporaries in many ways share the second: we shall see that Origen in 
particular found it difficult to maintain a teaching of Trinitarian equality. 
So Tillich and Panikkar provide us with examples of trinitarian thought 
proposing universal patterns claimed to be found across religions, and 
Plotinus' theory substantiates these claims in developing the implications 
of the tension between transcendence and immanence in relation to divine 
plenitude. This is significant for a general assessment of the place of 
trinitarian theologies of religions, but more immediately important in 
dialogical terms will be the correlation of his system with the religious 
situation of his own time. Thus, we must now set, in comparison alongside 
his treatment of plenitudinal themes, the contemporaneous forms of 
Trinitarian theology developed by Christians - amongst whom (as 
explained earlier) we select Origen, and particularly his De Principiis. 
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3 Origen: the Trinitarian hypostases 
(a) Hypostatic distinctions in the De Principiis 
The title of this, the most systematic and the most controversial of all his 
works, suggests at least the possibility that Origen might be developing a 
Trinitarian theology which - like that of Tillich or Panikkar - would 
correlate with the understanding of divine reality in another tradition by 
interpreting the Trinitarian personae as specific representations of more 
far-reaching trinitarian principles. ' Such was, in effect, the accusation of 
Origen's bitter critic Marcellus of Ancyra, who alleged that the apXai of 
this title- were in fact none other than the (Middle) Platonist `causes' 
discussed above. 2 We have seen that this was countered by Eusebius with 
an insistence that, not only did Origen admit only one, apXr7, but this one 
was of uniquely Christian provenance - the Father of the only Son. 
3 
Clearly this is a question of considerable importance for us: turning 
Marcellus' criticism around, we may say that he is representing Origen's 
theology as a universal trinitarian resource of precisely the type we are 
seeking. However, it is no straightforward matter to assess the validity of 
such an interpretation of the De Principiis. Besides the complex and 
unsatisfactory textual history of the work, it at no point includes a 
systematic analysis of the meaning of the key term apXrf (or principiuni). 
Archai 
For some light on this, we may rather turn to two other works - the 
Commentary on John's Gospel, one of Origen's earliest compositions, 
and the great apologetic treatise Contra Celsum, written towards the end 
of his life. The former includes, in Origen's comments on Jn 1.1, his most 
' Cf above, p13, for Tillich's `trinitarian principles'. 
2 Above, P85. 
3 Eusebius, Contra Marcellum 1.4 - quoted above, p86. 
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extended analysis of the semantic range of the word apXrf. It is 
interesting to see how in this detailed biblical exegesis Origen draws on 
the philosophical tradition of Middle Platonism to analyse the text. Thus, 
he first reviews and rejects possible interpretations of apXrj as matter' 
and as Ideal respectively. Instead, he opts for a third definition: 
That `by which', that is to say, that which creates (To 60' oü oir(p a'rr rroroüv) 3 
He affirms that it is in virtue of this demiurgic function, belonging to Him 
`in a certain sense (rrws) through the Father's command', that Christ can 
be called apX, 7 So, in a discussion which overlaps with the traditions of 
Timaeus exegesis, Origen has reviewed a plurality of causes, 4 and 
associated one of the Trinitarian personae, the Word, with the last of 
these in particular. 
Much later, Origen perhaps returns to a Trinitarian appropriation of the 
apXai in response to Celsus' affirmation concerning God that `all things 
are from Him (Zý auroü rd rravra)'. 5 It is interesting to see that, while 
exegesis of the scriptural text Jn 1.1 led him to use a metaphysical 
formula, here conversely dialogue with a Platonist philosopher leads him 
to cite the Bible. Thus, Origen corrects Celsus as follows: 
But our Paul says that `from Him and through Him and unto Him are all things', 
referring to the beginning of the existence of all things (4oX4 rrjs Tv rrävrwv 
C .1 ürrooTdovdS) in the words `from Him', to their maintenance in `through Him', and 
to their end in `unto Him'. 6 
In quoting Rom 11.36, Origen here seems to be linking the Platonist 
`metaphysic of prepositions' with a comparable Pauline `theology of 
In Jo. I. 103: `that "out of which" things are made, as out of a pre-existent matter (Td tý oü olo v rd 
4 151rOKE1N¬vr75'üAgS)'. 
2 Ibid., 104: `that "according to which" (a thing is such and such) according to its original idea (rd 
Kae' oTov Kara Td d5os)'. 
3 Ibid., 110. 
4 I. e. the triad 1ý o5- Kao'ö - 04'o5 - cf above, p85, nn2,3. 5 Con. Cel. VI. 65. 
6 Ibid. 
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prepositions'. ' It is unfortunate that the portion of Origen's Commentary 
on Romans dealing with 11.36 has been lost, but two factors suggest that 
a Trinitarian interpretation of this verse may have been in his mind in the 
Contra Celsum citation. Firstly, Origen's Christology accords well with 
the suggestion that the `hypostasis of all things' is the A yos, in whom 
the Aoyoc of all created beings are to be found. That being so, the apxrj of 
this hypostasis would in turn be the Father. Secondly, the citation 
immediately follows in the Contra Celsum a passage where Origen insists 
in metaphysical terms on the distinction of the Father from the Son. 2 
While the Commentary on John and the Contra Celsum therefore appear 
to apply the title of apXrj, in different senses, to different Persons, we can 
surely say that Origen's work shows that the idea of apXai was for him 
linked - perhaps in no very clear way - to the Trinity. It is this link which 
must be borne in mind when interpreting the title and purpose of the De 
Principiis, for the plan of the work could be taken to support either 
Marcellus' or Eusebius' reading of apXrj On one hand, Origen 
announces that he is setting out to expound the apostolic teaching 
regarding the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 3 and indeed he begins with a 
treatise (I. 1-4) on the Persons of the Trinity. On the other hand, this first 
section De Deo4 is followed by two parts entitled successively De 
rationalibus naturis (1.5-8) and De Mundo (111.1-3), and it is easy to see in 
this a reflection of the schema of 'God-Ideas-Matter'. 
Paul's formula may in turn be based on a doxology incorporated into early Christian liturgy from 
the Hellenistic tradition - Käsemann, p318, cites a Stoic background; certainly a close parallel is 
found in Marcus Aurelius' Meditations 4.23: `from thee, in thee, to thee are all things'. Cf also 1 
Cor 8.6, where the prepositions `unto' and `through' are respectively linked to the Father and to 
Christ. 
2 Con. Cel. VL64 -quoted below, p135. 3 De Princ., Praefatio, 4. 
4 For the rather confused history and status of the titles given to the first few sections of the De 
Principiis, see (in detail) Widdicombe, pp10-13. 
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A balanced appraisal of the situation is probably that given by Henri 
Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti in the introduction to their edition of the 
De Principiis. While affirming (with Eusebius) Origen's primarily 
theological understanding of apxai, they conclude that the title `semble 
garder intentionellement une certaine ambiguite entre les deux 
signification', and add that such ambiguity is generally a characteristic 
of Origen's method: 
Souvent, quand il emploie un mot ä lens multiples, un predomine, mais les autres 
subsistent autour, comme des harmoniques. 1 
Crouzel and Simonetti, therefore, recognise that Origen's Trinitarian 
theology is designed to resonate with the philosophical theology of the 
Platonist tradition which also formed the background to Plotinus' tri- 
hypostatic system. As with Plotinus, so too within these resonances in 
Origen we may discern a certain hesitation as to whether there is one 
aoxrj or three apXcr 
This ambiguity, which derives (as in Plotinus again) from the tension of 
divine transcendence and immanence, finds expression in the structure of 
Origen's Trinitarian theology. Thus, on one hand, he repeatedly stresses 
in the De Principiis that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are transcendent and 
ineffable: 
It is this Trinity alone which exceeds all comprehension, not only of temporal but 
even of eternal intelligence. 2 
This corresponds logically to a view that identifies the Trinity - for which 
Origen uses the traditional expression rpcäs- as one single apxrj 
Only in this Trinity, which is the source of all things, does goodness reside 
essentially. 3 
On the other hand, rpidr in pre-Origenist theology bore `a collective 
sense', with no implication of unification: it signified `triad, not tri- 
' Crouzel & Simonetti, I, p14. 
2 De Princ. IV. 4.2. Cf also 1.4.3,1.5.5, etc. 
3 De Princ. 1.6.2. 
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unity' .' 
It is in accordance with such a pluralist understanding of the 
Trinity that Origen should carry the dialectic of transcendence and 
immanence to within the Tpiäs, so that it becomes the principal factor 
generating the distinction of the three Persons one from another. The 
radical plurality this implies as constitutive of the Trinity is confirmed by 
the term ürröaaraoriq which Origen (once more, like Plotinus) used to 
identify each of Father, Son, and Spirit. As in the case of apXrj, so here 
too it will be helpful to look at the Commentary on John and the Contra 
Celsum before considering the complex evidence of the De Principiis as 
to Origen's understanding of the word Orröaraoig. 
Hypostases 
Commenting on Jn 1.3, Origen refers to orthodox Christians as those 
`who are persuaded that there are three hypostases, the Father and the Son 
and the Holy Spirit'. 2 Cecile Blanc here translates TpCis chrooTdorcis as 
`trois realites subsistantes (distinctes)', and maintains that Origen's use of 
u7rooTaacs in this sense - which was to become the accepted terminology 
of orthodox theology after the Council of Nicaea - is its first application 
to the Trinitarian Persons in Christian literature. 3 Nevertheless, Origen's 
way of introducing the concept suggests that, even in this early work, 4 he 
is using language which already commanded widespread acceptance 
within the Christian community. Use of the term in non-Trinitarian 
contexts before Origen suggests a double emphasis in its meaning: 
`concrete and independent objectivity' .5 Here, 
independence implies that 
two individual hypostases will be sharply distinguishable one from 
I Prestige, p93. 
2 In Jo. 11.75. 
3 Blanc, p255 and Note complementaire', ad loc., pp401ff, where she also cites In Jo. I. 151. 
4 The Commentary is from the Alexandrian period (Eusebius, HE 6.21), probably c218 - Blanc, p8. 5 Cf Prestige, p178. 
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another, while concreteness points to a reality which cannot be reduced to 
an abstract quality. 
These emphases are important for Origen, since a key tenet of his 
theology is the identification of the Son with the Word or Wisdom of 
God, and either of the latter expressions might be taken to imply that the 
second hypostasis is a mere abstraction. In a significant passage of the 
Commentary on John, Origen explains that this would be a complete 
misunderstanding of his position: 
Wisdom does not have his existence (ürrooTacr v iXEI) in the bare imaginations 
(tv OtAaiq cavraQials) of the God and Father of the universe, understood after 
the pattern of human thoughts (ciavrdopara). ' 
Origen's insistence on the substantiality of Wisdom's existence can be 
understood against a complex background. It is likely that his principal 
target here - as elsewhere in this commentary2 - was a form of 
Gnosticism, which denied any subsistence to Wisdom before his 
emanation, as one of the `aeons', from the Father. 
It is also noticeable, though, that Origen's argument controverts the 
Middle Platonist account of the Ideas as the `thoughts' of God. He insists 
on the hypostatic existence of the Son as Wisdom, precluding His 
reduction to a metaphor for the thought processes of the supreme Father, 
in much the same way as Plotinus stressed the Platonic Forms' 
irreducibility to voCq 3 At the same time, the individuality implied by the 
term ÖSrroo-raais meant that Origen allowed for a much stronger sense of 
unity at this second level of divinity than that found in Plotinus. 
I In Jo. 1.243. 
2 Cf Blanc, pp 13ff, who explains the significant background: the Commentary on John was written at 
the request of Origen's patron Ambrose, who had recently converted to orthodox Christianity from 
the Valentinian sect, and part of its aim is to refute the earlier commentary of (the Valentinian) 
Heracleon. 
3 Cf above, p 115. 
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Christian modalist interpretation of the Trinity, which would fail to 
guarantee the Son's identity (18t rid) as distinct from the Father's. ' In 
this, he is maintaining the immanence of the Trinitarian plurality: `Son' is 
not just another name for God, but denotes a hypostatic reality 
`numerically (7-4 dpiOp ij)'2 different from that of the Father. 
In the late treatise Contra Celsum, Origen insists in yet sharper language 
on the distinction of the hypostases. 3 Having insisted against Celsus that 
the status accorded to Jesus in Christian worship is not inconsistent with 
monotheism, Origen expresses concern lest he be misunderstood to be 
`going over to the views of those who deny that there are two hypostases, 
Father and Son'; on the contrary, he insists on their real hypostatic 
difference as follows: 
We worship the Father who is the truth and the Son who is the truth; they are two 
objects in distinct existence (8uo Tr- ö röaracreI rrpdypara), but one in mental 
unity, in agreement, and in identity of will. 4 
This sense of objective and differentiated individual existence must be 
remembered as we finally turn to the De Principiis; unfortunately, the 
relevant passages here survive only in Rufmus' Latin translation. In a 
discussion of the manner of existence of the Son as the Wisdom of God, 
Rufinus quotes the Greek original ürröoraars, and glosses it as the Latin 
substantia. This provides a literal translation according to the etymology 
I Cf In Jo. 11.2.16. 
2 In Jo. X. 37.246 - cf Danielou, p377. 3 At other points in the Contra Celsum however, far from mapping out the terminological distinction 
of ülroaraars and oücta which was to become normative for subsequent Trinitarian orthodoxy, 
Origen uses the two words in parallel in such a way as to suggest an equivalence of meaning as `the 
fact or reality of existing' (1.23, VI. 71, VIII. 67 - two of these three dual occurrences of c3nrtarraars 
and oüQta refer to the un-reality of pagan deities). It should also be noted that in the Commentary 
on John too there is found another meaning for ürröarraais - that of `nature', applied in 
Christological contexts to the divinity and humanity of the incarnate Saviour (Blanc, p402n9). 
4 Con. Cels. VIII. 12, with Chadwick's translation amended to bring out the force of lrpd»Jara - 
Prestige, p179, parenthesises as `things'; Borret, p198, has `realitcs'. 
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of ürröa"racts, but the rather different meaning Origen gives the word in 
the context of his theology is seen a few lines earlier when he remarks: 
Let no one think that, when we call Him the Wisdom of God, we are saying that 
He is something without substance (insubstantivum); as if - to take an example - 
we understood Him, not as a wise animal being, but as a something (rem aliquam) 
that made people wise. ' 
The metaphor Origen here disallows is perhaps not the best for him to 
choose, as his words could suggest a hesitation over the Son's identity as 
animated personal being which is in fact very far from his purpose. Yet 
his positive meaning is clear: the Son as Wisdom is an urröo"rauns in that 
He possesses objective and identifiable existential reality. In Rufinus' 
Latin usage, this was better expressed by subsistentia than substantia, as 
he himself stated in translating Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History: 
Substantia expresses the nature or manner of being something, that which 
constitutes it (qua constat), but the subsistentia of a person shows that this exists 
and subsists (quod exstat et subsistit) 2 
It is understandable, therefore, that a few pages later, in a passage which 
almost certainly translates another reference to the Son's ürröoiaoiq, 
Rufinus writes substantia vel subsistentia, 3 and it is likely that he uses the 
latter term on its own to render ürröoraoig in other passages of the 
work. 4 We may thus surmise that in De Principiis the Son is 
distinguished from the Father by subsistentia rather than by substantia: in 
other words, Father and Son differ in their concrete individual existences, 
rather than in their fundamental nature. This distinction of similarly 
divine subsistent hypostases, then, implies the existence of a radical 
immanent pluralism within the Trinity. We now inquire further into the 
grounds for this hypostatic separability, first tracing the implications of 
applying Origen's transcendentalism to the first hypostasis. 
I De Princ. 1.2.2. 
2 H. E 1.29 - quoted by Crouzel & Simonetti, II, p46n46. 3 De Princ. 1.2.8. 
4 E. g. De Princ. I. 1.3, speaking of the Holy Spirit; cf also Crouzel & Simonetti, II, p34n8. 
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(b) God, Mind and Being 
The primary reference in Origen's theology of the unqualified expression 
`God (6 Ocdq)' is to the Father, and the biblical background implies that 
this carries with it the implication of a being relating both to creation and 
to the other Trinitarian hypostases in ways expressible in personal terms. 
Of course, Origen insists that unsuitably anthropomorphic language must 
be re-interpreted when applied to God, ' but he also maintains against 
Marcionis. m the identity of the `God of the Old and New Covenants', 2 
and this itself ensures the presence in his theology of a wealth of imagery 
- derived from descriptions of human volition, emotion, and activity. 
God and Mind 
However, the most sustained and systematic passages in the De Principiis 
implying the attribution of personality to the Father are those where the 
divinity is described in intellectual terms, for example the following: 
God must not be thought of as if He were any kind of body or in a body, but as a 
simple intellectual nature (intellectualis natura simplex), admitting of absolutely 
no addition; nor must we believe that there is greater or less in Him, for He is in 
every part a monas, or I might say, a henas, a mind, a source (mens ac fops), from 
which is the beginning of every intellectual nature or mind. 3 
We may make several comments on this important passage. Origen 
appears to make a straightforward identification of `God' (from the 
context, this means `the Father') with `mind', developing his meaning by 
analysing intellection to show how in several ways (non-spatiality, 
instantaneity of operation, absence of physical growth) the human mind is 
an appropriate metaphor for the divine; more than a metaphor, indeed, he 
insists on `a certain affinity between the mind and God' . 
4 
I E. g. De Princ. 11.4.4, where the examples of divine `anger' and `repentance' are cited. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
3 De Princ. I. 1.6. 
4 Ibid., 7- cf also De Princ. IV. 4.10. 
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However, while this `affinity' implies the reality of personality in the 
divine, Origen's main aim in this opening section is to insist that God is 
incorporeal (dou uaros). This in turn - since only bodies have parts - 
means that He is entirely simple (ärrloüs). Divine incorporeality and 
simplicity are key themes throughout the De Principiis, and link Origen 
clearly with the Middle Platonist theological tradition before him. l 
In this passage in particular, Origen emphasises simplicity by using the 
two words /yoväs and evdg, which Rufinus has left untranslated in their 
original Greek forms. It is probable that Iva!; is designed to express the 
absolute transcendence of the divine unity even more forcibly than 
luovdf , 
but both emphasise the absolute indivisibility and non- 
composition of the primal God. In contrast, when in Chapter 2 he turns to 
the second hypostasis, Origen asserts of the `only-begotten Son of God': 
[He] is called by many and diverse names (multis et diversis nominibus 
nuncupatur) according to (many and diverse) realities or the opinions of those who 
name Him. 2 
The chapter goes on to expound these nomina of Christ as an index of the 
diversity of creation which is found in Him, yet this diversity, far from 
being external to the Son, is constitutive of His internal reality. This 
contrast of the two hypostases in respect of their relative unity and 
plurality is perhaps most clearly stated in Origen's remarks on the 
cosmogonic role of the Word in the Commentary on John: 
God is absolutely one and simple. But, because of the multiplicity of things (Sri 
Td iro i ia), our Saviour, whom God `put forward as a sacrifice of atonement' 
[Rom 3.25] and as the beginning of all creation, becomes many things (rroAA r 
yfverar) 3 
The opening lines of De Princ. begin Origen's attack on those who press the Scriptures into service 
to maintain deum corpus esse (1.1.1). In his own Praefatio, he had acknowledged that the word 
`incorporeal' was of philosophic provenance, and would be unknown to many in the Church. 
2 De Princ. I. 2.1. 
3 In Jo. I. XX. 119.57B. Blanc (pl22n2, ad loc. ), suggests that Oxigen may here be drawing on 
Clement, Stromateis 25.156, and draws a parallel with Plotinus, Enn. VI. 9[91.4.5-6. 
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Finally, it is therefore clear that, despite the apparent identification of 
God with Mind in passages such as De Principiis 1.1.6, we cannot take 
this to mean that Origen is systematically locating the Father on the same 
level as, rather than above, Intellect. Were this to be the case, indeed, his 
teaching on divine transcendence would be considerably weaker than that 
of Plotinus, for whom the unity of the One required a dignity above that 
of voig In fact, however, we shall see that in other parts of his work 
Origen's thought approximates much more closely to that of Plotinus: 
indeed, not only does he imply a supra-noetic status for God, but he also 
suggests that trans-ontic status which Plotinus also maintained. Before 
dealing with these more transcendental elements in Origen's thought, 
then, we must ask about God in relation to Being in the De Principiis. 
God and Being 
As throughout Origen's work, ' so here also we find frequent references to 
God the Father as `Being itself (ö j y)', drawn particularly from one of 
his favourite proof-texts, Ex 3.14, which Origen interpreted as being the 
revelation of a divine name of central importance: 
The Lord said to Moses: `Being (ö Jv)' - that is my name. 
2 
However, it is important to notice that Origen always uses the personal 
(masculine) construction ö wv, and never the neuter form TO öv- it is the 
latter which would connect his discourse more clearly with that of the 
philosophical tradition stemming from Timaeus 27D. 3 In fact, as we saw 
in the case of Mind, so here Origen's intention in describing God in this 
way is not to locate him on a given level of a metaphysical hierarchy. 
' Cf Widdicombe, p29, who cites numerous references, and points out that 6 w"v `has a particular 
significance for him [Origen] because not only is it one of the names recorded of God in the Bible, 
but more than that, it is specifically God's self-designation'. 
2 In Jo. 11.13.95. 
3 Above, pp75f. Widdicombe, loc. cit., suggests this may have been deliberate, or Origen may have 
`assumed the traditional parallel and felt that there was no need to make explicit reference to it'. 
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Rather, when he speaks of the Father as 6 div, his emphasis is not on any 
precision in speaking of the divine status so much as on God's 
communication of being to the beings: 
All things that exist derive their being from Him who truly exists (ex eo qui vere 
est ... omnia quae suns participium trahunt), who said through Moses: `I am He 
who is', which participation in God, God the Father extends to all, both righteous 
and sinners, rational and irrational creatures, and absolutely everything that exists. ' 
God above mind and being 
If the evidence for a deliberate equation of God with either Mind or 
Being is then weak, we must next look at some passages in which Origen 
treats of the Father in more unequivocally transcendental language. In the 
Exhortation to Martyrdom, he refers to God as the One who is `above the 
intelligibles', 2 and in commenting on Jn 4.24 ('God is spirit'), he alludes 
to Plato's formula in Republic VI when he observes: 
Many people have said many things concerning God and His being. While some 
say that He is also of a corporeal nature, subtle and ethereal, some say that He is of 
an incorporeal nature, and others that He transcends being in rank and power 
(ürreperreKEz va odQiac rrpecßeifr Kai Suv4tEt) 3 
Here, however, he does not come to any clear choice between the last two 
options. It is in the late Contra Celsum that two passages, respectively 
from Books VI and VII, suggest that Origen finally reached a conclusion 
on a subject which had remained ambiguous in his earlier writings. 
In the first, Origen quotes with approval Celsus' claim that `God does not 
participate in being', adding that, in fact, `He is participated in rather than 
participates (pcTUErai ydp u5AAov rj 1jcTZXei)'. 4 We have seen earlier 
the inequality which is implied for Plotinus by the relation of ptO iq s 
and we shall also see later the importance it has in Origen's own theology 
I De Prince 1.3.6. 
2 Exh. ad Mart. XLVII, quoted by Crouzel, p13. 
3 In Jo. XIII. 21.123. 
4 Con. Cel. VI. 64.14. 
5 Above, p 100. 
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as a marker of the Son's status relative to the Father. ' Origen here 
indicates his awareness of these issues by combining an allusion to 
Plato's formula of transcendence in Republic VI with the introduction of 
the Logos, who must be located within the hierarchy of transcendence: 
There is much which is hard to perceive about being, and especially if we take 
`being' in the strict sense to be unmoved and incorporeal. We would have to 
discover whether God transcends being in rank and power (Err£KEIVa ouciag Eo-rl 
rrpEoßEicr Kai 8uv4lEi), and grants a share in being to those whose participation is 
in the Logos, and to the Logos Himself, or whether He is Himself being ()j Kai 
aüTog ?u ri v oüaia). 2 
The terms in which he goes on to describe the Logos in fact suggest the 
exclusion of the latter option in favour of a supra-ontic and supra-noetic 
status for the first hypostasis: 
[The Logos is] being of beings, and idea of ideas, and beginning (oüaria ouart v 
Kai 18th 18ECWv Kai apXrf), and His Father and God transcends all these 
(EUEKEY va iTaVTU1V TouTWV). 
3 
This suggestion is finally made explicit in the next book, where in our 
second passage Origen in fact appears to correct himself as he writes: 
Since we affirm that the God of the universe is mind, or (rather) that He transcends 
mind and being (ZIiEKEI va Vol Kai ouotag) ..: 
' 
On the basis of a text like this, it has been suggested that in his later 
years, Origen `trembled on the brink of the radical Plotinian solution', 5 in 
which the first principle would be beyond all knowing, either by another 
or even by Himself. 
Whatever the implications for the Father, though, applying the logic of 
transcendence within the Trinity must implicitly ascribe to the Son, and a 
fortiori to the Spirit also, a lesser rank. Next, then, we must ask how 
involved Origen is in subordinationism. 
' Below, p148. 
2 Con. Cel. VI. 64.17-23. 
3 Ibid., 26-7 - cf above, p125. ° Con. Cel. VII. 38.1. 
5 Williams (1987), p206. 
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(c) Hierarchical Trinitarianism 
Origen's logic of transcendence applied within the divine triad clearly 
points to a hierarchical view of the Trinity; what must be clarified is the 
sense in which this implies the subordination of the Son, and the Spirit, to 
the Father. Two points are certain in the De Principiis: first, that the three 
Persons are graded in the `economy' through being assigned successively 
narrower spheres of operation in relation to creation; and second, that the 
first Person also ranks more highly than the other two through being the 
origin of the whole triad. Consideration in turn of this `subordinationism 
of economy' and `subordinationism of origin" will lead us to ask about 
Origen's accounts, respectively, of the Spirit and the Son. 
Subordination of economy 
After his successive treatments in the De Principiis of Father (1.1), Son 
(1.2), and Holy Spirit (1.3.1-4), and before he moves onto the question of 
creation, Origen concludes his initial exposition of Trinitarian doctrine 
with a section (1.3.5-4.2) which sets out his purpose as follows: 
[To] describe the special action (operationem specialem) of the Holy Spirit, and 
that of the Father and of the Son. 
He later refers to these `special actions' as `appropriations' of the 
communication of grace to particular Trinitarian persons (proprietates 
gratiae operisque); 3 while insisting that the action of the entire Trinity is 
necessary for salvation to be received (non percepturus salutem nisi sit 
4 Integra trinitas), he distinguishes the proprietates through identifying 
different spheres of operation for each of the three Persons. 
' The phrases are those used by Crouzel & Simonetti, II, p74. 
2 De Princ. I. 3.5.141. 
3 Ibid., 7.245. 
Ibid., 5.138. 
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Firstly, the Father - equivalently referred to in these passages simply as 
`God" - is defined through his bestowal of being: 
[His] principal action (inoperatio principalis) is that He confers existence on all 
things according to their nature (quam omnibus ut esset naturaliter praestitit). 2 
This means that the Father's operation extends in universality to all 
things, `absolutely everything which is (in omnia omnino quae sunt)'. 3 
Secondly, the `principal function' (praecipuum ministerium) of the Son is 
described in these terms: 
To confer rationality on those' of a rational nature (quibus naturaliter ut 
rationabiles sins confert) 4 
This is a function which He performs by virtue of being God's Word and 
Wisdom, the principle by participation in which all rationality derives. 
Thirdly, the particular operation of the Holy Spirit is the sanctification of 
those who, through following the way of Christ, are turned towards the 
good. 5 Correspondingly, the Spirit's operation is not universal to the 
extent of the Father's, or even the Son's; rather, it is ecclesiologically 
restricted: 
We find that only the saints have participation in the Holy Spirit (spiritus sancti 
participationem a sanctis tantummodo haben invenimus), 6 
Origen finds support for this thesis in scriptural exegesis and in the 
liturgical practice of the Church. He can therefore summarise the working 
of these Trinitarian proprietates by describing `the saints' thus: 
Those who have firstly received being from God the Father (ut sint habeant ex deo 
patre), who secondly have received rationality from the Word (ut rationabilia sint 
habeant ex verbo), and thirdly have received holiness from the Holy Spirit (ut 
sancta sint habeant ex spiritu sancto) 7 
I On the application of `God' in Origen's theology, see further below, p149. 
2 De Princ. I. 3.7.251. 
3 Ibid., 6.162. 
4 Ibid., 7.254. 
5 Ibid., 5.146ff. At the beginning of this section, where he is aiming to distinguish the operation of 
the Spirit from the other two hypostases, Origen ascribes to the Son a universal activity like that 
accorded to the Father (ibid., 5.143ü); the passage quoted is a correction of this position. 
6 Ibid., 7.227. 
7 Ibid., 8.278. 
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This implies, of course, a concentric series of circles associated with each 
of the three Persons. At the centre lie the saints, participating in the Spirit 
and through that in the Son and so in the Father; a wider circle includes 
all rational beings, their rationality derived from participation in the Son 
as Word or Wisdom; the widest circumference embraces all existent 
things, which have participation in God by virtue of their existence. A 
concentric schema like Origen's is found in later Neoplatonism 
associated with an elaborate double hierarchy. The ascending hypostatic 
sequence of Intellect: Life: Being: the One is balanced by a decreasing 
but laterally extending sequence of intelligent beings: living beings: 
beings as such: matter, with Soul pivotally at the centre of these mirrored 
arrangements. ' However, we have seen that in Plotinus, as in the pre- 
Origenist Platonist tradition, there is no such extensive concentricity 
corresponding to the hypostatic hierarchy; indeed, it might be more 
natural to regard ciuxrj, in as much as it is the immanent World Soul, as 
more widely dispersed than the more transcendent voüs or One, which 
can only be attained with difficulty. What is the source of Origen's 
restriction of the range of the third hypostasis? 
Spirit and soul 
Crucially important in understanding Origen's account of his third 
hypostasis is an analysis of the language he uses to describe it. Whereas 
Plotinus had identified his second and third hypostases as voUg and 
y'uXrj, in Origen these correspond to A yos and rrveCpa. In accordance 
with his stated aim in the De Principiis of expounding the apostolic 
faith, 2 Origen of course takes the titles of Son or Word and Spirit as 
t Dodds, p232, commenting on Proclus' Elements of Theology Props. 58-59. 
2 De Princ., Praefatio, 4. 
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given; nevertheless, it is significant that he does not try to link rrveüpa 
with the Platonic 1iu, Yrj in the way he equates `Son' as aöyos with voüg. 
The background to Origen's thought here can surely be found in the 
anthropology which he derived from his exegesis of the Pauline epistles. 
The apostle's terminology is notoriously fluid, but a trichotomy of acZTpa, 
buxrj, and 7rvEU1ua can plausibly be detected, e. g. in 1 Thess 5.23: 
May the God of peace himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul 
and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. ' 
Two features of the Pauline use of cbu, 'if in particular may be noted. 
Firstly, Bultmann insists that it does not generally represent the `principle 
of animal life' (as does the Platonic idea of `soul'), but rather `is that 
specifically human state of being alive which inheres in man as a striving, 
willing, purposing self'. In this respect, it becomes difficult to distinguish 
from the biblical use of voü5: 2 Secondly, in one important passage Paul 
explicitly contrasts Ouxrj and lTvei pra, to the detriment of the former: 
Thus it is written, `The first man, Adam, became a living being (E-IS ciuXr)v 
ý, woav); the last Adam became a life-giving spirit (c rrvtüia 4"porroiouv)'. But 
it is not the spiritual that is first, but the physical, and then the spiritual (ou 
npwrov TO 7rvEO1rariK6v cWa rd buXrxdv, ZnE1ra TO trvE-ONarIKöV). 3 
Turning now to Origen's interpretation of Paul's anthropology, we find 
firstly that he accepts the trichotomistic scheme based on 1 Thess 5.23. 
Indeed he uses this as a basis for his whole system of scriptural exegesis: 
Just as man consists of (ouvtarr7KE-v) body, soul, and spirit, so in the same way 
does the scripture. 
Then, in line with Paul's own tendency, he aligns (PuXi as an 
anthropological concept with voüs rather than with rrvaüua. More 
Whiteley, p37, recognises the `trichotomistic language' here but insists that the thought is 
`monistic' - an unforhmate word, but one by which he simply means to affirm that for Paul - as for 
the Old Testament - anthropological language is used `aspectivally, not partitively' (ibid., p36). Z Bultmann, I, p205 - n. b. in pp207ff he goes on to establish a similar parallel in some passages 
between irvEgia and vows 
31 Cor 15.45-46. `First' is of course here used in a chronological, not a hierarchic, sense. 
4 De Princ. IV. 2.4. Cf also Dialogue with Heraclides 6. 
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precisely, for Origen this alignment is reinforced by his controversial 
doctrine of the fall of souls, according to which the pre-existent vdcq 
were degraded to become ciuXai, intermediate between rrveUlia and crdpý 
in fallen humanity. ' Although Origen was to be condemned for this 
teaching, which was interpreted as an undue Platonising of Christianity, 
Dupuis points out that the Pauline anthropology which it was designed to 
support in fact marks out Origen's divergence from philosophy: 
Le pneuma, distinct de l'äme, et du `noüs' qui en est le partie superieure, rend 
compte ici de la distance qui separe Origene theologien des philosophes. 2 
It is this anthropological background which governs the way Origen 
interprets the Trinitarian Persons in terms of the lexicon of contemporary 
philosophy. From the exegesis of many scriptural passages, 3 he deduces 
that the Spirit is only given to the regenerate. As he never equates rrveüpa 
with ciuXrf, though, this conclusion nowhere leads him to criticise the 
Platonist doctrine of a universal third hypostasis; on the contrary, we may 
suppose that he would more readily align a hypostatic iuXrf with the 
A yos, as we have seen that anthropologically he links cbv,, « with voUq 
The absence of any ground of criticism, however, does not mean that 
Origen's system at this point is not radically divergent from that of the 
earlier Platonists; the textual closeness of his scriptural exegesis leads 
him to insist on a restricted area of operation for the Spirit, and so also 
makes his pneumatology differ sharply from that of the Stoics. 
Paradoxically, in this very area where the distinctiveness of his biblical 
inheritance led him to stand out from the prevailing philosophical culture, 
Origen was not entirely followed by the Church as a whole - in modem 
theology, certainly, we have seen the importance of the theme of the 
' De Prince 11.8.3: `Mind when it fell became soul'. 
2 Dupuis (1967), p63. 
3 De Prince. 1.3.7, for example, cites Gen 6.3, Ps 104.30, Col 3.9, Rom 6.4, Ac 8.18, Jn 20.22, etc. 
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universal presence of the Spirit throughout the created order. ' On the 
other hand, Origen was still more emphatically disowned by subsequent 
Christian tradition in an issue where his teaching did approximate quite 
closely to that of contemporary Platonism - namely, the subordination, in 
terms of origin, of the second hypostasis to the first. 
Subordination through origin 
After distinguishing the more restricted sphere of operation of the Spirit 
from that of the other hypostases, Origen finds it necessary to state, 
according to Rufinus' text: 
There is no question of greater or lesser in the Trinity (nihil in trinitate maius 
minusve dicendum est), for one source of divinity (unus deitatis fops) governs the 
universe by His Word and His Reason, and sanctifies by the Spirit [or `breath'] of 
His mouth those who are fit for sanctification - as it is written in the Psalm [32.6]: 
`By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all their strength by 
the breath of His mouth'. 2 
Rather surprisingly, the context of these words is a refutation of the 
suggestion that the more restricted, and therefore more refined, operation 
of the Spirit might mean that the third hypostasis is greater than the other 
two (patri et filio maiorem). 3 Such a refutation could in principle be 
provided in two ways: either by a statement of co-equality in the Trinity, 
or by an affirmation of the Father's hierarchical superiority to the other 
hypostases. The former is indeed clearly supplied by the opening words, 
but the authenticity of these is disputed: it is on balance likely that they 
are a Rufiman interpolation. 4 In any case, the passage definitely goes on 
to assert the latter position, that of the superiority of the Father, the one 
who speaks the Word and breathes forth the Spirit. Here, as so often, 
` Above, pp39ff. 
2 De Prin. 1.3.7.246. 
3 Ibid., 244. 
4 Butterworth, p37n6 (following Koetschau), suggests that Rufinus has modified some such phrase as 
`there is no separation in the Trinity' - but Crouzel & Simonetti, II, p74n42, point out that the 
scriptural quotation is characteristic of Oxigen, so the whole passage cannot be simply dismissed. 
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Origen proposes a major doctrinal theory by quoting Scripture in a 
context implying a particular Trinitarian interpretation. 
In fact, he uses the same method a few pages earlier also, in discussing 
Isaiah's vision (Is 6.2ff). On the authority of his `old Hebrew master', 
Origen suggests that the `two seraphim' the prophet saw should be 
understood as the Son and the Spirit. ' The implication - recognised 
clearly by later anti-Origenists who preserved the Greek text of this 
passage in a collection of extracts designed to ensure Origen's 
condemnation as heretical2 - is that the second and third hypostases are in 
some way on a lower level than the primal godhead of the first. 
Both these passages provide illustrations of the second sense in which 
Origen holds to a `subordinationist' account of the Trinity: the Father is 
the sole source of divinity, and by virtue of this primacy of origin can 
appropriately be described as `greater' .3 
This in itself would be sufficient 
to show that Origen's Trinitarianism was incompatible with the assertion 
of co-equality between the divine Persons; but further evidence might 
suggest that his subordinationism was more radical still, involving the 
suggestion that Son and Spirit were not truly divine in status. As we have 
already highlighted the distinctiveness of Origen's pneumatology, in what 
follows we will focus on the status of the Son. 
The inferiority of the Son 
The situation here is complicated by the textual history of the De 
Principiis. An entire text survives only in Rufinus' Latin translation, and 
Rufmus - working in an age when Origen's orthodoxy was under 
I De Princ. 1.3.4. Origen also here provides a Trinitarian interpretation of Hab 3.2, `In the midst of 
the two living creatures thou shalt be known'. 
2 Justinian, Ep. adMennam (Frag. 8; Mansi 1X. 528) - cf also Justinian's 4th anti-Origenist anathema 
(Denzinger, no 206). 
3 Simonetti & Crouzel, II, p74n42, argue that Origen here only speaks of the Son's mission `daps 
l'ordre de 1'6conomie', but this surely reads into the text the distinctions of a later age. 
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ferocious attack - explicitly states in his Preface that he has omitted or 
altered apparently heterodox passages on the grounds that these are 
probably interpolations into Origen's writings anyway. ' This does not 
inspire confidence in Rufinus' version; the alleged fragments preserved in 
condemnatory compilations by the anti-Origenists Jerome and Justinian 
can equally be suspected of biased interpretation in the opposite direction. 
A complicating factor here is Origen's liberal use of theological 
terminology as compared to the precision established by Jerome's time. 
Two particularly significant lexical items here are the verb KTfC ez v and 
its cognate nouns, and the description of the Son as yevr7Td6-. Crouzel has 
argued strongly that the former for Origen could be used to describe the 
production of any distinct reality, whether by generation, procession, or 
creation, and was therefore an appropriate word to use in describing the 
relation of the second hypostasis to the first. Jerome, on the other hand, 
would have read xriopa as implying a definitely creaturely, and therefore 
non-divine or at most semi-divine, status for the Son (whereas Origen in 
fact reserves the verb rroIEI v for specific reference to the act of 
creation). 2 Again, Origen may have described the Son in De Principiis - 
as he did in other writings3 - as yevgTog, but Crouzel claims that this was 
not for him distinguished from yevvrirös, deriving by generation from 
the Father. This would mean that Origen was not inconsistent in referring 
to Christ as also dyFvriros, in that He shared in the absolute character of 
divinity; 4 yev, 7Toq would not carry for him, as it did for Jerome, a 
necessary implication of inferior status through creation. 5 
I Praefatio Rufini 3.55-64: Crouzel & Simonetti., I, p72. 
2 Cf Crouzel, pp453f. 
3 E. g. In Jo. H. XXVI1.172 (Blanc, p323, translates yevrlyd here as `titres qui sont nes'). 
4 Con. Cel. VI. 17.37 applies dyevrlroý; yEvgTcd-to Christ in the same line - cf Prestige, ppl37ff. 5 Cf Crouzel & Simonetti, II, p52n69. 
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Crouzel's arguments are powerful, but not entirely persuasive. His 
interpretation of KTi'"et v, for example, is not shared by all scholars. ' It is 
also difficult to escape the impression of inferiority when Origen in De 
Principiis parenthetically refers to the Son as `second to the Father 
(Se repog roü n-arpdg))2 or as `a second god'. 3 Moreover, some well- 
attested fragments - but not Rufinus' translation - do teach an inequality 
of the hypostases in the sense that an emphatically inferior status is 
ascribed to the Son (and the Spirit) - for example: 
So that in this way the power of the Father is greater (ieiI"wv) than that of the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is greater than that of the Holy Spirit, and 
again the power of the Holy Spirit is greater than that of the other saints. 4 
More generally, we should not expect Origen to teach anything other than 
a subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity. We have seen the importance in 
his theology of the logic of transcendence, and in a Hellenistic context 
this logic would naturally be expressed in the common language of 
mediation of the One and the many. As we saw with Plotinus, the 
mediating or `bridging' principle would inevitably be thought of as 
inferior to the unmediated One, and it is exactly this inferiority which 
Origen insists on in his `subordination of origin'. Indeed, it is hard to see 
how such a sense of subordination could be maintained without also some 
implication of an inferiority of status on the part of the second hypostasis. 
Nevertheless, Origen does not allow the inferiority of the Son, or the 
Spirit, to extend to the point of denying to either of them divine status. On 
the contrary, he insists at the very outset of the De Principiis on a status 
of divinity based on louorcpria. 
Cf the summary of views in Rowe, p 10 and nn. on the Son and Spirit as ! crfouara. 
2 De Princ. 1.3.5. This is a Greek fragment preserved by Justinian (Ep. ad Mennam - Frag. 9, Mansi 
IX. 524). It is omitted by Rufinus, but of the authenticity at least of this first part there can be little 
doubt, since an equivalent Latin version is in Jerome, Ep. adAvitum 2. For the continuation of the 
passage, see below. 
3 Con. Cel. V. 39, VL61. 
4 Ep. adMennam (Frag. 9; Mansi IX. 524). See n2 above. 
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The apostles delivered this doctrine, that the Holy Spirit is united in honour and 
dignity with the Father and the Son. ' 
In other words, he maintains both the divinity of Son and Spirit and their 
inferiority to the Father; and the former point marks out his sub- 
ordinationism as different in kind from that of Plotinus, particularly as he 
applies it within a biblical context where the difference between divinity 
and non-divinity is much more sharply emphasised than in Greek 
thought. Origen's dual emphases can be seen clearly if we consider the 
relationship of the first two hypostases from two angles. From above, 
corresponding to Plotinus' principle of `undiminished giving', Origen 
uses the idea of `eternal generation' as his principal metaphor for the 
Father-Son relationship. Considering the same relationship from. below, 
he echoes Neoplatonism in speaking of the Son's `participation' in 
essential divinity. 
Eternal generation 
In De Principiis 1.2, having introduced the theme of Christ as the Wisdom 
of God, and insisted on the hypostatic distinctness of this Wisdom from 
God, Origen goes on to ask: 
But how could anybody, wanting to have a religious understanding and thought 
concerning God, think or believe that God the Father could ever, even for one 
small moment, be without the generation of this Wisdom (extra huius sapientiae 
generationem feisse)? 2 
To maintain such a position, he argues, would imply that God had 
undergone a change, which is impossible; therefore, the immutability of 
God requires that the second hypostasis - whether described as Wisdom 
or as Son - should always have existed in its present distinct relationship 
of origination from the Father: 
We know that God is always the Father of His only-begotten Son, who is born of 
Him and derives what He is from Him (ex ipso nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis), 
1 De Princ. I, Praefatio 4. 
2 De Princ. 1.2.2. 
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without any beginning ... and 
it must be believed that Wisdom was generated 
without any beginning that one can speak of or understand. ' 
This theory of `eternal generation', which is affirmed at other points in 
Origen's writings also, 2 is therefore a direct implication of the 
unchangeable character of God the Father: He is, through and beyond all 
time, always endowed with a Son, who can be described variously as 
Word, Wisdom, and Reason. Yet because this Son is hypostatically 
distinct from Him, this involves Origen in recognising equally an 
eternally existent divine subsistence alongside that of the Father. 
This insistence on the eternal existence of the Son as flowing necessarily 
from the fecundity of the Father has resonances with several strands of 
tradition before Origen. On one hand, there are clear parallels with the 
philosophical theology of Middle Platonism, with its exegesis of those 
texts speaking of the absence of gOovog in God as leading to the 
emanation of Intellect and diversity from His generosity - we have seen 
how central this motif was to Plotinus' theory of undiminished giving. On 
the other hand, the New Testament itself emphasises both an 
understanding of God as overflowing love and the relationship of Sonship 
between Christ and the Father, `sans toutefois mettre ces deux verites 
explicitement en rapport l'une avec 1'autre'. 3 
A clear connection, expressed in the language of generation, between 
divine charity and paternity was, however, established by the 
Valentinians: 
As He [the Father] was fecund, it seemed to Him good one day to generate and 
send forth that most beautiful and perfect being which He carried within Him, for 
He did not wish to be in solitude; for He was entirely love, and love is not love if 
there is no beloved object. So the Father, as He was alone, generated and emitted 
Nous [`Intellect'] and Aletheia [`Truth']. 4 
I De Princ. 1.2.2. 
2 E. g. In Jo. L29.204; Hom. Jer. IX. 4 (cf Nemeshegyi, p71). 
3 Nemeshegyi, p65. 
4 In Hippolytus, Refutatio VI. 29.5 - quoted by Nemeshegyi, p65. 
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Origen was deeply concerned to engage with and correct Valentinian 
teachings, and it is instructive to set his theory of eternal generation 
alongside this account of the origin of the triad of hypostases. ' There are 
clear parallels in the way in which both link the dynamism of trinitarian 
theology into the very heart of the primal Godhead. On the other hand, 
Origen differs from the Gnostic imagery in two important respects. 
In the first place, as we have seen, he insists on the eternity of the other 
hypostases' origin as a consequence of the immutable divinity of the 
Father, rather than resting content with the suggestion that generation 
`seemed good' to the Father `one day'. In this sense, we may say that the 
trinitarian dynamic of divinity is for Origen a necessary characteristic of 
God: the nature of the Father is such that the eternal generation of the Son 
could not have failed to be a reality. He insists on this argument forcibly 
in a passage towards the end of the De Principiis: 
Let the man who dares to say, `There was a time when the Son was not', 
understand that this is what he will be saying, `Once wisdom did not exist, and 
word did not exist, and life did not exist'. 
But it is not right, nor is it safe for us in our weakness to rob God, so far as in us 
lies, of his only-be otten Word who ever dwells with Him, who is His wisdom, in 
whom He rejoiced. 
It is significant that these Greek fragments are preserved for us by 
Athanasius, for here more than elsewhere in the De Principiis Origen 
approximates the language of Nicene orthodoxy (indeed, Arius' position 
involved precisely the denial of Origen's words). Nevertheless, even here 
two caveats must be entered. Origen's primary motivation is not to 
safeguard the status of the Word, but to preserve the immutability of the 
Father - the doctrine of eternal generation for him is a necessary 
Marcellus of Ancyra reports that Valentinas was `the first to devise the notion of three hypostases' - 
Layton, p233; it is possible therefore that Origen's use of the word ürrdaraaig (cf above, p128) 
itself derives from Valentinianism, though equally the strongly anti-Origenist character of 
Marcellus' writings should not be forgotten. 
Z De Princ. IV. 4.1. - Frags. 33,34, from Athanasius, Ep. de decret. Nicaen. Synod., 27. 
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consequence of the simplicity and incorporeality of the divine monad. ' 
Moreover, in other parts of the De Principiis this same logic of necessity 
is extended in other directions which would be repudiated by subsequent 
orthodoxy. Thus, when he comes to speak of creation, Origen suggests 
that divine immutability likewise implies that `at no time whatever was 
God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence'. 2 However, the 
consequence he draws, that the universe in its ideal form must have been 
eternally existent in the divine wisdom, he did not maintain with such 
vigour as the principle of the Son's eternal generation; 3 nor, of course, 
was it to play a significant part in later Trinitarian thought. 
Origen's second way of distancing himself from Valentinianism is by 
avoiding the language of `emission' to describe the process of 
generation. 4 Rather, he emphasises the continuing presence of the Son or 
Wisdom `with' or `alongside' God the Father. This is best understood in 
terms of his account of the Father-Son relationship from below as 
`participation'. 
Participation 
In De Principiis 1.2, Origen seeks to explain the meaning of Heb 1.3, 
which refers to Christ as the `express image of his [God's] substance 
(, apo rrr)p rrjs c3rroardorcwg)', 5 and Wis 7.26, which speaks of wisdom 
as the `image of his goodness (ef, «Jv rrjs dyoOdrrjros)'. In a fragment 
preserved in Greek, he interprets the Son's `imaging' of the Father thus: 
The Son, while being good, is yet not good purely and simply ... He is the image of 
the goodness, and yet not, as the Father is, the good without qualification. 6 
' Cf Wiles, p21. 
2 De Prince 1.4.3. 
3 Wiles, p23, overstates the case in claiming that 'the two beliefs' (i. e., in the eternity of the logikoi 
and in the eternity of the Logos) are 'co-ordinate ... 
if one stands, both stand; if one falls, the other 
falls with it' - the severance of the two was in fact made by Athanasius (cf Danielou, p385). 
Cf De Princ. I V. 4.1 - emission, implying spatial separation, would deny divine incorporeality. 5 Rufinus' translation (1.2.8) explains hypostasis as substantia vel subsistentia - above, p130. 6 Justinian, Ep. ad Afennam (Frag. 6, Mansi IX. 525). 
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He goes on to explain that `the original goodness' is located in the Father, 
and the Son (and Spirit) `draw into (trahunt)' this essential source. ' 
Origen's imagery of `drawing' from a spring reappears in the 
Commentary on John, this time explicitly associated with the 
philosophical language of participation which clearly provides its 
conceptual justification. Commenting on Jn 1.1, he explains that the 
proximity to God the Father of the Word who was in the beginning `with 
God (rrpds rdv 4edv)' means that this Word is the first `to draw His 
divinity into Himself (rnrtzaras Trjs 4 drgros eig eaurdv)'. 2 Origen goes 
on to remark of the Word: 
If He were not with God He would not have that (oiK av 8' avrd Eoxrjxct's) 3 
The precise meaning here is a little unclear, but the preceding discussion 
suggests that `that' refers to the Son's participation in the Father's 
divinity. In expounding his theory of participation (JETOXq) at this point, 
Origen draws attention to John's use of the definite form 6 Oeös in 
referring to the (unparticipated) divinity of the Father, as distinguished 
from the anarthrous Oedg to indicate the divinity of the Son which derives 
from participation in the former. Indeed, he maintains that this enables 
him to defend himself against the fear of positing two gods (Süo Boor') 
without either denying the divine status of the Son or obliterating His 
distinct identity from the Father - to those tempted by either strategy, he 
gives the following explanation: 
It must be said that, on the one hand, d Bros means God strictly so called 
(atiroO ds), so that the Saviour Himself says in His prayer to the Father: `That 
they may know You, the only true God'; and on the other hand, that all besides this 
God, which is divinised by participation in His divinity (/JErorrj rffs t`KE1 you 
s 9t-örnros O onvto(iýuevov) is more accurately called, not b 0, -d; 7, but 8ed 4 
De Princ. 1.2.13. 
2 In Jo. II. 2.17.109A (Blanc, p219, translates as 's'imprrgncr de sa divinite'). 
3 Ibid., 109B (Blanc translates as 'I1 ne sm it pas Dieu'). 
4 Ibid. 
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In language reminiscent of the philosophical tradition, Origen then 
describes how the Word in turn communicates (cTaöibdvai) this 
participated divinity to the creatures out of His generosity (doO vwq). We 
can see in this chain of participation an indication of the central part that 
concept plays in his account of the sharing of the divine life, rationality 
and holiness; elsewhere in the Commentary on John, for example, we 
learn that all humans `somehow (irws)' participate in the Word, ' and that 
the Spirit has participation in the attributes of Christ. 2 Throughout, the 
relationships established by this participation are univalent: that which is 
participated is superior to that which participates. Moreover, the 
continuity of this logic is such that Origen can draw parallels between the 
relation of the Father to the other hypostases on the one hand, and the 
relation of those hypostases to creatures on the other: 
We say that the Saviour and the Spirit transcend all creatures not comparatively but 
by an immeasurable transcendence; yet they in turn are transcended by the Father 
by as much or more than the Son and the Spirit transcend the rest of creatures. 
Later, Origen was to revise his opinion on this detail, suggesting in the 
Commentary on Matthew that `the similarity between the goodness of 
God and that of the Saviour is closer than that between the Saviour and a 
good man'. 4 Nevertheless, this does not affect the overall character of the 
structuring of Origen's Trinitarianism by the relationship of participation. 
On one hand, this guarantees the real, but participated, divinity of the Son 
and the Spirit; on the other hand, it generates a dynamic of inequality 
between the hypostases. With this in mind, we must now attempt an 
overall assessment of Origen's fundamental theology in the De Principiis, 
asking how far he both develops Trinitarianism as a resource in dialogue 
with Platonism and remains authentically Christian. 
I In Jo. I. 38.269.97A (/pE-r1Xa v). 
2 In Jo. R. 10.76.129A (pE-To%q). 
3 In Jo. XIII. 25.151-3. 
4 In Matt. XV. 10 - Danielou, p384. Origen also quotes in this context Jn 14.28. 
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(d) Origei:: Trinitarian rc'sources and problems 
{ run's theology in the Ik 1'ri nc: piis is both 'Trinitarian' and 
'trinitarian': not only does he explicitly treat of the Trinitarian personae 
of the Father, Son. and Spirit, but he also does so in ways which reflect 
the dynamic,, of 'trinitarianisnn' proposed by Tillich and Panikkar as a 
resource for a universal theology of religions. At least, this is evident in 
his treatment of the relationship of Father and Son. In proposing the 
Su -rnoetic tr-ansce nc ence of the former compared to the latter, he 
implies, like Panikkar, a distinction between apophatic and personalist 
s iritt lities appropriate to the hvpostascs, ' while Tillich's distinction of 
t 'abysmal' and logical' as the ground for hypostatic differentiation is 
explicitly Pre-, rill in C1ri en's account of Fattier and Son as pond and 
Ady respectivcly. Indeed. Tillich himself actually refers to the 
'Origenist question of the ontological standing of the Logos in relation to 
the abyss of divine nature' as an authentically trinitarian issue:. ' 
At tim s: itirc timc, Ive rte¬¬. s: t notice that Origen differs markedly from both 
Tillich . inct P-mikL. ir in the place he assigns to the Spirit - far from king 
the Primary or universal catcjc, rv of divinity, the third hypostasis is in his 
tltcolQ the last in rank, and the most restricted in operation. In 
c"'PiY, itiSir¬g this, Wr have seen that Origcn stances out decisively from his 
iiio 0pt¬icai milie¬¬, in which the third hypostasis is ¬snivcr: al in : scope. 
In Other rc' ppccts, h owcvcr, and pcrbaps more significantly. close parallels 
can be cttahlishcct bctwce n Orion'. theology and the philosophies of his 
I'l, 110nist cuutcmp aricc, i rticulariv 11lc tinrts. This is true both of the 
a: 1d,, "11 Ill is or tr ii cndcnoc and immanence which generates their 
X11 1 xi. ý, t tý jturc are 111 (n.! SIM t%%Xl VCIUIIc'ý, bill tt31'rnrtc c--tCIIIV ý: f! jtis `nmý tc ýi 
but dillcicni rcaIIIICý, M. 11 this ýý. itcntrnt (t ýCý 
u: 'ý rý il"ý lbý ci; +; "c: iR t (vtu, aUý1ýlý Oiircn ds tr iý}'ns4 to the E a; hcr zýZýýc. -p131f. 
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respective sy~stems, and in more specific areas also - for example, the 
tension between one and %l dp at, the nomenclature of 
O ociz tic. the use made of Plato's Republic VI in justifying 
tr. 1JiSCcndcnce. the importance of 'participation'. Most importantly of all, 
we have observed a consistently hierarchical approach in the way Origen 
expounds his Trinitarianism. In these and other ways he shows himself 
remarkably open to the philosophical and religious thought surrounding 
him, and the degree toi which his dialogue with contemporary Platonism 
has beeil internalised is shown by the fact that thenn motifs appeu not 
only in the ('antn, where he is engaging with a non-Christian 
thinker, but even more importantly in the De f'rincipiis, where he is 
expound inj, apostolic faith. The intimacy of his involvement with 
Philosophy is underlined by his sharing with I'lotinus a common teacher. 
For later Christians. h owever, the question arose of how far, in his 
commitment to an rn dialogue. (urigen had strayed from the parameters 
of rccognis; ahly Christian faith. In fact, in the last section of this chapter 
vac Shall show that this was aas issue not only for Origen but also for 
other, later theologians, of unimpeachable orthodoxy; first, though, we 
will briefly review our checklist of trinitarian problems in relation to the 
1 1'rr, rc, piis - as 'equality' is the most problematical, we shall treat of it 
last. 
/'biter/lt ti. 
t thcUlc of a plurality of divinc 1'cr:. ons is highly developed in 
Qriý cry: insists «0 the slr: rrlrrres of the hypostatic distinctions, and 
jrtstifics tlti. % by carp-ying thc logic of trinsccridcncc and immanence 
Mithin the Trinity. A; cond sense, ply lity marking immm ncc against 
Ole WUIS" of the tr , e; c; cnx snt (n)dis Asta lea ut, tut its trinitafi 
PA 7i'1. 
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-f. 7 
application is less marked than in the Ennead : while the Son includes a 
plural element, his internal unity is assured by his personal identity. 
ferst,, Iiiv 
The biblical background ensures that all three hypostases are spoken of in 
personal terms - for the Son. CSI Cially. this is normative. While Origen 
understands divine: paternity primarily in terms of c Xrf, he recognises 
the inipli Lions of personality it also carries for the first hypostasis. 
7hreenes. r 
rlFain, biblical n liturgical us: >>le mean that this is definitely maintained 
by Orig cn, w 1u) repeatedly refcrs to the divine rpi Further, his careful 
ctzbo Lion of the place oftl Spirit leaves little room for binitnrianisn1. 
NCccx. %lt Y 
Trinit riani. sm is; : tt, ci>kj ; ical ncccssity f( ,w Origen: he argues for eternal J 
9cncration from the cs ntial character of primal divinity. A similar 
11cccssity is suggested for the ideal existence of the world, but this is 
easiiyttlmr; ible from tip rest of hi theology, and soon repudiated. 
/'II III UIl C! J ce 
Orig; cn explicitly rcjcc s rr cc list theories which would relegate the 
lrinit: tri, tr1 Plurality tot the economic level only. Through the theories of 
eternal t' c: r tion m (I p rticipatitm. he seeks to accommodate the real 
divinity of the Sonn and Spirit to the ()%rf of the Father: this implies a 
9ct utncly imui. mmit. tihotut_h tindoubtedly sub)rdinating. divine, plurality. 
btftt /uv 
l #ýis iti the "10 st I)b{c coati a of Ori m's Trinitarian theology; there 
C. 111 to little (IOiit)t that in imIttal%t ways he regards the Son and the 
Spirit is inferior to the Father. Not sur risingly, this has troubled later 
PATRISTIC 154 
2-3D 
theologians deeply, and was one of the principal objections raised by the 
fourth- and sixth-century `anti-Origenists' . In our own century, 
in a 
classic exposition of the `social analogy' of the Trinity, Leonard 
Hodgson, while applauding Origen for `the doctrine of eternal generation 
by which he freed Trinitarian theology from one element in 
subordinationism', 1 reproaches him for his insistence on the dpXrj of the 
first hypostasis: 
In this [divine] unity there is no room for any trace of subordinationism, and the 
thought of the Father as the Source or Fount of Godhead is a relic of pre-Christian 
theology which has not fully assimilated the Christian revelation. 2 
We may respond in various ways to judgements of this type. Firstly, like 
earlier anti-Origenists, Hodgson is writing from the perspective of a 
Nicene orthodoxy which developed the idea of eternal generation to insist 
on full co-equality of the divine Persons. This insistence was in response 
to Arius, who had emphasised one-sidedly another aspect of Origen's 
thought, namely the distinct separability of the hypostases. 3 Yet before 
the Arian challenge had been raised, it is difficult to see why Origen 
should in any case have thought of insisting on co-equality: there was 
little in the Christian tradition positively to require him to do so. He 
should not, therefore, be too harshly judged by post-Nicene standards: 
There may be a kind of incommensurability between the whole mentality and 
thought categories of Origen and those of a later age, so that it would be 
unhistorical to transpose from the one to the other. 4 
Moreover, the profoundly biblical basis of Origen's thought must be 
remembered: even in the De Principiis, exegesis is his normal way of 
doing theology. Certainly, Origen cannot simply be accused of 
discounting scriptural evidence in his Trinitarian theology - we have seen 
how the New Testament teaching on the Spirit caused him to disagree 
I Hodgson, p100. 
2 Ibid., p102. 
3 `One-sidedly', since Arius rejected Origen's teaching on eternal generation - above, p147. 
Lonergan, p63. 
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with contemporary philosophers in his account of the third hypostasis. 
Indeed, his subordinationism with respect to the Son is itself based on 
biblical texts which were also to be adopted by the Arians. It is surely a 
little simplistic, therefore, to refer to this motif in his thought as, in 
Hodgson's words, `a relic of pre-Christian theology'. 
Further, we must see Origen not only within a developing Christian 
theology, but also within his dialogical context. Within that context it will 
surely be necessary to give a more positive evaluation to what Hodgson 
describes as a `relic of pre-Christian theology'. Rather than being seen as 
simply a piece of philosophical baggage to be discarded as superfluous in 
the light of Christian faith, the idea of the dpXrj - like other motifs from 
the Platonist tradition with which Origen engages - can be seen as a 
shared resource to help establish a common trinitarian framework of 
discourse within which genuine dialogue can take place. Viewed in this 
way, Origen's subordinationist tendencies are the almost inevitable 
consequences of the openness of his dialogical stance; co-equality could 
only be assumed as non-problematic in a situation where Christian faith 
went unchallenged by other religious traditions. 
Finally, subsequent history shows that the criteria of orthodoxy expected 
of Origen should not be set too high, as the precise formulation of 
Trinitarian faith remained a problem even for Christians less involved in 
dialogue than him. 
Although Nicaea laid out definite parameters of Trinitarian orthodoxy, 
including full co-equality, it will be our contention that individual 
theologians in fact found it difficult to remain entirely within those 
boundaries. We will illustrate this point in the final part of this chapter 
with regard to our checklist of six trinitarian problems. 
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4 Patristic theology: Trinitarian resources and problems 
(a) Niceno-Constantinopolitan parameters of faith 
Although it was the teaching of Arius which led to the Council of Nicaea 
in 325, the Nicene definition did not end Trinitarian controversy. Rather, 
debate intensified in the middle fourth century up to Constantinople I 
(381), after which the focus of interest shifted rather to the Christological 
controversy. These two Councils should be seen as setting the parameters 
within which orthodoxy was to be expressed, rather than as endorsing any 
one particular theological system. In fact, we shall show that individual 
attempts to formulate Trinitarian theology tended in practice to violate 
one or other of the defined criteria of orthodoxy. 
Arius is now generally seen against an Origenist background: ' he upheld 
the doctrine of the three hypostases, but emphasised the transcendence of 
the Father to the point of repudiating Origen's teaching of eternal 
generation, insisting rather that the Son must be accounted as a creature: 
`before he was begotten or created or defined or established, he was not'. 2 
Against this, the Nicene Creed proclaimed its faith in Christ as follows: 
We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten from the Father as 
only-begotten, that is, from the substance (t'K Tffc oüaiag) of the Father, God from 
God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, the same in 
substance (dpoodutos) with the Father .. 
3 
The Nicene Fathers further excluded Arianism by adding to their Creed 
an anathema of those who held that the Son was `of another hypostasis or 
oeciig 17" oüofas)' to the Father. substance ( erEpag ürrorrrä 4 
Young, pp63f, repudiates traditional heresiologies tracing Arianism to Paul of Samosata. Also 
unlikely is Robert Gregg and Dennis Groh's view (Early Arianism: A New of Salvation', 1981) of 
an ascetical movement with adoptionist Christology - criticised in Williams (1987), pp19ff. 
2 Letters: to Alexander ofAlexandria 4 (Rusch, p31); to Eusebius of Nicomedia 5 (Rusch, p30). 
3 Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no 125. 
Ibid., no 126. 
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The three phrases `from the Father's substance', `the same in substance', 
and `not of a different hypostasis' have given rise to much interpretative 
debate in modern scholarship. ' Critical points are:. the reference of odm'a, 
the distinction, if any, between this and ürrooTaorrs, the implications 
(whether numerical identity or just meaning `the same Stuff 2) of 
d1roodmos, and the prepositional force (like English 'of, either generic 
or originative) of the particle ek in two of the phrases. Moreover, the 
same issues of interpretation were current in the fourth century, both 
among those who accepted and those who rejected the Nicene formulae. 
We may draw three summary points from these debates as relevant to our 
purposes: first, ör0o7-auiq and ouQia are broadly equivalent in Nicaea's 
definition, and only gradually became distinguished as `really subsistent 
personal reality' and `essence or substance' respectively; 3 second, 
dprooddiog primarily expressed the Son's status of divine equality with 
the Father, rather than asserting numerical identity; 4 third, despite the 
claims of extremists like Marcellus of Ancyra, Nicaea did not intend to 
exclude Origen's formula of three hypostases, but to correct its 
subordinationism. 5 
At Constantinople in 381, the boundaries established by Nicaea were 
clarified in two ways. The Creed definitively extended to the third Person 
the assertion of divine co-equality - the Spirit was to be `worshipped and 
' Cf the detailed analysis in Stead, pp223-267. 
2 Prestige, pp197ff. 
3 As late as 362, a council convened in Alexandria by Athanasius recognised this ambiguity by 
accepting (Tomus adAntiochenos) the language of either one or three hypostases - Young, P79. 4 Stead, p265, cautions, however, that this is not to be interpreted in a `rationalistic' sense, after the 
analogy of two members of the same species; Athanasius in particular emphasises the sharing or 
communication of life, light, and being between Father and Son. 
5 Cf Eusebius of Caesarea, Letter to His Church Concerning the Synod at Nicaea, 8-9, discussing the 
meaning of the anathema regarding `of another hypostasis' from an Origenist viewpoint (Rusch, 
p59). Stead, p242, summarises: `It was clearly impracticable to condemn the doctrine of three 
distinct hypostases, which had widespread support in the East'. 
PATRISTIC 158 
2-44 
glorified together with the Father and the Son'. ' Moreover, the appended 
Canons reinforced our interpretation of the Nicene attitude to the 
ürroo-rMorel S by joining to the condemnation of extreme subordinationism 
in Arianism and `Macedonianism'2 an anathema against `Sabellians' and 
`Marcellians': 3 the justification of a modalist denial of hypostatic 
differences through appeal to the Nicene duooüoiog was thus excluded. 
Between and behind the conciliar definitions, we may trace the 
emergence of a consensual Trinitarianism which built both on the 
Origenist tradition and on the Nicene dpoouQCog The Greek formula in 
which this consensus found expression was that of `three ürroo"rdceig in 
one oüQfd ;4 the three hypostases, as they were worshipped as one saving 
God, were equal in the sense of Icorcpfct, `equality of honour' .5 
In the 
west the equivalent Latin formula finally to win agreement was `three 
personae in one substantia'. 6 Such general formulae needed detailed 
interpretations to give adequate theologies of the Trinity; before looking 
at two examples, we briefly review the conciliar parameters in terms of 
the six criteria noted earlier. 
Plurality 
The Nicene definition, in that it did not exclude the recognition of three 
hypostases, established continuity with the Origenist tradition in allowing 
for a genuine plurality within the divine reality. This pluralistic approach 
1 Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no 150. 
2 I. e., the denial of the divinity of the Spirit - the position of the so-called Pneumatomachi. 3 Canon 1- Denzinger-Schönnmetzer, no 151. 
Young, p85, points out that, the earliest occurrence of this formula is in the treatise Adversus Arium 
et Sabellium attributed to Gregory of Nyssa. If this is the work of Didymus the Blind, this would 
cohere with the emphasis on the formula in the De Trinitate also attributed to him. 
5 Young, p89 (on Didymus). 
6 The situation was complicated by Greek öiro-ordain corresponding etymologically to Latin sub- 
stantia (above, p106); hence the west suspected that the Origenist formula of three hypostases 
implied a division of the divine substance. Equally, Greek writers interpreting the Latin persona by 
the Greek irpdawirov (at root an expression derived from actors' masks) saw modalism in the 
western formula. 
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in one sense was in tension with the interpretation of the Nicene 
dptoouutos as implying numerical identity; at the same time, the 
d1toouQtos served to emphasise the gulf separating the divine triad from 
all creation, ' and so to locate plurality firmly within the former. 
Personality 
Biblical and liturgical usage ensured that the language of personality was 
central to any presentation of the Church's understanding of God; what 
was not immediately clear was whether personality was more properly 
attributed to the entire Trinity or to the constituents thereof - in these 
terms, indeed, the issue was not even raised during the fourth century. 
However, we saw earlier how Origen's theology inclined to the latter 
view; the permissive interpretation which allowed this at Nicaea had by 
the time of Constantinople become a positive endorsement, reinforced by 
arguments used to support the personal divinity of the Spirit. 
Threeness 
The principle that God is constituted by a precisely threefold plurality 
was implicit in the tripartite structure of the Nicene Creed, 2 but it was 
definitively confirmed by the insistence at Constantinople I on the full 
divinity and loorrpia of the Spirit. 
Equality 
The primary intention and effect of the dprooüuiog formula at Nicaea was 
to eliminate from the Father-Son relationship any suggestion of 
subordination, by insisting on the status of the Son as fully divine, in 
every respect sharing in the Father's divinity; at Constantinople, the same 
One of the lines of argument Athanasius repeatedly uses against Arius is to point out that his 
account of the Son proposes a non- or semi-divine being for worship, which is idolatry - e. g.: `A 
thing originated is counted with the creator, and that which once was not is worshipped and 
glorified with Him who always is' (Contra Arianos I. 17 - Rusch, p80). Z Nicaea has the simple: `And [we believe] in the Holy Spirit' - Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no 125. 
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status was accorded to the Spirit. The dpooüaroq therefore necessarily 
acted as a guarantee of perfect co-equality among the Trinitarian Persons. 
Necessity 
Affirmation of Origen's teaching of eternal generation is explicit in the 
Nicene Creed, just as Arianism is characterised - and repudiated - on the 
basis of its proposal that there was a stage when the Son was not. The 
orthodox, adapting Origen's arguments, argued that this would impugn 
the dignity of God, by positing in Him a state when He was without His 
Word or Wisdom. As such a state for God would be inconceivable, 
plurality is necessary in the sense that the divine nature requires God 
eternally and irrevocably to be Trinity. 
Immanence 
That the plurality of which Nicaea and Constantinople spoke was 
immanent to the divinity can be seen in several ways: the acceptance of 
tri-hypostatic language coupled with insistence on the full divinity of 
each hypostasis; the clarification of the boundary between the Trinitarian 
Creator and all created beings; Constantinople's explicit repudiation of 
the modalistic interpretation of the cpoouQCog proposed by Marcellus. 
Thus the conciliar parameters correspond broadly to our checklist of six 
criteria. However, when we look at the work of individual theologians 
seeking to fill out these parameters into a coherent account of the Trinity, 
we find everywhere tendencies to violate one or other of these criteria. 
We shall illustrate this from the conciliar age with reference to two works 
of Trinitarian theology of seminal importance in east and west 
respectively - the Five Theological Orations (Nos. 27-31) of St Gregory 
of Nazianzus, and the De Trinitate of St Augustine. In both, we shall 
concentrate on three of the criteria, rather than on the system as a whole. 
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(b) Post-Nicene Trinitarian problems: Gregory of Nazianzus 
Fundamental to Gregory's theology is the idea of one divine nature 
(oüarfa) existing simultaneously in three persons (ürroaräcreig); he also 
maintains the traditional theory that the Father is the sole dpxrj of the 
Trinity. This was clearly a pluralistic position - so much so that Gregory 
had to defend himself against accusations of tritheism. In proposing a 
`social analogy' for the unity of the three hypostases, his theology pointed 
to an understanding of personality in God as distributed among the 
Trinitarian constituents. In taking the primary reference of `God' as being 
the whole triad rather than the Father, it confirmed the immanence of 
Trinitarian plurality. However, we can fairly ask to what extent Gregory's 
system tended to support threeness, equality, and necessity. 
Threeness 
As one who insisted on the dproouorov of the Spirit alongside the 
djroouutog of the Son, it is not surprising to find Gregory explicitly 
maintaining that the number of hypostases to be acknowledged as divine 
is precisely three. This is particularly apparent in the last of the Orations; 
arguing specifically against the `Macedonians', Gregory complains: 
Why do you call us `tritheists', you who honour the Son and at the same time reject 
the Spirit? Are you not `ditheists'? ... The arguments 
by which you defend 
yourselves from `ditheism' will serve to defend us from `tritheism'. 1 
He goes on to speak of the `Three who are to be adored (rp fa rd 
rrpooxuvoüpreva)' as being `with equality of glory (dpoöödwq)' . 
However, the parallels Gregory himself draws between his opponents' 
binitarian and his own trinitarian arguments perhaps indicate rather more 
than he intends, for elsewhere in this same treatise he finds it difficult to 
explain why the number of hypostases should be three rather than two. A 
1 Or. XXXI. 13. 
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first indication of this tendency occurs early on, where he discusses the 
reference of the `true light' spoken of in Jn 1.9. It is clear that the 
evangelist here is speaking specifically of the incarnate Son, but Gregory 
feels free to apply the verse equally to the Spirit (and, indeed, to the 
Father). ' Such indiscriminate treatment of the hypostases - which occurs 
elsewhere in the Orations also - undermines the scriptural basis of the 
Trinitarian personal distinctions, as even Gregory's editor acknowledges: 
parole evangelique dite Appliquer ä chacune des personnes de la Trinite une 
2 manifestement du Verbe ... 
West pas un procede innocent. 
The problem of explaining the distinction between the second and third 
hypostases becomes more acute when he has to face his opponents' 
accusation that insisting on the dpoouoiov of both Spirit and Son means 
that the Father either has two Sons (if both issue directly from Him) or (if 
the Spirit is through the Son) a Son and a 'Grandson'. 3 
This ridicule relies, of course, on the principle that the Father and the Son 
are distinguished as dy¬vvrjros and yevvgrTÖ respectively; the problem 
lies in discriminating between one yEvvr1Tdc hypostasis and another. 
Gregory's answer to this dilemma is not very convincing: he simply 
insists that the Spirit's `proceeding (eKrröpcuoi )' is `intermediate 
(pecr v)' between these two statuses; although he goes on to designate 
non-generation, generation, and procession respectively as the 
characteristics of each of the hypostases, 4 he does not succeed in further 
explaining the meaning of the latter. This demonstrates clearly the 
perplexity this problem causes him: although entirely orthodox in both his 
language and his intention, the underlying logic of Gregory's thought 
does not clearly support a Trinitarian as opposed to a binitarian theology. 
I Or. XXÜQ. 3. 
2 Gallay, p280n1. In the same section, for example, Gregory treats Ps 35.10 in the same way. 
3 Or. Xü. 7. 
Ibid., 9. 
PATRISTIC 163 
2-4B 
Equality 
A rather similar judgement may be made concerning Gregory's treatment 
of the theme of co-equality. Again, his language and intention is entirely 
orthodox in stressing the `equality of honour' 1 and the impossibility of 
ranking the three hypostases who share in one divine nature: 
For us, there is only one God (, -TS Oeds), since there is only one divinity (/. eia 
OeöTgs); and those who are from that one have their return to it, even though we 
believe they are three. For one is not more (ir . Uov) God and one less (lfrTov); nor 
is one before (rrpöTepov), and another after (ucrepov). 2 
At the same time, however, Gregory insists on the transcendence of the 
first principle, and this leads him to maintain in forcible terms the sole 
dpXrj of the Father: his theology `attributes the origin of hypostatic 
subsistence to the urroarauts of the Father, not to the common oc3Qia'. 3 
But this clearly opens up Gregory to a criticism which in fact he himself 
puts into his opponents' mouths: 
When we say that the Father is greater than the Son in reference to cause (alrfw 
pe(ý"wv), they assume as a premise that He is the cause by nature (atriov büa-r) 
and then they infer that He is the greater by nature (PC 410)v raj OüQEI) 4 
Gregory responds to this argument by trying to show that it would lead to 
ridiculous contradictions, but again his reasoning is not entirely 
convincing. To assert an originative primacy surely is to imply a 
hierarchical superiority which is apparently in contradiction to the 
assertion of co-equality; at the least, it generates remarkable paradoxes: 
I should like to call the Father greater, for from him flows both the equality and the 
being of equals. ' 
It is difficult to make sense of Gregory's system as a coherent whole 
because of these tensions. Meijering indeed describes his position as 
Or. XXIX. 2: `a monarchy constituted of an equality of honour of nature (q)uvtws öporipfa)'. 
2 Or. XXXI. 13. 
3 This is the contention of Meyendorff (1974), p183, citing in support of this view Or. XLII. 15: `The 
principle of unity is the Father, from whom the other two are brought forward and to whom they are 
brought back'. 
Or. XXLX. 15. 
5 Or. XL. 43 
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`logically untenable' in trying to fuse `Athanasius' doctrine of complete 
equality' with the `Neoplatonic doctrine of ontological subordination'. I 
Less harshly, Noble proposes that the immediate theological context must 
always be borne in mind when interpreting Gregory: 
When the One is considered the ultimate reality, the Three, being `within' this 
ultimate One, are equal in essence, deity, glory, power and dignity; but when the 
Three are considered ultimate ... there 
is an order (taxis) and the Father is `greater' 
as arche and aitios of the Son and the Spirit. 2 
This apparent irreconcilability in Gregory is particularly important since 
his theology was to be formative of the subsequent Eastern tradition; 
throughout Greek Trinitarianism, the insistence on maintaining the 
principle of the Father's dpXrj generates a tendency which, as in Origen, 
does not unambiguously fall within the parameters of complete equality. 3 
Necessity 
It may seem strange to suggest that Gregory's theology was weak on the 
characteristic of necessity, as it is clear throughout his writings that - 
more than his predecessors - he understood `God' to mean first and 
foremost 'Trinity'. However, if we ask about the grounds on which he 
justified this, we see a withdrawal from the kind of Trinitarian necessity 
which Origen had propounded on metaphysical grounds. We may look 
briefly at two examples, one showing this withdrawal from metaphysics, 
and one attempting to ground theology in a new, very different method. 
Firstly, Gregory begins the Third Oration with a discussion of the way in 
which the divine monarchy `timelessly and incorporeally' issues in the 
Trinity. His language in this passage is highly metaphysical in tone; yet 
he corrects any misunderstanding of his position his hearers might have 
deduced from this when he cautions: 
I Meijering, pl 11. 
2 Noble, p97. 
3 Cf the comments of Hodgson quoted above, p154. 
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We will not dare to mention an overflow of goodness (urrepXucrls dyaOorr7roc), 
which a certain Greek philosopher had the audacity to say, as if a certain bowl 
overflows. He has spoken plainly in those words in his philosophical works about 
the first and second cause. Then let us not introduce the generation as involuntary 
(di-ouo, tov yevvgorv), as some natural superfluity (impirrwpa Ti OuoiKÖV), hard 
to hold - this would be least appropriate for opinions about the deity. ' 
Here Gregory consciously distances himself from Plotinus2 to affirm the 
freedom of the Trinitarian processions of God. These cannot 
appropriately be described in the language either of `emanation' or of 
`undiminished giving' since for Gregory all such images suggested an 
impersonally necessary process. On the contrary, he insists on the 
retention of language drawn from the personal relationships of the Father 
and the Son. 
Secondly, the Fifth Oration includes a remarkable passage3 where 
Gregory proposes a theory of `doctrinal development' to explain why the 
divinity of the Spirit, hitherto unacknowledged clearly, is in his time to be 
openly confessed. The point he makes is, that this truth could not have 
been known apart from the unfolding of the personality of the Spirit in 
the life of the community of faith. In other words, `la theologie elle-meme 
a ete soumise a variation par la mediation de 1'economie'. 4 
Gregory here introduces into apologetics a new element - that of the 
personal experience of the believer as a member of the community caught 
up in the Trinitarian life of God. In so doing, he radically introduces 
human contingency into the ground of Christian knowledge of the 
Trinity, and thereby further distances himself from any suggestion that 
Trinitarianism can be demonstrated to be logically necessary, as Origen 
had suggested. The experiential dimension will be an important aspect of 
our account of dialogue; for Gregory it belongs to the whole laos of God. 
I Or. XXIX. 2. 
2 The reference to the works of `a certain Greek philosopher' is to Ennead V. 1[10]. 6. 
3 Or, XXXI. 26f. 
4 Gallay, p326n2. 
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(c) Post-Nicene Trinitarian problems: Augustine 
In contrast to Gregory's emphasis on the plurality of hypostases, 
Augustine's starting-point is the one divine essence, which is presented as 
Father, Son, and Spirit; he stresses the indivisibility of this essence, and 
its numerical identity in all three persons. Insisting on the complete 
equality of these three, he vigorously repudiates any suggestion of 
subordinationism. Augustine also proposes a number of analogies from 
the psychology of human experience; these are developed in such a way 
as to provide an emphatically threefold schema, the compellingly analytic 
character of which gives a sense of necessity to his Trinitarian exposition. 
However, we must ask about plurality, personality, and immanence. 
Plurality 
Augustine opens the De Trinitate with a statement which sums up the 
primacy of the language of divine substance in his theological tradition: 
The purpose of all the Catholic commentators I have been able to read on the 
divine books of both testaments, who have written before me on the Trinity which 
God is, has been to teach that according to the scriptures Father and Son and Holy 
Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity; and 
therefore there are not three gods but one God. ' 
Affirming this as his understanding of the faith, he goes on to insist that 
this substantial unity is reflected in inseparability of action: the economic 
dispensation of the Trinity cannot be split between the different persons, 2 
who act in regard to creation as `one origin (unum principium)'. 3 
On the level of ultimate reality, therefore, Augustine emphasises an 
essentialist approach which relies heavily on the doctrine of divine 
simplicity and indivisibility, while in the economic dimension also 
1 De Trin. 1.7. 
Z Ibid., 7- cf also De Trin. 11.3,11.9, etc. 
3 De Trin. V. 15. 
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inseparability is maintained. Together, these principles mean that he is 
very reluctant to use any plural language whatever to speak of God: 
Such is the force of the expression `of the same substance' in Father and Son and 
Holy Spirit, that whatever is said with reference to self about each of them is to be 
taken as adding up in all three to a singular and not to a plural. Thus the Father is 
God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, and no one denies that this is 
said substance-wise; and yet we say that this supreme triad is not three Gods but 
one God. ' 
Rather than speaking of three distinct realities of which predications can 
be made, Augustine prefers to speak of making the same predication 
`three times over (ter)7.2 Compared to the eastern tradition of three 
hypostases, this pushes the parameters of Trinitarianism to the limit in its 
reluctance to admit plurality. Augustine recognises the distinction of 
Father, Son, and Spirit, but is uneasy about their collective enumeration 
as a triad; his uneasiness is focused in hesitations over applying 
`personality' to God. 
Personality 
When he introduces the term `person' into his Trinitarian theology, 
Augustine does so reluctantly, in order to be able to give an answer to the 
question `Three what or three who (Quid tria vel quid tres)? '3 That is to 
say, he wishes to defend - against the Sabellians - the correctness of 
referring to Father, Son, and Spirit as `three', yet is acutely conscious of 
the limitations of language in applying number to the divine, and the 
dangers in suggesting `person' as a generic name which these three share 
in common. Accordingly, his endorsement of the actual term persona is 
very limited: 
We say three persons, not in order to say that precisely, but in order not to be 
reduced to silence. 4 
I De Trin. V. 9. 
2 Ibid. 
3 De Trin. VH. 7. 
4 De Trin. V. 11. 
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Yet even this recognition, restricted as it is, of the propriety of the 
language of persona as applied to the constituents of the Trinity does not 
imply that Augustine was prepared to have `personality', in anything 
approaching the modem or even the Cappadocian sense, as something 
distributed among those constituents. We may see this from two angles. 
Firstly, it is significant to note the form of the question to which persona 
provides the answer. `Quid tria vel quid tres? ' not only varies in gender, 
but actually places the neuter form first. This corresponds to the 
apparently austere and abstract understanding of persona Augustine 
proposes: that of being a subsistent relationship. ' In fact, when he 
expounds this concept in terms of the relationship of Father and Son, it is 
easy enough to trace connections with the idea of `personality' as that is 
understood today. However, when he speaks of the Holy Spirit Augustine 
proposes an analysis of the existence of that persona in which 
autonomous personality seems to have entirely disappeared: 
The Holy Spirit is a kind of inexpressible communion or fellowship of Father and 
Son (ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio), and perhaps he is given this 
name just because the same name can be applied to the Father and the Son. 2 
Such content as Augustine does supply to the idea of the Trinitarian 
personae, then, seems much less than that implied by 'personality'. 
Secondly, when he develops analogies from human experience to 
interpret the Trinity, Augustine's preference is for `interior', 
psychological images -a preference which in itself suggests personality 
as applied to the whole Godhead, rather than to its constituent parts. It is 
true that he first tentatively proposes a comparison of the Trinity to the 
trio of lover-beloved-love, 3 and the inter-personal imagery here might 
I Cf e. g. De Trin. V. 6. 
2 Ibid., 12. 
3 De Trin. VIII. 14. 
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seem to suggest a plural recognition of personality in God. ' However, 
Augustine does not linger on this proposal, estimating it to provide only a 
`glimpse (paullulum)' of truth. 2 Instead, using the doctrine of the imago 
dei as justification, Augustine turns inwards to the `more familiar 
consideration of our own mind', to find a more appropriate trinitarian 
parallel in the tripartite analysis of psychological activity as memory, 
understanding, and will. 3 The discussion here shows the extent to which 
Augustine was prepared to draw on personal biography in interpreting 
theology - like Gregory, though in a very different context, he introduces 
experience as a ground for knowledge of the Trinity. 
Yet this is always an interior orientation towards the undivided self: 
consonant with the general dislike for pluralist language he shows, 
Augustine points out that the three faculties constitute `not three lives but 
one life, not three minds but one mind', and this clearly corresponds to 
his admission in God of `not three substances but one substance' 4 In fact, 
the logic of his analogy points from this to one personality in God, as one 
human personality is the subject of all three, yet his earlier discussion of 
the meaning of persona prohibits him from drawing this conclusion. 
Instead, he expresses his surprise at the paradox he has reached: 
While in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man but belong to one 
man, it is not likewise the case in that supreme Trinity of which this is the image 
that those three belong to one God: they are one God and they are three persons, 
not one. It is certainly a marvellously inexpressible and an inexpressibly 
marvellous thing that while this image of the Trinity is one person and that 
supreme Trinity is three persons, that Trinity of three persons should still be more 
inseparable than this trinity of ones 
I But this analogy is then corrected to a reflexive model: mens, notitia sui, amor sui - De Trin. 1X2. 2 De Trin. XV. 10. 
3 De Trin. X 17. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
5 De Trin. XV. 43. 
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In these words, we catch something of the perplexity Augustine felt in 
applying the concept of personality to God, and particularly in identifying 
it as occurrent in three subsistences. 
Immanence 
Finally, we should just raise a question about the genuinely immanent 
character of plurality in Augustine's Trinitarianism. He is certainly 
concerned to exclude any Sabellian modalism - indeed, it is for this very 
reason that he consents to the vocabulary of persona. However, two 
features suggest a tendency to regard personal distinctions as not 
ultimately significant. Firstly, the psychological analogy discussed above 
shows the influence on Augustine of Plotinus' account of voUg thinking 
itself: it is a distinctively personal activity related to plurality. As in 
Plotinus this noetic level was transcended by the indivisible and ineffable 
monad, we might fairly suspect the possibility of a similar tendency in 
Augustine also. ' Secondly, such a suspicion may be justified when we 
consider the way in which the De Trinitate forcibly prioritises the 
language of undivided divine substance, for this inevitably carries with it 
the implication of a secondary status for the vocabulary of personal 
distinction. Such, at least, has been the contention of eastern theologians: 
Essential unity takes precedence over personal diversity ... This 
is no longer the 
`simple Trinity' but an absolute simplicity of essence, which is treated as an 
ontological basis at a point where there can be no basis except the primordial Tri- 
Unity itself. 2 
Augustine's theology, then carries within it at least suggestions of an 
essential level of divinity higher than that of personal plurality; again, this 
- like his hesitation over the language of personality - was to be of great 
significance for subsequent western theology, because of the paramount 
position of the De Trinitate as a text of Latin theology. 
1 Cf above, p104. 
2 Lossky (1975), p88; p81 of the same essay refers to the `semi-Sabellianism of the Latins'. 
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(d) Trinitarian resources in patristic dialogue 
In our exploration of the Christian encounter with Hellenic monadism, we 
have seen ample evidence of the development of trinitarian' resources, 
from both the Christian and the Greek philosophical traditions. We may 
group that evidence into the following broad categories. 
Firstly, Christian theologians and Greek philosophers shared during this 
period similar assumptions about transcendence in relation to immanence 
as the background to their overall thinking. For example, there was 
among both a quest for a single dpXrj, an emphasis on the simplicity and 
indivisibility of the highest principle, a consequent alignment of 
transcendence and immanence with unity and plurality respectively, and a 
tendency to arrange metaphysical realities in a hierarchical ranking. 
Beyond this, Christian theologians used elements of the Greek 
philosophical tradition to interpret and commend the biblical and 
ecclesial faith which they had received in God as Father, Son, and Spirit. 
Here we might mention the application of the imagery of noetic activity 
to the Son (encouraged by his identification as Aoyos), the promotion of 
a supra-noetic and supra-ontic transcendence beyond this level for the 
primal divinity, and the development of images of generation to explain 
the origination of the second hypostasis from the first. 
Finally, some Christian theology of the Trinity was developed in explicit 
dialogue with, or at least apologetic towards, practitioners of the 
philosophical tradition, and therefore necessarily took detailed account of 
the latter's methods and concerns. With the gradual establishment of 
Christianity as the dominant religion in the fourth century, theological 
emphases tended to shift away from apologetic, first to internal 
' In the sense in which we defined `tcinitarian' in Chapter 1(above, p34). 
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controversies and then to a concern to systematise. However, the 
examples of Plotinian influence in Gregory of Nazianus and Augustine, 
both of whom were to be counted as authoritative figures in their 
respective traditions, should remind us how much the earlier dialogue 
with Platonism had become internalised even in these later phases. 
We must conclude by asking about the character of the encounter which 
we have considered, in particular trying to identify issues relevant for 
modem Trinitarian dialogue. Three points may be made. 
Most importantly, this was an open dialogue, in several senses. The fact 
that Christians and pagan Greeks shared a common language, culture, and 
philosophical ambience gave it a character of intimacy and immediacy 
which encouraged communication. The evidence we have summarised 
above shows the extent to which Christians allowed this communication 
to influence the development of their own theology. This influence was 
not always explicitly acknowledged, yet the dialogue partners on both 
sides did recognise that they were in some sense engaged in the same 
quest: Greek philosophy was from its inception heavily influenced by 
religious motivations, and while Christians were hostile to the polytheism 
of pagan cults, they valued the philosophers' search for ultimate divinity. 
Alongside this we have seen suggestions of an experiential dimension 
being developed in the dialogue, in both Gregory's theory of the 
revelation of the Spirit and Augustine's reflections on the Trinitarian 
significance of personal introspection. We will return to this theme later. 
Finally, Christians in this encounter desired of course to remain faithful; 
yet we have seen something of the complexity involved in giving a more 
precise meaning to that desire or in establishing the limits of `faithful' 
Christian exploration. Not only Origen, who was to be censured for 
heresy by the zealots of later generations, but also theologians of 
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undoubted orthodoxy displayed tendencies to transgress the strict 
parameters of Trinitarian faith we identified in our sixfold list. 
This indeed must cause us to reflect on the standards of orthodoxy which 
may reasonably be expected in a dialogical situation. It may suggest, for 
example, that we should not envisage our six criteria as a checklist, 
violation of any one of which points to deviation from authentic 
Trinitarian faith. Rather, we might propose the idea of a cluster of 
authenticating characteristics, which together guarantee the family 
likeness of Trinitarian theologies.. Again, this is an important issue, to be 
further clarified when we consider Trinitarian dialogue in the 
contemporary situation. 
In Greek philosophy, patristic Christianity was interacting with a 
religious tradition at the heart of which was a divine monad whose simple 
existence was justified by inferential reasoning. We have seen how 
effectively Trinitarian resources were developed in a dialogue 
characterised by a fundamental openness, together with interesting hints 
of an experiential dimension. We have also seen how the concern to 
remain faithful was an anxiety for Christians to the extent to which they 
took dialogue seriously. 
When we next turn to consider our second major example, that of 
medieval encounter with the assertively based tradition of Islamic 
monotheism, we shall find a very different atmosphere. In particular, in 
large parts of the Christian world, one fundamental condition of a 
confidently open dialogue could not be taken for granted: namely, it 
could not be assumed that Christians and Muslims recognised one another 
as engaged in fundamentally similar issues through being addressed by 
the same divine reality. 
MEDIEVAL 
Chapter 3 
The Trinitarian dialogue between Islamic 
monotheism and medieval Christianity 
1 One God according to two faiths 
(a) Trinities of denial and defamation 
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The medieval encounter of Christians and Muslims developed in 
circumstances very different from those of the patristic period considered 
above. Two contrasts in particular can be identified which help to explain 
why the later dialogue was attended by many more problems than the 
former. First, while Christian and pagan Platonists in the Roman Empire 
shared a certain distance from, and disdain for, the popular religiosity 
around them, the perspectives of both Christian and Muslim medieval 
theologians were strongly influenced by the mutual hostilities, suspicions 
and misunderstandings which generally marked the relations of their 
respective faith communities at every level. Second, while the late 
antique period had in Greek language and thought a common currency of 
educated discourse, Christians encountering Islam in the Middle Ages did 
so with presuppositions formed in the distinct linguistic zones of Arabic, 
Greek, and Latin, each with a different relation to the Islamic world. 
Before exploring the themes of Trinitarian dialogue suggested by early 
Islamic theology, then, we must look first at the influence on subsequent 
dialogue of early misconceptions, then at the different contexts within 
which the dialogue developed. The former can be addressed through two 
striking examples: from a Muslim perspective, the Qur' an's denial of 
authentic faith to `those who say God is three'; from the Christian side, 
the defamation of Muslims in the popular western Chansons de Geste 
through imputing to them the worship of an imagined diabolic 'trinity'. 
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The Qur'c nic prohibition of divine triplicity 
The Qur'an makes several references to Christian beliefs, particularly in 
the Suras following the Prophet's move to Medina. ' Among the 
unfavourable references to Christians are those which can be taken to 
imply that they have joined the pagan Arabs in committing the sin of 
shirk, the association of other beings as objects of worship alongside 
God, which is equivalent to polytheism. 2 Thus, some Qur'anic passages 
specifically deny the possibility of any divine paternity - for example: 
And they say: Allah has taken to Himself an offspring - glory be to Him! Rather, 
whatever is in the heavens and the earth is His. All are obedient to Him. 3 
Muslim commentators have from the beginning taken this verse to be a 
repudiation of Christian beliefs, though it is also possible that the focus 4 
of criticism here is rather the pre-Islamic Makkan worship of goddesses 
described as Allah's daughters. 5 In any case, Christians are explicitly 
criticised in the Qur'an for `saying that Christ is the Son of God', 6 and 
' Trimingham, p259, states that `there was no direct Christian influence upon Muhammad during the 
formative years of his mission'. His detailed study concludes (pp308fl) with reflections on the 
superficiality of the Christian presence among pre-Islamic nomadic Arabs. Cragg, pp31-52, draws 
attention to the fragmented character of pre-Islamic Arabian Christianity (Nestorian, Jacobite, 
Melkite), suggesting that this may partly account for the apparent confusions in the Christologies 
criticised by the Qur'an. 
2 Shirk is the sin that God will not forgive (S. 4.116). The accusation that Christians are mushriki2n is 
made early in Christian-Muslim confrontation (cf below, p197), but is not unambiguously present 
in the Qur'an. Moreover, critical passages like those discussed here need to be balanced by other, 
much more positive, verses (e. g. S. 5.85) to gain an overall picture of the Qur'än's view of 
Christianity. 
3 S. 2.116, with Ali's translation ('taken to Himself a son') amended to indicate the textual possibility 
of either gender - cf SS. 6.102,10.68,18.4,19.35,19.91,23.91,37.149,39.4,112.3. 4 E. g. al-Tabari (839-923) says of this verse: `These are the Christians who claim that Jesus is the son 
of God' - Jämi ` al Bayun, 1: 403, quoted by Ayoub (1995), p74. 5 Ayoub (1995), p73. Ayoub also points out that the expression ittakhadha, `taken to himself, used 
here and elsewhere, suggests an adoptionist Christology divergent from orthodox Christianity, on 
the other hand, when in other verses the Qur'an denies the possibility of walad, `generation', this is 
assumed to involve a crudely physical process. Thus, Ayoub claims, space is left within Islam for a 
metaphorical acknowledgement of Jesus as `son of God' in the sense of `friend of God' -a claim found among Muslim commentators as early as Räzi (1149-1209). Much earlier, Zaehner (pp202ff) 
had developed such arguments more radically to claim that the Qur'an was specifically denying 
only the (heterodox) view that God could `acquire a son in the course of time', and was not at all 
impugning orthodox Christology. 
6 S. 9.30 - where the Christian confession is compared to the Jewish description of Ezra as `son of 
God'. For both figures, filiation is expressed by the word ibn, which could be given a metaphorical 
interpretation devoid of metaphysical implications (ef n5 above). 
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this Christological polemic surely leads logically to the undermining of a 
Trinitarian conception of the divine. 
It would therefore at first seem obvious that we must interpret in an anti- 
Trinitarian sense the two critically important Qur'änic verses which 
attack some form of triadic thinking: 
The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, is only a messenger of Allah and His word which 
He communicated to Mary and a spirit from Him. So believe in Allah and His 
messengers. And say not, Three. Desist, it is better for you. Allah is only one God. ' 
Certainly they disbelieve who say: Allah is the third of the three. 2 
However, the polemic of these verses cannot be simply equated with later 
Islamic critiques of Trinitarian theology. One complicating factor is that 
the second passage quoted seems to refer to a form of naive Christian- 
derived3 polytheism, in which God is numbered as one being among a 
class of three gods, rather than to orthodox belief that God's unity is in 
some way threefold. In the first passage too, interpretation depends on 
what subject is supplied as that of which `threeness' is predicated: 
If one accepts the Christian view ... then one must supply the subject as 
follows: 
`God is three(fold)'. Otherwise, one must supply (the subject) thus: `The gods are 
three'. 4 
In other words, while the denial of threefoldness could on one reading be 
extended to rule out orthodox Trinitarianism, another exegesis would 
limit its scope to repudiation of a multiplicity of divine figures. Masson, 
like most western commentators, concludes that both verses are directed 
against a form of tritheism; consequently `les textes ... n' attaquent 
nullement les dogmes de la Trinite ... tels que 
l'Eglise les professe'. 5 
S. 4.171. Ali (n653, ad loc. ) vocalises r-w-h as rauh, and translates `mercy', rather than rüh, 
`spirit', but this is contrary to traditional exegesis - cf Gätje, p126. See further below, pp199,202, 
for early Christian attempts to argue for the Trinity from the Qur'änic descriptions of Jesus as 
`Word' and `Spirit'. 
2 S. 5.73. 
3 Even the Christian background of the belief repudiated in S. 5.73 is not unambiguously clear - 
though the surrounding verses are littered with references to Christianity. 
4 The exegesis of Zarnakhshari (1134) - quoted in Gätje, p126. 5 Masson, p87. He points out that tritheism - linked to an extreme version of Monophysitism - is in 
fact attested in the sixth-century school of Edessa (ibid, p93). 
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More seriously still, it seems almost certain that the constituents of the 
trinity here being denied are not the three Persons of Father, Son, and 
Spirit. This becomes clear later in the same Surah, when God is 
represented as rhetorically asking Jesus (who denies the charge): 
0 Jesus, son of Mary, did you say to people, `Take me and my mother for two 
gods beside Allah'? ' 
In other words, the trinity being denied in the Qur'an appears to be that of 
God (the Father), Jesus, and Mary, 2 conceived as three distinct divine 
beings. The historical object of the Qur'an's criticism is hard to identify: 
No adequate explanation of the Koranic representation of the Christian Trinity has 
been advanced. The fact that a certain Christian sect, already extinct at the time of 
Muhammad, held such a view of the Trinity could hardly explain it. 3 
Subsequently, Muslims were of course to learn more accurately the 
orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity. 4 Nevertheless, even when it 
was recognised that `Father, Son, Spirit' were the authentic objects of 
Trinitarian faith, Muslims inevitably interpreted these three Persons as 
`three gods', 5 and so felt able to direct against Christians the Qur'änic 
strictures on shirk. Moreover, the verses we have cited left Muslims with 
a particular repugnance to any application of the number `three' to God. 6 
' S. 5.116. Ali, n75 1, ad loc., maintains that this is a criticism of Mariolatry distinct from the earlier 
repudiations (SS. 4.171,5.73) of Trinitarianism, but this is not convincing, as the reference here to a 
triad of divinities falsely worshipped by Christians provides the most obvious exegesis of the two 
verses quoted above - in fact, Ali himself concludes that `the recent proclamation of the Pope 
relating to the bodily assumption of Mary ... will raise a new question for the Christian world 
whether Trinity really consists of God, Jesus and Mary? ' (p276). 
2 Masson, p93, links such Mariolatry to the earlier heresy of the `Collyridians', identified by 
Epiphanius (Adv. Haer. XIX4) as having an Arabian origin. 
3 Wolfson, p304 - he goes on, though, to suggest that `the two Koranic deviations from the conciliar 
conception of the Trinity are not without precedent'. Zaehner, pp208f, claims that the Qur'an in fact 
implicitly teaches a trinity of God, His spirit (rflh), and His command (amr). However, the evidence 
for this is scanty and (as Zaehner admits) this pattern was of no importance in later Islam. Cf also 
below, pp199,202. 
Thomas, pp37ff, shows that most Islamic attacks on the Trinity up to the 9th century followed the 
Qur'änic line in centring arguments on the divine sonship of Jesus. Later polemic was conceptually 
more elaborate, producing a critique of the ideas of hypostases, substance, and their respective 
status and distinctions - he suggests that this may be in part due to the influence of Abü `Isa al- 
Warräq. 
5 To cite one example: in the celebrated `Dialogue' between the Caliph al-Mahdi and the Nestorian 
Catholicos Timothy I which took place probably in 781 in Baghdad, the Caliph immediately 
assumes that the Trinitarian Persons are thaldtha dliha, `three gods' - cf Caspar, p 129. 6 Haddad, p83. 
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Popular western imputations of Islamic tritheism 
Just as the Qur'an's attacks on a confused tritheism were thus to remain 
critical for later Islamic assessments of Trinitarianism, so also popular 
attitudes around the time of the First Crusade (1095-1102) were to be 
persistently influential in moulding western Christian views of Islam 
throughout the Middle Ages. Such attitudes are strikingly expressed in 
the early French verse epics known as the chansons de geste - particularly 
the Chanson de Roland, probably composed in the late eleventh century 
from traditions of the Pyrenean abbey of Roncesvalles, on the pilgrims' 
way to Compostella in honour of St James `Matamoros' ('Moor-slayer'). 
Although its action is set in Carolingian Spain, the Roland throughout is 
designed to resonate with the crusading movement of its own time: `the 
poet was aware that his account would have a special appeal as 
propaganda'. ' The picture of Islam which informs this propaganda is 
bizarre in the extreme, as may be seen from the following description of 
the prayers of the Muslim leader `Baligant': 
Now the Emir invokes his deities - Mahound, Apollyon, and Termagant, that is 
(Apolin e Tervagan e Mahun altresi): `0 lords my gods (mi damnedeu), I've 
served you well ere this; now of fine gold I'll make your images (ymagenes) if 
against Carlon you grant me grace to win! '2 
Several remarkable misrepresentations of Islamic belief and practice are 
seen in this text. For example, it is claimed that Muslims worship 
images, 3 that they treat the Prophet Muhammad as divine, 4 and maybe 
also that their religion is linked to the cults of pre-Christian paganism. 5 
' Routledge, p93. 
2 Laisse 253 - Sayers, p184. 3 Cf Laisse 187 (after defeat the paiens in disgust trample the image of Apollyon, and throw that of 
Mahound into a ditch); Laisse 235 (the Emir's standard of Termagant and Mahound and an image 
fierce and foul of Apollyon'). Camille, p135, shows how in medieval vernaculars `idols' are called 
`mawmets', a term which `became synonymous with all non-Christian deities'. 
`Mahound' is a derogatory corruption of the name Muhammad, revived by Salman Rushdie in The 
Satanic verses as an abusive title for his anti-hero - cf Atam Vetta, pp103f, in Ahsan and Kidwai. 5 In Roland, this depends on associating Apolin with the Greek Apollo; another explanation identifies 
him as the angel of destruction in Rev 9.11, but the two are not mutually exclusive. The 15th- 
century Florentine Andrea da Barberino explicitly identifies Apolin and Apollo (Allaire, p248). 
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What is particularly interesting to note, however, is the poet's suggestion 
that Muslims too acknowledge a trinity of sorts: `Mahound, Apollyon and 
Termagant" are clearly proposed to the reader's imagination as a false 
counterpart of Father, Son, and Spirit, diabolically mirroring the true 
Trinity as other features of Saracen society mirror corresponding aspects 
of Christendom. 2 Short summarises the poet's approach as being `evoquer 
chez les musulmans une structure religieuse qui est visiblement calquee 
sur la Trinite chretienne'. 3 Paradoxically, we can detect in this an 
ideology akin to that expressed in the Qur' an's denunciations of divine 
`threeness' - moreover, like the `trinity' denied there, that imagined here 
is a random assemblage of three deities which appear to bear no relation 
to one another or to a single unifying divinity. 4 
It is not clear how seriously the poets of the chansons de geste intended 
their descriptions to be taken as factual accounts - it has been suggested 
that `they have much fun inventing the gods; it is hard to see that these 
are intended as other than fun'. 5 Even so, the `fun' is important to us 
because it shows that, even when mocking their opponents, western 
Christians projected onto them their own Trinitarian preconceptions. 
Such projection was to feed a long-continuing tradition of defamation. 
As translations from the Arabic gradually came to be available to Latin 
Christians, it became clearer to them that Islam in fact excluded any kind 
Sayers describes Termagant as `a diabolic personage of obscure origin' (p20). An oath is sworn in 
his name in Chaucer's Sir Thopas (Canterbury Tales, VII. 810), as `Termagaunt' - Robinson, p739, 
remarks simply of this figure: `the origin of the name is uncertain'. 
2 Cf Sayers, pp20f for such ideas. This is not, of course, to suggest that one-to-one correspondences 
can be established between the individual members of the two trinities; they clearly cannot. 
3 Short, p29n8. 
4 AI-Azmeh, p126, points out that other gods were on occasions substituted in this medieval Christian 
account of alleged Islamic polytheism - including Mars and Plato. 5 Daniel, p338, where he draws a sharp distinction between the genres of academic religious polemic, 
for which increasingly accurate knowledge of Islam was important, and the fantastic imputations of 
chivalric literature, for which it was not. Nevertheless, attitudes and presuppositions formed by the 
latter would inevitably be carried over to the former. 
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of trinitarian belief. For example, the earliest translator of the Qur'an, 
Robert of Ketton, had read Surah 4.171 as a denial of polytheism: 
Do not say that there are three gods, as there is none but the one God, who is 
without a son. ' 
In early anonymous annotations to this text, though, these words have 
come to be interpreted as an explicit criticism of Trinitarian Christianity: 
Muhammad called Christians deviators as he thought they adored three gods. 2 
Accordingly, while the Chanson de Roland had imputed to Muslims 
belief in a false trinity, in later Latin authors the distinguishing 
characteristic of Islamic belief is seen to be the denial of any Trinitarian 
belief whatsoever. In 1333, for instance, Richard Fitzralph described 
Muhammad as a `pseudoprophet, whose attempt was always and above . 
all things to persuade that there is no Trinity of Persons in God'. 3 
This recognition of the centrality of unitarianism to Islam led to an 
abandonment of the Roland's fantasy of a triadic idolatry, but it did not 
lessen the hostility Christians felt towards Muslims; as in the poetic texts, 
so in the later academic polemics also, this remained focused on issues of 
divine unity and plurality. Here we see parallels with Islam's 
development from an elementary Qur' änic anti-tritheism to a 
sophisticated theological anti-Trinitarianism: growing academic 
knowledge of the other's faith in both cases did little to change the 
underlying ideological attitudes of hostility and suspicion. 
However, those ideologies in turn were formatively influenced by the 
various different contexts within which believers of the two faiths 
encountered one another; and here one must distinguish carefully the 
attitudes and experiences of Latins, Arabs and Greeks. We will discuss 
these in reverse chronological order of their engagement with Islam. 
' Cf above, p176, for the varying interpretations of this verse. 
2 Daniel, p200. 
3 Fitzralph, Summa Domini Arcani in QuestionibusArmenorum, quoted in Daniel, p200. 
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(b) Latin, Arabic, Greek: contexts of Christian Muslim encounter 
Latin Christians 
Latin-speaking Christians' perspectives on Islam in the medieval period 
were generally delimited by the twin horizons of intermittent military 
conflict and the exploration of philosophical and theological texts; for 
most, there was little or no opportunity for sustained personal encounter 
with Muslims. In preparation for the Crusades, anti-Islamic violence was 
spiritually justified by writers such as St Bernard of Clairvaux: 
To embrace death for Christ or cause his enemies to submit to it - this is glory. 
' 
On the other hand, Bernard's twelfth-century contemporary Peter the 
Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, was the first to sponsor a Latin translation of 
an. Later, scholastic theology was marked by the discovery of the Qur'ä 2 
Aristotle through Arabic commentators; this led to a serious engagement 
on the part of western theologians with one of the four principal strands3 
of medieval Islamic thought, that of philosophy, and there is also limited 
acknowledgement in a few Latin writers of academic Islamic theology. 4 
The primary motivation of Latin authors was to defend Christian faith 
from Muslim critics -a concern which developed for Lull and others into 
an overtly evangelistic intents For some, this involved attempting to 
demonstrate the coherence or even the logical necessity of Trinitarianism: 
A falsely Augustinian cast of thought led some authors to `prove' the Trinity by 
reason, and so to try to convict Islam of being irrational. No medieval author could 
see any concept of God that was not Trinitarian as other than wholly defective. 6 
I `In Praise of the New Knighthood' - Leclerq, pp63-70. 2 Kritzeck, passim. 
3 I. e. fiqh (jurisprudence), kaläm (theology), tasawwuf (Sufism), falsafa (philosophy) - below, p187. ° E. g. St Thomas' refutation, Summa Contra Gentiles 3.65, of the loquentes in lege Maurorum; this 
usage, deriving from Maimonides, refers to the mutakallimfin (practitioners of kaldm). 
5 Evans, pp137-166, tracing this `missionary theology' to Alan of Lille in the twelfth century, also 
notes that the academic challenge of Islam was not then felt as keenly as that of Jews and heretics. 6 Daniel, pp200ff, citing, as well as Alan of Lille and Ramon Lull, Ramon Marti (who expounded 
comparationes designed to demonstrate the plausibility and coherence of Trinitarian belief), 
William of Tripoli (who aimed to make clear to Muslims that the Trinity is `what they already 
believe' by developing arguments about the necessity of God having Word and Spirit), and 
Riccoldo da Monte di Croce (who detected Trinitarian beliefs implicit in the Qur'an itself). 
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By contrast, alongside this explicit concern, particularly found among 
missionaries, to commend Trinitarianism, there also developed among 
scholastic theologians an increasingly precise demarcation of the 
respective areas of natural theology and revealed theology. In such a 
scheme, the doctrine of the Trinity, as a truth of revelation, could not in 
any way be demonstrated by philosophical argument: 
It is impossible to come to the knowledge of the Trinity of divine persons through 
natural reason (per rationem naturalem pervenire). 1 
Yet this left open the possibility that in natural theology Christians could 
perceive that they were in fact - through the exercise of reason - handling 
issues identical with, or closely related to, those exercising their Muslim 
counterparts; thus there could grow up a guarded sense of theologians of 
both faiths being `fellow travellers in an arduous intellectual attempt 2 to 
explore together the rationally accessible knowledge of God. 
It was the careful scholasticism of St Thomas plus the vigorous hostility 
of the Crusades which were to define normative Latin attitudes to Islam 
rather than the Trinitarian evangelism of Lull; accordingly, we could 
expect to find, in western discussions of the plenitudinal dimensions of 
divinity, a considerable convergence of thought with Muslims which co- 
existed with a complete lack of acknowledgement that such consensus 
might serve any purpose in the development of a Trinitarian dialogue. In 
particular, we shall see that this was in fact the case with medieval Latin 
discussions of the status of the divine attributes. 3 
' St Thomas, S. T., la 32.1. In responding to the suggestion that Augustine had `set about proving 
(procedit ad manifestandum)' the Trinity rationally, Thomas stresses (ibid., ad 3) that the traditional 
Augustinian analogies were illustrative arguments which could only confirm the fittingness of a 
prior acknowledgement of the doctrine (Trinitate posita congruunt huiusmodi rationes), rather than 
prove it conclusively. 
2 Burrell, p60. Reflecting on this surprising openness to Muslims in the age of the Crusades, Burrell 
remarks: `he [Thomas] was more inclined to examine the arguments of thinkers than their faith'. 
3 Cf below, pp268ff. This is reflected in the fact that, from St Thomas onwards the treatises De Deo 
uno and De Deo trino were rigorously distinguished. Rahner (1972), pp130f, noting that Thomas' 
treatment here differs from that of Peter Lombard's Sentences, suggests that this change may be `in 
opposition to the Arabic systems or from apologetic or pedagogic motives'. 
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Arabic Christians 
The situation in the east was very different among the Arabic-speaking 
churches living in the very heart of Islamic society. Here, status as 
dhimmi, `protected people' gave Christians an assured, if inferior, place 
in society. ' At the same time, Christian subjects were always answerable 
to Islamic rulers for their conduct, and this necessarily involved a 
sustained apologetic designed to equip them to respond to criticisms 
confidently - `a method of intellectually commending the credibility of 
Christian doctrines in response to objections coming largely from 
Muslims'. 2 In such a context, then, it was an Islamic agenda which 
largely directed the direction of dialogue; that this entailed very 
significant differences from the western situation can be seen from the 
earliest surviving text of Arabic Christian apologetic. This is an 
anonymous tract, recently edited by Samir Kahlil Samir, known as the Fl 
tatlit Allah al-wahld ('On the triune nature of God'). 3 The work dates as 
far back as 754 at the latest. 4 
In striking contrast to Latin authors, this Christian Arabic writing is well- 
informed about Islam. Indeed, not only does the writer repeatedly make 
direct quotations of the Qur'an, but also - and more significantly - he 
assimilates its usage in a way that shows a thorough impregnation with 
Qur'änic culture - Samir remarks that: `this means that the text you quote 
(in this case the Qur'an) is already a part of you'. 5 Subsequent Arabic 
Christian literature was to continue in the same tradition, evidencing a 
I The dhimmi was legal ly obliged to pay a `poll-tax' (jiryah) in return for protection; the importance 
of this income to the caliphal treasury meant that the Muslim state sometimes was reluctant to 
reduce the Christian (or Jewish) population through large-scale conversion - cf Cragg, p79. 2 Griffith, p3. 
3 It is not clear whether this title is original to the text or added to it subsequently - Samir (1994), 
p57n3. 
Samir (1994), p63, moots the possibility of a date as early as 737/738 - this would mean taking the 
tract back to the Umayyad (Damascus) caliphate, whereas `up to the present day, it was thought that 
Arabic Christian theology started only under the Abbasids' (i. e., the Baghdad caliphate). 
5 Samir (1994), p70. 
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deep knowledge not only of the Qur'an but also of later developments 
among the mutakallimün or Islamic theologians: 
Christian mutakallimün actually adopted a way of presenting the traditional 
teachings of the Church in an Arabic idiom conditioned by the Islamic frame of 
reference in the midst of which they lived. l 
The defence of Trinitarianism is a central theme in the Fl tatlit Allah al- 
wahId. After an opening invocation the argument moves straight into 
establishing the coherence and plausibility of the doctrine of the Trinity 
in terms appropriate to an Islamic audience, both by offering analogies to 
explain the doctrine and by adducing arguments (some drawn from the 
Qur'an) in its support. 2 Again, this pattern, so different from the 
normative approach of Latin theology, was to continue in the later 
tradition: while rational commendation of Trinitarian belief to Muslims 
remained a minority interest in the west, for medieval Arabophone 
Christians it was the most significant of all theological concerns: 3 
The principal topics were always the unity of the one creator God, the Trinity of 
persons (or hypostases) in the one God, and the Incarnation of God the Word. 
In two respects, then, Latin and Arabic Christians engaged very 
differently with their Muslim contemporaries on theological issues: in 
their knowledge of Islamic theology, and in their readiness dialogically to 
relate this to Trinitarian belief. The area where this contrast is clearest is 
in analysis of the divine attributes: we shall see that Arabic, unlike Latin, 
Christians made significant attempts to establish a connection between 
this analysis and the systematic expression of Trinitarian thought. 5 
Griffith, p5, with particular reference to John of Damascus' disciple Theodore Abü Qurrah (c750- 
c825). The Christian mutakallimün probably derived both their designation and their principal 
preoccupations from their Muslim counterparts, rather than vice versa - see further below, ppl93f. 2 sue, pp70ff. 
3 However, Samir (1994), p72, alongside the endeavour to commend rationally Trinitarian belief, 
also stresses the continuing importance in Christian Arabic apologetic of the theme of the `Mystery 
of the Trinity' (idrdk al-talfit); he points out that this in turn resonates with apophatic Islamic 
emphases on the unknowable majesty and transcendence of the divine. 
4 Griffith, p3. Cf also, in more detail, Thomas, pp31-50. Gutas, p67, suggests a continuity between 
the method and spirit of Muslim-Christian debates and the earlier intra-Christian polemic of 
Chalcedonians, Monophysites and Nestorians. 
5 Cf below, pp258ff. 
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Greek Christians 
Meanwhile, a third context of medieval Christian-Muslim encounter, 
alongside the Latin- and the Arabic-speaking lands, was provided by the 
zone between these two: the world of Greek Christianity. We may 
identify here two areas of interest: on one hand, the explicitly dialogical 
encounter between the two faiths, and on the other the parallel existence 
of religious communities in the two traditions, without any acknowledged 
influence in either direction, but still showing remarkable convergences. 
Christian theological encounter with Islam in a Greek medium begins 
with St John of Damascus (c660-749), ' whose influence was seminal on 
subsequent Byzantine theology. 2 John's aim was controversy and 
apologetic against what he saw as the latest in a series of heresies to 
trouble Christianity, but `Sa polemique reste moderee. Elle va inspirer les 
auteurs chretiens de son epoque. Ä leurs yeux, il est une grande autorite' .3 
John's direct knowledge of Islam, and the context of relatively friendly 
Muslim-Christian relations in early 8th-century Syria when he wrote, 
mean that his writings reflect a genuinely open dialogue rather different 
from the ill-informed abuse of most later Greek anti-Muslim polemic, 
which naturally reflects the political hostility of Byzantium to Islam; 4 but 
the themes he addressed remained central in the tradition. In particular, 
we shall see that Greek Christians maintained continuity with earlier 
patristic theological tradition by insisting on the status of Christ the Word 
of God as a principal Trinitarian theme in dialogue. 5 
On John's dates, cf Sahas, pp38-50. 
Z John's theology was also to shape future Arabic-speaking Christianity in dialogue with Islam - for 
example, the Ft-tatlit Allah al-wahid shows clear signs of his influence (Samir (1994), p72). John 
knew Arabic (Sahas, pp45-47), though writing in Greek; Melkites in Syria gradually adapted to 
Islamic hegemony by adopting Arabic as the language of public discourse (Cragg, p67). Non- 
Chalcedonian churches were generally quicker to switch from Greek. 
3 Ries, p230. 
5 Khoury, pp310-318. 
Cfbelow, pp197ff. 
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Meanwhile, within each society there developed groups of religious 
people - Christian Hesychasts and Muslim Sufis - committed to seeking 
union with God though prayer, and developing around this commitment 
mystical theologies which both articulated the doctrinal traditions of their 
respective communities and added experiential dimensions of 
interpretation to that inheritance. In contrast to earlier twentieth-century 
European theories of a Christian background for Sufism, the 
contemporary scholarly consensus prefers to see the movement as arising 
from developments within Islam. ' Equally, the contemporary accusations 
of `Turkish' sympathies directed against the Hesychasts are to be 
dismissed as insubstantial polemic. 2 But if there is no serious evidence of 
historical borrowing in either direction between Sufism and Hesychasm, 
it is all the more remarkable to note the many parallels between the two 
movements. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, comparing the practice of the `prayer 
of the heart' in each, observes: 
The remarkable resemblance between Sufism and Hesychasm, especially as far as 
the prayer of the heart is concerned, is due not to historical borrowings but to the 
nature of Christian and Islamic spirituality on the one hand and the constitution of 
the human microcosm on the other. 3 
Given this remarkable ascetical parallelism, it is reasonable to ask if the 
mystical theologies elaborated by Sufis and Hesychasts also evidence any 
common features, particularly in the way in which they interpret and 
transform the plenitudinal motifs of their respective traditions. While no 
explicit theological sharing developed in our period, we shall see4 that 
parallels which can be traced in relation to the divine energies do embody 
the potential for a specifically Trinitarian dialogue if critically analysed. 
The earlier view is represented particularly by the pioneering work of RA Nicholson. Cf now e. g. 
Danner, p243, who still allows for possible borrowings of specific Christian motifs; he stresses the 
point, though, that Sufi theology overall remains identified as authentically Islamic. 
2 Meyendorff(1974), p27. 
3 Nasr (1986), p I96. Nasr cites the centrality in both traditions of remembrance of the divine name, 
the spiritualisation of the body, the symbolism of light, the incantatory method, and so on. 
4 Cf below, pp280ff. 
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(c) Themes in early Islamic theology 
We have already mentioned two areas where medieval Muslims and 
Christians were involved in Trinitarian dialogue - namely, the questions 
of the divine attributes and of the divine Word, respectively. We now set 
these two themes in the wider context of early Islamic theology, kaldm. 
Kaläm is in classical Islam one of four streams of religious thought, 
alongside jurisprudence (fiqh), mysticism (Sufism: tasawwuj), and 
philosophy (falsafäh); it has not had the privileged position within Islam 
that theology has enjoyed within Christianity, in that it has generally been 
fiqh which has been seen as the main area in which the implications of the 
Qur'änic revelation are intellectually developed and systematised. ' 
However, the mutakallimün (practitioners of kaldm) are of particular 
interest to us, as it is they who explored rationally the plenitudinal themes 
of unity and diversity in God. 2 Derived from the Arabic root k-l-m 
3 meaning `word' or `speech', kaldm has been defined as `the science that 
bears the responsibility of solidly establishing religious beliefs by giving 
proofs and dispelling doubts. 
Qur'anic exegesis and early kaläm 
For Muslims, an area where it early became apparent that such an 
exercise was needed was the interpretation of Qur'änic passages which 
spoke of God in terms drawn from the language of human experience - 
`seeing', `moving', `speaking', and so on. One particularly notorious 
example was the so-called istawd verse: 
' E. g. Watt (1998), pp64f. 
2 The later Sufis were to complement this rational exploration by building the categories of kaldm 
into their own experientially validated theology - cf below, pp280ff. The key figure in this process 
of integration was al-Ghazäli, whose Munqidh min ad-Daldl (`Deliverance from Error) tells his 
spiritual autobiography through doubt to certitude based on experience - Watt (1994b), pp 17-94. 3 The root could be used in a general philosophical sense or specifically to refer to the `Word of God' 
- in S. 4.171, for example, Jesus is referred to as kalimdtAlldh - cf below, p199. 4 `Adud al-din al-Iji, Mawafiq, quoted by Nasr (1989), p396. 
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Surely your Lord is none other than Allah, who created the heavens and the earth 
in six days, and then ascended his throne (istawä `ald'l-'arsh). ' 
The exegetical question here was centred upon the proper translation of 
the verb istawä; this literally means `to mount' or `to sit down', 2 but the 
early mutakallimün were troubled by the implications of such a reading 
when set alongside the Qur'änic insistence on God's incomparability: 
None is like Him. 3 
We may distinguish a range of responses within medieval Islam to the 
exegesis of the istawä and other `ambiguous' (mutashäbih) verses. At one 
extreme were the mushabbiha, 4 a disparate group of extreme realists 
accused by their contemporaries of an anthropomorphic `likening' 
(tashbih) of God to creatures, through following a very literal exegesis: 
They go as far as to say that God's eyes were sore and the angels went to console 
him; that he wept over the deluge of Noah till his eyes became red; that the throne 
creaks under him like a new saddle on a camel; that he overlaps the throne by four 
inches. 5 
There is surely an element of heresiographical caricature here, 6 but this 
merely served to reinforce the views of another group of theologians, 
radically opposed to the mushabbiha, holding that only allegorical 
exegesis of `ambiguous' verses could safeguard God's transcendence. 
During the ninth century, this was the position adopted by the influential 
' S. 7.54. Other passages often debated in this context included those which described individuals as 
hearing the Word of God, e. g. SS. 28.30 (Moses), 9.6 (cf below, p222), and 6.103, plus various 
hadith relating to ru yat Allah, the vision of God by the faithful in `the garden' (Paradise) - dc 
Vaux, S. E. I., p88 ('Djanna') - cf also Nader, pp114ff. 2 Netton, p129, also lists as meanings: `stand erect', `be straight', even `be properly cooked'. 
3 S. 112.4. Cf also SS. 42.9 ('Nought is like Him'), 6.3 ('He is God in the heavens and on the earth'), 
6.103 ('No vision reaches Him') - on which three verses ibn Hanbal, in his refutation of the 
`Jahmiya' (al-Radd 'ala'l-Zanddiqa wa-'1 Jahmiya) reports that Jahm (cf below, p208) built his 
system - Seale, p98. Rather confusingly, ibn Hanbal - presumably for polemical purposes - here 
refers to these three verses as `ambiguous (mutashdbfh)', when in fact their general import is clear. 
4 An equivalent designation was mujassima, `corporealists', from their reported belief that God either 
was, or was possessed of, a `body' (jis n). Cf n6 below. Watt (1998), p248, suggests that some 
mujassima may have been misrepresented, as they were probably using jism to indicate a `self- 
subsistent entity', rather than anything corporeal - he concludes: `This was partly a dispute about 
terminology'. 
As-Shahrastäni on the mushabbiha - Kazi & Flynn, p90. 6 As-ShahrastW imputes equally extreme views to Däwüd al-Jawäribi ('God is body, flesh and 
blood'), but Däwüd's reported words include the significant but unexplained phrase: `He is a body 
unlike other bodies, with flesh unlike other flesh, and blood unlike other blood' - ibid. 
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Mu'tazilite school. ' Mu'tazilism was the circle out of which the most 
influential early mutakallimün arose, 2 and the Mu'tazilites' theological 
categories were to mould the development of the kaldm, both directly and 
in reaction against their positions. Al-Ash`ari describes their views thus: 
The Mu'tazila agree that God is one; there is no thing like Him; He is hearing, 
seeing; he is not a body, not a form, not flesh and blood, not an individual, not 
substance nor attribute. ' 
We may notice here two significant points to which we must return: that 
the Mu'tazilite denial of anthropomorphism is derived from the unity of 
God, and that it is seen to imply a repudiation of divine attributes. For a 
broadly mediating group of Muslims, however, this position seemed to 
imply the error (opposite to tashbih) of to `tä1, the `stripping' of the 
concept of God of any significant meaning -a path which they saw as 
leading eventually to atheism. These traditionalists, while avoiding 
tashbIh through insisting on the elements of `unlikeness' (tanz? h)4 in the 
Qur' än 's use of creaturely imagery to describe God, denied a purely 
allegorical interpretation of the istawä: 
Some of the Mu'tazilah and the Jahmiyyah and the Harüriyyah have said that 
God's words `the Merciful is seated on the throne' mean that He has the mastery 
and reigns and exercises power, and that God is in every place; and they deny that 
God is on His Throne. They hold the opinion, regarding God's being seated, that it 
is God's Power... But its meaning is a being seated that belongs particularly to the 
Throne and not to all things. 5 
This position - broadly that later to be accepted as Islamic orthodoxy - 
propounded a rule of bilä kayfä, `without (asking) how', in relation to the 
I On the traditional origin of the name Mu `tazila, see below, p 192n2. 
2 Watt (1998), pp186-204, following van Ess, points out the complexities of the designation 
Mu `tazila. On one hand, it was used by heresiographical writers apparently as a description of all 
who, perhaps influenced by Greek philosophy, promoted the rational investigation of problems in 
the kaläm; on the other hand, some of these early mutakallimün were clearly not Mu`tazilites in the 
narrower sense of accepting the `five principles' (below, p190n3) - indeed, the earliest of all, 
Hishäm ibn-al-Hakam, was characterised as a mujassima like Däwüd (above, p188n6). 
3 Magdlat, 155f, quoted in Watt (1998), pp246f. 
There is a certain fluidity in the respective meanings of tashbfh, tanzih, and ta`til, arising from (1) 
differing positions along the spectrum of exegetical method of those using the terms, so that one 
theologian's tanzih will be another's WWI, and (2) different values given to the terms: while ta'til in 
particular is generally used in a pejorative sense, tashbih, which functions as a term of abuse for the 
Mu`tazilites, is given a positive meaning in the Sufi theology of Ibn Arabi - below, pp280f. 5 Al-Ash`arº, al Ibänah - Klein, p84. On the Harüriyyah, cf below, p239n2. 
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ambiguous passages. That is to say, the specific referentiality of a 
Qur'änic passage was to be retained, but coupled with this was a 
prohibition on further inquiry into its mode: 
The sitting on the throne is known, but the `howness' (al-kayfiyyäh) is unknown; 
the belief in it is obligatory, but the questioning about is heresy. ' 
Inevitably, though, such a stratagem could not provide a long-term 
solution to the theological problems posed, and the analytic and 
questioning methods of kaldm, initially developed by the Mu'tazilites to 
support their allegorising exegeses, were pressed into service by orthodox 
Sunni Muslims to defend and elucidate traditionalism. 2 As this process 
can be best understood as a response to the challenge of Mu'tazilism, it is 
important first to map out the overall structure of the latter, and to ask 
about the historical factors which attended its growth. 
The structure ofMu `tazilite belief 
Introducing the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, the eleventh-century Islamic 
heresiographer as-ShahrastänI places first their emphasis on `divine unity' 
(tawhid), 3 and includes within this the denial of attributes eternally 
subsisting in God, the denial of the uncreated status of the Qur'an, and 
the insistence on an allegorical interpretation of Qur'änic verses. His 
account is worth quoting at length, since it both expresses concisely the 
understanding of Mu'tazilism current in his time, and also presents the 
key plenitudinal themes which we will take as being the (potential) 
subjects of medieval Trinitarian dialogue: 
I Malik ibn Anas, quoted by Al-Suyüti - cf Seale, p54. 2 Cf below, p215, for al-Ash`ari's relation to the traditionalist position of ibn Hanbal. 
3 The Mu'tazilites identified themselves by reference to five fundamental principles (Watt (1998), 
pp229f): (1) 'divine unity' (a! -tawhid); (2) 'justice' (a! - `ad! ), i. e. the denial that God wills evil and 
consequently the affirmation of the freedom of human determination (qadar); (3) `promise and 
threat' (at-wad wa-'1-wa7d), i. e. the ineluctability of the moral order established by God; (4) the 
'intermediate position' (a! -manzildh bayn al-manzilatayn) afflnned of a Muslim who commits sin; 
(5) `commanding the right and forbidding the wrong' (a! -amr bi-'! -ma'rz2f wa- n-nahy 'an a! - 
munkar), which perhaps was the least controversial of all their teachings. Cf also below, p 192n2. 
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[1a] The Mu'tazila deny altogether the eternal attributes. According to them God is 
`knowing' by his essence, `powerful' by his essence, `living' by his essence: not by 
`knowledge' or `power' or `life' considered as eternal attributes or entities 
subsisting in him. [1b] This is so because if the attributes shared in the eternity of 
God, which is his special characteristic, they would also share in his godhead. 
[2] They are all of the opinion that the speech of God is temporal and created in a 
place. It consists of letters and sounds, and these are recorded in books by means of 
their likenesses which manifest them. Again, what is found in a place is an 
accident which at once disappears. 
[3] They all hold that will, hearing and sight are not entities subsisting in the divine 
essence. They differ, however, in their explanation of the meaning of attributes and 
their manner of existence, as we shall explain later. 
[4] They deny the possibility of any description of him in anthropomorphic terms, 
such as assigning him direction, place, form, body, abode, movement, transition, 
change, or emotion. Hence, the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an with such 
descriptions must be interpreted in a metaphorical sense. This is what they mean 
by Unity. 1 
Here as-Shahrastäni gives a clear and logical explanation of the structure 
of Mu'tazilite thought: central to the school's theology is a severely 
rational account [1b] of tawhid, divine unity, as requiring the exclusion of 
any hint of multiplicity whatsoever. 2 In terms of scriptural exegesis, this 
means that anthropomorphic imagery must be reinterpreted [4], as its 
corporeal tendencies suggest a composition of parts; as a more general 
rule, any attributes ascribed to God must be either indistinguishable from 
his essence or in fact entirely creaturely: knowledge, power and life fall 
into the former category []a], speech into the latter [2], while there is a 
division within the school about other attributes [3]. 3 According to this 
presentation of Mu'tazilism, therefore, the specific questions of both the 
mutashäbih verses and the status of the Qur'an overall are particular 
instances of a more general theory of the divine attributes, which in turn 
flows from a particular interpretation of the unity of God. 
I Kazi & Flynn, p42 (my numbering added in square brackets). 
2 The Mu'tazilite theory relies on identifying `eternity' as the defining characteristic of God; so any 
attribute or entity posited as eternal would itself rank as divine, and therefore imperil tawhfd. This 
was, for example, the reasoning followed by al-Ma'mün in relation to the Qur'än (below, p207). 
3 As-Shahrastäni's account here reflects the traditional Sunni enumeration of seven divine attributes 
(below, p244); since three have been mentioned in []a] and a further one in [2], he evidently feels 
the need to add a comment [3] about the other three. 
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As-Shahrastäni's account is important because it provides a readily 
comprehensible conceptual map of Mu`tazilite thought, and it also 
broadly coheres with later Mu'tazilite self-understanding. ' However, the 
historical evolution of the Mu'tazilite system by no means followed such 
a logical course, as can be seen from three facts: that tawhid does not 
seem to have been the earliest principle by which the Mu'tazilites defined 
themselves; 2 that problems over the Qur'anic use of anthropomorphic 
language were discussed before the general questions either of the 
Qur'an's status or of the ontological subsistence of attributes were 
raised; ' and that theological disputes about the divine attributes in general 
seem chronologically to have followed after the controversy over the 
uncreated and eternal nature of the Qur'an. 4 
If, then, logical progression does not provide an adequate explanation of 
the process by which the Mu'tazilites and other mutakallimün developed 
the structure of Islamic theology, it is natural to ask what other historical 
factors might have contributed to the adoption of rational argumentation 
in elucidating the problems of kaläm. Here there are two obvious 
candidates to consider: the possible influence of Christian thought; and 
the effect of socio-political pressures arising from the Muslim community 
itself. 
E. g. in the highly influential Mu'tazilite textbook Kitdb al-UsAI al-khamsa (Book of the Five 
Fundamentals ) of Qädi `Abd-al-Jabbär (c935-1024), the first principle established is that of tawhfd 
('unity'), which is taken to imply the non-subsistence of divine attributes distinct from the essence - 
Martin, Woodward & Atmaja, pp67ff. 
2 More likely candidates from among the five principles (cf above, p190n3) are either 'adl (`justice') 
- as evidenced by the early designation Qadariyya ('proponents of [human) determination') 
regularly applied to them - or al-manzildh bayn al-manzilatayn ('intermediate position') - as 
suggested by the apocryphal story tracing the origin of the school to the separation of Wäsil ibn- 
`Atä from the teaching of al-Hasan al-Basri over the question of the status of sinners, when Hasan 
allegedly remarked: `Wäsil has withdrawn (i `tazala) from us', whence the Mu`tazilites' name. 
3 Cf above, ppl87f, and further below, p208 (with reference to Ja'd and Jahm) on the relation of 
exegetical questions to the debate over the status of the Qur'an. 
Thus Watt (1998), p242, criticising Wensinck's view that the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the Qur'an 
`was only a logical consequence of their denying eternal qualities', comments: `There is certainly a 
logical connection at this point, but historically it is more likely that the concrete discussions of the 
Qur'an preceded the abstract discussion about the essential attributes'. 
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Christian theology and the origins of Mu `tazilism 
That kaläm was formatively influenced by Christian theology was a view 
advanced by Morris Seale and by Harry Wolfson. Seale saw Mu'tazilism 
as going back to Jahm bin Safwan, who in turn had learnt his allegorising 
exegesis and anti-anthropomorphism from the Church Fathers; ' the 
conduit by which philosophy reached the Islamic world was Christianity. 
Wolfson laid less emphasis on Jahm, but equally insisted that the Church 
Fathers were significant in that through their agency Greek thought 
encountered Islamic faith in a way which mirrored its earlier encounters 
with Judaism (Philo of Alexandria) and with patristic Christianity: 
The story of the Kalam is the third version of a thrice-told tale based on the same 
plot. The plot is "Scripture meets philosophy". 2 
However, it is misleading to look mainly to Christianity to explain the 
birth of the kaläm. In the first place, the Church Fathers were neither the 
only nor the most effective means by which Greek philosophy entered the 
Islamic world. On the contrary, during the Abbasid caliphate Baghdad 
became an important centre for the direct translation of works of the 
pagan philosophers into Arabic; while many translators were Christians, 
these acted as collaborators with Muslims in the joint exploration of 
classical learning, and the resultant shared language of rationality in turn 
enabled dialogue between the faiths. 3 
Moreover, at an earlier stage of the kaläm's development, we should not 
assume that reports of Mu'tazilites or others applying rational methods of 
argument to theological problems need imply use of Greek philosophical 
Seale, pp43-86; he emphasises particularly the importance of St John of Damascus. Seale further 
maintains that Jahm's reputation was so bad in subsequent Islam that the Mu'tazilites re-wrote their 
history, disowning him in favour of a more respectable pedigree. 
2 Wolfson, p720. The figure of Philo is central in Wolfson's work; he particularly ascribes to the 
Philonic theory of the simplicity of divine unity an importance difficult to justify historically. 
3 Cf Rosenthal, pp5-16. For example, Aristotle's Topics (translated by Christians at the request of al- 
Ma'mün) was important in providing training for Christians and Muslims in argumentative 
techniques - Gutas, pp67ff. 
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categories. The primary Islamic discipline of fiqh had already evolved 
sophisticated methodologies of debate which could be taken up by the 
mutakallimün and extended from jurisprudence to other areas: `systematic 
reasoning in law prepared the way for reasoning in theology'! 
Most importantly, we must distinguish between alleged direct borrowings 
by Muslim theologians from Christians and the undoubted parallels 
which can be traced between theological structures in the two traditions. 
Our purpose is to explore the latter, but the existence of such parallels 
does not require the former; consonant with this distinction, it is 
important to realise that the positions not only of the Mu'tazilites but also 
of their orthodox opponents can be convincingly paralleled within the 
diversity of Christian opinion on the theological issues which 
corresponded to those exercising the Islamic mutakallimün. 2 Not only are 
Seale's and Wolfson's arguments conjectural; even where specific ideas 
were borrowed this need not imply wholesale imitation. Watt's comment 
on free will is more widely applicable in this respect: 
Muslims did not take over the doctrine of free will because they heard Christians 
express it and thought it intellectually sound; on the contrary, in their struggle with 
the Umayyads ... when they 
found that some Christian idea or principle was an 
effective stick with which to beat these opponents, they did not hesitate to use it 3 
Watt concludes that any Christian ideas introduced into kaläm were those 
`which were relevant to the community's main tensions'; we now set 
kaldm in its Islamic context by briefly indicating some of those tensions. 
The Muslim origins ofMu `tazilism 
Two important Mu'tazilite teachings - that the Qur'an is created, and that 
human determination (qadar) is free - are linked not only theologically 
but also politically. The theological logic is clear: the Qur'an reveals the 
Watt (1998), pp 180-182. 
2 Evidence in Sweetman 78ff on attnbutes 1/2,116ff on the , e. g. 1/1, PP 
( ), PP ( Qur'än). 
3 Watt (1998), p99. 
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divine predestining will, so lowering its status reduces its authority and 
thereby enhances the space for free human qadar. Watt has shown that 
the political linkage hinges on the dramatic events of 750, when the 
Umayyad clan was massacred and their Damascus caliphate replaced by 
Abbasid rule centred on Baghdad. Prior to 750, the Umayyads had sought 
to justify their rule by claiming that it was ordained by God; conversely, 
opposition to the caliphate had been expressed theologically by the 
affirmation of free humangadar. 1 When the Abbasids gained power, 
then, it was natural that the Mu'tazilites (also referred to as Qadariyya) 
were favoured; in turn, the new autocracy was resisted by the `ulamd', 
those `learned' (`aiim) in the religion, particularly in the Qur'an. In these 
changed circumstances, to insist on an uncreated Qur'an was to 
acknowledge an eternal and unchangeable authority above that of caliphal 
rule. Moreover, these tensions were heightened by the incorporation into 
the Islamic empire of large numbers of non-Arabs, looking to the caliph 
for protection, who did not necessarily share fully in the Arabs' respect 
for their Arabic scripture. 3 
This summary of course represents a gross simplification of a complex 
and constantly changing evolution; yet it does show that, far from being 
of merely academic interest, the disputed issues of the kaldm both 
reflected and reinforced major socio-political tensions among Muslims. 
In what follows, we will concentrate on the potential for Trinitarian 
dialogue of two of those issues: namely, the questions of the status of the 
divine Word and of the divine attributes respectively. In both cases, our 
' Watt (1998), p95: `To assert the general principle that good acts were from God and bad acts from 
men was to contradict an important part of the Umayyad apologia for their rule'. 
2 Ibid., p179: `The doctrine of createdness enhanced the power of the caliph and the secretaries, that 
of uncreatedness the power of the ulema'. 
3 Prominent among the non-Arab `clients' (mawdl), who had laboured under various disadvantages 
in Umayyad times, were the Persians, who were dominant in the 9th century Shu`übite movement, 
which praised non-Arab literature and culture at the expense of Arabic - ibid., pp172f. 
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interest will be twofold: on one hand, to trace the explicit dialogue 
between theologians of the two faith communities on these themes, and 
the extent to which in the case of Christianity this dialogue was 
consciously related to Trinitarian doctrine; on the other hand, to explore 
the latent trinitarian dynamic of the intra-Muslim debates, and to ask 
whether or not this dynamic can be explained in terms of a borrowing of 
ideas and methods from one tradition to the other. The former task must 
have in mind the variety of contexts of Christian-Muslim encounter, east 
and west, outlined above; the latter, while focusing on the currents of 
Islamic theology recognised as `orthodoxy' - those associated with ibn 
Hanbal, al-Ash` ari, and al-Mdturidi - must understand these in relation to 
the Mu`tazilite and other heterodoxies against which they were reacting. 
With all this in mind, our plan will be as follows. First, in looking at the 
question of the divine Word, we begin with the earliest Muslim-Christian 
dialogues in the Greek tradition - those of St John of Damascus. We then 
set alongside these both the early debates within the Muslim community 
about the status of the Qur'an and the later Islamic scholasticism which 
analysed more carefully the theological implications of an uncreated 
Word. Turning to our other principal theme, we begin with a presentation 
of the doctrine of divine attributes as received in the Ash'arite school of 
Islamic orthodoxy; we then look at the very different ways in which 
Christian theologians in the Arabic east and the Latin west respectively 
related their understanding of the attributes to their Trinitarian faith. 
Finally, given the remarkable parallels noted above between the 
spiritualities of Hesychasm and Sufism, we suggest that critical analysis 
of the theological foundations of these two ascetical traditions may also 
indicate a shared understanding of divine plenitude which provides 
grounds for a trinitarian dialogue. 
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2 Hearing God: the divine Word 
(a) St John of Damascus 
Two works relating to Islam are ascribed to St John of Damascus: 
Chapter 100 of the De Haeresibus, ' and the Disputatio Saraceni et 
Christiani. 2 The De Haeresibus itself forms one part of John's tripartite 
`Fount of Knowledge', the third and much larger part of which, De Fide 
Orthodoxa, has been described as a `classic reformulation of Greek 
theology'. 3 As a prelude to this reformulation, John adapted the 
heresiology of Epiphanius of Salamis (315-403), adding to Epiphanius' 
list of eighty deviations from orthodox belief a further twenty which had 
arisen since the fifth century; the last of these, in John's original text, was 
Islam, numbered as 100.4 
The chapter on Islam is distinguished in De Haeresibus not only by this 
significant position but also by its form: alongside passages of descriptive 
heresiology like those found in the earlier chapters there are, uniquely, 
sections of imagined dialogue between a Christian and a Muslim. A 
crucial passage of this kind (PG XCIV. 768B-D) centres on the Muslim 
allegation that Christians are guilty of shirk in teaching the divinity of 
Christ, and on the corresponding Christian retort that Muslims are 
`mutilators' of the divinity in their mistaken account of the Word of God. 
The dialogue form is developed further in the Disputatio Saraceni et 
Christiani. This text has been ascribed both to John and to his disciple 
Theodore Abu Qurra (c720-785); 5 its most recent editor concludes: 
Text in Sahas, pp132-141; Le Coz, pp2lO-227; cf also Khoury, pp60-66. It has been suggested that 
this chapter is a later interpolation, but Khoury, pp47-55, after a long discussion, concludes: `Les 
arguments contre 1'authenticite du chapitre ... ne sont pas probants'. 2 Text in Sahas, pp143-155; Le Coz, pp228-251; cf also Khoury, pp68-82. 
3 Kelly, p396. 
4 In Migne's edition, `Islam' is Chapter 101, but B. Kotter has established that 100 is the correct 
numbering for this section, which then concludes John's survey of heresies (Le Coz, pp70f). 
5 Sahas, p l00. 
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S'il n'est donc pas possible d'affirmer que Jean en est le redacteur definitif, il est 
cependant legitime de considerer ce texte au moins comme un heritage de 
1'enseignement du Damascene. ' 
The Disputatio consists of three sections, each dealing with a particular 
theme: respectively, the source of good and evil, the Word of God, and 
the relation between Jesus and John the Baptist. These three units, each 
corresponding to a separate opusculum in the attribution to Theodore, 
supplement the treatment of the same themes in the De Haeresibus. In the 
second section of the Disputatio, where Christian and Muslim debate 
over the status of the Word of God, two parts can be discerned: in the 
former (PG XCVI. 1341 C-D), their theme is `the Spirit and Word of God', 
while in the latter (PG XCVI. 1344A-D), it is `the Word and words of 
God'. 
We can thus identify in writings ascribed to John three significant units of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue concerning the Word of God - viz.: (i) De 
Haeresibus, PG XCI V. 768B-D; (ii) Dispütatio, PG XCVI. 1341 C-D; and 
(iii) Disputatio, PG XCVI. 1344A-D. We shall consider each in turn. 
Dialogue L De Haeresibus: PG XCIV. 768B-D 
In this dialogue, Muslim and Christian make successive counter-claims, 
which can both be related to Qur' änic texts. 2 The Muslim begins by 
accusing Christians of being eraiptao-raf, `associators', i. e. those who 
introduce an `associate (eraipos)' alongside' God, in that they describe 
Christ as `Son of God and God'. It is clear that the Muslim's allegation 
here is that of Christian shirk; ' the doctrine of divine sonship is explicitly 
excluded for Muslims by the Surah al-TawhId: 
` Le Coz, p203; cf also Sahas, p102: `Even if the text in its present form does not come from his 
[John's] own hand, its content is a product of his thought'. 
2 The parallelism between claim and counter-claim is strikingly highlighted by the repetition of the 
word ircrperodycr v, `to introduce', to describe the alleged consequences for God of first Christian 
and then Muslim teaching. 
The description of Christians as mushrikiln became common in subsequent Islamic polemic - Sahas, 
p82n3. 
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Say: He, Allah, is One. Allah is He on Whom all depend. 
He begets not, nor is He Begotten; and none is like Him. 1 
This is in fact a Qur'änic passage which John had already recognised as 
central to Islam, placing it at the outset of his exposition of Muhammad's 
teaching in De Haeresibus 2 John's initial response is defensive and 
rather unconvincing - an appeal to `the prophets and the Scripture', also 
accepted by Muslims, as having `handed down' to Christians the teaching 
of divine sonship. However, as he himself acknowledges, the Muslim can 
easily counter this by alleging either corruption or misunderstanding of 
the Scriptures as having misled Christians into such a belief. 
Accordingly, John sets out on a counter-offensive, shifting the debate 
from Christ as `Son of God' to Christ as `Word of God'. He is enabled to 
do this by another Qur'anic verse to which he has already alluded: 
The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was only a Messenger of Allah, and [he was] His 
word (kalimah) which He conveyed unto Mary, and a spirit (rüh) from Him. ' 
John does not develop this Islamic reference to the Spirit; instead, he 
concentrates just on the Word of God, claiming that this must be divine: 
For the Word and the Spirit is inseparable each from the one in whom this has the 
origin (dXwpco-röv Eo'n Toi Iv ui fft¢, uxEv); if, therefore, the Word is in God (EI 
ouv Iv rQ7 OeW Eon v), it is obvious that he is God as well (Kai OEdg Earn v). 
The alternative - that the Word should be `outside of God (txrds Tog 
OeoU-) '- would imply a God `without Word and without Spirit' (IMoyoc 
Kal &Tvoug)'. This, John concludes, would mean Muslims were 
`mutilators (Kdrrrai)' of God, making him like `stone, or wood, or any of 
the inanimate objects' - he sees this as involving a worse error than that 
implied by the accusation of `association'. 
' Surah 112 - also known as al Ikhläs, `The Purification' (from polytheism) - All, p1219. 2 PG XCIV. 765A: tvrr 9E6v eivat trotgrdv TGv öiwvIW TE yEvv778Evra fujrE ycy£vv>)Köra. 
3 Surah 4.171. On the relation of this verse to Muslim criticisms of Trinitarianism, cf above, pp176f. 
John refers to it immediately after Surah 112. At this point, however, he acknowledges without 
argument the major divergence of Muslim Christology from orthodox Christianity - the beliefs that 
Jesus is a creature (xrto-Og), engendered by God's Word and Spirit `entering Mary'. 
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A number of points may be noticed in this exchange of allegations. We 
may observe first the important shift in John's Christological vocabulary. 
When the Christian is defending himself against Muslim accusations of 
shirk, that charge arises from his use of the language of `sonship'. When 
he seeks positively to relate his understanding to that of the Muslim, 
however, he speaks of Christ as `Word' rather than `Son'. For John, it 
seems, `God the Son' is the confessional title recognised within the 
Christian community; when making theological connections beyond the 
boundaries of that community, Word-language becomes more 
appropriate. John's subtle use of language here marks him off from his 
successors in Byzantine theology. For example, the twelfth-century 
Thesaurus Orthodoxae Fidei of Nicetas Acominatus, based largely on the 
De Haeresibus, l replaces John's correct reporting of the Muslim 
description of Jesus as `Word of God' by the false claim that the Qur'an 
understands him as `Son of God'. 2 This is a striking example of the way 
in which disengagement from dialogical involvement with Islam of the 
later Greek tradition led to changes in its presentation of Trinitarianism. 3 
Although John's discussion of `the Word of God' begins from the 
4 inferred Qur' änic identification of that Word with Jesus, once taken into 
an Islamic context his arguments have wider implications. In particular, it 
On Nicetas Acominatus (or Choniates), cf Khoury, pp249-258. The contention of A Abel that the 
Thesaurus in fact predates De Haeresibus 100, which is a late text, derived from the former and 
falsely attributed to John of Damascus, is discussed at length by Le Coz, pp 186-196, and rejected. 
2 Thesaurus PG CXL 105 - cf Sahas, p78n2, who remarks: `This is a serious misunderstanding and 
an indication that Acominatus did not have any real knowledge of the Qiu'än'. 
3 This disengagement is also characterised in the theological literature by hardening attitudes towards 
Islam, which Khoury derives from consciousness of Byzantium's growing impotence in the face of 
the Muslim advance: `rette intransigence implacable dans la condamnation et cette violence dans 
1'expression cherchent Avenger par les ecrits poldmiques les defaites militaires' (ibid., p3 18). 
4 `Inferred', because Muslim exegetes did not and do not interpret S. 4.171 or other verses (e. g. S. 
3.34,3.40 describing Jesus as kalimdtAllah, ) as teaching an actual identification of the Word with 
his person. For example, Ali, ad loc., p234n652, explains the Qur'änic phrase as implying simply 
that `Jesus was born in accordance with a prophetic word from Allah', on the analogy of a hadith 
where the Prophet speaks of himself as `the prayer of my father Abraham'. For John's own 
awareness that Muslims would not be likely to accept his inference from the Qur'änic text, cf 
above, p199n3. 
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would be quite possible for a Muslim to maintain in the same way as John 
the `inseparability' of the divine Word from God, yet to understand by 
that Word, not Jesus, but the Qur'an. In fact, we shall see that the 
traditionalists' defence of an uncreated Qur' än committed them to 
parallel John's theology in asserting both the `proximity' of the Word to 
God, and the impossibility of conceiving of God without his Word. ' 
However, any attempt to deduce from such parallelism a historical 
influence of John on later Muslims would need to identify more closely 
the particular context of Islam to which John's arguments relate, yet this 
is difficult. On one hand, Sahas suggests that, in this passage: 
John's theology seems to anticipate the Mu'tazilite position, according to which 
the attributes of God are not entities in themselves but are of the nature of God. 2 
On the other hand, the implication of divine status for the Word is nearer 
to the insistence on uncreatedness of those traditionalist Muslims, such as 
the Hanbalites, who opposed Mu'tazilism; so is the criticism of 
`mutilation' directed against those who would strip the divine essence of 
its Word. 3 We shall see a corresponding ambiguity in the position of the 
Muslim interlocutor in the Disputatio also; the important point, however, 
is that, in discussing the relation of God to his Word, Christians and 
Muslims are dealing in similar ways with similar issues. 
We must also note a major limitation in the attempt in this passage to 
apply Christian theology in dialogue with Islam. Though he cites the 
Qur'anic references to Christ as both Aöyog and -rvcü1-. ra, John then 
develops this only with reference to the relation between `God' and his 
`Word', with no further mention of `Spirit'. This is presumably because 
Below, p212. 
2 Sahas, p83. Le Coz, pl15n3, remarks: `11 est tres proche de la position que prendront les 
mutazilites en disant que les attributs font partie de 1'essence de Dieu', but in fact John's argument 
equally supports the position of Ash'ari, which Le Coz himself summarises as follows: `Dieu 
poss8de les attributs distincts de son essence, mais ils n'ont ni realfite ni existence en dehors d'elle' 
(ibid. ). 
3 Cf Seale, pp57-66. 
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the sharp distinction which Orthodox Christology draws between the 
hypostases of the Word (incarnate in Jesus) and the Spirit (non-incarnate) 
means that a Christological interpretation of the Qur'änic verse can leave 
little space for pneumatology; but the unfortunate consequence is that 
John's theology here moves in a binitarian, rather than a fully Trinitarian, 
direction. 
Dialogue It. Disputatio: PG XCVI. 1341C-D 
This first part of the Disputatio dialogue addresses the same themes as the 
De Haeresibus argument considered above - namely, God's `Spirit and 
Word' and their relationship to God. 
The exchange begins with the Muslim asking `what (TC')' Christians say 
Christ to be; John recommends that they should answer, `Word of God'. 
Interestingly, he feels the need to reassure the Christian interlocutor that 
in giving such a reply he is not sinning (qMv ?v TovTw vopIC'wv 
4uaprävEcv), as the Scriptures describe Christ by a whole variety of 
names. John presumably means by this that the constraints of dialogue 
authorise the Christian to give a partial account of his Lord, by avoiding 
the confessional, and confrontational, language of `sonship' in favour of 
the shared terminology of `Word'. 
In reply to the Muslim's question, the Christian in turn asks what Christ 
is called `in the Scripture (rrapa rrj ypagrý'. Certainly, ypaorj here 
means the Qur'an,, for the answer the Christian seeks from the Muslim is 
that noted above in De Haeresibus - `Spirit and Word of God'. The 
Christian then poses directly the question of the status of these divine 
entities: 
In your Scripture are the Word of God and the Spirit of God said to be uncreated or 
created (&no'ra rI zo'Td)? 
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To answer that they are created' would imply, again as in De Haeresibus, 
that before their creation (rrpö roü iTicat) God had neither Word nor 
Spirit. But, says John, if these conclusions are suggested by the Christian 
to the Muslim: 
He will flee from you not having anything to answer. For these are heretics, 
according to the Saracens, and utterly despised and rejected: and if you want to 
report him to the other Saracens he will be very much afraid of you. 
Sahas and Le Coz suggest that this passage refers to the Mu'tazilite, or 
more precisely the earlier Jahmite, 2 teaching of the created status of the 
Qur'an, which was regarded with disfavour by most Muslims. 
However, it is by no means clear that the Muslim interlocutor is in fact 
intentionally a proponent of these views; rather, John may be seeking to 
show that such is the logical consequence of his position - to his own 
consternation. Again, therefore, we face a certain ambiguity in attempting 
to locate precisely the Islamic context of John's dialogue partner. What is 
clear, though, is that he is engaging with the same issues as the Christian. 
Within this shared theological exploration, as in the De Haeresibus, so 
here also language introduced into the dialogue by John with a 
Christological import would become susceptible of interpretation in a 
different context once the Muslim were to identify the `Word of God' in 
question as the Qur'an. In fact, the argument that God could never have 
been without his Word was to be used by traditionists precisely to defend 
the uncreated status of the Qur'an -a position bound up, for them as for 
John, with a strong assertion of the Qur'än's proximity to (or 
inseparability from) God. 
The Greek text here reads &TtOTQ but Sahas reasonably conjectures that this is a manuscript 
corruption; to ensure logical coherence, the reading rrrro-rd is certainly required - and is in fact 
found at the corresponding passage in Theodore's opusculum (Sahas, p114n2). Le Coz amends in 
the same way. 
2 Sahas, p1 14n4, quoting the view of Guillaume that this is the `earliest non-Muslim reference to the 
Mu'tazilites'. Le Coz, p161, points out that the early Fiqh al Akbar I singles out (art. 10) the 
Jahmites as a sect destined for perdition. On the Jahmiyya, cf below, p208. 
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Dialogue III: Disputatio: PG XCVI. 1344A-D 
Here the äxrco"ra z KTtorcr alternative is raised again - but this time by 
the Muslim, and in relation to a subtly different theme: 
The words of God (rdaöyra Toü 9e-ou-), are they created or uncreated? 
John recognises that for the Christian this is `a very difficult question'. If 
he were to answer `created', this would of course be heard by the Muslim 
as an acknowledgement of the created status of the A yos, which it is his 
aim to establish. If, on the other hand, he were to opt for `uncreated', ' the 
Muslim would say in response: 
Here, all these that are words of God (A yra roü Oto ÖT140Xovra), although they 
are uncreated, yet they are not gods (Ocoi ö ouk E-I m v). Behold you confessed 
that Christ, although he is the Word of God, he is not God (A yoS aiv Toü 8&oü 
OdK &T1 Oeös). 
The second sentence here must be read as a summary of the Muslim's 
whole argument at this point, which not unreasonably claims to have 
refuted the Christian's equation of the Word's uncreated status with the 
Word's divinity. He has done this through pointing to the existence, not 
just of one aöyoS, but of a whole ensemble of A yia to whom the same 
reasoning applies - either these are all Boot, which is unthinkable, or there 
is no reason to deduce divinity from uncreatedness in any of these cases, 
including that of Christ. 
This is a powerful argument, for it points to the possible existence of a 
class of uncreated realities which yet cannot be described as `God' - for 
example, an early formula held that the Qur'an is `neither Creator nor 
created'. Again, though, the Muslim's own stance is ambiguous: it is 
Following Sahas' emendation of Kriorä to &Tiora - p1 15n2. However, there is no textual 
evidence for this - Theodore at this point also has x-rr-Td. In fact, while the general dilemma facing 
the Christian is easy to grasp, John's precise line of argument is difficult to establish here. 
2 Below, p210. It also corresponds to the orthodox Islamic formulation of the status of the divine 
attributes, that they are 16 huwa wa Id ghayruhu, `neither God nor other than God' - below, p242. 
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unclear whether he regards such a position as merely a reductio ad 
absurdum for the Christian or as a tenable theory for himself. 
Once more, then, the Muslim and the Christian find themselves facing the 
same dilemmas. John's recommendation to the Christian seeks to evade 
the issue by distinguishing sharply between the one . 40yoc and the many 
A yta as a stratagem to avoid the force of his opponent's reasoning. 
Thus, of the former the Christian is to say: 
I confess that there is only one hypostatic Word of God (Eyw Ava prövov A yov 
Toü Geoff Iv ünoo-ram l 6poAoyw7, ' who is uncreated, as you also confessed. ' 
On the other hand, the Christian scriptures are clearly to be distinguished 
as . iöyia from this one hypostatised Aöyos -a distinction better served by 
describing them `not as words but as utterances of God (od 4 yw aöyia 
cWd prjýuara 9CoO'. 3 To justify this against the evidence of biblical 
usage, John is then led into a discussion of scriptural exegesis, in which 
he distinguishes between `literal speech (KuptoAoyfa)' and `figurative 
speech (Tporroioyca)': 
Thus he [the author of Ps 11 ] called, figuratively, the `utterances' words, which are 
not words but utterances (Sw, -p oüx eloi vA yia cW r prjpara).. 
The Greek prfpara equates with the Arabic lafz; the interlinking of 
methods across the two religions is shown by the way the distinction of 
`word' (kaläm) and `utterance' (lafz) was to become important in 
subsequent Muslim theology of the Qur'än. 4 
On the significance of John's arguments in these three dialogue passages, 
we may make several general observations. 
So reads Sahas. Le Coz has: Adyov roü Beou Zvvirda-rarov. He explains this as meaning: `Ce qui 
ne subsiste pas en soi-meme', deriving John's use of EvuzrdaTaros from the Christology of 
Leontius of Byzantium, as a term serving especially the divinity of Christ (p164). 
Z The force of these last words are difficult to gauge, as the Muslim can hardly share the precise 
terms of the Christian's confession without abjuring his faith We could, though, interpret them as 
indicating the Muslim's assent just to the uncreated status of the Word - provided his orthodox 
identity is accepted. 
3 Le Coz translates priuaraas `paroles'. 
4 Sahas, pl l7n1, and below, pp2l4ff. 
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We can see that the use of the expression `Word of God' leads in all three 
texts to a certain creative ambiguity. John's clear intention is to employ 
this expression in a Christological context, relying both on his own 
tradition and on Qur'änic references to do so; but the arguments which 
then develop are pertinent to any understanding of the self-expression of 
the one God, including the delivery of the Qur'an through Muhammad. In 
this way, space for a genuinely shared exploration of trinitarian issues is 
opened up. 
From a Muslim point of view, this shared conceptual space provides the 
key to the influence which interaction with Christian theology exercised 
on early kaldm. The dialogues allude to debates within Islam in the 
apparent ambiguities within the Muslim's position; later, the appellation 
of mushrikün ('associators' - with an implication of polytheism) was to 
be hurled by Muslims, not only at Christians, but at fellow-Muslims too. 
In other words, the kaläm developed not by the straightforward adoption 
of Christian ideas, but rather through Muslims taking into their own 
debates the same concerns as exercised Christians over the Word of God: 
Muslim theologians did not simply copy Christian ideas, but a man might adopt a 
Christian idea if it fitted into his arguments against Muslim rivals. ' 
From John's own point of view too there is an evident desire to use the 
traditions of trinitarian theology as an ecumenical resource for the 
encounter with Islam, albeit in a polemical spirit. This is shown by his 
repeated citations of the Qur'än, by his recognition of unity as the central 
focus of Islam, and above all by his choice of `Word' rather than `Son' as 
a Christological category on which to focus - for this is the choice of a 
concept susceptible of dialogical appropriation, rather than of a 
confessional title acceptable only within the Christian faith community. 
Watt, p50. Needless to say, such adoptions would not be acknowledged by the Muslim, though his 
co-religionist opponent might well point it out to him! 
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(b) Early controversies over the status of the Qur'an 
We now turn to the ways in which the corresponding themes were 
handled within the context of intra-Islamic debate. We will focus on two 
periods - the early controversies, and later medieval scholastic Islam. 
In 827, the Caliph al-Ma'mün (733-833) declared that acceptance of the 
created status of the Qur'an was the official teaching of Islam; he went on 
to attempt to enforce this doctrine judicially through instituting a mihnah, 
or inquisition into the beliefs of judges and religious leaders. ' The 
instruction to establish this mihnah was conveyed by the Caliph to the 
Governor of Baghdad, Ishak bin Ibrahim, by a series of letters, in the 
third of which he gave a theological justification for his orders: 
[Those who believe in the uncreatedness of the Qur'an] are like Christians when 
they claim that Jesus the son of Mary was not created (makhlüq) because he was 
the Word of God ... he has no belief in God's unity who does not confess that the Qur'an is created. 2 
Ma'mün here makes two related points in support of the Mu'tazilite 
position which he had adopted. Firstly, he alleges that his opponents' 
belief in the uncreatedness of God's Word mirrors the shirk of Christians3 
- and it is reasonable to infer that he also implies that, as a matter of 
historical fact, they had been influenced by the adoption into Islam of 
Christological and Trinitarian theories. Secondly, he asserts that authentic 
acceptance of divine unity (tawhfd) requires the created status of the 
Qur'an, since otherwise the relation of an eternal, uncreated entity to God 
would introduce complexity into the simplicity of the divine essence. 
The Mu'tazilites called themselves ahl al-'adl wa'1-tawhid, `people of 
justice and unity', since they espoused an understanding of divine unity 
Glasse, p251. Curiously, al-Ma'mün's decision was in later tradition explained by a vision of 
Aristotle in a dream - but this cannot be taken to imply a simple equation of early Mu`tazilism with 
Greek philosophy: cf Gutas, pp98ff, and above, p193f. 
2 From al-Tabari, quoted in Patton, pp67,69. 
3 The charge is echoed in modem times by Zaehner, p198 
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which excluded any possibility whatsoever of differentiation., Ma'mün's 
arguments, however, must be interpreted within their polemical context. 
While he may have accurately represented the situation as he saw it, on 
both counts his analysis fails to give a true picture of the factors leading 
up to the ninth-century controversy, as we shall show below. Thus, on 
one hand, belief in the created status of the Qur'an did not initially stem 
from a direct concern for unity. On the other hand, the proponents of 
uncreatedness were not dependent on Christian theological influences. 
Theological associations of a created Qur'än 
The first identifiable Muslims to maintain the creation of the Qur'an were 
Ja'd bin Dirham (d. 743) and Jahm bin Safwän (d. 745). According to 
traditional sources, the former was executed for the heretical assertion: 
God has not taken Abraham as his friend, nor has he spoken to Moses. 2 
Similarly, ibn Hanbal reports that Jahm's followers denied that God had 
ever spoken. ' Behind statements like these is a concern to distance the 
divine from any anthropomorphic descriptions: it was because Ja'd and 
Jahm wished to emphasise the utter transcendence of God, and so his 
entire difference from mankind in all respects, that recognisably human 
activities such as speech needed to be restricted to the level of creatures, 
and therefore denied of the Creator. Thus, at this early stage of the 
controversy, the disputed point was not merely the status of the Word of 
God but the very reality of its existence, the Jahmiyya asserting of alleged 
auditions of the divine speech by Moses and Muhammad that: 
God created (khalaqa) a talk and a speech, and his talk and speech struck the ears 
of the creature whom God wanted (to make hear it). The hearer then transmitted it 
on behalf of God after he had heard it. And he called this talk and speech. God is 
exalted far above what they say. 4 
Nasr, pp397ü. On the changing relation between the emphases on `justice' and on `unity' in early 
Mu'tazilism, see above, pp 1900,192n2. 
Z Madelung, p505. 
al-Radd 'ala '1-Zanädiga wa-'1 Jahmiya, 1- Seale, p98. 
This is the report of the traditionist writer Husays (d. 867), quoted by Madelung, op cit, p506. 
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Accordingly, the traditionists responded at this stage with the insistence 
that God truly spoke, `as part of their general defence of an 
anthropomorphic and personal concept of God' -a defence which 
naturally relied on contesting the anti-anthropomorphists' scriptural 
exegesis with its emphasis on tanzih, `unlikeness' of God to creatures. ' 
However, these debates over the existence of God's Word were to be 
superseded in the later eighth century by a focus on its status, as Jahm's 
anti-anthropomorphism was overtaken by a new set of arguments in 
favour of createdness: those advanced by the Mu'tazilites. As we have 
seen from Ma'mtln's letter, the defence of divine unity strictly conceived 
became now the main impetus to insisting on the created nature of the 
Qur'an. In Mu'tazilite thought, the Qur'an was accepted to be the speech 
of God, and this was not seen to involve problems of anthropomorphism, 
since `speech' could be interpreted as `letters and sounds', and a 
`speaker' as a `maker of speech'. In support of such a view, indeed, the 
scripture itself testified: 
We have made it (ja'alnähu) an Arabic Qur'an, so that perhaps you may 
comprehend. 2 
However, this speech was emphatically a created reality; indeed, the 
Mu'tazilites claimed that the verb ja `al in this verse itself established this 
created status. 3 More commonly, though, the word used to describe this 
was makhlüq, from the root kh-l-q. A long-standing formula drawing on 
this root had asserted that: 
The Qur'an is neither Creator (khäliq) nor created (makhlüq) 4 
This cautious refusal to place the Qur'an either side of the Creator- 
creature divide was now repudiated by the Mu'tazilite option for makhlüq 
I Madelung, p508. Cf above, p189. 2 S. 43.3. 
3 Wolfson, p297. 
4 The formula is quoted by al-Ash'ari (Ibänah) as dating back to Ali ibn al-Husayn (d712) - Klein, 
p79. Wolfson, p2 10, suggests a parallel with Surah 111.3: `He begets not and is not begotten'. 
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(created) status; in so doing, they kept terminological continuity with 
earlier Jahmite explanations of the origins of purported divine speech as a 
human attribute which God created (khalaqa). 
It is at this stage of the controversy that the question of `created vs 
uncreated' comes to be linked to that of `temporal vs eternal'. The 
Mu'tazilites were aware of Qur'änic verses which, in their resonances 
with Jewish speculations on the Torah, suggested a pre-existence of the 
scripture before its delivery to Muhammad: ' 
It is a glorious Qur'än, on a Preserved Tablet. 
It [the Qur'an] is there in the Mother of the Book (umm al-kitdb) in Our presence, 
truly exalted, the definitive wisdom. 2 
However, they insisted strongly that admission of the Qur'än's co- 
eternity with God. would imperil the divine unity, and therefore 
interpreted creation as necessarily implying temporality: 
The Mu'tazila ... say the Qur'dn 
is the speech of God and it is created by Him. It 
was not, then it was. 3 
Thus, makhlüq, `created', became generally identified with muhdath, 
`originated in time', though some resisted this equation. 4 Further, in order 
to stress the distancing of this created speech from the unitary divine 
essence, Mu`tazilism spoke of the Qur'än's creation as having taken 
place `elsewhere', 5 or - equivalently - `in an abode (mahall)'. 
6 According 
to later orthodoxy, some at least of the Mu'tazilites identified this mahall 
with the `Preserved Tablet' of 85.22, and emphasised the creaturely 
contingency of the Qur'an in this context by the following formulation: 
[The Mu'tazilites said that] the Qur'an was created by God on the Preserved Tablet 
and that it is an accident. 7 
' Wolfson, p238. 
2 SS. 85.22; 43.4. 
3 al-Ash'ari, MagdIdt, p582, quoted by Madelung, op cit, p516. 
° Wolfson, pp291-303. 
5 Madelung, p516. 
6 Wolfson, p264. 
al-Ash`ari, MagdIdt, p598, quoted by Wolfson, p270. Ash'ari's reference is to Abü al-Hudhayl (d. 
849) and his followers. 
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Ibn Hanbal 's defence of the uncreated Qur'an 
In this stage of the controversy, therefore, the proponents of createdness 
were seeking to safeguard the unity of the divine essence by 
distinguishing the Qur'an from God in three ways characterising its 
creaturely status: its temporality as contrasted with the divine eternity, its 
distance in a locus foreign to the divine reality, and its contingency as an 
accidental addition to the divine substance. Correspondingly, the 
traditionist riposte led by ibn Hanbal stressed the uncreated status of the 
Qur'an through emphasising its co-eternity with, inseparability from, and 
procession out of the essence of, God Himself. Thus, equally dissatisfied 
as the Mu'tazilites with the formula of `neither Creator (khaliq) nor 
created (makhlüq)', ibn Hanbal boldly asserted before the mihnah the 
phrase which was to become the touchstone of subsequent Islamic 
orthodoxy - that the Qur'an, as the speech of God, is `uncreated (ghayr 
makhlüq)'. More expansively, he declared: 
Nothing of God is created (makhlüq), and the Qur'an is of God (mina'llah). ' 
Accordingly, he contested the Mu'tazilites' interpretation of ja'al in 
Surah 43.3, claiming that this verb indicated a change in the status of an 
existing being rather than an act of creation (khalq). 2 
Ibn Hanbal then naturally developed this statement of the uncreated status 
of the Qur'an to embrace the three corollaries mentioned above - co- 
eternity, inseparability from God, and divinr procession. So, accepting the 
Mu'tazilite equation of uncreated status with eternity, he insisted that not 
only had God not created the Qur'an, but he had also not originated it in 
time (lam yuhdithu). 3 As proof of this, he claimed that, if there were a 
' Madelung, p524. 
2 al Radd 2 (Seale, p100), citing S. 2.118: God makes (jd `iluka) Abraham a leader of humanity. 
3 al-Radd 8 (Seale, p110). It is true that the later Hanbalite ibn Taymiyya argued that ibn Hanbal 
nowhere explicitly affirmed the eternity of the Qur'än - unless one is to accept a dubious report that 
he declared before the mihnah: `The Qur'an is the speech of God, eternal (qad Im) and uncreated'. 
However, his arguments clearly imply this. 
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time when God was without speech, He would then be on a level with his 
creatures; indeed - since the Qur'an contains the knowledge of God - he 
would be at that time ignorant. ' 
Again, according to the Hanbalite school of interpretation, the scriptural 
texts referring to the `Preserved Tablet' and the `Mother of the Book' by 
no means suggested an abode (mahall) elsewhere than God as a distanced 
locus for the Word of God; rather, by indicating the pre-existence, they 
implied the eternity of the Word. The idea of `distance' was roundly 
rejected by the traditionists, who stressed that: 
The Qur'an is the speech of God; it is not separate from God. 2 
This closeness of the Qur'an to God as compared to any part of his 
creation could also be expressed in terms of formulae of procession, 
stating that the speech of God had `come forth from' or `begun from' 
God3 - and, it was added, `to Him it shall return'. 
This anchorage of the Word in the essence of God, depicted in spatial 
terms as proximity or procession, could equivalently be expressed in 
personalist language, as in ibn Hanbal's explanation that: 
God was always a speaker when he willed. 4 
A corollary of this was, that the speech of God was by no means an 
accident contingently brought into being; since God was always 
exercising his will, the expression of his Word had about it the necessity 
conveyed by the divine will. 5 
If in these ways ibn Hanbal responded to the challenges of Mu'tazilism 
by a reasserting and strengthening of the traditional position, his 
reactionary attitude was perhaps most clearly seen in the way in which he 
t Ibid, 11 (Seale, p116). Cf al-Ash`ari, Luma ` 33 (McCarthy, p23). 
2 al Tayälisi (d. 841) - Madelung, p51 1n2. 
3 Creed of al-Tahawi, article 5- Watt (1994), p49. 
4 al-Radd, 11(Seale, p116). 
5 The divine will is in Hanbalite (and Ash'arite) Islam the criterion of all necessity - e. g. the creeds in 
Watt (1994), pp3l, 33. 
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took for granted the close identification of the Word of God with the 
written, recited, and heard Qur'an of his own time. He is famously 
reported to have taught as follows: 
What is between the covers is the Word of God, and what we read and hear and 
write is the very Word of God. It therefore follows that the individual words and 
letters are the very Word of God. But inasmuch as agreement has been established 
that the Word of God is uncreated, it follows that the individual words and letters 
are eternal and uncreated. l 
If this report is accurate, ibn Hanbal accepted the Mu'tazilite analysis of 
`speech' as `sounds and letters'. However, his view is very problematic, 
for it implies both that the recitation or writing of the Qur'an repeatedly 
involves a bringing into being of that which is eternal, and that the human 
senses are the organs of production and loci of existence of that which is 
uncreated. Behind these problems lies the issue which Wolfson has 
described (on the analogy of `incarnation') as that of `inlibration' - the 
question of how the divine Word can be located within a human book. 2 
Reviewing the controversy over the status of the Qur'an culminating in 
the mihnah, then, tawhId (unity) was not the only factor involved - other 
concerns were the interpretation of language expressing the personality of 
God, the reality of his communication through his Word, the grounding 
of that Word in the divine essence. Despite Ma'miin's claims, there is no 
real evidence that his opponents' theology was formatively influenced by 
Christian Trinitarian principles; the imperative for ibn Hanbal, the most 
prominent of these opponents, was to re-emphasise and strengthen 
traditional Muslim teaching. While ibn Hanbal himself hardly seems to 
have been aware of the problems his unequivocal assertions implied, the 
later Ash'arites and other orthodox theologians were deeply concerned at 
the apparent incoherence of his doctrine of inlibration; in the subsequent 
development of the kaläm, inlibration was to become a major focus. 
As summarised by ShahmstänI, Nihäyat - Wolfson, p251. 
Z Wolfson, p246. 
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(c) The Qur'an in later credal Islam 
From the ninth century onwards, the kaläm was marked by a proliferation 
of creeds (`aga'id) and commentaries on creeds. As with Christian 
creeds, these focused particularly on disputed theological points; unlike 
Christian creeds, however, they were acknowledged to be the works of 
individual writers, and commanded in general no further assent than the 
school or tradition to which their authors belonged. ' Nevertheless, it is 
possible to trace recurrent themes through a variety of the `aqd 'id, and in 
this way they provide a valuable testimony to the development of kaläm. 
The earliest creed to be known is the al-Fiqh al Akbar I, attributed to Abü 
HanIifah (d. 767). 2 As its name indicates, this derives from a period when 
kaldm as a distinct discipline was just emerging from the primary Islamic 
area of religious knowledge, jurisprudence (fiqh). It is interesting 
therefore to notice that this early text includes among its ten articles no 
reference to the questions of either the status of the Qur'an or the divine 
attributes. The controversy aroused by the mihnah's attempt to impose 
Mu'tazilite principles by coercion was to change this, however, and 
subsequent `agd'id always assert the uncreatedness of the Word of God. 
This is unsurprising in the case of those creeds which issue from the 
Hanbalite tradition; one of their most uncompromising formulations, for 
example, states: 
The Qur'an is the Speech of God by which He speaks. It is not created. If anyone 
supposes the Qur'an to be created, he is a Jahmite, an unbeliever. If anyone 
supposes that the Qur'an is the Speech of God, but suspends judgement and does 
not say it is uncreated, this is worse than the previous (person). If anyone supposes 
that our utterance (of the Qur'an) or our reciting (or reading) of it is created, while 
the Qur'an is the Speech of God, he is a Jahmite. He who does not declare all these 
people unbelievers is in a similar (position) to them. 3 
Jeffery, p339. 
2 Watt (1998), p 132. 
'Agida I from Henri Laoust, 'La Profession de Foi d'Ibn Batta' (Damascus, 1958) - tr Watt (1994), 
pp37f. 
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The latter part of this article exemplifies the strong Hanbalite insistence 
on the actual identity of the Word of God with the written, recited, and 
heard Qur'an. ' Orthodox Muslims outside the specifically Hanbalite 
tradition, however, aware of the difficulties which such an insistence 
created, developed their understanding of the Word of God in a more 
nuanced direction, which can be traced in credal formulations from both 
the principal schools of kaläm recognised as orthodox by Sunni Muslims, 
namely Ash'arism and Mäturidism - founded by al-Mäturidi (d. 944) and 
al-Ash`ari (873-935) respectively. 2 Al-Mäturidi was a member of the 
Hanifite legal school, and early in that tradition the following distinction 
is drawn in the creed known as al-Fiqh al Akbar II: 
The Qur'an is the Speech of God, written in the copies, remembered (preserved) in 
the hearts, recited by the tongues, and sent down (from God) to the Prophet. Our 
utterance of the Qur'an is created, our writing of it is created, our reciting of it is 
created, but the Qur'an is uncreated. 3 
Al-Ash`an, on the other hand, dramatically converted from Mu`tazilism 
to the position of the Hanbalites, and expressed his new allegiance in the 
following definite terms: 
We hold firmly to what Abü `Abdalläh Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal 
professed, avoiding him who dissents from his belief, because he is the excellent 
imam and the perfect leader, through whom God declared the truth, removed error, 
manifested the modes of action, and overcame the innovations of the innovators, 
the deviation of the deviators, and the scepticism of the sceptics. 4 
However, the later Ash`arites5 were to move away from such an 
uncompromising Hanbalism to accept many of the distinctions already 
drawn by the Hanifites; as a result, it is possible to discern the emergence 
of a broad consensus on many issues in later kaläm. 6 
' Cf above, p213. 
2 Traditionally, Maturidism and Asharism differ on thirteen points; Elder, ppxxiv-xax, identifies 
eleven significant divergences. For the specific question of the audibility of the uncreated Word of 
God, cf below, p222. 
3 Figh Akbar ll - Watt (1994), p63. 
4 Preface to Ibänah - Klein, p50. 5 Wolfson, pp254-257, claims that a similar evolution can already be traced in al-Ash'ari himself. 
6 Elder, prxiii. 
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TaftäzdnI and Nasafi on the status of the Word of God 
We will consider the implications of this emergent consensus for an 
Islamic account of the Word of God by looking particularly at the 
relevant articles of the commentary by Sa'd al-Din al-Taftäzäni on the 
`agIdah of Najm al-Din al-Nasall. This is a highly significant pairing of 
texts for two reasons. Firstly, both the creed of al-Nasafi (d. 1142) itself 
and the commentary of al-Taftäzani (1322-1389) have been very popular 
in subsequent Islamic teaching, providing respectively a logically ordered 
approach to the articles of belief and a compendium of different views on 
disputed questions; ' widely used as an authoritative textbook, al- 
Tafläzäni's work has itself received numerous super-commentaries. 2 
Secondly, the relation of the two texts shows an emergent consensus 
between the two schools of orthodox kaldm, for al-Nasafi writes as a 
Mäturidite theologian, while al-Taftäzäni provides an Ash'arite 
interpretation of his words. With this background in mind, we may 
consider the two relevant articles of the `agIdah relevant to our present 
purposes: that on the Word (or Speech) of God, and that on the Qur'än. 3 
Statements regarding God's Speech in al-Nasafi's creed immediately 
follow the list of eight attributes subsisting in God's essence: 4 `speech 
(kaldm)' is in fact listed as the eighth of these. Thus, after mentioning this 
attribute, Nasafi goes on to explain: 
He speaks with a kind of Speech which is one of His attributes, from all eternity, 
not of the genus of letters and sounds. It is an attribute incompatible with silence 
and defect. God speaks with this attribute commanding, prohibiting, and narrating. 
I Cf Jeffery, p347n1; Elder, ppxix xxii. 
2 Elder, p)=ii, in his notes on his translation of Taftäzani, mentions five such super-commentaries, 
i. e. commentaries on Taft "A's own commentary. 
3 Chapter 6 in Elder, pp58-66, from which the following quotations are drawn. Elder throughout 
translates kaläm as `Speech', and this coheres in English translation with verbal forms from `to 
speak'. However, it is important to remember that `Word' is an equally valid translation In other 
contexts, kaläm can also have the technical meaning of Islamic theology. 
° On the enumeration of the divine attributes, cf below, p244. 
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This is a clear rejection of the Mu'tazilite belief in created divine speech, 
and Taftäzäni expands the credal statements to draw out the implications 
we have seen this to have for the eternity, the proximity, and the necessity 
of the Word of God. So the status of the Word as one of the uncreated 
attributes implies a repudiation of any temporality in its emergence: 
Of necessity it is impossible that originated things subsist in His essence. 
This Word is not to be regarded as in any way distant from God: 
In this way al-Nasafi refuted the Mu`tazilites, inasmuch as they took the position 
that Allah is a Speaker of Speech which subsists in something other than Himself, 
and is not one of his attributes. 
Moreover, the Word of God differs from human speech in that it is not a 
contingent accident. To establish this point, the emphasis in Taftäzäni's 
exposition is on the unity of the divine Word. Nasafi's creed had defined 
the Word as being `not of the genus of letters and sounds', and this is now 
justified as follows: 
Letters and sounds are originated accidents, the occurrence of some of which is 
conditioned on the fact that others have been finished.. 
For example, it is impossible to pronounce the second letter of a word 
without first pronouncing the initial letter. Now such a situation would 
mean clearly that the expression of divine speech were dependent on 
successive utterances; if God's Word were to be of this kind, it would be 
irredeemably characterised by contingence, according to Taftäzäni. 
However, he will not accept such a definition of the Word, although this 
is not only the view advanced by the Mu'tazilites but also a position 
shared uncritically by their traditionist opponents: 
This is a refutation of the Hanbalites ... who say that the Speech of Allah is an 
accident of the genus of sounds and letters, and yet in spite of that it is eternal. 
We may note in passing that the Hanbalites of course did not `say that the 
Speech of Allah is an accident'; Taftäzani is polemically drawing out in 
his own terms what he sees to be the implications of their position, in 
order to establish its incoherence. 
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Taftäzäni on the `speech of the mind' 
If the identification of `speech' with `utterance' is in this way rejected, 
though, the question naturally arises as to what positive content can be 
given to the subsistence of the eternal and uncreated Word of God. 
Taf fizäni here has recourse to the concept of the `speech of the mind 
(kaläm nafsi)'. This expression, - common to Ash'arites and Mäturidites - 
refers to mentally formed ideas prior to, or apart from, their external 
utterance. Taftäzäni, like other theologians, ' illustrates this principle 
through a quotation from the verse of a Christian poet, al-Akhtal: 
Verily speech is in the heart, 
And the tongue has been made only as a guide to the heart. 
Taftäzani also insists that this inner attribute of God is to be distinguished 
from the related attributes of Knowledge and Will. The former is proved 
by the fact that it is possible to narrate to oneself something known not to 
be the case; the latter is shown by the possibility of commanding oneself 
to do something not desired. In the drawing of these distinctions, we see a 
concern to maintain a plurality between the divine attributes. 
We can also infer from Taftäzäni's reasoning at this point a different kind 
of plurality, namely the distinction drawn between God and his Word 
even in its inner form. This is because Taftazäni's examples of counter- 
factual self-narration and contra-volitional self-command both imply that 
the divine subject recognises his speech, though unexpressed externally, 
as in some way an object which can be set against other dimensions of his 
essential activity. Taftäzani goes on to underline the significance of this 
in discussing al-Nasafi's statement that the divine speech is `an attribute 
incompatible with silence and defect'. We have seen this kind of position 
already used both by traditionist Muslims and by St John of Damascus to 
' E. g. al-Ghazali - cf Abu Zayd, p50. 
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argue that the Word of God must be eternal unless He were to be 
considered dumb. ' 
Taftäzäni extends this argument to maintain that such a conception is of 
relevance to the idea of kaläm nafsI also: `internal silence and internal 
defect' are equally to be ruled out as unworthy of God. In other words, 
necessarily, eternally, and essentially we must recognise within God the 
differentiation of his Speech as object from Him as speaking subject. 
Now, the principle of kaläm nafsI enables this intimate attribution of the 
Word to God by purging the divine Speech of those elements of 
contingency and multiplicity which its expression in `letters and sounds' 
had lent it for the Mu'tazilites. So Nasafi and Taftäzani conclude this 
discussion by further stressing the internal unity of this divine attribute in 
that they refuse to separate it (as the Mu'tazilites had) into separate 
activities of `commanding, prohibiting, and narrating' - on the contrary, 
these are explained as just different forms of the same attribute arising 
from its relation to different contexts. However, this stress on the 
unuttered unity of God's Word obviously raises questions over the status 
of the revealed Qur'an, and this provides the subject matter of the second 
credal article we must consider. 
Taftdzäni on inlibration 
Nasail's statement regarding the Qur'an clearly builds on the tradition of 
anti-Mu'tazilite Hanbalism in asserting the uncreatedness of God's Word; 
yet it also echoes the wording of the Hanifite Fiqh Akbar II2 in insisting 
on a distinction between this uncreated Word and the created contexts in 
which it finds its expression: 
Above, ppl99,212. 
2 Cf above, p215. 
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The Qur'an, the Speech of Allah, is uncreated and it is written in our volumes, 
preserved in our hearts, recited by our tongues, heard by our ears, yet it is not a 
thing residing in them. 
Commenting on this article, Taft^ ami first points out that `uncreatedness' 
is asserted not of the Qur' än as such, but of `the Qur' än, the Speech of 
Allah'. The point of this qualifying addition, he explains, is to avoid the 
error of confusing an originated and contingent sequence of utterances 
with the essential Word of God: 
This distinction is made lest the mind jump to the conclusion that the thing 
composed of sounds and letters is eternal. This is just the position that the 
Hanbalites took out of ignorance and obstinacy. 
It is interesting to notice that, at this point at least, Taftäzäni seems in 
some of his presuppositions to be closer to the Mu'tazilites than to ibn 
Hanbal. In particular, he agrees with the former that to assert the 
uncreatedness or eternity (the two are explicitly equated in this passage) 
of verbal utterance in sound is unthinkable, since only an attribute of the 
divine essence could be described by these qualities; but, of course, he 
can then claim that his principle of kaläm nafsI provides just such an 
attributive interpretation of the Word of God. He therefore summarises 
the debate in these terms: 
The verifying of the matter on which we and they [the Mu`tazilites] differ goes 
back to whether or not the speech of the mind can be established. However, we do 
not say that the verbal expressions and letters are eternal, and they do not say that 
the speech of the mind is originated. 
As contrasted with the kaläm nafsi, the uncreated and eternal Word which 
is an attribute of God's essence, Taftäzäni explains that Nasafi's 
reference to that which is `written in our volumes, preserved in our hearts, 
recited by our tongues, and heard by our ears' demonstrates the created 
and originated `context (nazm)' in which this Word is to be found 
expressed. The nazm serves to indicate the reality of the Word and to 
provide a means of understanding it, but the two should on, no account be 
confused. Taftäzani illustrates his meaning in the following way: 
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This is analogous to our saying that fire is a burning substance, which is recalled to 
mind by a verbal expression and is written down with a pen, but it does not follow 
that the real essence of fire is a sound and a letter. 
This analogy seems to be drawn from al-Ghazali, who had argued thus: 
And if we say it is written in the books (I mean the attribute of the Eternal, Glory 
to Him), this does not require that the eternal is located in the book, just as, if we 
say that `fire' is written in the book, it would not necessarily follow that the 
essence of fire is located in it, because if the essence of fire resides in the book, the 
book would be burnt ... Likewise, the eternal speech that subsists in God's essence is the thing indicated and not the sign. ' 
This radical separation between the sign - the spoken or written words - 
and the reality signified - the eternal Word - is underlined by Nasafii's 
final statement that the latter `is not a thing residing in' the former. The 
verbal form `reside (hall)' derives from the same root as the expression 
`abode (mahall)' used by the Mu'tazilites to convey their theory that the 
Word was created `elsewhere' than God. So we see that even the written 
or recited Qur'an itself cannot be allowed, because of its verbal 
contingency and origination, to serve as the locus of the essential Word of 
God. 
Taftäzäni does not, however, draw from this the apparently obvious 
conclusion that the Qur'an is after all created. Instead, he explains that the 
word `Qur'an' can be used in two ways: 
When we say that the Qur'an is uncreated, the meaning is its true existential 
essence ... Whenever it is described as that which is inseparably connected with 
things created and originated, the verbal expressions which are spoken and heard 
are meant. 
Here again Taftäzäni follows al-Ghazali, whose distinction is similar: 
There are three expressions involved here: `reading (girä'ah)', `what is read 
(magrü)', and Qur'än. 2 
For Ghazali, the first was contingent, the second uncreated, and the third 
an equivocal expression. The advantage of such a strategy for the later 
theologians was, of course, that this equivocality enabled them to assent 
1 Igtisäd - Abu Zayd, p58. 2 Abu Zayd, pp58-64. 
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to the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an taught by the `pious 
forefathers', while interpreting this as applying to the essential attribute 
of God rather than its context of expression or reception. 
Finally, Taftäzäni makes reference to a dispute arising from the 
interpretation of Surah 9.6 which had become one of the points of 
disagreement between the later schools of theology. The verse states: 
If any one of the false worshippers seeks your protection, give him sanctuary in 
order to hear the Word of God. 
In Ash'arite theology, Tatäzäni points out, this was taken literally: the 
`Eternal Speech which is an attribute of Allah' was declared to be 
audible. This position, though, was disputed by the Mätundites, and it is 
with them that Taftäzäni himself sides on this occasion: 
The meaning of the saying [9.6] ... is that 
he heard that which indicates it ... So Moses' heard a sound which indicated the speech of Allah. 
Trinitarian implications of credal Islam 
Here again, then, we see a persistent concern of the later kaldm: the desire 
to preserve the dignity of the Word of God by distancing it as far as 
possible from a compromising involvement with the contingent and 
temporally originated contexts of created beings. Moreover, throughout 
the orthodox creeds and their theological commentaries, it is evident that 
the pressures leading to this desire arise from issues about the relation of 
the divine Word to the multiplicity of human words - we have seen a 
strong motivation to safeguard the unity, eternity, and necessity of the 
Word of God from confusion with the multiplicity, temporality, and 
contingency of created utterances. 
If in fact the dominant theological motive at this stage is this desire to 
limit the effects upon the Word's simplicity of that exposure to plurality 
I According to Swah 4.164, Moses was the recipient of direct divine speech -d Ex 33.11. 
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with which orthodox kaldm had already invested it in the struggle against 
Mu'tazilism, we may deduce some conclusions relevant to our purposes 
In the first place, the issue here is that of the unity of the Word of God, 
rather than tawhid, the unity of God as such - despite the latter's being so 
insistently raised by the Mu`tazilites, it does not seem to have been a 
major explicit concern at this later stage. In fact, as we have seen, it is the 
theory of kaläm nafsI, `inner speech', by which both Ash`arites and 
Mäturidites sought to resolve their dilemmas over the Qur'an; yet this 
very theory implies a definite differentiation between God the speaker as 
subject and his Word as object. A theological concern to establish the 
unity of the Word thus coexists with implicit acknowledgement of some 
plurality between that Word and God. 
Next, this theory of kaläm nafsI is shared by theologians who hold rather 
different views of the relation between this uncreated attribute of God and 
the created contexts in which it is expressed - for example, there is the 
dispute between Ash`arites and Mäturidites over the audibility or 
otherwise of the eternal Word suggested by texts such as Surah 9.6. So in 
the credal and commentarial literature we can discern a growing 
separation between, on the one hand, questions of the relation between 
God and his Word in the uncreated context of eternity and, on the other, 
questions of the mode of expression of that Word in the created contexts 
of contingency. Now, in terms of the distinction we set up in our 
introductory chapter, ' it is the former that may be described as `trinitarian 
problems'; in Nafasi and Taftäzäni, moreover, this problem of the relation 
to God of his Word becomes explicitly annexed to the wider trinitarian 
problem of the divine attributes in relation to the divine essence. 
1 Above, p9. 
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Further, while there is no real evidence of Christian influence on the 
kaldm debates at this stage, it is clear that Muslims are dealing with 
theological issues paralleling those in Christianity. Light is cast on this by 
Wolfson's coinage of the term `inlibration' as a parallel to 'incarnation': 
The question arises in our mind whether similarly, in analogy to the Christian 
controversy over the problem of the incarnation and the problem of two natures, 
there was not also in Islam a controversy over the problem of the inlibration, that 
is, the embookment, of the pre-existent Koran in the revealed Koran and also over 
the problem of whether the revealed Koran had two natures, a divine and a man- 
made, or only one nature, a man-made nature. ' 
Thus, just as orthodox Trinitarianism in Christianity was espoused in the 
fifth century by theologians who held very different Christological 
opinions, so in Islam also acceptance of the Word of God as an eternal 
attribute could go along with different accounts from Muslims of the 
relation of that Word to its created context in the Qur'an. 
Indeed, Wolfson's analogy can be pushed further still to give some very 
suggestive parallels. In that both asserted the created status of the Word 
of God, the Mu'tazilites could be seen as corresponding to the Arians; in 
that both seemed, at least to their opponents, either to swallow up the 
created context in the divine Word or to imperil the Word through 
exposure to contingency, the Hanbalites would similarly correlate with 
the Monophysites. If space were available, it might even be possible to 
compare in more detail the Ash'arites and Mäturidites with Alexandrian 
and Antiochene christological approaches respectively. 
At least, what is clear is that Muslims and Christians alike, in the two 
parallel areas of inlibration and incarnation, were struggling with the 
same fundamental issues of the Creator's ability to communicate directly 
with creation, and the implications of such a communication for unity and 
multiplicity in the divine. 
Wolfson, p246. Cf Zaehner, p198: `For the Word made flesh Muslim theology substitutes the Word 
made book'. 
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(d) The Word of God: Trinitarian resources and problems 
In our examination of both Christian and Muslim writings concerning the 
Word of God during this period, we have seen the potential for trinitarian 
patterns to be adopted as a resource for dialogue. For example, the 
writings of St John of Damascus show how the dynamic of Christian 
reflection on the status of the Word could be applied to Muslims' parallel 
involvement with the same theological issue. We shall now briefly review 
the factors establishing this possibility, and also point to the severe 
limitations of the dialogue so enabled, before evaluating it in terms of the 
checklist of trinitarian problems we have identified. 
The context of Trinitarian dialogue 
As a matter of theological history, elements drawn from both faiths seem 
to have contributed towards the conditions which made this dialogue 
possible. From his knowledge of the Muslim tradition, John could point 
to verses in the Qur'an referring to Christ as Word (and Spirit); this 
encouraged him to use such pointers towards a possible shared 
Christology to develop his own apologetic case, and so he was inevitably 
drawn into dialogue with Muslim interpretations of these Qur'änic verses. 
From the Christian tradition, alongside the predominant confessional 
acknowledgement of the `Son of God', he also inherited theological 
resources identifying Christ as `Word of God'; these particularly included 
those presentations of Christian thought which had been developed in 
apologetic dialogue with philosophical paganism. 
That these traditions came together to create a genuine trinitarian 
engagement with Islam was then a two-stage process. The first stage is 
John's conscious decision - which he felt the need to justify - to use the 
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apologetic language of `Word' rather than the confessional language of 
`Son'. 
At a second level, in a context of creative ambiguity, the resonances this 
choice of language established with the `Word' speculations of Islam 
began to interpret parallel issues in Muslim theology. 
Despite such potential, however, this germ of trinitarian Christian- 
Muslim dialogue was not to grow further in the subsequent tradition. On 
the Christian side, we have seen that John's Byzantine successors lacked 
both his first-hand engagement with Islam and his apologetic sensitivity - 
evidenced most strikingly in their apparently casual reversion from 
`Word' to `Son' language. On the other side, later Muslim discussions of 
the status of God's Word contain no conscious positive acknowledgement 
of their parallels with issues in Christian theology, even though we have 
seen that interesting correspondences can in fact be traced. Rather, 
Islamic assessments of the Trinitarian implications of Christology in the 
kaläm remain at the level of repudiating it as shirk, `association'. 
Moreover, if John's approach was to bear such little fruit in subsequent 
dialogue, it was in any case seriously flawed as a trinitarian resource. In 
part, this was because of the polemic mode in which the apologetic of his 
time was perhaps inevitably cast; this precluded on the Christian side any 
generous appreciation of Muhammad or the revelation of God's Word 
which he claimed to present. Thus, despite the more open possibilities the 
dialogue form opened up, John himself repeatedly fell back on an 
exclusive identification of the divine Word with Christ alone. But we 
have also noticed other limitations inherent in the very fabric of John's 
Christian arguments: for example, his avoidance of the Muslim's question 
about the relation between `the Word' and `the words', and his failure to 
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develop a pneumatology which would make his approach fully 
Trinitarian. 
All in all, then, the possibilities for trinitarian dialogue around the theme 
of the Word of. God must be described as an interesting opportunity 
which was not fully developed by John, and which was largely ignored 
by his successors. Nevertheless, in medieval Islamic debates about the 
Word we can trace clear, though unacknowledged, correspondences with 
Christian thought, and the continuing potential of trinitarianism as a 
resource for dialogue on this theme is affirmed from the Islamic side in a 
recent contribution to a symposium of Orthodox Christians and Muslims: 
Whatever else the Trinity is, it signifies God's operation in the world to create, to 
save, and to guide humanity back to him, who is its ultimate source and end. Many 
have written that what is analogous in the Islamic tradition to the Trinity in 
Christianity are the divine attributes ... 
But may I suggest another, and perhaps in 
the final analysis a more fruitful analogue in Islam to the Trinity. It is the word or 
words (Aöyor) of God. ' 
We will consider the trinitarian `analogue' of the divine attributes in the 
next section. But first we ask: if trinitarianism can be used as a resource 
for dialogue with Muslims over the Word of God, how does our checklist 
of six trinitarian problems relate to such a use? We consider each in turn. 
Plurality 
As an emphatically monotheistic religion in which the confession of 
unity, tawhid, is central, Islam finds it extremely difficult to acknowledge 
any sense of plurality or differentiation within God: such an admission 
would seem to imply the worst of all sins, that of shirk. It is therefore not 
at all surprising that the pluralist implications of the orthodox account of 
the Word of God should not be generally recognised in medieval Islam. 
However, they were highlighted polemically by contemporaries who 
opposed the orthodox view - those Mu'tazilites who explained tawhid as 
1 Ayoub, p76. 
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a strict doctrine of unitary and undifferentiated divinity - and there can in 
fact be little doubt of the reality of the plurality which the doctrine of the 
Word introduced into Islamic theology. The Mu'tazilites particularly 
stressed this to be the case with the Hanbalites' insistence on the literal 
uncreatedness of the Qur'an; this, they maintained, involved God in 
radical exposure to the multiplicity which characterises creation, to such 
an extent that that multiplicity would inevitably compromise His unity. 
In the later kaldm, this kind of argument is answered by a renewed stress 
on the internal unity and simplicity of the Word of God, which is to be 
abstracted from all created contexts; yet it is important to realise that here 
too the principle of kaldm nafsI, `mental speech', still implies a 
differentiation within God - the differentiation between speaker as subject 
and speech as object. From this evidence, we may conclude that orthodox 
Islam throughout the medieval period implicitly allowed for a significant 
measure of plurality within God as a result of its account of the Word. 
Personality 
In one sense, personality is clearly a central category within this divine 
plurality. We have seen that the first (Jahmite) phase of the controversy in 
Islam centred upon the question of the very existence of the Word of 
God: arguments were about the reality of those `anthropomorphic' 
scriptural passages which represented God as speaking to humans. The 
orthodox line was to insist on the authenticity of God's personal 
communication; in this way, personality predicated of the divine was 
recognised as a non-negotiable feature of Islamic faith, and the plurality 
we have discussed arose from analysing the implications of this 
personality. 
However, personality as the constituent subject of plurality is not a 
category to be found in the Islamic account of the Word - that is to say, 
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whereas Trinitarian plurality in Christianity is that of an ensemble of 
three personae, in Islam personality is not to be predicated of the Qur'an. 
Herein lies the difference between `inlibration' and 'incarnation': 
reflection on the status of the Word in Islam begins from the fact that it is 
found in a book, rather than in a human being. 
Yet even here the particular character of that book must be remembered: 
far from being an abstract treatise, the Qur'an is cast as a rhetorical 
address of God to humanity. Although the Word in Islam does not itself 
have personal status, ' therefore, it does serve as a medium for personal 
communication; in this weaker sense at least, personality has its part to 
play among the constituent subjects of plurality, as well as being 
constitutive of that plurality as a whole. 
Threeness 
Of threeness as a characteristic feature of trinitarianism there is no trace 
in the Islamic recognitions of the plurality engendered by the Word of 
God. In fact, it is striking that this is even reflected in the Christian 
dialogical engagement with Muslims in this period: we have seen that St 
John of Damascus, through the absence of any significant 
pneumatological dimension, developed a binitarian rather than a 
Trinitarian theological response to a Quränic verse explicitly mentioning 
both Word and Spirit. 
In part, this may be because of the structure of the arguments being used - 
a focus on the binary relation between God and his Word, it could be 
said, leaves no obvious opening for a third constituent of plurality in the 
divine. However, it is worth remembering that this has not been felt to be 
But it is interesting to observe in this connection that in popular Islam even to this day the Qur'an is 
depicted in personified form - e. g. the Leicester schoolchild who asserted: `If you pray the Qur'an, 
when God is telling us something on Judgement Day, the Qur'an will come and talk - like, "He 
prayed me, so you can put him in Paradise"". (J Ipgrave, p34). 
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necessarily the case within the history of Christian theology. St 
Augustine, for example, developed an analogy of the Trinity by 
distinguishing between mens and verbum mentis in a way resembling the 
principle of the kaldm nafsI; but he completed this duality by adding a 
third element, which he identified as amor. l 
Again, Karl Barth - whose theology is very close to Islam in its emphasis 
on the sovereignty of the God who reveals Himself through His Word - 
located the root of the Trinity in analysis of Dei loquentis persona, a 
concept quite in place in the Muslim writers we have been considering, 
yet he expressed the results of this analysis as not only `Revealer' and 
`Revelation' but also `Revealedness'. 2 
Now, of course, it could be argued that, as committed Christians, 
Augustine and Barth arrived at the number three only by special pleading 
to justify their existing belief in the Trinity. Nevertheless, their theologies 
at least. show that consideration of the Word of God need not preclude 
threeness as a dimension of plurality. 
Equally, it could be argued in the opposite direction that Muslims failed 
to develop a third dimension to plurality because of constraints of 
theological history as powerful as those experienced by Christians - 
namely, the Qur'änic injunction: `Believe in God and His messengers and 
say not, Three". 3 For this text could mean that `threeness' in itself came to 
be viewed by Muslims with suspicion as a marker of Christian influence. 
Thus, while we must record that a third dimension to plurality was not 
recognised in Islam's account of the Word of God, we cannot assume that 
such non-recognition was necessarily inherent in the logic of its theology. 
I De Trinitate 1X. 18 (Hill, p282). 
2 Church Dogmatics I. 1.8 - Bromiley, pp295ff. 3 Surah 4.171. Cf above, p176. 
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Equality 
It is difficult to see how within Islamic theology God and the Word of 
God could possibly be established on a level of equality; certainly as a 
matter of historical fact this did not happen. So, as we have seen, the 
Mu'tazilites taught a radical subordinationism in which the Word was 
unambiguously creaturely in status. The oldest traditional formula moved 
beyond this to adopt the cautiously intermediate position `neither Creator 
nor created'; yet even the definite assertions by the orthodox of the 
uncreated status of the Word were never seen as implying co-equality 
with God. Thus, within the context of a dialogue with Orthodox 
Christians, an informed Islamic comment on the opening verses of the 
Fourth Gospel observes: 
John tells us that the Word was with God, but where we differ is with John's next 
statement, that is, that the Word is God. The great theological controversy over the 
Qur'an, a controversy which remains unresolved to this day, concerns the 
relationship of the Qur'an, as the Word of God, to God himself. To my knowledge, 
no one has asserted that the Qur'an is God. ' 
Straightforward assertion of the divinity of the Word thus cannot be 
allowed in Islam; this automatically precludes any possibility of allowing 
equality within any analogue of trinitarian differentiation. 
Necessity 
We have seen that a firm denial of the contingent status of the Word of 
God became a dominant theme in later Islamic orthodoxy; moreover, this 
was closely linked to an assertion of the Word's eternity as a corollary of 
its uncreatedness. In the sense that, according to Islamic belief, God could 
not have been otherwise, we may therefore say that the speaking of the 
Word is a necessary consequence of God's being. This is expressed in the 
tradition by the numerous arguments to the effect that God could never 
have been silent as this would imply both initial defect and subsequent 
Ayoub, p73. 
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change on His part - arguments which, in the elaboration of the idea of 
kaläm nafsi, were pushed back into the private mental world of God to 
deny even an interior silence. 
If the Word is a necessary dimension of God's being, then so must be 
whatever plurality that Word implies. Indeed, the kaldm recognised this 
necessity negatively by its silence on the subject, as compared to the very 
vociferous repudiation of the kind of contingent plurality which would 
result from allowing the `sounds and letters' of human speech to be 
eternally attributed to God. That repudiation shows an acute awareness 
among Muslim theologians of the dangers of introducing accidental 
plurality into the divine; we may conclude that such plurality as is 
implied by the relation of the eternal Word to God must be a necessary 
plurality. 
Immanence 
Finally, the `immanence' of the plurality related to the Word of God is 
demonstrated by the way Muslim theologians emphasised, positively 
through the language of spatial proximity or procession, and negatively 
through the denial of a separate locus for its existence, the inseparability 
of the Word from God. In the idea of the kaldm nafsI, this Word becomes 
a most intimate part of the divine inner life; at the same time, there is a 
clear distinction made between this eternal reality and its outward 
manifestation in the `economy' of the Qur' än's utterance. 
The Word of God came to be recognised by the mutakallimün as a 
particular instance of the attributes subsisting in the divine essence; their 
treatment of the status of these attributes in general was to provide a 
further genuine Islamic instance of plurality at an immanent level of 
divinity, as we shall show in the following section. 
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3 Naming God: the divine Attributes 
(a) Attributes in Ash `arism 
Ash`arite theology succeeded during the tenth to twelfth centuries in 
establishing itself as the dominant school of orthodox Islamic theology, a 
position which it has largely maintained to this day. ' Therefore, as the 
teaching on divine attributes (sifät) not only is an important part of its 
system, but also has most interesting trinitarian resonances, an 
examination of the medieval Ash'arite understanding of the sifdt will be 
important for contemporary Trinitarian dialogue also. It is necessary first 
to recognise that two factors moulded the thought, of the founder Abu' l 
Hasan al-Ash`afi (c873-941): the training in Mu'tazilite kaläm which he 
received from his mentor Abü `Ali al-Jubbä'i (d. 915), and his later 
dramatic conversion to the orthodox position maintained by the disciples 
of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855). 2 His subsequent theological work is 
marked by a continuing reliance on the techniques of rational 
argumentation he had learnt as a Mu'tazilite, but now applied to defend 
theories radically opposed to theirs; this double emphasis explains in 
particular the pattern of his theory of attributes. 
We have seen above how the dispute over attributes probably originated 
in the Mu'tazilite repudiation of a literal acceptance of the 
anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'än. 3 Correspondingly, among the 
Hanbalite opponents of Mu`tazilism, acceptance of these verses bill kayf, 
`without asking how', was linked to belief in the substantive existence of 
those attributes unambiguously attested of God by the Qur' än. The 
Hanbalites held both these positions on the basis of a literal fidelity to the 
' Cf, e. g., Nasr (1991), pp399-403. 
2 On ibn Hanbal's defence of the uncreated Qur'an, cf above, pp207ff; for al-Jubbä'i's nominalism, 
cf below, p235. A full discussion of al-Ash`ari's conversion can be found in Allard, pp37-47. 
3 Above, p189. 
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Qur'anic text; but in the Ash'arites' rational defence of traditional 
orthodoxy two different emphases appear. Firstly, they emphasised the 
element of tanzih ('unlikeness') in interpreting the anthropomorphic 
language. ' Secondly, and more significantly for our purposes, the 
Ash'arites widened the extension of the attributes to include all possible 
Islamic descriptions of God. Whereas Hanbalism had only admitted the 
existence of those substantive attributes explicitly attested in the Qur'an 
and the Sunnä, the Ash'arite theology proposes a substantive divine 
attribute corresponding to every adjectival or participial description of 
God. This position of course results in a much more numerous list of 
substantival divine attributes than those recognised among the Hanbalites; 
in respect of this formal structuring at least, Ash`arism follows the plan of 
speculative Mu'tazilism rather than abiding by the scriptural limitations 
of Hanbalism. 
Thus a debate over the status of the Qur'anic language used to describe 
God came to have considerable implications for issues of divine unity and 
plurality. We can explore those implications on three levels - the 
Ash'arites' own theories, their opponents' criticisms, and the dialogical 
potential of their views. First, then, we must set out in more detail al- 
Ash `ari's argument for a multiplicity of substantival divine attributes. 
The Ash `ante theory: names and attributes 
The language used of God is commonly referred to by Muslim 
theologians by the phrase `names (asmä) and attributes (sifät)'. 2 The 
latter word derives from the Arabic root wsf, `to describe', and therefore 
has in general simply the meaning of a `description' or 'predication'. In 
the analyses of Qur'änic statements made by the Mu'tazilites, this 
Above, p189. This `refus de tout univocite des termes employes pour les hommes et pour Dieu' is 
still more pronounced among al-Ash`ari's followers than in the master himself - Allard, pp411ü. 
2 The corresponding singular forms are, respectively, ism and sifa. 
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differentiation of ism and sifa is preserved as the grammatical distinction 
between the nominal form used to identify a subject and the verbal or 
adjectival form used to qualify a subject by a predicate. The most 
frequently discussed example in the literature concerns the root 'Im, 
`knowing'; in this case, according to the Mu'tazilites, when the Qur'an 
refers to God as 'd1im, `the knowing one', it is citing one of the divine 
names ('asmä'), whereas a statement such as Alldhu 'älimun, `God is the 
knowing one', expresses a predicate (sifa). 1 Indeed, the Mu'tazilites were 
reluctant to speak of divine attributes as having any kind of existence 
other than within the linguistic context of theological predication - so, 
for example, al-Ash`arl' reports of his former master al-Jubbä'i: 
He held that the act of attributing is the attribute (al-wasfu huwa s-sifa) and that the 
naming is the name, i. e., the statement 'God is knowing and endowed with 
autonomous power'. When one would say to him, `You say that knowing (al-'ilm) 
is an attribute, ' he would reply, 'We do not [in speaking of God] affirm a knowing 
in the strict sense so as to be able to say that it is an attribute or not, nor do we 
affirm a knowing in the strict sense so as to be able to say that it is eternal or 
temporal or that it is God or other than He. '3 
This report is significant both because it lucidly expresses the nominalism 
against which al-Ash`ari was reacting, 4 and because it signals the key 
themes - the reality of the attributes, their eternity, their relationship to 
God - which he was to maintain in his own theology as a result of that 
Frank, pp10ü. In fact, the Qur'an uses the intensive form, `aiim, more commonly than the 
unemphatic `älim - Gimaret, p253. 2 Various theories were promoted by different Mu'tazilites in the attempt to solve the problem of the 
extra-linguistic reference of the attributes. Abu'l-Hudhail, for example, taught that `God is knowing 
with knowledge and his knowledge is his essence' (Shahrastäni, Milal - Kazi & Flynn, p46), but 
this ontological identification of attribute with essence was rejected both by al-Jubbä'i (Frank, p16), 
and following him also by the Ash'arites (below, p18). Later, al-Jubbä'i's son Abü Häshim 
developed a theory of attributes as `modes', which is of considerable sophistication but rather 
remote from our concerns here (cf, e. g., Wolfson, pp 167-204). 
3 Magdldt, 529f, quoted by Frank, p18. 
The Magdlät is a difficult work to analyse and to interpret. Allard, pp67ff, suggests that it may 
include elements from both before and after al-Ash'ari's conversion from Mu'tazilism to 
orthodoxy, which opens up the possibility that in the text quoted above he is in fact agreeing with 
al-Jubbä'i's rejection of views which he was himself later to hold. In that case, we would have 
further evidence of the powerful way in which al-Ash'ari's theology continued to be shaped by the 
issues raised by the Mu'tazilite mutakallimün even though he came to disagree with their 
fundamental contentions. 
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reaction, and in developing which he was to transform the meaning of 
sifa' and the understanding of the relationship between sifät and 'asmd'. 
For al-Ash`ari, stfa has lost its opposition, as predicative, to ism, denoting 
the subject of predication, and rather implies a really existing quality, 
typically expressed in a substantival noun form. Thus, to pursue the 
example of knowledge quoted above, he argues as follows: 
We find the name `knower (`älim)' derived from `knowledge (`ilm)'. The purpose 
of the derivation of the names of God must be either to indicate His nature or to 
give Him a proper name. Now God cannot be called, when He is given a proper 
name, by a name that does not indicate His nature and is not derived from a 
predicate. Therefore, when we say that God is a knower, that is not giving Him 
proper names, as when we say, "Zayd" and "Amr", and since it is not giving Him 
proper names, and the name is derived from `knowledge (`ilm)', the assertion of 
the existence of knowledge necessarily follows. 2 
Al-A. sh`ari here exemplifies his general theory relating sifät to asmä' - 
namely, that `chaque participe actif est derive du substantif 
correspondant; ces deux categories du langage s'impliquent 
mutuellement'. 3 The roots of this principle lie in the tendency of Arabic 
grammarians (many of them in fact of the Mu'tazilite school) to ascribe a 
priority to nominal over verbal or adjectival forms; 4 al-Ash`an, however, 
holds his theory not as a merely linguistic rule, but as a pointer beyond 
language to the ontological structure of the divine nature to which 
theological discourse refers. 5 
I Frank, p33n25, points out in this connection that the passage we have quoted in fact uses the word 
sifa in two distinct ways - first in the Jubbä'ite sense of wasf, and second as implying an entitative 
existence (cf further on ma `nä below). He observes: `the second is never employed by the 
Mu'tazila'. 
2 Ibänah XI - Klein, p97. 3 Allard, p410, citing Luma' p22,9-15, and Risdla I p95,2-6. 
4 Frank, p28n8 gives as a particular example 'the concept that the conjugated forms of the verb and 
the verbal adjectives are derived from the nomina actions'. In the context he quotes, however, sifa 
is interpreted in its Mu'tazilite sense as `predicate', and the grammatical point would therefore 
reinforce the secondary character of the term as compared to the asmä'. 
Frank, loc. cit., by contrast maintains that the grammarians' 'consideration of grammatical 
phenomena is almost nowhere contaminated or clouded by a confusion of the linguistic reality of 
nouns and verbs with the concrete reality of things and events'. He does point out, however, that a 
similar process - though conducted on different assumptions - can also be detected in some forms of 
later Mu'tazilism itself: 'a tendency to proliferate a host of entitative "accidents" as different 
grounds (ma'dni') were conceived to be asserted as constituting the ontological basis for each one of 
many predicates' (p12). 
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In the passage we have quoted, he supports this claim by an analogy 
drawn from the use of language in the human context; and in this method 
of argument, he again differs significantly from both Mu'tazilites and 
Hanbalites. To preserve transcendence, the former rejected efforts to 
establish a continuity between divine and creaturely predication. ' The 
latter, restricting themselves to the text of the Qur'an and Sunnä, equally 
repudiated the exercise of reason to justify or explain such divinely 
authored language. 2 In other words, we see in al-Ash`an a desire to move 
beyond the boundaries. of linguistic discourse imposed by conservatives 
and liberals alike, in order to engage directly with the reality of the 
divine; and this is consonant with his emphasis on the entitative status of 
the sifät: `al-Ash`ari atteste en effet que pour lui le centre d'intdrdt West 
pas le langage qui design les qualites mais les qualites visees par le 
langage'. 3 
The Ash `ante theory: reality of the attributes 
One of the ways in which the reality of the attributes is demonstrated in 
Ash'arite theology is through their identification as ma `äni (sing. ma `nä) 
or equivalently their description as ma `nawiya. 4 Theological vocabulary 
from, this root (`ny) has proved difficult, to translate satisfactorily into 
western languages, largely because it functions differently in different 
In fact, the situations of God and 'Zayd' are for Mu'tazilism contrary in this respect: for Zayd to be 
knowing means the existence of a contingent entity of knowing other than and separable from him, 
whereas such an entity of divine knowledge, which would have to be eternal, cannot be asserted 
alongside God, who rather must be knowing per se - cf Frank, p17, Peters pp241f. 
Z Al-Ash'arI does cite Qur'änic texts referring to the divine knowledge ('ilm) - e. g. SS. 4.164 ('In his 
knowledge He sent it down'), 35.12 ('No female conceives or bring forth without His knowledge') 
- in the lbdnah (Klein, p94 - cf also the same texts quoted in the Luma' 1.24 - McCarthy, p18), but 
the scriptural attestations are logically subsidiary to his main line of argument. 
3 Allard, p229. 
4 This equivalence was later refined by Ash`arites such as al-Sanüsi, who distinguished .s fdt al- 
ma'änf as the substantive forms ('flm, etc) from si[dt al-ma nawIya as their participial derivatives 
('ohm, etc); but this did not affect their insistence on the entitative status of the former - Elder, 
p49n3. 
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contexts and different authors. ' The general sense of ma `nä as `qualifier' 
or 'determinant -)2 indicate it as that category within a subject which 
validates a particular predication - as such, it stands in relation to the 
descriptive language used as `meaning' to `word'. In Mu'tazilite 
theology, ma `än? as found in created beings are typically `accidents', in 
that the predications they enable are contingent; conversely, the idea of 
ma `nä is inappropriate with respect to God, concerning whom no literal 
predication can be made. 
In the case of al-Ash`ari and his school, 3 by contrast, the ma 'an? were 
understood as really existing and distinct entities, and the sifät came to be 
identified with these ma `dnI: 
These are superadded to God's essence and they are sift eternally existent and 
ma'äni subsisting in his essence. 4 
Wolfson suggests that the word here is best rendered `things'; 5 a more 
restrained translation is `entite reelle' (ma `nä), `entitatif' (ma `nawiya). 
6 
In any case, the significant points established by this expression are, first, 
that, in Ash'arite understanding, so far from being merely logical 
distinctions, the attributes are identifiable realities subsisting in God; and 
second, that these realities are different one from another. 
One consequence of their subsistence in the divine is the implication that 
the attributes must themselves be eternal, 7 since anything other than a 
knowledge pre-existing creation would involve introducing change into 
Cf the summary history of the discussion in Peters, p156n234, which also points to the range of 
(non-Islamic) conceptual backgrounds which have been proposed for its ultimate provenance. 
Z The translations, respectively, of Peters (p156) and Frank (p12). 
And also of his predecessor ibn Kulläb, whose usage Wolfson, p117, summarises thus: `It would 
seem that ma `nä and shay ('thing') and sifa all became interchangeable terms'. 
Shahrastani, Nihäyat, reporting the views of the Ash'arites - quoted in Wolfson, p214. 
Wolfson, p117 - his discussion is unfortunately somewhat marred at this point by his rather forced 
derivation of ma nd in this sense from Christian Trinitarian vocabulary, in particular the technical 
usage of irpd*a. Cf below, p252, for an overall assessment of Wolfson's claims. 
6 Allard, p387n2, where he also rejects as inadequate Luciani's translation of ma `nawIya as 
`qualitatif'. Allard is followed by, e. g., Gimaret (p328 etc). 
This assertion was to provide the grounds for one of the major Mu'tazilite criticisms of the 
Ash'arite doctrine of attributes - cf below, p249. 
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God. ' Al-Ash`ari fully accepted this position, making a strong claim that 
it represents orthodox Islamic belief: 
The Muslims unanimously agreed, before the origin of the Jahmiyyah and the 
Mu'tazilah and the Harüriyyah, that God had knowledge eternally, and said, 
`God's knowledge is eternal, for God's knowledge precedes created things', and 
they do not refuse to say of every new thing that arises and everything that comes 
down from God, `All this exists antecedently in God's knowledge'; and therefore 
he who denies that God has knowledge dissents from the Muslims and is guilty of 
a departure from their agreement? 
Remembering that al-Ash' ad maintains that the arguments by which he 
has defended the reality and eternity of God's knowledge apply with 
equal force to the other divine attributes also, 3 we may thus summarise 
his position on the sifdt as follows: that the theological language of Islam 
rightly interpreted implies the subsistence in God of a plurality of eternal 
realities sustaining an equal plurality of divine names. Two questions 
then arise: how is such a plurality to be reconciled with the fundamental 
principle of divine unity (tawhId) through its account of the relation of 
many attributes to one divine essence; and what is the scope of this 
plurality in terms of enumeration of the attributes? 
The Ash `arite theory: attributes and essence 
In describing the salient features of the Mu'tazilite theology, the 
heresiographer Shahrastäni places first their essentialist nominalism: 
The Mu'tazila deny altogether the eternal attributes. According to them God is 
`knowing' by his essence, `powerful' by his essence, `living' by his essence: not by 
`knowledge' or `power' or `life' considered as eternal attributes or entities 
(ma `c ni) subsisting in him. 4 
The logic of al-Ash`ari's argument therefore implies eternity both aparte ante and also a parte post 
- these are signified in Arabic by two different sets of expressions, respectively gadIm or azalf, and 
abadI or bägi - cf Gimaret, pp 163ff. 
Z Ibänah, XI - Klein, p95. The Harüriya were an early group of Kharijites; it is not clear why they are 
mentioned in this connection. 
3 E. g. Luma' 1.26 (McCarthy, p19): `This proof also proves the affirmation of all God's essential 
attributes'. In particular, of course, the Ash'arites devoted much time to establishing the eternity of 
the attribute of speech, as this related to the uncreated status of the Qur'an - cf above, pp207ff. 
Milal - Kazi & Flynn, pp4lf. Mu'tazilite theology in fact distinguished these `attributes of the 
essence (sifät adh-dhdt)' from `attributes of action (sifdt al al-fi `0', i. e. those which `follow the 
existence of an act from Him' (Peters, p249n126, citing `Abd al-Jabbär). It was regarding the sifdt 
adh-dhdt that the controversy with the Ash'arites was maintained. 
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In some sense or other, therefore, the common position of all the 
Mu'tazilites involved the conflation of the attributes with the essence. 
Shahrastäni goes on. to describe the more detailed disagreements within 
the school about the best way of describing this conflation. Thus, Jubbä' i 
limited himself to a denial of the real existence of the attributes, while his 
son Abü Häshim developed a theory of them as 'modes'. ' Of particular 
note, though, was the view of Abu'l-Hudhail, who declared: 
God is `knowing' with knowledge and his knowledge is his essence; he is 
`powerful' with power and his power is his essence; he is `living' with life and his 
life is his essence. 2 
This conflation of attributes with essence is a position against which al- 
Ash`am consistently argued - whether specifically in the form of Abu`l- 
Hudhail's explicit equation of the two, or more generally in any attempt 
to reduce the reality of the attributes to a statement about the essence. 3 
His reasoning - as in the exposition of the entitative status of the 
attributes we discussed above - is based on grammatical considerations. 
Thus, he claims that any identification of the attributes with the essence 
would imply that `knowledge' (or similar concepts) would have to be 
taken as the subject of the verb `to know' (or corresponding active 
forms), and this is impossible: 
Knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the knower be knowledge, nor can God be 
identified with his attributes. 4 
Similarly, such an identification would propose `divine knowledge' as a 
proper recipient of prayer and worship, and this too is inconceivable. 5 We 
can in fact trace here definite limits to al-Ash`ari's doctrine of the 
1 Kazi & Flynn, p67. Cf also above, p235n2. 
2 Ibid., p46. Shahrastäni claims that Abu'l-Hudhail derived this opinion 'from the [Greek] 
philosophers'; he also suggests that his theory `agrees with the Christian notion of the hypostases'. 
3 Al-Ash'ari himself in this context typically uses the more general term nafs rather than the more 
philosophical dhdt to refer to the divine essence. Allard, p199n4, remarks (of the Risdla Ild AhlAI- 
Tagr): 'il ne semble pas que l'on doive attribuer un sens technique precis an terme nafs'; he goes on 
to replace his own translation '1'essence divine' by the less specific 'Dieu Iui-meme'. 
4 Luma' 25 (McCarthy, ppl8f). 
S Ibänah XI (Klein, p95) - 'Since you say that God's knowledge is God, say "0 knowledge of God, 
forgive me and have mercy on me! "' Al-Ash`ari here argues by name against Abu'1-Hudhail. 
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substantive existence of the attributes, for what he is drawing attention to 
is the latter's inability to operate as personal subjects in the way that God 
can - `tout en ayant une certain realite, [ils] ne peuvent cependant pas 
eire hypostasies'. 1 This denial of personality is one significant sense in 
which the attributional divine plurality acknowledged in Ash`arism 
differs from the hypostatic plurality of orthodox Trinitarianism; we shall 
see that this difference was to prove a problem for Arabic Christian 
theologians attempting to use the Muslim account of the sifät as a basis 
for commending Trinitarian faith. 2 
Al-Ash`ari contends that he has shown that from the Mu`tazilite position 
there must flow one of two contradictory positions, which are both 
untenable: either `a knower but not knowledge' or `knowledge but not a 
knower'. 3 It is in fact questionable whether, considered as a criticism of 
Mu'tazilism, his argument does -demonstrate this satisfactorily; 4 but the 
balanced character of the negative conclusion al-Ash`ari believes he has 
reached can perhaps be taken as indicative of the reconciliation of unity 
and difference which he is seeking in the account he gives of the relation 
of the attributes to the essence. Positively expressed, the attributes can be 
described as follows: 
Not He nor other than He (lä huwa wa Id ghayruhu). 
There are no unambiguous attestations of this formula in the surviving 
works of al-Ash` ari, s though he does use it - apparently with approbation 
- to describe the doctrine of his predecessor Abu Muhammad `Abdalläh 
Allard, P199. 
Z Cf below, p265. 
Ibänah XI (Klein, p95): the latter is implicit in the challenge to Abu'l-Hudhail (p240n5 above). 
Allard points out that, since for his opponents any identity of essence and attributes is admitted only 
`sur un plan logique', and not at the kind of ontological level which would permit that hypothetical 
transfer of predicates from essence to attributes on which he bases his reductio ad absurdum, his 
reasoning is faulty: for the Mu'tazilites too, `il n'y a qu'un sujet viel auquel on pent attribuer ces 
actions - c'est Dieu lui-meme' (ibid., p200). 
5 Wolfson, p212, points out that Ibn Hazm (Fisal II, p126,21-22) quotes from an unidentified work 
of al-Ash`ari a very similar formula regarding the divine knowledge: `One is not to say that it is 
God nor is one to say that it is other than God'. 
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ibn Kulläb (d. 855). ' However, it well expresses the truths which he seeks 
to hold together in his discussion in the Luma', where `we find both 
elements of the classic phrase in which Ash`ari's doctrine was summed 
up', 2 and it is clearly attested in the influential Ash'arite theologian al- 
Juwaini, 3 from which time on it becomes a touchstone of the orthodox 
Muslim doctrine of the attributes. 
The origins of the formula are traced by Massignon back to situations 
where Hanafite lawyers sought to locate a middle term between two 
objects they were comparing: `inventoriant un ä un les elements simples 
que ces deux concepts ont, ou non, d'analogues, on conclut ä leur identite 
incomplete par equivocation'. 4 However, two important qualifications 
need to be added to this remark if we are to grasp the formula's 
significance in the context of Ash'arite theology. First, while the original 
force of the formula may have been `une distinction purement logique', 
al-Ash`an definitely intends it to convey an ontological reality: it is as 
subsistent entities that the divine attributes are to be declared neither 
identical with nor other than the divine essence. 5 Second, Massignon's 
summary of its meaning as `incomplete identity' does not match the 
emphasis the formula has in this theological context, for it rather stresses 
a relationship of non-identity by. insisting that the attributes are ld huwa 
('not He'). The second phrase qualifies this by adding that attributes and 
essence are not ghayr ('other'), but it would be misleading to interpret 
Maqdldt p169,12-13 and p546,11. Wolfson, p208ff, therefore refers to this as `the Kullabite 
formula'. His otherwise valuable discussion is unconvincingly linked to attempts to trace its origin 
back to Muslim polemic against Trinitarianism. Thus he claims that its original meaning was that 
the attributes are not (like the Trinitarian hypostases) divine, nor on the other hand separable from 
God. However, the general tenor of the formula is in fact rather close to the dialectic of the 
Trinitarian reconciliation of identity and difference - certainly if one were to allow in its dialogical 
interpretation a traditional Christian ambiguity in the reference of huwa ('God') between `the 
Father' and `the divine essence'. 
2 McCarthy, p16n16. 
3 Irshdd, 137. 
4 Massignon, pp579f. 
5 Allard, p200. 
MEDIEVAL 243 
3-34. doc 
this as just a contrary affirmation of identity on the basis of the excluded 
middle. In later theological discussion of the lä huwa wa ld ghayruhu 
formula, detailed attention was given to this point. Al-Taftäzäni, for 
example, ' describes the Mu'tazilite understanding as follows: 
They have interpreted `otherness (al-ghayrrya)' to be the state of coming-into- 
being on the part of two existing things so that the existence of one is determined 
and conceived along with the non-existence of the other. 2 
On such a view, of course, the denial of ghayrIya would imply a 
straightforward equation of attributes and essence, but al-Taftazäni insists 
that there is conceptual space for a middle position: 
An intermediate thing is conceivable to the extent that what is understood by one 
thing is not that which is understood by the other. Yet it does not exist without the 
other thing. 3 
According to such an interpretation, we could perhaps take ghayr to mean 
`apart', `distant', or even `alien'. In other words, the formula would 
emphasise the inseparability of the attributes from the essence, while 
insisting strongly on a real distinction of the two. In such an account of 
the attributes in relation to the essence, we can see suggestive parallels 
with formulations. of Trinitarian plurality, in that both Muslims and 
Christians are genuinely concerned to acknowledge real plurality while 
seeking to reconcile this with the requirements of divine unity. Next we 
must ask about the dimensions of this plurality - how are the attributes to 
be counted and organised according to the Ash'arite system? 
The Ash `arite theory: enumerating the attributes 
In the Risäla Ild AN al-Tagr, al-Ash an presents three lists of words 
which can be predicated of God. 4 Though there is substantial overlap 
between the three, there are also some significant differences in content; 
moreover, while the first two lists consist of participial forms, the third 
I Cf above, p214ff. 
2 Sharh 73 -Elder, p53. 3 Ibid. - al-Taftäzäm gives the example of `part and whole' to validate this possibility. 
Respectively, Risdia I: p93,12-13; p93,23; and p94,10-12. Cf Allard, pp191ff. 
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has only substantives. These are seven in number, as follows: (1) life 
(haydt), (2) knowledge (71m), (3) power (qudra), (4) speech (kaldm), (5) 
will (iräda), (6) hearing (sam `), and (7) sight (basar). After enumerating 
these participles and substantives, al-Ash`ari goes on to discuss the 
`anthropomorphic' expressions affirmed of God by the Qur'an and the 
Sunna, such as his possession of two hands or his sitting (istawä) upon 
the throne; ' but he does not number these among the attributes as such. 
In subsequent Ash` arism, the list of seven attributes was to be regarded as 
an invariable datum, but in the context of al-Ash`arIi's own works the 
situation appears rather more complex. The discrepancies between the 
different lists offered in the Risdia suggest that, rather than to provide a 
definitive and exhaustive catalogue, his purpose is just to mention several 
attributes as important examples. If we then ask how the attributes are to 
be enumerated in his theology, no clear answer is discernible. On one 
hand, al-Ash`ari refuses to limit himself to the Hanbalite criterion of 
scriptural attestation. 2 For example, the first attribute in the list cited 
above, hayat ('life'), is not attested in its substantive form in the 
scriptures, and was therefore rejected by the Hanbalites. 3 On the other 
hand, al-Ash`ari's one-to-one correlation of substantival attributes and 
participial names should mean that the divine attributes are equal in 
number to the divine names; a celebrated tradition of the Prophet counted 
the latter as ninety-nine, but there was also a general recognition that the 
names could not be limited to this number. 4 
Cf above, p187. 
2 The rationale of the Hanbalite principle lies in acceptance of the Qur'än as the Word of God, so that 
a Qur'änically attested attribute will be one which God has applied to Himself. Cf above, p234. 
3 Allard, p410n2. Allard points out that, for reasons precisely of this kind, Hanbalite authors do not 
cite the lists of seven or eight attributes which were to become current in Sunni Islam. 
4 Gimaret, pp50ff outlines the various theories. Alongside the hadrth of 99 names, another described 
the Prophet addressing God by His names grouped in various categories - `those by which You 
have named Yourself, or that You have revealed in your Book, or that You have taught to your 
creatures, or that You have reserved for Yourself alone in your knowledge of the unknown'. 
However these phrases are interpreted, they question any precise definition of the number of names. 
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However, a sevenfold enumeration of the attributes, while without 
apparent intrinsic significance for al-As h`ari himself, later came to be 
regarded as a hallmark of Ash'arite orthodoxy. At the same time, 
theologians came to argue that precisely this list of attributes was 
necessary for God to be as He is known to be. Such systematisation is 
clear at least from the time of Abu Mansur al-Baghdädi (d. 1037), 
' who 
distinguished a limited number of sifdt. al-ma `änä (entitative attributes) 
from, on the one hand, the sifdt ad-dhdt (essential attributes), predicated 
of God by virtue of his essence per se, and, on the other, the sifät al-af `al 
(attributes of action), ascribed to God through his relation to creatures. ' 
The dimensions of the later Ash` arisen can be clearly seen, for example, 
in the writings of al-Ghazdli. In his work of technical kaldm, he proves 
the existence of each of the seven entitative attributes in turn, 3 and goes 
on to insist on their distinction from the essence and from one another. 4 
When he writes a devotional treatise on `The Ninety-Nine Beautiful 
Names of God', it is. this established attributional plurality which 
provides the theological orientation for his exposition, for he includes a 
section `offering an explanation how these many names resolve to the 
Essence with seven Attributes, according to the people of the Sunna'. 5 So 
we see a gradual reversal of priorities: in al-Ash`arIi, a still fluid 
I Baghdädi, in common with some other Ash'arites, in fact recognised an eighth attribute, baqd 
('duration') in God, by virtue of which He possessed eternity - Gimaret, plO8n8. Among the 
Mäturidite theologians, `creating' was added as an eighth eternal attribute, whereas the Ash'arites 
generally classed it is an indication of activity in relation to creatures - Elder, pnvi. 
2 Cf Gimaret, pp107-1 10, for a detailed exposition of Baghdädi's system. The classificatory scheme 
derives from that of the Mu'tazilites (cf above, p239n4), but significantly modifies it by introducing 
the second category of sifät a! ma'änf, in which group are placed (a) most of the sifät ad-dhdt 
ascribed by the Mu'tazilites directly to the essence, and (b) the eternal attribute of kaläm, denied by 
the Mu'tazilites in their repudiation of an uncreated Qur'an. 
3 Iqtisad - Abu Zayd, pp1-64. In Ghazäli's treatment, however, the first of the attributes to be 
discussed is `power', with `life' in fourth place. 
4 This latter point is more clearly developed in the later theologians than in al-Ash'ari - al-Ghazäli 
asks, for example: `Is what is said from our saying "powerful" the same as what is said from our 
saying "knowing", or is it something else? ' Answering that it is `something else', he concludes to 
the existence of the two really distinct attributes of power and knowledge - Igtisad: Abu Zayd, p68. 
Maqsad 172-174 - Burrell & Daher, ppl59ff. The editors observe: `Ghazäli is less than orderly 
here; indeed one suspects that he finds this exercise tedious and pointless' (ibid., p193n110). 
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recognition of an unspecified plurality of attributes was justified by 
appeal to the multiplicity of the divine names; in al-Ghazäli, the divine 
names are themselves analysed in terms of a specifically sevenfold 
plurality of attributes established by the technical argumentation of the 
kaldm. 
A further point should be mentioned in the later development of the 
theology of the attributes, because it is of particular significance in 
discussing the potential of Ash'arism to serve as a resource for Trinitarian 
dialogue. A tendency to posit relations within the ensemble of seven 
attributes, whereby certain are logically presupposed by others, 
. 
led to the 
identification of three attributes as particularly significant. A not 
dissimilar strategy in Mu'tazilism had proposed to reduce the number of 
divine predicates by stages through analysing one in terms of another; 
eventually, all descriptions would be resolved into the one assertion of 
God as `knowing', which would then be collapsed into his essence. ' In 
the case of the Ash'arite application of the method, the three attributes 
singled out were generally knowledge, power, and life; of these, life had 
priority, in that only a living being could be powerful, knowing, and 
exhibiting the other four characteristics. 2 If in the Ordo essendi the 
attribute of life had first logical place, however, the ordo cognoscendi 
reversed the sequence: thus, we come to know God through his acts; from 
the, character of those acts we deduce his power and knowledge; as only 
one who is living can have power and knowledge, we are then led to 
This is, for example, the Mu`tazilite reasoning criticised by al-Ghazäli in Maqsad 175-177 (Burrell 
& Daher, ppl63f). Other Mu'tazilites, however, identified `eternity' as the primary predicate to 
which all other essential attributes could be reduced - Shahrastäni, Milal 1 (Kati & Flynn, pp41f). 2 Gimaret, p229, points out that much of this argument derives from the Mu'tazilite theologian al- 
Jubbä'i (cf above, p235). It was expressed by him in terms of a hierarchy of predicates applied to 
living beings, but it was taken into Ash`arism, probably by al-BAgilläni, when the substantival 
attribute of life was declared to be that which enabled other attributes. 
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recognise the subsistence of life as a divine attribute. ' Yet it must be 
noted that for the Ash'arites the argument stopped at this point: they did 
not follow the Mu'tazilites in collapsing this primary predicate of `life' 
into the divine essence. Their position was that power, knowledge and 
particularly life should be given a relative cognitive primacy; 
ontologically, however, they remained subsistences distinct from one 
another, from the other attributes, and from the essence. 
To prioritise three out of seven attributes in this way, even though that 
prioritisation was only in terms of logical derivation, clearly had potential 
implications for dialogue at a number of levels. Most specifically, the 
ideas of `life', `power', and `knowledge' could with some plausibility be 
appropriated to the three Trinitarian hypostases, giving a clear Islamic 
parallel to Christian belief; we shall see that this line was pursued by 
several Arabic Christian theologians. Or again, even if the names of the 
prioritised attributes be not taken into account, it could still be thought 
significant that they number three. Or at the most general, the suggestion 
that `life' be accorded some kind of primacy might point to Islamic 
recognition that some of the emergent constituents of divine plurality can 
be inferred from the quality of divine personality. Yet that recognition 
was not shared by all Muslims: the Ash'arite theory of attributes was at 
the time severely criticised from within the Islamic community. 
Criticising the Ash `arite theory: divine unity 
Writing four centuries after al-Ash`ari, the commentator al-Taftazäni 
identifies two groups who criticised his theory from a radical 
perspective2: 
Gimaret, p230, summarising the arguments of al-Bägilläni (TamhId 46), al-Juwaini (Irshäd 37), and 
others. 
2 On al-Taftäzäni, cf above, pp2l4ff. From a conservative direction, earlier criticisms of Ash`arism 
by Hanbalite traditionists had been given up by this time. For example, ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), 
explicitly approved al-Ash`ari's theory of the attributes (Michel, p21) - cf below, pp258,266. 
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The Philosophers and the Mu'tazilites denied this [the Ash'arite account of an 
eternally subsistent divine attribute of knowledge] and asserted that the attributes 
are the very essence itself. ' 
This conflation of the views of the practitioners of kaldm and of falsafäh 
must be treated with caution in historical terms, in that the two groups 
played quite different roles in the development of the debate over the 
attributes. We have seen that Ash'arism arose largely as a reaction to the 
Mu'tazilite denial of eternally subsistent attributes, which itself was 
derived from theological questions of the interpretation of the 
`anthropomorphic' expressions of the Qur'an. By contrast, philosophers 
such as ibn Sina and ibn Rushd drew on their inheritance of 
Aristotelianism to critique an already established Ash'arite theory; while 
orthodox theologians in turn replied to their arguments with further 
elaborations of their own views, 2 in terms of our interests the significance 
of this later phase of the debate lies in the way in which - in the guise of 
`Avicenna', `Averroes' and other Latinised identities - the philosophers' 
views came to influence Christian scholastic theology of the attributes in 
the west. 3 
In terms of logic employed, though, al-Taftäzani's linkage of Mu'tazilism 
and philosophy is surely justified, for the same two themes appear in 
both: a general claim that the Ash'arites' theology denies divine unity in a 
way that is contrary to the Islamic principle of unity, tawhId, and 
philosophically incoherent, and a specifically ad hominem argument that 
seeks to discredit their views by showing that they resemble, or are even 
derived from, those of Christians. We may identify both these criticisms 
I Sharh 70 - Elder, p50. 
2 Notably al-Ghazäli, whose Tahäfut al falsafryyah ('Incoherence of the Philosophers') was answered 
by ibn Rushd's Tahäfut al-Tahäfut ('Incoherence of the Incoherence'). 
3 Cf below, p269. Curiously, al-Ghazäli provided such a careful exposition of the views he was 
opposing that (as `Algazel') he was in the west assumed to be another of the `philosophers' - Copleston, p116. In Latin, these two texts were known respectively as the Destructio 
Philosophorum and the Destructio destructionis. 
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in the reports al-Taftäzäni gives of the views of `the Philosophers and the 
Mu'tazilites'. 
Thus, generally, the Ash`arite theory was attacked for implying `the 
existence of numerous eternal and necessarily existent beings'. ' This is an 
argument which goes back to the earliest Mu'tazilites - as-Shahrastäni 
describes how the founder of the school, Wäsil bin `Atä, explained his 
denial of the attributes in the following simple terms: 
It is universally agreed that the existence of two gods is impossible; so to assert the 
existence of an eternal entity (ma `nä), or an eternal attribute (sifa) [in God], would 
be to say that there are two gods. 
Al-Taftäzäni's responses to this line of criticism involve denying several 
of its presuppositions - that an eternally existent entity must be a god, that 
the attributes can be separated from the divine essence in which they 
subsist in such a way as to be rival candidates for divine status, that 
Islamic defence of tawhid must exclude any differentiation whatsoever 
within God. 3 The orthodox defence of the Ash'arite theory thus `reduces 
itself to an insistence upon a relative conception of the unity of God 
which does not exclude its being internally composed of real attributes 
which existed together from eternity and were never separated' .4 
What is never questioned, however, is the fundamental constraint of 
tawhid, which itself is built upon the principle of so-called `mutual 
hindrance (tamdnu `)'. This relies on a Qur'anic verse which states: 
If there were in them [heaven and earth] gods beside Allah, they would both have 
been in disorder. 5 
In distinction from other scriptural passages which simply contain divine 
self-assertions of uniqueness, 6 this verse adumbrates an appeal to reason 
I Sharh 70 - Elder, p50. 2 Milal 1- Kazi & Flynn, p43. 
3 Sharh 71-74 - Elder, pp5lff. 4 Wolfson, pp138f, discussing al-Ghazäli, Tahäfut V, 7. 
5 S. 21.22. 
6 E. g. SS. 3.18,16.51. 
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in pointing to the untenable consequences of belief in a multiplicity of 
gods. It was therefore able to become the basis of a tradition of argument, 
common to orthodox, Mu'tazilites and philosophers alike, of seeking to 
demonstrate the necessity of divine unicity by a reductio ad absurdum. l 
As this logic relies on the inevitability of conflict should several 
candidates to divinity be entertained, it well suits the fundamental 
impulse of Islam, which is to see monotheism in terms of a triumphant 
conclusion to a struggle between the one true and the many pretended 
gods. 2 
Criticising the Ash `arite theory: Christian parallels 
Muslims of all schools, sharing a common overall understanding of the 
necessity of the principle of divine unity, in this way disagreed amongst 
themselves over the application of that principle to the question of the 
divine attributes. A polemical way of expressing this disagreement 
frequently used by their opponents was to accuse the orthodox of falling 
into the same position of effective polytheism as that implied by Christian 
Trinitarianism. Thus al-Taftäzäni reports the anti-Ash'arite rebukes of the 
Mu'tazilites in the following terms: 
The Christians have become Unbelievers in establishing three eternal beings, so 
what is to be said of one who establishes eight or more? 3 
The orthodox response to such accusations on the level of argumentation 
was in general to undermine any claim that their theory imperilled divine 
unity through rival divinities by repeating the arguments outlined above 
denying any separation between the attributes; in particular they aimed to 
show the respects in which their theories differed from those of the 
Christians. We shall consider the latter point in more detail later when we 
The argument is carefully developed, for example, by the Mu'tazilite `Abd al-Jabbär - Peters, 
pp264ff. For its use in an orthodox context, cf al-Tatäzäni, Sharh 55 - Elder, pp37f. 2 Above, p62. 
Sharh 70 - Elder, p51. The `eight or more' may refer to the eight attributes recognised by the 
Mäturidites (above, p245n3), or to the seven of the Ash'arites plus the divine essence. 
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consider the work of those Arabic Christian theologians who sought to 
expound Trinitarian faith with reference to the Islamic theory of 
attributes. 1 It will be convenient at this point, however, to touch upon an 
issue distinct from, though related to, that of the conceptual parallels 
which can or cannot be discerned between theologies in the two faiths: 
namely, the historical question, whether the Ash'arite theory was in fact 
influenced in its genesis and development by Christian Trinitarianism. 
Michel Allard has pointed out that this question appears in very different 
contexts for medieval Muslims and for contemporary western scholars 
respectively. For the former, the purpose is `pour stigmatiser le caractere 
errone de certaines positions, que les theologiens accusent leurs 
adversaires de s'etre faits les disciples de courants de pensee non- 
musulmans'. 2 This observation shows the difficulty of any assessment in 
historical terms of either Mu'tazilite accusations or Ash'arite refutations 
of Christian influence, since both are motivated more by an instinct for 
polemic than by a concern for historical accuracy. `Orientalist' scholars, 
by contrast, looking for the provenance of the elaborate theory of 
attributes in an Islamic system with which it seems to be in tension, have 
naturally turned to relatively familiar patristic texts for an explanation. 
However, as Allard remarks, their theories also face serious difficulties: 
D'une part elles ne tiennent pas compte de la repugnance instinctive des 
theologiens musulmans pour toute We non-musulmane, et d'autre part leurs 
auteurs n'expliquent pas suffisamment les conditions concretes dans lesquelles se 
sont exercees ces influences. 3 
Although he does not specifically name him, Allard's second point would 
surely apply forcefully to the reasoning of Harry Wolfson, for example. 
Wolfson starts from a questionably formulated premise - namely: 
' Cf below, pp258ff. 
2 Allard, ppl53f. Equally, he shows that the Ash'arites polemically accused their Mu`tazilite 
opponents of being influenced by (pagan) Greek philosophy. 
3 Allard, p161. 
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If we are to assume, on the basis of what its opponents say about it, that the 
Muslim doctrine of attributes had its origin in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, 
we shall have to find some external evidence in support of that assumption. ' 
He then claims to find precisely such evidence both in the terminology 
used by Muslim authors to describe the attributes, and also in the identity 
of the members of various threefold lists of attributes which those authors 
quote. The former he claims as derivative from Trinitarian vocabulary; 
the latter he equates with Christian patterns of appropriating the 
hypostases of Father, Son, and Spirit. 2 Neither contention is plausible, 
however: we have seen above both how the language used to assert the 
entitative nature of the sifdt is explicable in terms of an Islamic 
background (ultimately, that of Arabic grammar), and also how the 
formulation of threefold lists of attributes was a secondary activity in 
Islamic theology, derived from originally more fluid patterns of 
enumeration. We must conclude that, for all its ingenuity, Wolfson's 
account of a decisive formative influence on the Ash'arite doctrine from 
Christian Trinitarian theology is unproven; and the same can be said for 
other theories of the same kind. 
However, the improbability of historical Christian influence of this kind 
surely makes all the more interesting the two remaining possibilities: 
first, that, independently of actual borrowing, Islamic thought about 
divine plenitude came to resemble Trinitarianism in significant ways 
because of the inherent logic of both systems; and second, that Christians 
were themselves able to use the Islamic theories as a starting-point for 
expounding their own Trinitarian theology. The latter possibility will lead 
us in the next section of this chapter to explore the achievements and 
limitations of medieval Trinitarian dialogue regarding the attributes. First, 
though, we evaluate Ash'arism in terms of the former hypothesis, asking 
Wolfson, p113. 
2 Ibid., pp 114-122. Wolfson goes onto trace the origins of the appropriations to later Neoplatonism. 
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butes we have described above meets our 
the continuing influence of Ash'arite 
will be significant for contemporary 
Evaluating Ash `arisen as a trinitarian problem 
We have shown above that Ash'arism in a real sense accepts a certain 
plurality subsistent in the divine. This is demonstrated by its insistence 
on the entitative status of the attributes, by its refusal simply to identify 
them with either the divine essence or one another, and by its resistance 
to the Mu'tazilite project of reducing all theological predications to the 
level of figurative language applied to an ultimately simple monad. Of 
course, the Ash'arites share with other Muslims an instinctive aversion to 
any open recognition of plurality in the context of the divine, yet there 
can be little doubt that the logic of their system points to a genuine 
differentiation within the ontological structure of God. Meanwhile, the 
Islamic form of monotheism as denial of rival candidates for divinity is 
satisfied in Ash'arism by interpreting the attributes as subsistent in the 
divine essence, rather than as separable from or external to (ghayr) God. 
As regards personality, we must recall al-Ash`an's argument for the 
non-identity of the attributes with the divine essence. This relies on the 
impossibility of the attributes themselves becoming either the subjects of 
predication or the objects of prayer or address. Such a restriction, though 
couched in grammatical terms, clearly excludes the ascription of any 
personal or hypostatic character to them. At the same time, this restriction 
to non-personal status is imposed precisely in order to safeguard the 
overall personality of God Himself as one to whom predicates, prayer and 
address may be applied -a principle further underlined by the positing of 
Above, pp9f. 
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`life' as the primary divine attribute. In other words, personality must be 
ascribed to the ensemble consisting of the divine essence and attributes, 
but cannot be identified with any one of that ensemble's component 
parts. ' It is not difficult to see here parallels with some formulations of 
the Latin tradition of Trinitarian doctrine, where `personality' similarly is 
most obviously a feature of the one God, explicated in terms of an 
internal or `psychological' differentiation. 2 
The attributes in the Ash'arite system cannot be straightforwardly 
enumerated in terms of threeness. The argument correlating them with 
the divine names points to their being equal in number to the latter, 
whether these are counted as ninety-nine or as infinite; even when a fixed 
list of standard attributes does emerge in Islamic orthodoxy, it generally 
has seven3 members. However, we have also seen a tendency in later 
Ash`arism to identify three of these as in some way logically prior to the 
others. The later theologians did not mean to imply by this that these 
three were of a different ontological rank to the other four; nevertheless, 
they did provide a suggestive possibility of correlation with the hypostatic 
threeness of Christianity. 
The same considerations, on the other hand, show that the criterion of 
equality can be successfully applied to the attributes. Indeed, a central 
tenet of the Ash'arite theological position was its resistance to the 
Mu`tazilite programme of successively reducing the number of attributes 
by decomposing some into others until eventually one (e. g. `eternity') 
could be accorded a status generative of the others. The Ash'arites 
There is something of an ambiguity in this respect regarding the status of the divine essence. Al- 
Ash`ari's argument would imply that the essence is personal, and in so far as `essence' has the 
sense of nafs, 'self, this indeed appears to be so (cf above, p240n5). Later, however - for example in the Sufi adaptation of Ash`aritc theology (cf below, pp280fl) - the technical expression for 'essence', dhat, was distinguished from the attributes precisely by its impersonality. 2 Cf above, ppl67f, on Augustine. 
Or sometimes eight - cf above, p245n3 for Baghdadi and also for the Maturidites. 
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refused such a hierarchical arrangement: the attributes in their theory are 
co-equal. The Mu'tazilite project of decomposition was both de- 
ontologised and curtailed so that it became simply a matter of identifying 
chains of logical derivation from three of the sifdt. 
The necessity within the Ash'arite theory of the plurality generated by 
the attributes follows from the arguments by which its theologians 
defended both those attributes' entitative reality and their eternity. The 
former rely on analyses of the Arabic language, believed to mirror in its 
grammatical patterns the underlying structures of reality. The latter stress 
the impossibility of conceiving God as at any time unendowed with his 
essential attributes or as at some time changing to receive them for the 
first time. In both cases, the very possibility of coherent theological 
language is held to depend upon a plurality of attributes; it is in this sense 
that attributional plurality in the divine can be said to be a necessity. 
Finally, immanence is not a characteristic which can be unambiguously 
applied to the Ash`arite theory, in that attributional plurality is not 
definitely affirmed as a marker of divinity at its ultimate level. It is true 
that the attributes are held to subsist in God's essence, and their necessity 
implies that that essence is inconceivable without them; nevertheless, the 
strong emphasis that they are 16 huwa, `not Him', points to an essential 
level of divine existence, albeit inexpressible in any predicates, which 
transcends their subsistence. The most that we can say is, that 
attributional plurality characterises any aspect of the divine life of which 
we can speak coherently; but this then does not rule out a remainder of 
undifferentiated unity which, inaccessible to reason, could be susceptible 
of direct experience in other ways. ' 
It is of course the claim of Sufism to provide just such experience of ultimate unity through 
methods which begin from the plurality of attributes but transcend this to reach the ineffable 
simplicity of the divine essence - cf below, pp280f 
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Summarising the above survey, we see that, while plurality, equality and 
necessity are to be found in the Ash'arite theory of attributes, personality 
and threeness are not, while immanence is questionable. What scope does 
this give for Ash'arism to serve as a resource for Trinitarian dialogue? 
Evaluating Ash `arisen as a Trinitarian resource 
In a recent dialogue with John Hick, the Muslim scholar Muzammil 
Siddiqi reiterates Muslim criticisms of the Trinity in opposing Hick's 
attempt to reinterpret the doctrine through `grouping the ninety-nine 
names [of God] in three columns corresponding approximately to the 
three trinitarian names'. ' Like Hick's reinterpretation, Siddiqi's 
arguments presuppose a basically Ash'arite position, and his criticisms 
are in fact directed against those trinitarian characteristics we have 
identified as problematic from such a point of view; he draws on a wealth 
of Islamic tradition to make his case. 
Thus, to counter any suggestion of a personal status for the attributes, he 
repeats one of the arguments used by al-Ash`ar"i against Abu`1-Hudhail: 
Even in prayer one is not allowed to address the attributes (sifät) but the attributed 
being (mawsuf). Thus it is not allowed in Islam to say in prayer, `0 Life of God! 
Save me', or `0 Merciful! Help me'. This will show the major difference between 
Islamic attributes and Christian Trinity. 2 
In denying any special significance to the number three, Siddiqi draws on 
his personal experience of Christian apologetic: 
I am reminded of a story that I was told by a Christian evangelist. He said that a 
man was very doubtful of the Trinity and kept on arguing against it the whole day. 
At night while asleep he saw in his dream three strings over his head. As he looked 
upwards he saw all of them connected to one rope hanging down from the heaven. 
He woke up confessing the Trinity. I said to my evangelist friend, `Suppose he had 
seen four or five strings over his head what would have been his belief? i3 
Hick (1989), p201. 
2 Siddiqi, p213 - cf al-Ash`ari, Ibänah XI (above, p24in1). 
3 Ibid., p212. Similarly, Siddiqi asserts that `It is unbecoming of God that his modes, names and 
attributes are limited only to three', and quotes the anti-Christian polemicist Ismä11 al-FariIgi: `The 
Christian may not claim that the Trinity is a way of talking about God; because if the Trinity 
discloses the nature of God better than unity a greater plurality would do the job better' (ibid., p69). 
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In allowing that the Trinity may have some value as a `hidden affirmation 
of Divine Unity', but only if its claims to immanence are denied, he 
quotes from a poem by Hätif, a nineteenth-century Persian Sufi, in which 
a Christian girl responds to the poet's criticisms of her Trinitarian faith: 
She parted her sweet lips and said to me: `If thou art aware of the secret of the 
Divine Unity, do not cast on us the stigma of infidelity! In three mirrors the Eternal 
Beauty cast a ray from His effulgent countenance' ... While we were thus 
speaking, the chant rose up beside us from the church-bell: `He is One and there is 
naught but He; there is no god save Him alone! " 
Such a range of illustrative material demonstrates how seriously Muslims 
continue to take the suggestion that the orthodox Islamic doctrine of the 
attributes provides a parallel to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. We 
shall return to the contemporary implications of this for Trinitarian 
dialogue in our final chapter; first, though, we must examine the 
corresponding medieval Christian views of the subject. 
Here we find a sharp dichotomy. On one hand, in the Latin west the 
leading scholastics made no connection between Trinity and divine 
attributes. 2 On the other hand, the tradition of eastern theology has 
different resources to explore: in medieval Arabic Christianity, a 
sustained effort was made to expound an authentically orthodox 
Trinitarianism within the context of Ash'arite attributionism. It is to this 
Christian project that we must now turn, focusing especially on the 
twelfth-century writer Paul of Antioch, who summed up a long tradition 
of Arabic Trinitarian theology. 3 
Ibid., p71, quoting from the translation by EG Browne. Hätif was writing in the context of the city 
of Isfahan, where many Armenian Christians lived just across the Zayanderud River from the 
Muslim quarters - Nasr (1986), p9, who also points out the similarly sympathetic treatment of 
Christian Trinitarianism in ibn `Arabi (below, pp280ü), also derived from a background of 
Christian-Muslim coexistence, in medieval Andalucia. 
2 See below, pp268ff, on St Thomas. For marginal exceptions, cf above, p 181 and n6. 
Siddiqi does mention Paul (p212), but appears (wrongly) simply to group his theology with Hick's. 
Whereas Hick's listing of three sets of attributes appears to be a thinly disguised modalist 
unitarianism, we shall see that Paul, like his predecessors, engaged seriously with the hypostatic 
status to be given to the divine names if they were to function in Trinitarian theology - cf below, 
pp258ff. 
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(b) Attributes and Trinity in Arabic Christianity 
One of the most enduring works of Christian Arabic apologetic directed 
to Muslims was the Letter to a Muslim (Risala ila Ahad al Muslimin) of 
Paul of Antioch, also known as `Paul the monk', the Melchite Bishop of 
Saida in the twelfth century. ' Paul's Letter was taken very seriously by 
Muslims, and provoked several responses, in particular from his 
contemporary Ahmad al-Qarafi2 and later from the fourteenth-century 
Hanbalite controversialist Ahmad ibn Taymiyya. 3 The perceived 
influence of Paul's work can be gauged from the latter's comment: 
This book is the basic support on which their scholars depend, both in our time and 
in previous ages, although some of them may elaborate further than others 
depending on their situations. 4 
Paul in his turn was dependent on a tradition of Arabic Christian theology 
reaching back ultimately to St John of Damascus through figures like 
Elias of Nisibis (975-1043), Yahya ibn `Adi (d. 974), and `Abd al-Masih 
al-Kindi (9th century). 5 He sums up a heritage of Christian thought which 
has a sophisticated and dialogically significant apologetic, particularly in 
the area of Trinitarian doctrine, 6 yet which is little known in a wider 
theological context. 7 We shall present key themes through a text from 
Paul before appraising this tradition as a resource for Trinitarian dialogue. 
Quotations are those cited by Michel of the fragments embedded in the text of ibn Taymiyya's 
reply. A reconstruction of Paul's text was edited in: Paul Khoury - Paul d'Antioche (Beirut, 1964); 
the paragraph numbers given below are those from Khoury's text. Cf also Siddiqi (1986). 
Z Kung, p114, briefly discusses this, the al-Ajwiba al-Fakhira `an a! As`ila al-Fajira (Excellent 
Answers to Shameful Questions), which he describes as the `standard Islamic rebuttal to 
Christianity, continually referred to in the following centuries'. 
Al-Jawab al-Sahih li-Man Baddal Din al-Masih (The Correct Answer to Those Who Changed the 
Religion of Christ) - cf further below, p266; also, above, p210n5. 
4 Michel, p93, 
5 These are key figures selected by Samir (1994) as representatives of the second, third and fourth 
phases of his periodisation of Arabic apologetics - the first being found in John's immediate 
successors Theodore Abo Qurra and the author of F tatlItAlldh al-wahid (above, pp183f). 
6 Samir (1994), p111n237, points out that even in the second phase of his periodisation, when 
`biblical and homiletical' motifs dominated, treatises on the Trinity tended to a philosophical style. 
For example, a standard and fairly comprehensive account of the history of Trinitarian thought does 
not once mention Arabic theologians, and refers to John of Damascus just as `the last great 
representative of Greek theology' - Fortman, p90. 
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Paul of Antioch: establishing the Trinity 
After a long passage defending the Christian scriptures from Muslim 
allegations of textual corruption, Paul's Letter abruptly moves to an 
apologetic for the doctrine of the Trinity through an argument drawn 
from reflection on the nature of created beings: 
If they [Muslims] really understood that by this belief of ours we mean that God is 
some thing living and speaking then they would not reject our holding it. We, 0 
Christians, when we see things coming into being in time, know that something not 
created in time has brought them into being, since their temporal creation from 
their own essences involves a contradiction. We see that created things are divided 
into two groups: living and non-living things. In reference to these two classes we 
describe Him as a living thing in order to deny any death to Him. We see living 
things divided into two groups: speaking and non-speaking living things. We 
describe Him by the higher of the two categories, and say that He is a thing living 
and speaking in order to deny any ignorance to Him. The three names thus signify 
that the one God who is called one Lord and one Creator is a living, speaking thing 
- that is, essence, speech, and life. 
' 
The core of this argument repeats that which we saw earlier, first in John 
of Damascus and then repeated by Muslim mutakallimün, to establish the 
eternity of the divine Word: 2 God must be endowed with the attribute of 
speech since otherwise He would be likened to the lower, dumb or 
irrational, parts of creation. Parallel reasoning is used to establish the 
divine essence and divine life. These three `names' will then provide the 
basis for Paul's Trinitarian doctrine. It is striking that Paul expands this 
core argument - which in John related solely to the eternal aspect of 
divinity - so that all three lines of reasoning begin from the observable 
structure of the created world. This might lead us to believe that his text 
is trying to prove the doctrine of the Trinity as a proposition of natural 
theology. The plausibility of such a reading would be strengthened when 
we recognise the similarity of Paul's argument to the tripartite schema of 
later Neoplatonism which arranged reality in widening concentric circles 
Khoury, paras 26-29 (Michel, p255). The Arabic word translated `speech' is nutq, which also 
conveys the sense of `rationality', as it is generally used in Arabic theology to represent ; dyos - cf 
also Samir (1979), p36, on Elias of Nisibis. 
2 Above, p219. 
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of intelligent beings, living beings, and beings as such. ' Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the Arabic Christian presentation of the Trinity in 
terms of attributes can be explained historically as the incorporation into 
theology of this philosophical method as a rationally accessible proof. 2 
However, while there are undoubted resonances with Neoplatonism, 
Paul's arguments cannot really be understood in this way. The historical 
evidence suggests that, rather than being influenced significantly by 
Proclus, Paul continues and develops the Arabic theological tradition 
which reaches back to John of Damascus through Elias of Nisibis and 
others; 3 and we have seen that John's argument essentially arises from the 
exigencies of his dialogue with Muslims rather than from philosophical 
borrowing. 4 Moreover, Paul himself goes on to insist on the importance 
of scriptural authorisation: 
We have not invented these names for God of ourselves, 0 Christians, but God has 
called His divine nature by them. God spoke in the Torah. Our master Christ spoke 
thus in the Gospel. In the Qur'an it speaks of the Holy Spirit. 5 
This last sentence shows also the importance for Paul of making his 
theology cohere with Islamic thought in so far as that is possible. Indeed, 
not only does he several times appeal directly to the support of the 
Qur' än; 6 he also presents his Trinitarian doctrine in such a way that it 
relates to the Ash'arite theory outlined above through introducing the idea 
of `substantival attributes'. 
Cf above, p138 on Proclus, and the parallels drawn there with Origen. However, there is no clear 
indication of concentricity as such in Paul's discussion. 
2 Wolfson, pp122ff. 
The key link proposed in Wolfson's philosophical transmission is Yahyä ibn `Adi, but his theology 
of the Trinity in fact stands aside a little from the main line of Arabic theology in its extremely 
philosophical character - cf Platti (1994), p 190, and further below, p264n3. 
Above, p199. Swanson, pl05n33, remarks of the Disputatio that `his [John's] argument that God 
cannot be without a Word and a Spirit should not be taken as a "proof' in the strict sense of the 
word, but is rather a (not entirely convincing) attempt directed especially to those who do not 
accept the witness of scripture'. 
Khoury, pars 30 - Michel, p273. Paul goes on to cite Mt 28.19-20 as scriptural warrant for the 
identification of the three attributes with the Trinitarian personae. 
6 Al-Qarafi describes Paul's Letter as `containing argumentation from the Qur'än for the truth of 
Christianity'. 
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Paul of Antioch: substantival attributes 
Having established the three divine `names' of essence, speech, and life, 
the next step in Paul's argument is to identify these with the three Persons 
of the Christian Trinity: 
The essence we hold to be the Father who is the source of the other two. The 
speech is the Son who is born from the Father in the manner of the birth of speech 
from the intellect. The life is the Holy Spirit. 
Muslims say that the Qur'an is the speech of God. But there is no speech unless 
there is someone living and speaking. These are substantival attributes (as-sifät al- 
jawhariyya) flowing in [an infinite] succession of names. Each attribute is different 
from the other, but God is one, one creator, one Lord, undivided. ' 
The main point which Paul is making here is clear: that a Trinitarian 
understanding of God coheres with the Ash'arite theory of the divine 
attributes, in that each of the Trinitarian hypostases can be seen as distinct 
from the others without imperilling the divine unity. Moreover, in the 
second paragraph quoted we see that he also makes reference to the 
orthodox kaläm theology of the Qur'an as the uncreated Word of God. 
Thus his apologetic for the Trinity is designed to intersect at two points 
with positions reached by Muslims through their own internal debates. 
A complicating factor is that, of the three divine realities which Paul 
correlates with the Trinitarian Persons, one is not, in Islamic thought, an 
attribute (sifa); namely, the divine essence (dhdt), which for al-Ash` arII is 
rather the substrate within which the attributes subsist, and with respect to 
which they exhibit a relationship of inseparable but irreducible non- 
identity. 2 Paul, however, follows Elias of Nisibis both in counting dhät - 
here to be interpreted as the divine `existence' 3- as an attribute and in 
using the term jawhar (generally translated `substance') to refer to that 
' Khoury, paras 30,32 - Michel, pp266,279.1 have altered Michel's translation of as-sifat a! - 
jawhariyya from `essential' to `substantival' attributes, to avoid confusion with the Mu'tazilite 
expression sifdt adh-dhdt (above, p239), and to correspond to Michel's own usage in his 
introductory essay `The Theology of Ibn Taymiyya and His Critique of Christianity' (Michel, p91). 
2 Above, pp239ff. 
3 Al-Juwaini (Irshdd, p28) in fact reports that the reality identified by Christians with the hypostasis 
of the Father is precisely `existence (wujüd)' - Wolfson, ppl2lf. 
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aspect of God which is the bearer of the divine unity. ' Indeed, Paul 
argues forcibly for the legitimacy of applying `substance' language to 
God, a move which had been severely criticised by earlier Ash'arite 
theologians such as al-Bägilläni. 2 This enables him to describe the 
`names' corresponding to the Trinitarian Persons as `substantival 
attributes' (as-sifdt al-jawhariyya), and to understand by this a relation 
between these Persons and the divine substance (jawhar) which broadly 
parallels that recognised in Ash'arite theology between the attributes and 
the divine essence (dhdt). 
The importance of such a parallel for Christian apologetics was twofold. 
On one hand, Christians could hope that it presented an explanation of 
Trinitarian belief which was intelligible and accessible to Muslims. Paul 
expressed this hope as follows: 
If they really understood that by this belief of ours we mean that God is some thing 
living and speaking, then they would not reject our holding it. 3 
On the other hand, and equally importantly, they were provided with a 
defence against Islamic accusations of polytheism, in that they could 
point to an acknowledgement by orthodox Muslims of a diversity within 
the divine equivalent to their own confession of Trinitarian plurality. 4 
This line of defence is succinctly expressed by Emilio Platti: 
Il n'est pas irraisonnable d'admettre la Trinite, c'est ä dire une certaine multiplicite 
en Dieu, puisque ces gens eux-memes acceptent certains attributs divins. 5 
Elias, paras 140-159: Samir (1979), pp88-93. Samir's title for paras 142-146, `Verbe et Esprit de 
Dieu sont deux substances' is thus surprisingly misleading, and would be better expressed: `deux 
[realites] substantiels' - he himself (p88n9) criticises Cheikho for precisely this misunderstanding. 2 Khoury, paras 55ff, discussed by Michel, pp92f. On al-Bägilläni's criticisms, cf Haddad, pp87f. 
3 Khoury, para 26 - Michel, p255. 
This point is not explicitly developed by Paul in relation to the status of the attributes, though he 
does argue in exactly the same way with respect to the closely related question of the interpretation 
of `anthropomorphic' Qur'änic attributions like the istawä verse (above, pp1871): `If they compel 
us to conclude by holding shirk and tashbih because of our view that God is one substance and 
three hypostases ... then we can make them 
logically conclude by affirming materialisation 
(tajassum) and anthropomorphisation (tashbih) for saying that God has two eyes, a face, a leg, and 
a side, that He sits upon the throne ... 
' - Khoury, pars 54 (discussed by Michel, p92). Elias of 
Nisibis, paras 130-134, explicitly justifies the monotheism of Christian Trinitarianism by 
comparing it to the Sunni belief in seven attributes - Samir (1979), pp84-87. 
5 Platti (1983), p112, summarising the exactly similar arguments of Yahyä ibn `Adi. 
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Paul of Antioch: hypostatic distinctions 
If presenting Trinitarianism in terms of divine attributes allowed the 
Arabic theologians a defence against Islamic accusations of polytheism, 
we must also ask if this apologetic strategy did not on the other hand run 
the risk of distorting the Christian understanding through adapting it to a 
somewhat alien frame of reference. Two dangers in particular would 
seem to be present here: modalism and subordinationism. The former is 
suggested by a commonly-used analogy which justifies a triplicity of 
personae by comparing it to the performance of three different roles by 
one man: `Zayd the doctor, the accountant, the writer'! t Taken on its own, 
this certainly points to a reduction of the Trinitarian differentiation to 
merely external appearances. Meanwhile, the possibility of a certain 
subordinationism is surely present in the identification of the Father with 
the divine essence (dhdt), which, even if counted in some way an 
`attribute' through its distinction from `substance' (jawhar), seems to be 
of a higher status than the other hypostatic attributes of speech and life. 
Before concluding that the Arabic theologians fell into either or both of 
these dangers, we must consider the technical term they used to refer to 
the three hypostases. Paul himself uses the ontologically neutral 
expression `names (asmä')', but it is understandable that ibn Taymiyya in 
his reply should address his criticism to the technical term agnüm (or, 
equivalently, qunlim; plural agänim). 2 This is used throughout Arabic 
Christian theology for `hypostasis', and is undoubtedly the concept which 
lies behind Paul's theology also. 
This analogy is especially frequent in Yahyä ibn `Adi - Platt i (1994), p176n13, quotes the 
exasperated comment of Augustin Pdrier: `Et noun sommes condamnes ä entendre encore une fois 
l'inevitable comparaison de Zkid qui revient bien une centaine de fois'. The point of the comparison 
is merely to establish the possibility of triplicity, there is no attempt to associate each of Zaid's 
roles with specific personae or attributes. 
2 Michel, p263. 
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Agnüm is an important but obscure word; broadly, three lexical 
backgrounds have been proposed to elucidate its meaning. ' The first two 
derive it from the Greek yvtluq, `something known'. 2 If, first, this is 
taken in the sense of `that which is manifest', then agnüm would have a 
meaning something like the original meaning of rrpöoMrov, the external 
face or even mask which a reality presents. This would clearly suggest 
that the agänim were being identified with the attributes (sifät) in a purely 
Sabellian fashion. 3 An alternative derivation understands the agnüm 
usage to originate in the application of yvo pr, particularly to the 
hypostasis of the Son as the `thought' or `thing known' issuing from the 
Father, the background to such thought lying in Stoic ideas of the 
generation of the aöyos. This in turn might suggest a subordinating 
account of the second hypostasis, and so also of the third. 
However, the likelihood is that neither of these explanations is decisive 
for either the background or the meaning of agnüm, which rather derives 
not from the Greek yvu prrq but from the Syriac gnümd, with the sense of 
an `individual essence existing in its particular being', and which from a 
fairly early time came to be used with `only one application, i. e., for the 
4 Person of Christ or for the Persons of the Holy Trinity' . 
So agnüm in fact 
points strongly to real differentiation between the Trinitarian hypostases, 
with neither the subordinationist nor the modalist associations suggested 
by the derivation from yv&'pq. At the same time, the term's distinctively 
Christian provenance limited its appeal in dialogue with Muslims. 
In what follows, I follow the conclusions of Sweetman's detailed arguments (Sweetman, 1/2, 
pp225ff). Cf Platti (1983), p84 for an endorsement of Sweetman. 
2 This derivation is reported by ibn Taymiyya: `this [agnrm] is a term which they [the Christians] 
have invented, and it is said to be "Roman"' (Michel, p264 - `Roman' in medieval Islamic writing 
often refers to Byzantium, and so to Greece). This assertion appears to be uncritically accepted by 
Michel - ibid., p427n6. 3 Platti (1983), pp8Off points out that Yahyä ibn `Adi in fact often seems simply to identify sifat, 
agdnfm, and jawhar in God, which perhaps suggests Sabellian tendencies. However, Yahyä's 
Trinitarian theology is not entirely typical of the Arabic tradition. 
4 Sweetman, 1/2, pp226,236. 
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Paul ofAntioch: Trinitarian resources and problems 
In evaluating the Trinitarian contribution of Paul of Antioch, seen as a 
representative figure of the Arabic Christian tradition, we may first 
consider our checklist of six trinitarian criteria, ' before going on to 
appraise the usefulness of this type of theology as a dialogical resource. 
Paul maintains a real sense of plurality within his account of the Trinity, 
in the face of strong Islamic criticisms of alleged polytheism on the part 
of Christians. He is enabled to withstand this criticism through the 
correlation which he establishes between the Trinitarian hypostases and 
the differentiation of attributes as recognised by orthodox Muslims. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see to what degree the constituent 
elements of this plurality are marked by personality. The identification 
of the hypostases with more or less abstract divine attributes inevitably 
weakens their character as active subjects. In this respect the Arabic 
aqc nIm could perhaps be likened to the personae of Augustine's 
theology, with their psychological analogues; in both systems, personality 
is most readily understood as something marking the triad as a whole. 
The desire to identify his apologetic presentation with the biblical 
revelation of Father, Son and Spirit of course means that threeness is a 
marker of Paul's Trinitarian theology. However, there seems to be no 
inherent structural reason, other than this scriptural constraint, why Paul's 
method should be limited to the hypostatisation of precisely three 
attributes and no more - particularly as we have seen that parallels which 
can be drawn with Neoplatonist triadic arguments are probably largely 
fortuitous. In fact, Muslim critics of this apologetic method consistently 
objected that the restriction to three was quite arbitrary: 
1 Above, pp9f. 
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Since the names of God are many, such as the Loving, the Powerful, and others, to 
limit them to three without the others is wrong. ' 
This is not to deny that Muslims themselves sometimes singled out three 
attributes as particularly significant; but these three were not considered 
to be ontologically distinct from the other attributes in the sense of being 
uniquely capable of hypostatisation. 2 
As to equality between the hypostases, we have seen that the 
identification of the Father with the divine `essence' could be taken to 
have subordinationist tendencies. However, the basic structure was 
clearly designed to mirror the Ash` ante theory of different but equal 
attributes; Paul seems to have felt that the differentiation of `substance' 
(jawhar) from `essence' (dhdt) would entitle him to treat the latter as 
another attribute, thus ensuring at least formal equality of the Persons. 
Paul's argument for the Trinity makes a strong claim for the necessity of 
his theory - so much so, indeed, that it could at first sight be taken for an 
attempt at a rational proof of the doctrine. Although we showed that such 
a reading would misconstrue his purpose, it remains true that he believes 
a Trinitarian structure to the divine to be the inescapable result of 
reflection on the nature of creation in the light of scriptural revelation. 
The immanence of Trinitarian diversity in Arabic Christianity could be 
questioned in the light of many of its theologians' enthusiasm for 
apparently modalist analogies. However, our consideration of the key 
concept of agnüm suggested that in fact this should be probably be taken 
to indicate a real diversification of the divine substance through its 
presentation in different subsistent realities. In this respect, the Christian 
theory goes beyond the Ash'arite system which it in other ways parallels. 
Ibn Taymiyya - Michel, p267. Cf also Haddad, p89, describing the similar polemic of al-Bägilläni: 
`Why not two, he asks, or four or fourteen or fifteen? ' 
2 Michel, p427n2 even cites a passage from another work of ibn Taymiyya himself identifying three 
divine `attributes of perfection'. Cf above, pp246f. 
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While the combative reaction of Muslim polemicists to Paul's Letter is 
perhaps understandable, it is more surprising to see how critical some 
Christian writers have been of the Arabic theologians' Trinitarian 
apologetic. Hans Kung, for example, is wholly dismissive: 
The Christians attacked by shrewd Muslim critics presumably got little help from 
the sort of arguments we hear, for example, from Paulus ar-Rahib ['the monk']. ' 
Better informed but equally hostile is Sweetman, who warns of the 
`danger of the obscuration of the personal by the metaphysical and 
abstract in some attempts to explain the Trinity', and denounces the 
arguments of Elias of Nisibis as `vicious' for proceeding from `rational 
assumptions' in a vain attempt to `prove revelation'. Rather, he asserts: 
It is only accidentally that Christian doctrine has any concern with a logical or 
conceptual trinity. 2 
Quite apart from the fact that this statement immediately undermines any 
effort to discover Trinitarian resources for dialogue, we have seen that 
comments like those above are unfair as an assessment of the Arabic 
theologians' apologetic venture. That venture was a serious effort to 
commend the Christian vision of God as Trinity, both through rational 
arguments which could be accessible to all, and through dialogue with the 
Islamic theology of divine attributes. The failure of Arabic theology to 
deliver a wholly convincing and coherent system was as much a result of 
an unpropitious context as of inherent flaws in its approach: 
Apologetics involves a movement away from a faith's own ground, away from its 
reservoirs of language and narrative and practice ... The apologetically 
formulated 
triad ... could well 
have served as an opening move in an ongoing discussion. 3 
Unfortunately, despite the overtures of the Arabic theologians, no such 
ongoing discussion developed. The Latin West, by contrast, did not even 
try to correlate Trinitarianism with natural and dialogical theology. 
' King, p114. 
2 Sweetman, 112, pp225ff. 
3 Swanson, P100. His comments relate to the ninth-century text Kitdb al-Burhän, to which also ibn 
Taymiyya replied in the al-Jawdb al-Sahfh; but they are equally applicable to Paul's Letter. 
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(c) Attributes and Trinity in Latin Christianity 
During the twelfth and thirteenth century, a dominant trend in Latin 
scholasticism was to draw an increasingly sharp demarcation between 
those aspects of theology which were in principle accessible to natural 
reason and those which could only be grasped through faith in divine 
revelation. The theory of divine attributes was generally placed within the 
former category, and the doctrine of the Trinity within the latter. ' The 
degree to which this effected a separation between these two sources of 
plenitudinal motifs, and the sense of disengagement from Trinitarian 
dialogue to which this led, can be seen through a brief consideration of 
the treatment of the two questions given by St Thomas Aquinas. 
Names and attributes: St Thomas and Maimonides 
The technical term `attribute (attributum)' seems to have entered the 
Latin theological lexicon through an early thirteenth-century translation 
of the Jewish polymath Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed (Doctor 
Perplexorum), in which it translated the Arabic sifäh. 2 St Thomas knows 
the term, but generally prefers to use the more traditional word `name 
(nomen)', which corresponds exactly to the Arabic ism. 3 Nevertheless, the 
debate within Islam over the correct interpretation of sifät forms one of 
two important backgrounds for understanding what St Thomas has to say 
concerning the `names of God'; 4 the issues in this debate were mediated 
to him through the opinions of Maimonides. 5 
Cf above, p181n6, for some exceptions to this general trend. 
Z Wolfson, pp349-355. 
3 Elders, p145: `he refrained from using it (attributum) except on a few occasions to distinguish what 
is said of divine essence from what is proper to each of the divine Persons'. On this, cf below, p275. 
4 St Thomas' best-known treatment of the theme is in the Summa Theologiae - Ia 13 is a treatise De 
nominibus Dei. However, fuller discussions are found in the Commentary on the Sentences [of 
Peter Lombard], and in De Potentia, q7: De Divina Simplicitate. The early Commentary on the De 
Divinibus Nominibus [of Ps-DionysiusJ was important in the formation of his thought, and later he 
returned to some of the questions in the Commentary on the Book of Causes. 
5 St Thomas' direct awareness of the views of the mutakallimtln was very limited - cf above, p181n4. 
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Maimonides in the early chapters of the Guide engages with the Islamic 
debate over the status of the attributes. ' By the twelfth century when he 
wrote, the Mu'tazilite rejection in the name of tawhid of subsistent divine 
attributes had been taken up and developed by the philosophers ibn Sina 
and ibn Rushd, known to St Thomas as Avicenna and Averroes 
respectively. The orthodox Islamic mutakallimün opposing them from an 
Ash'arite position relied, as we have seen, on the formula that really 
subsistent attributes, neither identical to nor separate from the divine 
essence, were to be found in God. 2 Maimonides himself emphatically 
adopts the philosophical position, ridiculing the Ash'arites: 
Some people engaged in speculation have ended up by saying that the attributes of 
God are neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence ... such things 
are merely said. 3 
Rather, he insists that the starting-point for any interpretation of the 
attributes must be the unity of God, who is `one simple substance, 
without any composition or plurality of elements' .4 He concludes that, to 
safeguard this simplicity, the attributes must be interpreted in a purely 
negative sense - so that, for example, God's `goodness' means just that 
5 `He is not evil'. 
St Thomas considers Maimonides' proposed reduction of all divine 
predicates to negations, but rejects it in favour of the interpretation that 
the divine names apply to God substantialiter - they `express something 
Ben-Shammai, pp131f, draws attention to the tradition of Jewish mutakallimün before Maimonides 
who like him adopted a position on the attributes close to that of Mu'tazilism. Questioning why 
Jews should have become involved in an infra-Islamic debate in this way, he points out that writers 
such as Saadia saw their polemic as directed primarily against the allegedly anthropomorphic and 
polytheistic tendencies of Christianity; however, he also allows that there may have been an 
otherwise unknown school of `Jewish Ash'ariyya' against whom the mutakallimün were arguing. 
Z Cf above; pp241,248. 
3 Pines: Guide, 1.51. 
4 Ibid. Dienstag, pxxi recognises the congruence of this with Averroes' teaching in the Tahafüt 
(Destructio), but observes that there is no actual evidence that Maimonides had access to Averroes' 
writings. However, he also shows that Maimonides' teaching is `in conformity with the teaching of 
Avicenna' (ibid., pxxiii). 
5 Pines: Guide, 1.58. 
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of what he is'. ' He is enabled to do this through his theory of analogical 
predication, which involves the application of words to creatures in a way 
`somewhere between pure equivocation and simple univocity', and which 
has the consequence that all predicates, though made in the category of 
substance, fail adequately to represent what God is. 2 
However, we cannot immediately conclude from this that St Thomas, in 
his opposition to Maimonides' method, effectively aligns himself with the 
Ash'arites in his interpretation of the attributes. The contrast between the 
Thomist and Maimonidean theories was not so definite as that between 
attributism and anti-attributism in the Islamic context, 3 and St Thomas 
held to divine unity and simplicity at least as strongly as Maimonides: 
Both philosophers stress the absolute oneness of God, and they describe this 
oneness in very similar terms. In particular, God is not to be conceived as a 
substance in which attributes inhere ... 
Aquinas' doctrine of analog1 must be read 
in the light of the introduction to his discussion of divine simplicity. 
Before asking to what extent that doctrine of analogy in fact enabled St 
Thomas to posit any genuine sense of plenitudinal diversity within the 
divine simplicity, it will therefore be helpful to look briefly at the 
historical background to his theory of simplicity, and in particular at the 
way in which he treats those elements of attributional plurality which had 
been recognised in the Platonist tradition before him. 
S. Th. la 13,2 - the translation is that of McCabe (p51). Cf also De Potentia 7,5 - McInerny (p309) 
translates, more literally, `signify the divine substance'. The latter text, like Super libros 
sententiarum 1.2.1.3 (Mandonnet, I, p68) in fact attributes to Maimondes another interpretation 
alongside the `negative' theory mentioned above, i. e. the `causative' account that `God is good' can 
mean `God is the cause of good things'. However, Feldman (p34) shows that Thomas was mistaken 
in this, as Maimonides did not hold such a theory; in fact, in S. Th. 13,2 the `causative' theory, 
when it is mentioned, is ascribed not to `Rabbi Moses' but to anonymous `others (alii)' - McCabe, 
p53c, identifies Alan of Lille as one of these. 
2 In the Summa, the full theory of analogy is not developed until 13,5, but it is effectively assumed 
already in 13,2 and the following articles. 
3 Burrell (1986), describes the situation amongst Muslims as a `stand-off between the philosophers 
and the believers (p51), but goes on to explain that `Maimondes and Aquinas do not differ so much 
in their formal requirements for divinity, as in their grasp of the semantics of the terms we can 
attribute to God' (p63). He claims that this is because the Islamic tradition began with the names, 
then trying to reconcile their plurality with the divine simplicity, whereas Thomas and Maimonides 
both began with the latter as the basis for unfolding the meaning of the names. 
4 Broadie, p284. 
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Names and attributes: St Thomas and the Platonists 
St Thomas is rightly thought of as a Christian Aristotelian, but in 
interpreting his treatment of the divine names it is important also to 
remember that his views were formed through reflection on a tradition in 
which Platonist elements were deeply embedded; this is particularly 
evident in his commentaries on the De divinibus nominibus of Pseudo- 
Dionysius the Areopagite and on the Book of Causes, which had been 
wrongly attributed to Aristotle. ' Both these works drew on the elaborate 
late Neoplatonist system of Proclus' Elements of Theology, though St 
Thomas tended to view `Dionysius' as a corrective to such errors as he 
identified in the Book of Causes. For our purposes, the important 
passages are those where Thomas discusses being, life and wisdom. 
Following Proclus, the Book of Causes identified these as a triad of divine 
hypostases on the secondary level of reality, beneath the pure 
transcendence of the One; 2 at this subordinate level, they constituted a 
genuine diversity within the divine. St Thomas charts in the work of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the process by which this polytheism was adjusted to 
the requirements of Christian monotheism. Thus, whereas `the Platonists' 
had identified these hypostases as `separate and diverse principles 
(separataprincipia ab invicem diversa)', Thomas explains: 
Dionysius in one respect agrees with them and in another disagrees. He agrees in 
that he posits Life as separately existing, and similarly Wisdom and Being and 
other things like this; but he disagrees in that he does not say that these separate 
principles are diverse, but that there is one principle, which is God. 3 
However we are to interpret this difficult passage in detail, it seems clear 
that this is an unstable position, and in the later Commentary on the Book 
' St Thomas had accepted this ascription in the De Veritate, but by the time he came to write his 
Commentary he recognised the work's heavy dependence on Proclus' Elements of Theology, from 
which it is in fact excerpted. Discussing this, Mclnemy (1998), p786, remarks: `It is difficult to 
think of a book less congenial to Thomas's customary mode of thinking'. 
2 Cf above, p117. Proclus in fact developed a philosophical polytheism in which these and other, 
lower, hypostatic realities were equated with the gods of the Olympian pantheon - cf Dodds, p260. 3 In De Div. Nom. V. 1.634, quoted by Hankey, p93n47. 
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of Causes St Thomas in fact invokes the authority of Dionysius to reject 
both the plurality proposed by Proclus and the hierarchical patterns 
through which this plurality was emanated: 
Dionysius, however, corrects this position when they assert that the different 
separate forms, which they call `gods', exist in succession, for it must be asserted 
that all these are essentially the first cause of all things itself. 
According to the Platonists, the first being, which is the idea of being, is something 
above the first life, i. e., above the idea of life, and the first life is something above 
the first ideal intellect. But, according to Dionysius, the first being, the first life, 
and the first intellect are one and the same, which is God. ' 
What we see here is a working out of the fundamental programme of St 
Thomas in relation to the Neoplatonic material which formed part of his 
theological inheritance - namely, `to demonstrate the absolute dominion 
of God, the First Cause, and his unity". 2 He sought to fulfil this 
programme through three related strategies: a refusal to relegate the 
divine names to a level less ultimate than that of God in his 
transcendence; an insistence on the substantial identity of the names with 
one another and with God, so as to safeguard the divine simplicity; and 
what has been called the `de-ontologising' of the divine ideas3 - that is, 
their reinterpretation as analogically predicable qualities of God, rather 
than as being in themselves subsistent realities. 
With this background in mind, it does seem that there is little difference 
in starting-point between St Thomas and Maimonides in their treatments 
of the divine attributes; it is also noteworthy that it is precisely the three 
attributes adopted by Arabic Christian theologians as markers of 
Trinitarian diversity which St Thomas coalesces in the passage quoted 
above. Nevertheless, his theory of analogy does suggest a certain sense of 
plenitudinal richness arising from the application of the `names' to God. 
l Super Librum de Causis Expositio 20,95 - Guagliardo pp22,114. 
2 Fabro, p105. In the same article 101 Fabro (pp ý, points out that the most radical development of 
this programme in the Thomist corpus would have been in the unfinished De substantiis separatis. 
3 Clarke, p124. 
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Enriched simplicity: St Thomas and analogy 
The context in which this issue is raised for St Thomas is the question, 
whether or not the various divine names are to be regarded as 
synonymous. ' Not surprisingly, this had been the interpretation offered 
by Maimondes, in order to safeguard divine unity, 2 and one of the 
arguments in favour of synonymy against which St Thomas argues is cast 
in distinctly Maimonidean terms: 
That which is maximally one cannot be the root and basis of multiplicity (radix ei 
fundamentum multitudinis); but the divine essence is maximally one. Therefore the 
notions (rationes) of the foregoing names cannot be founded or rooted (fundari vel 
radicari) in the divine substance. 3 
However, St Thomas rejects the suggestion that the divine names are all 
synonymous on the basis of his interpretation of them as being 
substantialiter predicable of God, and therefore as conveying distinct 
truths concerning the divine nature. This interpretation in turn relies on 
his Aristotelian doctrine of signification in terms of res and ratio: 
The word signifies the thing (res) not directly, but via a conception of the mind. 
This conception, which is directly and immediately signified by the word, is given 
the technical logical designation, ratio. 
Therefore in St Thomas' theology of the attributes it is primarily these 
rationes which are the bearers of multiplicity, and this enables him to 
maintain that the incomposite unity of God is not impaired by his 
insistence on substantial predication: ' 
The cause of the diversity or multiplicity of names is from the side of our intellect, 
which cannot come to see the essence of God as it is. 6 
The treatment of this question in & Th. 13,4: `utrum nomina dicta de Deo sint nomina synonyma' 
summarises the fuller discussion in De potentia 7,6. Ile theory of signification on which Thomas 
relies is more extensively developed in his Super libros sententiarum 1.2.1.3: `utrum pluralitas 
rationum, quibus attributa d ferunt, sit tantum in intellectu, vel etiam in Deo', where the texts 
assembled by Peter Lombard include several from Ps-Dionysius (Mandonnet, I, pp63ff). 
2 Pines: Guide, 1.54 - cf Elders, p144: `Maimondes is of the opinion that one cannot say that God is 
one and at the same time assign a multiplicity of attributes to him'. 
' De potentia 7,6 videtur 6- Mclnerny (1998), p317. 
4 McInerny (1961), p61. 
5 De potentia 7,6 ad 6: `These notions (rations) are not founded in the divine essence as in a 
subject, but as in the cause of truth, or as represented by all, which does not derogate from his 
simplicity'- Mclnemy (1998), p321. 
6 Ibid., p320: we see `through many deficient likenesses which come about in creatures as in a glass'. 
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Nevertheless, this does mean that `God's simplicity is no longer 
absolute" for St Thomas in the way that it is for Maimonides. For if we 
ask whether attributional diversity exists in God in a real sense, we have 
to examine more closely the Thomist doctrine of signification. That 
doctrine teaches that, while the ratio exists only in relation to us and to 
our use of the relevant name, yet it can be said to be present in the reality 
signified (res) because `there is something in that reality which answers 
directly to it-). 2 So in the case of the divine names: 
There is something in God' answering to all these many and diverse notions of 
which all these conceptions of intellect are likenesses. 3 
In other words, St Thomas is pointing to a use of theological language 
which necessarily resorts to plurality in attempting to speak of the 
perfections of the divine simplicity because the immense richness of that 
simplicity can be expressed in human terms only through `signifying 
from many points of view' ;4 the unity of God incorporates within itself a 
richness exceeding the diversity of all creation. 
While therefore we do not at all see in St Thomas any acknowledgement 
of plurality within the divine essence - on the contrary, his exposition in 
the Summa discusses simplicity before going on to seven other attributes5 
- yet his discussion of the nomina generates a rich vision of divine 
plenitude as the analogue of created plurality. However, these 
plenitudinal motifs are explicitly distinguished from his Trinitarian 
theology, both in their logical status and in their order of treatment. 
Hankey, p94. He sees Thomas' strategy as a `dialectical mediation' of `the contradiction between 
God's simple being and our knowing and naming him'. 
2 Mclnemy (1961), p63 - cf Super libros sententiarum 1.2.1.3 - Mandonnet, I, p67: `[ratio] dicitur 
esse in re inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae'. 
3 De potentia 7,6 - Mclnerny (1998), p320. ° S. Th. la 13,4 as translated by McCabe (p61). 
It should be noted that the seven attributes of S. Th. la qq 3-11 (perfection, goodness, infmity, 
existence in things, immutability, eternity, unity) correspond neither to the traditional Islamic list of 
seven sifät (above, pp243f) nor to the schema which Maimonides in the Guide derives from 
Aristotle - Elders, p145, suggests that this is to demonstrate that the attributes are not 
`determinations added to God's substance' but designed to show `how God is'. 
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Attributes vs persons: the isolation of St Thomas' Trinitarian theology 
Thus, after the `Maimonidean' argument discussed above, St Thomas 
proposes for subsequent rebuttal a different case for synonymy, this time 
based on an appeal to the facts of Trinitarian plurality: 
The distinction of relations which are really (realiter) in God causes the plurality 
of persons (facit pluralitatem personarum). Therefore, if something in God 
answered to the common notion of the attributes, there would also be a multitude 
of persons in God according to the multitude of attributes (secundum multitudinem 
attributorum esset in Deo multitudo personarum). Thus there would be more than 
three persons in God, which is heretical. ' 
Although St Thomas may not have been aware of the fact, this is 
basically one of the arguments by which Islamic theologians sought to 
refute the Arabic Christian apologetic for the Trinity in terms of 
attributional plurality: namely, why should the number of attributes to be 
hypostatised be limited to three? 2 However, while Paul of Antioch and his 
predecessors, in their desire to maintain a linkage between attributes and 
Trinity, never really solved this problem, St Thomas takes the question so 
seriously that he uses it to drive a wedge between, on one hand, that non- 
plural divine plenitude which answers to the attributes and, on the other, 
the relationships of genuine plurality in which the Trinity is grounded: 
Paternity and filiation are opposed to one another (habent oppositionem ad. 
invicem), and therefore require a real distinction of supposits, but not goodness and 
wisdom. 3 
The basis of Trinitarian plurality, therefore, is much sharper than that of 
attributional plenitude, being characterised by a principle of mutual 
opposition absent in the latter. St Thomas develops this theme both in his 
technical vocabulary and in the overall plan of his theology. 
I De potentia 7,6 videtur 7- Mclnemy (1998), p317. Cf also Super libros sententiarum 1.2.1.5 
videtur 5 (Mandonnet, I, p75): `sicut paternitas et essentia differunt ratione, ita sapientia et 
essentia. Si ergo hoc sufficit ad distinctionem realem suppositorum, videtur quod etiam secundum 
diversa attributa distinguantur realiter supposita; et ita cunt tot personae quot attributa'. 
Z Cf above, pp 256,265f. 
3 De potentia 7,6 ad 7- McInemy (1998), p321. Cf Super libros sententiarum 1.2.1.5 ad 5 
(Mandonnet, I, 76): `licet sapientia secundum suam rationem d/erat ab aliis attributis, non tarnen 
opponitur ad aliquod alium attributum'. 
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In the Summa treatise on the Trinity, the language of nomina (and 
occasionally attributa) which St Thomas had used earlier gives way to 
that of proprietates. l These are of two kinds, absolute and relative: 
Absolute attributes (proprietates absolutae) of God, such as goodness and wisdom, 
are not opposed to each other; consequently no real distinction is drawn between 
them. Hence although one can say that they subsist, nevertheless they are not 
several subsisting realities (plures res subsistentes) as persons are ... whereas 
relative attributes (proprietates relativae) in God both subsist and are distinct from 
one another, as stated above. This is why the plurality of these last attributes 
justifies the plurality of persons in God. 2 
It is this idea of `relative attributes', into which a sharp sense of plurality 
is built through the dynamic of mutual opposition, that St Thomas uses to 
construct his doctrine of the Trinity of Persons as subsistent relations. He 
also seeks to show in particular that such a system would guarantee a 
hypostatic plurality precisely of the order of three, by a complicated 
argument to the effect that the three Persons must generate four relations, 
but one of these does not go with only one Person: 
The three relations of fatherhood, sonship and procession are called personal 
properties (proprietatespersonales) since, so to speak, they constitute the persons. 3 
It is not to our purpose here to analyse St Thomas' Trinitarian theology; 
the significant point to note for our purposes is that he believes that this 
argument gives him rational cause for insisting precisely on the 
`threeness' of the Trinitarian plurality, by relying on a clear separation of 
that plurality from the general doctrine of ('absolute') attributes. This 
separation come to govern his whole theological programme: whereas the 
Commentary on the Sentences had naturally followed Lombard's plan in 
dealing first with questions of Trinitarian theology, 4 De potentia and later 
the Summa treat of De Deo uno before De Deo trino. 5 
` Velecky in his glossary translates this as `property', defined as: `that which is proper to one thing 
though not part of its substance or essence' but in the body of the text at la 30,1 he has `attributes'. 
2 S. Th. la 30,1 ad 2, answering the objection that a plurality of divine persons could not be 
established from the plurality of attributes. 
3 S. Th. la 30,2 - the relation discarded being that of `spiration', common to Father and Son. 4 In Book I, distinctions 1-7 are Trinitarian; general attributes are in 8, then more Trinitarian issues. 
5 Cf above, p182n3. 
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St Thomas: Trinitarian resources and problems 
This isolation of Trinitarian theology in St Thomas, as in the medieval 
western tradition generally, means that it is little developed as a resource 
for dialogue; accordingly, we can be very brief in dealing with our 
customary checklist of six 'problems. ' Trinitarian plurality is clearly 
recognised and defended, though the emphasis on divine simplicity can 
lead to some reservations. The doctrine of subsistent relations also 
guarantees personality, if in a rather austerely attenuated form. We have 
seen that St Thomas made strong claims for being able to establish 
threeness, while equality is radically guaranteed by his system. 2 
Although he uses tightly-constructed proofs within his Trinitarian 
treatise, St Thomas' severance of the doctrine from natural theology 
abolishes any sense of its necessity; as for the immanence of the Trinity, 
this is of course formally guaranteed, yet the prioritisation of the 
discussion De Deo uno inevitably suggests an emphasis on the divine 
essence as a simple reality to which personal distinctions are secondary. 
If we are to look for resources for dialogue in St Thomas, then, we are not 
likely to find them in his Trinitarianism as such. Nevertheless, we have 
also seen that his account of the divine attributes leads him towards the 
recognition of powerful plenitudinal motifs even within the divine 
simplicity. While his treatment of the nomina certainly does not result in 
a system as explicitly (if reluctantly) pluralistic as the sifät of the 
Ash'arites, yet his nuanced divergences from Maimonides' extreme 
unitarianism mean that he cannot be counted simply as an anti-attributist. 
In these circumstances, it is tragic that St Thomas never was in dialogue 
either with Islamic kaläm or with the Arabic Christian tradition. 
Above, p9. 
Z But the arguments depend on the double procession of the Spirit; Orthodox critics maintain that this 
effectively denies equality, while dropping the filioque would destroy the case for threeness. 
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(d) The Attributes of God: Trinitarian problems and resources 
Any general assessment of the theme of divine attributes as a resource for 
Trinitarian dialogue would have to repeat the judgement made in our 
discussion of the related theme of the Word of God': that the failure of 
such a dialogue to develop partly reflects theological limitations within. 
the arguments advanced, but more importantly arises from the unhelpful 
dynamics of the context. We may summarise each aspect in turn, first 
appraising the theological arguments in terms of our sixfold list. 2 
Plurality 
An attributional plurality was openly recognised by the Arabic Christians; 
though the Latin scholastics denied this, and located the grounding of 
Trinitarian plurality elsewhere, they did develop a strong plenitudinal 
vision which could have transformed their account of divine simplicity. 
Plurality was certainly present also in al-Ash`än's system, as his Muslim 
opponents insisted despite the Ash`arites' denials. 
Personality 
This was a difficult area: multiple personality was of course denied by 
Muslims, and its justification found other than in the attributes by Latins; 
Arab Christians maintained hypostatic personality only tenuously. 
Threeness 
There are hints, some of which may be related to Neoplatonism, of a 
natural grouping of three attributes among some Muslims, and Arabic 
Christians were insistent on a given threeness; however, enumeration of 
the attributes was fluid among both Muslims and Christians, and it is 
difficult to see threeness as structurally required by any system. 
' Above, pp225ff. 
2 Above, p9. 
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Equality 
On the whole, theories of attributional plurality supported strong accounts 
of equality among their component elements, though this was a little 
confused by those Christian accounts which numbered `essence' as one 
alongside other attributes, rather than as that in which the latter subsist. 
Necessity 
The Christian theories of, attributes we have examined presented 
themselves as natural theology, and in this sense proposed `proofs' with a 
clear claim to logical necessity. In the Ash'arite doctrine, Qur'änic proofs 
also played a part, but its elaboration was through rational arguments. 
Immanence 
Attributional plurality was for Muslims only questionably a characteristic 
of the divine reality at its ultimate level. In so far as Christians used such 
plurality as a model for the Trinity, they too inevitably suggested a divine 
essence behind and beyond the hypostatic distinctions. 
The context of Trinitarian dialogue 
Here the problem was twofold. On one hand, while Muslims and 
Christians in the East did engage seriously with the issues, they generally 
did so in a confrontational way, each viewing the other as a threat. On the 
other hand, while scholastic theologians in the West were to some extent 
prepared to share with Islamic philosophers in a quest of natural theology, 
they were isolated both geographically and theologically from the Arabic 
debate between Muslim and Christian theologians. In this sense, the 
failure of the dialogue to reach its potential can be analysed as a result of 
a divorce from the methods and proponents of natural and dialogical 
theology: the Trinity was withdrawn from apologetic presentation either 
to human reason in general or to Islamic faith in particular. 
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4 Union with God: the divine Energies 
Sufis in the Islamic world and hesychast monks in Byzantium in their 
quest for union with God employed ascetical methods of remarkable 
similarity, though there is no convincing evidence of historical influence 
in either direction. ' The question then naturally arises, whether these 
ascetical similarities support any degree of theological convergence 
between hesychasm and Sufism; and further, if so, whether such a 
convergence could be a resource for Trinitarian dialogue. Our answers to 
both questions will be affirmative, with the proviso that a Trinitarian 
dimension can only be established through critically reconceiving the 
theological analysis of the experiential data. Before explaining this 
reconception, we must first explore the theological convergence, taking 
as, representative figures of the two movements respectively the leading 
hesychast monk, bishop and theologian St Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) 
and the Spanish-born Sufi master Muhyi-d-Din ibn `Arabi (1165-1240), 
known as Shaykh al Akbar, `The Great Sheikh'. 2 
Essence, energies and irradiations 
In both hesychasm and Sufism, spiritual experiences received in the quest 
for union with God form a fundamental datum for theological analysis; 3 
and in both systems what is experienced is described as divine light. In 
Cf above, pl86n3. Anawati and Gardet, pp193f, discuss the historical question in some detail, 
including the possibility of both traditions drawing on a common source, possibly Indian. They also 
draw attention to the reluctance of Eastern Christians to acknowledge these parallels. 
2 Some aspects of ibn `Arabi's system - particularly his teaching on wahddt al-wujzid, `the unity of 
all being' as an emanation from the divine - were rejected by some Muslims, who suspected him of 
pantheistic tendencies. However, for our purposes he serves as a good example of the integration of 
kaldm with mystical experience; the overall structure of multiplicity and unity he traces with regard 
to the divine is generally accepted in the Sufi tradition. In any case, the accusations of pantheism 
are largely unjustified - Burckhardt (1990), p30, remarks that such claims are `the more astounding 
since the doctrinal method of these masters consists in bringing out extreme ontological contrasts'. 
Anawati and Gardet, pp253ff, emphasise the importance of this experiential orientation. Such an 
approach naturally ran the risk of collision with more conservative theological methods in which 
scriptural and traditional norms eliminated or severely curtailed any direct contact with God - 
controversies over both hesychasm and Sufism can be best understood in this light. 
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the case of the Greek monks, this was held to be the light of the 
Transfiguration on Mount Tabor; ' in Sufism, developing a Qur'anic 
theme, it is an `irradiation (tajalli)' of God conceived as light. 2 Beyond 
this phenomenological similarity, though, more remarkable theological 
convergences between the two systems have often been noticed3 
namely: in both, what is experienced is held to be truly divine; it is 
marked by multiplicity; it is distinguished from the divine essence. 
Both Sufis and hesychasts insist on the divine status of the light. For 
Palamas, the goal of ultimate human `divinisation (0&016-)' requires that 
4 it be possible to participate in the uncreated light. So he repudiates his 
opponent Barlaam's claim that the hesychastic light is merely symbolic: 
What then shall we say of that light which admits neither movement nor shadow of 
change, which is the splendour of the deified flesh, flesh which enriches and 
communicates the glory of the divinity? Shall we say that this light is only a 
s symbol? Certainly not. 
Even more radically, ibn `Arabi teaches the actual divinity of the 
`irradiations (tajalliydt)' because his vision of all created things is that 
they have being in so far as they share in the luminous reality of God. 6 It 
is for him a consequence of the fundamental Islamic confession of faith 
that `there is no reality save the Reality' :7 the existence of creatures is not 
only wholly derivative from, but also entirely expressive of, the Creator. " 
I E. g. Triads Liii. 3: `The illumination on Tabor at the time of the Saviour's Transfiguration, and the 
One when the Holy Spirit descended, and all similar phenomena, were clearly perceptible to the 
senses' (Gendle, p31- this is a constant theme throughout Palamas' writings). 
2 E. g. Fusi s al-Hikam, I ('Adam') - Burckhardt (1974), pp21ff. Burckhardt gives a solar analogy for 
the word: `quand le soleil, convert de nuages, se "devoile", sa lumii re "irradie" sur terre' (p23n2). 
S. 24.35 describes God as `the light of the heavens and the earth'. 
3 E. g. Stoddart, p47; Burckhardt (1990), p56; Schuon, p202. 
4 This is brought out clearly by Mantzaridis, pp96ff, who draws attention to the parallelism between 
Palamas' arguments from Oewais to uncreated light and the patristic argument from soteriology to 
an uncreated Son. It is odd, however, that the translator should have used 'deification' rather than 
`divinisation' for Btwois, as this inevitably suggests a transformation into the divine essence. 
Triads lI. iii. 32 (Gendle, p63). 
6 E. g. Fuszls al-Hikam, X ('Solomon') - Burckhardt (1974), pl53n3 quotes the commentator al- 
Qashäni: `In so far as beings receive their being from the tajah, they are'. 
Burckhardt (1974), p54. 
8 Asin Palacios, p219, describes his vision as being of `Dios como un foco de luz cuyas irradaciones 
son las criaturas'. 
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This level of divine reality is moreover characterised by plurality. Clearly 
this is a feature particularly easy to envisage in terms of its nature as 
light: the variegation of the divine light into a multiplicity of colours is a 
powerful image of the diversity of creation in relation to the unity of the 
Creator. ' Yet both Palamas and ibn `Arabi go beyond imagery to root this 
plurality ontologically. When referring to participiable divine reality as 
manifold, Palamas speaks of the divine `energies (ivEp ye at)' : 
The divine energy of God is called not only one but also many (od p la Novov 
d. Ucr Kai no. Uat) by the theologians ... they treat the uncreated energy of 
God as 
multiple (rrAr78uvrrxw6-) in that it is indivisibly divided. 2 
Behind this usage lies a Greek version of the theory of divine attributes 
which we have examined above. Palamas in fact does not unambiguously 
identify energies and attributes, 3 but it is clear that attributes and energies 
occupy the same theological space for a number of reasons: they are both 
linked in the same way to the `divine names'; 4 the same questions are 
raised over their mutual distinction; ' in modern Orthodox theology, the 
equation of the two is generally made. 6 Most importantly, as we shall see, 
the relation of both to the divine essence is similarly contentious. 
Ibn `Arabi also affirms the plurality of this level of divine reality, which 
is expressive of the multiplicity of the divine names: 
Know that He who is called Allah is one in the Essence and all by His names. 
The Unity of God which reveals itself in respect of the Divine Names is the unity 
of the multiple (ahadiyat al-kuthrdh). 7 
Cf most strikingly the variant reading in Fusüs al-Hikam, I ('Adam') recorded by Burckhardt 
(1974), p21n3: `In creation God sees his essence endowed with faces (al-wujüh), that is, with 
multiple planes of reflection differentiating the divine irradiation'. The reading wujild ('being') is 
better attested, but given ibn 'Arabi's account of creaturely being the two are virtually synonymous. 
2 150 Chapters, 68-69 - Sinkewicz, p163. 
Though a very close parallel is established between EvEpyefat and irpoQ6vra (Sinkewicz translates 
`attributes') in, for example, 150 Chapters, 117-118. 
Particularly through Palamas' adaptation of Ps-Dionysius - e. g. 150 Chapters, 85-88. 
5 Ibid., 144 - like St Thomas, Palamas denies synonymy. 6 E. g. Lossky (1957), p80: `the energies are attributes of God'; Staniloae, p125. But both writers 
nuance this equation - Lossky insists that the energies as `dynamic and concrete ... have nothing in 
common with the concept-attributes with which God is credited in [Latin] abstract and sterile 
theology '; Staniloae refers to `lucrare' ('energies' or `operations') as `attributes of God in motion'. 
Fusüs al-Hikam, VII (`Ismail'), VIII ('Joseph') - Burckhardt (1974), pplOl, 118. These texts alone 
disprove Landau's claim (p32) that `for ibn `Arabi multiplicity has no spiritual reality'. 
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Like Palamas again, ibn `Arabi may be interpreted as connecting his 
experiential vision of divine diversity with his community's theological 
tradition of reflection on the plurality of the divine attributes. ' And so 
both writers also must face the question we explored above in relation to 
the attributes - how this plurality can be reconciled with divine unity. 
Here we find our final theological convergence: both distinguish clearly 
between the experienced plurality of divine manifestation and the 
transcendent singularity of divine essence. Palamas makes this distinction 
central to his whole theological enterprise: 2 
The Holy Fathers affirm unanimously that it is impossible to find a name to 
manifest the nature of the uncreated Trinity, but that the names belong to the 
energies... He Who is beyond every name is not identical with what He is named; 
for the essence and energy of God are not identical. 3 
Similarly, ibn `Arabi adopted the theological distinction of `essence 
(dhdt) and attributes (sifdt)' to support a bipolar account of God: 
That which is of the Divine unity (ahadiyäh), none participate in it, for one cannot 
designate aspects to it; it is not subject to distinction. 
The Unity of God by which he is independent of us and of the Names is the 
essential Unity. 4 
As a result of these distinctions, both hesychastss and Sufis6 were accused 
of ditheism. However, it is clear that in both cases the theological patterns 
are those we have already seen in relation to the divine attributes. 
While attributes and names correlate exactly with one another in ibn `Arabi, the nature of the 
correlation is in fact rather different to that proposed by the Ash'arite theologians (cf above, 
pp234ff). For the former, the attributes are exteriorisations of the names as manifested beings in the 
transient world (cf Austin, pp32f). However, in terms of the overall structure of the two systems of 
thought, the same dynamics of unity and plurality are operative, 
2 The Synod of Constantinople (1368) further defined the Palamite distinction as Orthodox dogma. 
3 Triads III. ii. 10 (Gendle, p97). 
4 Fusüs al-Hikam, VII (Ismail'), VII ('Joseph') - Burckhardt (1974), pplOl, 118. The expression 
ahadiydh, used above to translate the primordial `unity' of the divine essence, was distinguished by 
ibn `Arabi from the cognate wähidiydh, which carried rather the implication of oneness ad extra, as 
the divine unity faces differentiation - cf Deladri&e, p83 (translating as `unicitd'). 5 For this accusation by Akindynos, based on Palamas' use of the expression 9, -6rrlc 6kerp&I7, cf 
Meyendorff (1953), pp8ff, who shows that the charge can only be supported by Akindynos' 
omission of Palamas' explanation of the `superior' to which he opposes this `subordinate divinity' - 
namely, the divine essence (ürrepKezp vr7 odata rou Oeou"). 
6 Such at least may be the background of the surprising allegation of Peter the Venerable that 
Muslims acknowledge a binarius God, viz. divina essentia et anima eius: he claims that this is why 
the Qur'an speaks of God in the plural! (Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum - Kritzeck, p204). 
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Divine Energies and Trinitarian dialogue 
We saw earlier that attributional plurality could be seen as a resource for 
Trinitarian dialogue between Christians and Muslims, but that the 
dynamics of the dialogical context were such that this potential was not 
realised. ' Given the remarkable parallels we have identified between Sufi 
and hesychast analyses of religious experience, which appear to have 
developed in mutually isolated contexts, it is natural to ask whether there 
might be here further potential for a fresh Trinitarian dialogue unfettered 
by controversial legacies from the past. 
The obvious objection to such a proposal would be, that the Christian 
dialogue partners themselves would not understand their contribution in 
Trinitarian terms: that is to say, Orthodox theologians have drawn a clear 
line between the two discourses of multiple divine energies and three 
divine hypostases. This is already clear in Palamas: 
There are three realities (rpia övra) in God, namely, substance, energy and a 
Trinity of divine hypostases. 2 
The formula of `many energies, three hypostases, one essence' has 
become and remained definitive for Greek-derived Christianity. 3 
However, even within the framework of Orthodox theology, there are two 
pointers to a much closer linkage between energic and hypostatic 
plurality than is generally allowed; and these may encourage us to 
reconceive the language of divine energies in Trinitarian terms so that it 
can become a resource for dialogue. 
Within Orthodoxy first, then, discussions of the relations between 
energies and essence, on the one hand, and hypostases and essence, on 
Above, pp279f. 
Z 150 Chapters 75 - Sinkewicz, p171. While here `energy' is referred to in the singular, a little later 
(85 - ibid., p183), commenting on Ps-Dionyius, Palamas distinguishes the `energies', according to 
which God `is multiplied and enters multiplicity (0 rl(üveaOat Kai lroAutriaortd4coOar)' from the 
hypostases, according to which God `is not threefold (od. TpttrioC )'. 
3 E. g. Lossky (1957), p82. 
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the other, evince a remarkable parallelism. Palamas himself repeatedly 
argues that his opponents' referral of every attribute to the divine essence, 
without distinction of the energies, would logically result in Sabellianism, 
in that no distinction of the hypostases could be made either. ' That 
argument which makes space for the Trinitarian hypostases by refusing to 
reduce the dynamic life of God to an undifferentiated essence makes 
space in just the same way for the divine energies, and vice versa. Again, 
he explains that the divine `light' or `power' is `enhypostatic' - indeed, it 
is this enhypostatic character which marks off the uncreated energies 
from creatures. 2 That is to say, it must have its existence in a hypostasis - 
which Palamas at this point identifies as the Holy Spirit. 3 Such a 
recognition of the personally appropriated character of the energies is 
indeed an indispensable aspect of the process of union with a personal 
God - if the energies were experienced as having their being `of 
themselves' or as the ultimate essence, `they would overwhelm us in a 
way that was total, impersonal, and involuntary but simultaneously self- 
exhausting or destructive of us. 
Developing these hints, we can suggest that Trinitarian dialogue would be 
well served if the language of energic pluralism were to be reconceived in 
hypostatic terms. In one sense, this could be seen as a simplification of 
the complex threefold scheme of energies-hypostases-essence. As this 
was systematised in controversy with Barlaam's scholastically inspired 
doctrine of attribution, it shares some of his distancing from a dynamic 
Trinitarian theology; removed from its historical context, its elaboration 
is perhaps no longer compelling. Positively, a reconception could develop 
a theory of Trinitarian appropriation, whereby particular energies are 
E. g. 150 Chapters 96,125 (Akindynos is accused of Eunomianism), 142, etc. 
2 150 Chapters 225 (quoting Ps-Basil) - cf Triads. ff. i. 9. 
3 But the divine light can also be enhypostatised in Christ, as at Tabor - Gendle, p 137n4. 
Staniloae, p132. 
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understood as expressive of particular hypostases. This would surely be a 
complex task, as the energies are in principle infinite in number, the 
hypostases only three; but, for example, we might associate wisdom with 
the Logos, or life with the Spirit. In any case, the Palamite insistence on 
enhypostasia surely offers a more fruitful basis for this than the rather 
and assignation of various attributa set out in Latin scholasticism. To 
recast the dialogue in this way in Trinitarian terms would provide a 
resource with a wider ecumenical resonance than Palamite energism - in 
particular, it would establish links with the Trinitarian tradition of Arabic 
Christian theology. 
Trinitarian dialogue: critical, open, experiential 
Despite such promising prospects, in the medieval period the isolation of 
the two movements precluded any mutual engagement. We can identify 
three features of their potential relationship as important for any dialogue. 
Firstly, this would be critical: we suggested that, while the tradition of 
reflection on divine attributes and energies provides useful resources for 
dialogue, these need to be recovered through relocating them in a more 
definitely Trinitarian framework. Real commitment to dialogue requires 
of Christians a respectfully critical approach to tradition. 
Secondly, the very isolation of the spiritualities could create an open 
encounter, with no prior agenda of controversy or sense of threat: either 
would discover the other, as it were, while searching for God. Again, we 
shall argue that openness is both necessary for and sustained by dialogue. 
Finally, both Sufi and hesychast visions of God are experiential in their 
data, while interpreting this experience within a given tradition. In our 
last chapter, we shall also ask in what ways the experience of God's 
people, of whatever faith, can inform a Trinitarian dialogue. 
DIALOGUE 
Chapter 4 
The Trinity in Inter-faith Dialogue 
1 The Trinitarian grounding of dialogue 
(a) Dialogical contexts and attitudes 
The two dialogues compared 
287 
4-l. doc 
In this final chapter, we draw together the evidence of our two examples 
- the patristic encounter with Neoplatonism and the medieval Christian 
encounter with Islam. As explained earlier, ' we will then suggest some 
possible directions for contemporary Trinitarian dialogue with Hindus 
and Muslims respectively, based on this analysis. There is a double sense 
in which the expression `Trinitarian dialogue' can be used here. When we 
considered in Chapter 1 the proposals of Tillich and Panikkar that the 
Trinity could act as a resource in a pluralist context, we noted that their 
contention was both that the doctrine offered guidance in inter-faith 
encounter and also that it provided a conceptual map to help understand 
multi-faith diversity. 2 Our argument here will therefore proceed by two 
stages. We shall first ask how Trinitarian doctrine can be seen as a 
grounding for inter-religious dialogue. We shall then turn to the question 
of relating Trinitarian language to the patterns of plenitudinal language 
found in different religious traditions. 3 
Our method in the first. part of the discussion will be to move between 
four interrelated levels of analysis - namely: the dynamics of the 
historical contexts within which communities encountered one another; 
' Above, pp63ff. 
2 Above, p34. 
3 Above, pp48ff. This distinction in the Trinitarian case is close to the general line M Barnes (1989) 
draws between the `old problematic' of a theology for dialogue and the `new problematic' of a 
theology of dialogue, except we see the former as arising from the latter, rather than being given 
pre-dialogically, and therefore as not being superseded by the latter. 
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the attitudes enabling dialogue which those contextual dynamics either 
nurtured or inhibited; the different forms of dialogue in which those 
attitudes were expressed; and the interpretations of those forms and 
attitudes which make possible a Trinitarian grounding of dialogue. 
To embark on a contextual evaluation of our chosen historical episodes, 
then, we may start by observing that the earlier episode generally proved 
far more fruitful, creative, and influential than the later. Patristic 
Trinitarian dialogue moved beyond the field of apologetics to become a 
means through which Christians sought to express the heart of their belief 
in God - and, even in situations which were not overtly pluralistic, a form 
of internalised dialogue continued within the Christian community. 
Moreover, this dialogue connected with all the important ways in which 
both Christians and others were struggling with issues of divine 
plenitude. Further, the theological results of the dialogue came to be 
owned as the inheritance of Trinitarian theology of the whole Church, and 
it could be argued that they have remained formative for Trinitarianism 
ever since. In the case of medieval encounter with Islam, by contrast, the 
first two features, while not wholly absent from every dialogical 
situation, ' when present were only so in fragmentary form, while the third 
did not operate at all. 
That the two encounters developed so differently is primarily because 
they took place in very different contexts. We have already noted both 
some of the propitious factors attending the Christian encounter with 
Greek philosophy and some of the difficulties involved in the Christian- 
Muslim encounter. 2 The significance of such contextual dynamics in 
inter-faith relations has been persuasively argued by David Lochhead. 
And arguably present in the Trinitarian theology of Arabic Christianity - cf above, pp258-267. 2 Cf above, pp 172,174. 
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Dialogical contexts 
Approaching dialogue as an issue in the `sociology of knowledge' rather 
than the `history of ideas', Lochhead rejects the commonly held thesis 
that negative attitudes to other faiths result from `exclusivist' theology: 
It is very dubious to assume that the bad record of Christians in relating to other 
religious traditions is the fault of certain Christian ideas. It is equally as likely that 
the bad ideas are projections of bad relationships. ' 
As Lochhead himself acknowledges, corresponding attitudes affect all 
religious communities; 2 and we have seen evidence above that both 
Muslims and Christians were often held back from developing a fruitful 
dialogue because of the reciprocally negative images they held. 
Lochhead's contextual analysis proposes that faith communities 
commonly relate to one another according to one of four `ideologies' 
governing their perceptions of reality. The four ideological types are 
defined as follows: isolation, a situation where `the community defines 
reality for itself'; hostility, in which `the impact of another construction 
of reality is experienced as a threat'; competition, a viewpoint according 
to which `other communities are not totally outside the truth, but the full 
truth is to be found only in the beliefs and practices of our own 
community'; and finally partnership, which Lochhead describes3 as the 
perception that `similarities are primary and essential while differences 
are secondary and accidental' .4 He further maintains that alongside these 
there must be a fifth kind of relationship, which alone is authentically 
dialogical. We shall differ from him on this last point, arguing that in fact 
dialogue is best served by one of the four ideological types above, namely 
' Lochhead, p3. 
2 Ibid., p13. 
3 Cf Additional Note `B' for questioning of this definition of `partnership'. 
4 Ibid., pp7,12,18,23 respectively. 
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`partnership', provided that Lochhead's account of this relationship is 
suitably adjusted. ' 
It is clear in the first place that the ideologies of both isolation and 
hostility will be inimical to the development of any dialogue. As for the 
competitive approach, which typically underlies apologetic, while this 
may provide a powerful motivation for dialogue, it will tend within a 
dialogical situation to inhibit genuine openness in that it can `carry 
overtones of isolation and hostility'. At the same time, `insofar as the 
attitude of competition grants some similarity between traditions, it may 
also carry some overtones of the attitude of partnership' "2 
The appropriateness of a partnership type of relationship as a context for 
dialogue is already attested at one level by the language we habitually 
use: individuals or communities are described as `dialogue partners' 
inasmuch as they commit themselves to mutual openness in an inter-faith 
relationship. Yet an ideology of partnership goes beyond this in 
presupposing a wider commitment to working together. 3 We may sketch 
out the scope of that commitment both positively and negatively. 
Positively, partnership implies a readiness for some form of shared 
action; and such shared action presupposes the existence of some 
commonalty of values and understanding between the partners. The 
action envisaged may be quite restricted in intent - for example, to 
address a particular problem in inter-faith relations (such as the Trinity) 
with the aim of removing misunderstandings and so ameliorating 
community relations. Or the same task may be seen as part of a much 
Cf also Additional Note `B' for more detailed consideration of this. 
2 Lochhead, p29. 
Lochhead maintains that it is for this very reason that an ideology of `partnership' cannot provide 
an appropriate context for an authentic dialogical relationship (ibid, pp59ü). Cf Additional Note 
. 
`B' for criticism of his view. 
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more ambitious programme of work, as in the proposal for a `global 
ethic' advanced by Hans King: 
No human life together without a world ethic for the nations. 
No peace among the nations without peace among the religions. 
No peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions. ' 
In either case, the common ground that is being sought is such shared 
understanding and values as will enable the proposed shared action. 
Conversely, it is important to realise that this does not imply any 
prejudgement on the part of either partner on the other's view of reality 
taken as a whole. Shared action can be entered upon in some areas by 
partners whose values in other areas are radically different, or who have 
major differences in understanding of other areas; all that is required is 
the existence of sufficient common ground to enable the proposed action. 
This said, one significant prejudgement may be seen as implicit in the 
very commitment involved in any dialogue: namely, that the other partner 
is a fellow human being deserving of respect in their unlikeness as well as 
evoking sympathy in their likeness. In the particular case of inter-faith 
dialogue, as the partners are formed by their respective traditions, they 
will in turn want to ground this prejudgement in the terms afforded by 
those traditions. 2 
Although thus differing from him in our evaluation of partnership, we can 
use Lochhead's four categories as a framework within which to consider 
our historical examples, and so to identify attitudes important for 
dialogue. We must of course recognise that the different ideological types 
are often inextricably intertwined within the same community or even 
individual, as Lochhead himself acknowledges. 3 
I Kung (1991), p138. 
2 Cf below p297 for the Christian explication of this in terms of openness to one another as the family 
of God; also pp312f on the implications of shared humanity for interpreting religious languages. 
3 Lochhead gives (p28) the example of a Christian work on Islam which may display all four 
ideologies at different points. 
DIALOGUE 292 
4-1. doc 
Dialogical attitudes 
Most obviously, Christian-Muslim relationships were in many places 
characterised by overt hostility. We have seen how, in a time of violent 
confrontation, the crusading movement was fed with extraordinary 
misrepresentations of Islamic belief as tritheism; equally, the Qur'änic 
denunciations of those who described God as threefold inflamed 
opposition to Christian Trinitarianism. Alongside the hostility, there were 
also contexts of isolation - the interaction of these two stances can be 
traced, for example, in the degenerative evolution of later Byzantine 
polemic against Islam, and in the disengagement of Latin scholasticism 
from any serious Trinitarian apologetic. In all these cases, the ideological 
dynamics were such that no serious dialogue could develop. 
By contrast, relationships of competition and still more of partnership are 
naturally much more amenable to fruitful encounter, and we can identify 
contexts in which one or other of these ideologies was dominant. From 
these contexts we may infer three attitudes which will characterise any 
successful dialogue. 
We saw how the patristic dialogue with Greek philosophy was marked by 
an atmosphere of intimacy and immediacy; to some extent this was also 
true of John of Damascus' engagement with early Islam. In Lochhead's 
typology, parts of these encounters would be analysed in terms of the 
ideology of competition, and parts would be more appropriately described 
in the language of partnership; but what is significant about this 
relationship is its genuine openness, which clearly is a pattern to which 
any dialogue should aspire. We should also take note of the recognition 
of religious experience as an important datum at various points within the 
patristic dialogue; a contemporary dialogue must equally make significant 
space for the experiential dimension. 
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The Arabic Christian apologetic for the Trinity is clearly informed by a 
robustly competitive approach. This engaged theologians on both sides in 
vigorously rational arguments to establish or dispute the hypostatic nature 
and threefold enumeration of the divine attributes. It is remarkable to note 
the extent to which in these debates Muslims and Christians alike, aided 
by the shared medium of the Arabic language, were able to enter into one 
another's thought worlds and skilfully to handle one another's concepts. 
Such careful analysis of the other's theological processes are one sense in 
which a dialogue must be marked by a mutual commitment to rationality. 
The Latin scholastic investigation of divine attributes was an exercise in 
natural theology in partnership with Muslim (and Jewish) intellectuals. 
That this shared exploration did not at all develop into a Trinitarian 
dialogue was the result of a growing fragmentation in scholastic thought 
between natural and dialogical theology. From this experience, we can 
develop further the theme of shared rationality, which must provide for 
intelligible debate not only between the different religious traditions but 
also between these and the wider intellectual world. 
' 
The parallels of Sufism and Hesychasm also were potentially marked by 
real openness, but for a different reason to that in the patristic context: 
namely, the absence of any prior history of controversy or sense of threat. 
We see again the importance of the experiential component of dialogue, 
which indeed here provides the primary potential for dialogue. We also 
see the need to allow criticism of the tradition for that context's 
Trinitarian possibilities to be realised: rationality extends to self-criticism. 
`Shared rationality' as a possibility has been vigorously attacked by post-modern thinkers, but it 
seems that much of their critique is exaggerated. It is instructive, for example, to compare the 
radicalism of Alasdair Maclntyre's influential 1981 essay After VIrtue with his more constructive 
programme in Three Rival Versions (1990) - `to render our disagreements more constructive' (p8). 
Cf also below, pp301,329n2. However, we shall also argue that rationality on its own does not 
provide an adequate framework for dialogue - below, p303. 
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We have argued that dialogue must be contextually repositioned within 
an ideology of partnership, which will encourage three necessary 
attitudes: a mutual openness; a commitment to rationality; and a valuing 
of experience. Such a repositioning is apparent in modem Catholic 
thinking on inter-faith relations. The Second Vatican Council, while in 
various documents using the expression dialogus to describe encounter 
between Christians and people of other faiths, ' in the key declaration 
Nostra Aetate introduces the principle of dialogue as colloquium: 
The Church, therefore, urges her sons to enter with prudence and charity into 
discussion and collaboration (colloquia et collaboratio) with members of other 
religions. 2 
We notice here both the association of dialogue with shared action, and 
the location of both within an overall understanding of partnership which 
is suggested by the double use of the preposition con-. 
3 Indeed, the 
opening of the declaration makes this quite clear by setting the inter-faith 
question within the context of overall human unity: 
In this age of ours, when men are drawing more closely together and the bonds of 
friendship between different peoples are being strengthened, the Church examines 
with greater care the relation which she has to non-Christian religions. 4 
Building on this understanding, in 1984 an influential document from the 
Vatican's `Secretariat for non-Christians'5 proposed a fourfold 
classification of different forms of dialogue. First comes the `dialogue of 
life', in which people of different faiths through living together enrich 
one another in practising their respective religious values; this is 
Ruokanen, p86. 
2 NostraAetate, 2.3 - Flannery, p739. 
3 In answer to objections that the declaration downplayed differences to stress similarities, the official 
`justification' document accompanying the final draft explained: `The aim of the Declaration is ... 
to point to the connections between peoples and their religions which serve as a basis for dialogue 
and co-operation. Hence it takes more notice of that which unites' - Oesterreicher, p94. 
4 Ibid., 1.1- Flannery, p738. 
5 The Attitude of the Church towards the Followers of Other Religions: Reflections and Orientations 
on Dialogue and Mission. The Secretariat was subsequently renamed as the Pontifical Council for 
Inter-religious Dialogue. 
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accessible to all insofar as all share in one human community. Second is 
the dialogue of collaboration in social involvement arising from religious 
inspiration: the common commitment to justice and peace, the sharing of 
different faiths in projects for human liberation and development. Third is 
the intellectual dialogue of theologians and religious scholars seeking 
clearer understanding of the truth. Fourth is the sharing of religious 
experiences of prayer and contemplation in a common quest for the 
Absolute - for example, the inter-monastic dialogue. 
' 
We can see the importance of these different forms of dialogue from our 
historical examples. The first level, of the shared life of people of 
different faiths, is that which enabled the intimacy of much of the patristic 
dialogue, where Christians lived alongside pagans in the same society and 
with similar hopes, anxieties and concerns; equally, except in the case of 
Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians, its absence in the medieval 
period was a decisive factor in the failure of Muslim-Christian dialogue 
to develop. Indeed, this `dialogue of life' is recognised by the Secretariat 
document as the fundamental presupposition of the other three forms. 
The second dialogue is in general difficult to trace, perhaps because of the 
nature of the historical sources we have. Again, however, its absence, or 
rather its inversion, is very apparent in the medieval period: western 
Christians in particular, and Muslims to some extent, too often saw the 
service of `justice and peace' as requiring aggression towards, or even 
elimination of, the other faith community. 2 Clearly, any future patterns of 
dialogue have radically to disown approaches like this. 
The third dialogue, in the context of theology, is the primary subject of 
our study. It is important to realise, though, that it must draw on all the 
Cf the presentation of the list and comments in Dupuis (1991), p223, and McGregor, p193. 
2 This is explicit from the Christian side in the crusading mentality. From an Islamic point of view, 
attitudes towards the dhimmi were more ambiguous. Cf above, ppl8l, 183n1. 
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other three forms; indeed, this interdependence is probably best expressed 
by placing it fourth in the list, in particular so that its relation to the 
dialogue of spiritual experience can be made clearer: 
Does not religious experience precede theological discourse? Should not the 
exchange on the level of experience serve in its turn as a foundation for a common 
discourse? 1 
As for this fourth form, we saw evidence of its (historically as yet 
unrealised potential) in the comparison of Sufism and Hesychasm. We 
also saw hints of its importance in patristic writings, which further point 
to a distinctively Christian emphasis which needs to be incorporated into 
this dialogue: namely, the need to take seriously the religious experience 
of all believers, not merely highly-trained monastic groups. 2 In this sense, 
we may say that spiritual dialogue must be based on lay experience. 
In commending the Secretariat's analysis, Pope John Paul II insisted that 
its recommendations were rooted in Trinitarianism: 
Dialogue is based on the very life of God, one and Triune. God is the Father of the 
entire human family; Christ has joined every person to Himself; the Spirit works in 
each individual. 3 
Can we develop the Pope's words by tracing Trinitarian patterns in a 
more detailed way among these various forms of dialogue? The dialogue 
of life underlies all the other three forms; in its rich variety and 
complexity, this can be seen as a human analogue of that divine plenitude 
for which the language of Trinity provides the Christian analysis. The 
other three forms are interdependent yet mutually distinct, in a way that 
also suggests a Trinitarian dynamic. We next ask how we can find a 
Trinitarian grounding for these forms of dialogue and for the dialogical 
attitudes of openness, rationality and experientiality they require. 
' Dupuis (1991), p236 - he adds: `Without the latter, discourse may become abstract discussion or 
even degenerate into confrontation'. 
2 Cf above pp165,169 respectively for Gregory's account of the church's growing experience of the 
Holy Spirit and Augustine's analyses of Trinitarianism through psychological analogies - both are 
essentially levels of experience accessible to any Christian. 
3 Address to the Secretariat, quoted in Dupuis (1991), p220. 
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(b) The Trinitarian interpretation of dialogue 
Openness and the Father 
We argued above that, while genuine openness in dialogue does not 
require prior assumptions about the existence of `common ground' in the 
beliefs held by another faith community, it does presuppose some 
measure of commitment to partnership and some prejudgement of respect 
for the partner as human. This implies a sense of belonging to a shared 
community and so having a common commitment to justice and peace. 
However, religions cannot simply postulate the existence of such 
community without seeking in some way to interpret it; in the ground of 
such interpretation the ground of dialogical openness will be more closely 
approached. In Christian faith, the primary grounding of universal 
community is the doctrine of creation interpreted as divine Fatherhood: 
From one ancestor he made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted 
the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would 
live... For `In him we live and move and have our being'; as even some of your 
own poets have said, `For we too are his offspring'. ' 
We might expect dialogical openness, therefore, to arise from this 
awareness: we are open to our dialogue partners in the measure that we 
are open to the Father whose children we and they alike are. The dialogue 
partner is prejudged to be a fellow child of God; hence that partner's 
ideas are acknowledged as worthy of respect, since they are that by which 
a brother or sister finds meaning and purpose. So openness to God creates 
openness to the other person which enables dialogical openness. 
Before we can accept this as an appropriate theological grounding of this 
aspect of dialogue, we have to ask whether other faith traditions also have 
important elements within them which correspond to the Christian theme 
of divine paternity in this respect: that they require of their adherents an 
1 Acts 17.26,28. I 
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attitude of humble openness. Indeed, this question of mutuality will recur 
in each of our interpretations of the grounding of dialogical attitudes. 
In our first historical example, this is not difficult: we saw the attitude of 
reverence which Plotinus adopted towards the One as the source of all 
being - indeed, he specifically used the image of paternity to refer to this 
first hypostasis. ' In the case of other faiths, there seems at first to be a 
problem, in that language referring to God as `Father' is actually rather 
rare. Further, Islam has in general expressly repudiated such language as 
being inextricably linked to that of divine sonship, involving physical 
generation or adoption on the part of God. 
3 
However, this need not in fact trouble us, since at this stage we are not 
discussing the ontological reference of religious language in other faiths; 
rather, we are looking for motifs in their traditions which function 
analogously to divine paternity in this sense: that they practically enable a 
dialogical attitude of humble openness. In the case of Islam, it seems 
clear that the recognition of God as creator of all operates in just this way: 
O mankind, surely we have created you from a male and a female, and made you 
tribes and families that you may know each other. 4 
If Islam as a religion specifically repudiating Father-language thus 
provides analogues for the grounding of dialogical openness, we may 
expect other faiths to do the same. In particular, when we turn to 
Hinduism we will see that most Hindus do in fact acknowledge one form 
of the divine as universally ultimate. 
5 We conclude that for Christians to 
interpret dialogical openness as grounded in the Father is to offer part of a 
Trinitarian patterning of dialogue as a resource applicable across faiths. 
Above, pp101f. 
Z An exception must be made in the case of Judaism. Cracknell, pp91ff, discussing Jn 14.6, provides 
evidence of `Father' images from other faiths, yet not with the centrality given them in Christianity. 
3 E. g. All, p1219n2817, on S. 112 (al Ikhlds): `[the verse] points out the error of the religions which 
describe God as being father or son'. Cf above, p175n5, for the Qur'änic attack on divine sonship. 
S. 49.113, which seems very close in thought to Ac 17.26. 
1 Cf below, pp330ff for ways in which the polytheistic tradition is transformed to yield this result. 
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Rationality and the Logos 
We inferred from our historical examples three levels on which dialogue 
must be rational to be effective. The dialogue partners must be prepared 
to learn the language of one another's theologies, handle one another's 
concepts, enter as far as possible into one another's conceptual worlds. 
They must also be prepared to be critical of their own inheritance of 
theological resources, reshaping this as seems necessary in light of the 
requirements of the dialogue. Finally, they must maintain connections 
between dialogical and natural theology, that is, those areas judged by 
any tradition to be in principle accessible to those outside it. ' 
All these senses have in common that they require accepted criteria by 
which discrimination may be made between theological statements and 
concepts. In Christian faith, such criteria are especially associated with 
the Word of God, in a double sense: as universal Logos, providing 
structures of intelligibility for the universe, and as incarnate Lord, 
revealing to the faithful their fullest vision of the reality of God. In this 
duality of sense, we see again the same issue of mutuality which we 
raised in relation to `Father' imagery - namely: can the Christian theme 
of the Logos provide a resource for dialogue which reaches across the 
faiths? We may approach this question from two angles: that of Christian 
theology, and that of the dynamics of the dialogue itself. 
Theologically, we discussed in Chapter 1 the `two stages' of Tillich's 
Christology, and the multi-dimensionality of Panikkar's `christic' 
principle. 2 If the Logos is to provide a universal resource for rationality in 
inter-faith encounter, then - like Tillich and Panikkar - we will need to 
allow for the possibility of multiple Christophanies in some sense. Yet 
1 Above, p293. 
2 Above, pp20,26. 
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this need not entail following their particular strategies. Both theologians 
tend to a certain Nestorianism in that they draw a sharp distinction 
between the universal Logos as a dimension of the divine and the 
particular manifestations of that Logos appearing in human history. It is 
possible to follow a rather different line of thought, which was first 
sketched out by Justin Martyr: 
We have been taught that Christ is the first begotten of God and that he is the 
Logos of whom the whole human race partakes. ' 
Here the identity of the Logos as the incarnate Lord is maintained, but 
space allowed for his operation in other contexts: 2 the activity of the same 
Word is discernible in many places while his personal identity is known 
to Christians in one place. In our first historical example, we saw how 
Origen developed the theme of the universality of the Logos; 3 in this 
respect his thought was inherited by St John of Damascus4 and by 
subsequent medieval theologians in both east and west. 
Approaching the question from the dialogical context itself, we can see in 
our historical examples of non-Christian faiths elements which, like the 
Logos, sustain structures of intelligibility. In the case of Neoplatonism, 
the second hypostasis as Nous not only allows the discovery of patterns 
of meaning in being but actually imposes order through its demiurgic 
status. 5 In medieval Islam, it is significant that the expression kaldm for 
Justin, lApol. 46 - he goes onto link this to the insights of Socrates and other philosophers. Cf also 
11 Apol. 10,13. O'Collins, p43, points out how this Logos Christology, while designed to annex the 
traditions of Greek thought to Christianity, also opened the way for dialogue with non-Christians. 
Bourgeois, p165, interprets Justin's view thus: `Meme daps sa faussete, le message des religions 
demoniaques et des speculations imparfaites des philosophes s'enracinent, malgre leurs erreurs, 
dans le mystere du Christ'. 
2 Rossano, p25, approvingly describes Justin's views as being `to recognise in Christ a spiritual 
sovereignty over humankind even before His appearance in history'. Rossano's words are 
particularly significant as he is writing as Secretary of the Vatican's Secretariat for Non-Christians 
(cf above, p294 and n5). A similar theology was adumbrated by William Temple: `By the Word of 
God - that is, by Jesus Christ - Isaiah, and Plato, and Zoroaster, and Buddha, and Confucius 
conceived and uttered such truths as they declared' (Temple, p10). 
E. g. De Princ. 1.3.7.254 - above, pp137f. Cf also In Jo. 1.39. 
Cf p202 above for John's justification of the use in a dialogical context of the universal language of 
`Word' rather than the explicitly confessional language of `Son'. 
5 Cf above, p113, on Plotinus' identification of Nous with the Timaean demiurge. 
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rational theology equates with the Arabic term for God's Word: ' like the 
Logos in Christianity, that Word functions in Islam to enable rationality. 
Nevertheless,,, some writers insist that these and other foci of rationality, 
as they are grounded in their own traditions, cannot be equated with the 
Christian account of Logos; hence a certain incommensurability of 
method denies any serious possibility of dialogue: 
As it is impossible to neutrally specify such a reality independent of biography ... dialogue obscures the truth-of-difference. 2 
This diagnosis is unduly pessimistic. Dialogue does not require 
participants to agree that the groundings of their systems of intelligibility 
are identical, merely that they show sufficient convergence to allow the 
argument to proceed rationally. The Kaldm in Islam and Nous in 
Neoplatonism provide groundings of rationality both functionally and 
theologically comparable to the Logos in Christianity; when we later 
discuss Hinduism, we shall likewise argue against an isolation or 
reduction of its triadic patterns of intelligibility. 3 And in fact we have 
seen from our historical examples that other criteria of rationality can 
intersect creatively with the Christian Logos in dialogue. For example, St 
John of Damascus' discussion of the Word in a Christian context cross- 
references with a similar Muslim debate. Moreover, the sense of 
`rationality' we deduced from the scholastic debates included a linkage of 
dialogical to `natural' theology. Not only has Christian tradition generally 
recognised some zones of theology as accessible to non-Christians; the 
same or overlapping zones have been similarly designated by Platonist or 
Islamic philosophies. Here again, then, we see the possibility of a shared 
sense of rationality actually apparent in dialogue. 
' Above, p187n3. It is likely that this etymology mirrors the historical genesis of Islamic theology in 
disputes about the status of the Qur'an - above, p192 and n4. 
2 Milbank, p177. Cf also Lash, p 18: `There is no neutral vantage-point, no universal standpoint, no 
`nowhere in particular', from which truth may be discerned. '. 
3 Below, p329; this involves refutation of the thesis of Dumezil on which Milbank relies (p329n2). 
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Experience and the Spirit 
Our historical examples pointed to a possible experiential dimension in 
dialogue: ' tentatively present in the . patristic encounter, this was not 
significantly developed in the medieval dialogue, though its potential was 
apparent in the comparison of Sufism and Hesychasm. This is a theme 
which is increasingly recognised today as playing a vital dialogical part; 
it may be differentiated from the rational dimension through its emphasis 
on immediacy of experience as contrasted with subsequent explication. 
As the rational is seen as grounded in the Logos, so correspondingly it is 
not surprising that contemporary Christian theologians should root this 
dimension in the person of the Spirit. We saw indeed that, in different 
ways, both Tillich and Panikkar ascribed a certain primacy to Spirit in 
2 The former described the `spiritual aspect' of a their Trinitarian thought? 
religion in experiential terms as that which locates its symbols in a 
`history of revelation', 3 while the latt er emphasised immediacy in talking 
of the Spirit as the `freedom of Being to be what it is'. Michael Barnes 
proposes a specifically Christian pneumatology as an interpretative key 
for all current human experience of the divine: 
We look to the way the Spirit of Christ is active, in all religions, in revealing the 
mystery of Christ - the mystery of what God is doing in the world. 
' 
Because of its directly experiential character, it is difficult to speak more 
clearly of this dimension of dialogue without resorting to the intelligible 
terms associated with rationality - hence Panikkar associated 
pneumatology with an irreducible apophatism. 6 However, we can identify 
three features marking out the Holy Spirit, as understood in Christian 
Cf above, pp292f. 
Z Above, p41. 
ST1, p138 - cf above, p22. 
JTG, p109 - above, p32. 
M Barnes (1989), p143. 
6 Cf above, p30. 
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tradition, as an appropriate ground on which to base this aspect of 
dialogue. 
First, the Spirit is characterised by a freedom which cannot ever be 
wholly reduced to structures of intelligibility: 
The wind (rd irvE-üpa) blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but 
you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone born 
of the Spirit ('x Toü rrvE-dNaroc). ' 
This freedom we can expect to be addressed in a variety of patterns of 
experience, and particularly in ways which overturn preconceived ideas: 
Spirit means life, not death - and so vitality, creativity, and growth. 2 
Second, Panikkar's emphasis on apophasis derives from the `opaqueness' 
of spiritual experience which accompanies its freedom. Spirit is not a 
direct object of experience so much as an enabler: 
He [the Paraclete] will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and 
he will declare to you the things that are to come. 3 
Stanley Samartha expresses a similar insight in the inter-religious context 
when he describes a dialogue occasion as follows: 
The Spirit was not a topic for discussion, but the milieu in which we met. 4 
Third and most important is the theme of universality. In the multi-faith 
context, this means firstly the presence of the Spirit among people of 
other religions - modem theology has decisively repudiated Origen's 
thesis of the circumscription of the Spirit to Christian believers. 5 But it 
also means that the experiences to be taken into dialogue cannot be 
limited to the specifically religious or to those of an elite, for the Spirit is 
given in the whole life of all God's people. This `lay' emphasis seems to 
be a distinctive contribution of modem Christian reflection: in principle, 
the Spirit can mediate the mystery of divine presence to any person in any 
Jn 3.8. 
2 Samantha (1981), p74; also, Khodr, p43: `[in the Spirit] God is not tied down to any event'. 
3 Jn 16.12, which goes on to refer to the Spirit's work of `declaring' the things belonging to Christ. 
4 Samartha (1981), p75, describing a multi-faith gathering at Ajaltoun in the Lebanon in 1970 
5 Cf above, pp140f. The modem consensus is summed up by Cougar (1983), p219. 
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context. ' In practice, some contexts will be much more significant than 
others, but the Spirit's freedom cannot be curtailed in advance by only 
admitting certain categories of experience. 
Where may we find analogues in other faiths to this pneumatological 
grounding of the experiential dimension? In the first place, in Plotinus' 
system we will be reminded, not so much of the third hypostasis of 
`Soul', but rather of the indivisible duality established within the second 
2 hypostasis between Being and Intellect. Plotinus' insistence on the 
irreducibility of Being to Intellect corresponds closely to Panikkar's 
emphasis on the opacity and freedom of Being over against Logos. It is 
true that Plotinus himself centred religious experience directly on the 
One; however, the later Neoplatonic tradition was to develop his system 
experientially through associating the Forms which constitute Being with 
the Olympian gods. This is elaborately achieved in the theology of 
Proclus, who established a one-to-one correspondence between the Forms 
(rd övra) and the henads or gods who were the objects of his devotion. 3 
Guided by this, in Islam we may look to the divine names (asmd) linked 
to the attributes (sifdt) as being the enablers of the experiential dimension. 
These too mediate the closeness of the divine to the believer; through 
constant recitation they have provided a method of devotion for Muslims, 
though not themselves becoming the recipients of prayer or worship. 4 In 
Hinduism, we will find that the devas play a similar role of experiential 
mediation, but they (like henads) are also objects of direct devotion. 5 
I This theme, particularly prominent in the World Council of Churches (cf Samartha (1981), passim), 
may reflect the original context of many modem theologies of the Spirit, which lies in reflection on 
the Church's place in the secular world, rather than on inter-religious encounter as such. By 
contrast, the Vatican Secretariat's document (above, pp294f), though not limiting the scope of 
experiential dialogue, has primarily in mind such specialised areas as intermonastic dialogue. 
2 Cf above, pp114ff - the two are pta g is (Enn. V. 9[51.8.17). 3 El. Th. Prop. 135 - Dodds, p120. 4 The recitation (dhikr) of the names is a major component of Sufi spirituality (above, p283), though 
also widely practised by Muslims. On the inconceivability of worshipping the sifät, cf above, p240. 
5 Below, pp330ff. 
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A Trinitarian patterning for dialogue 
We have suggested, from considering our historical examples, that 
openness, rationality and the admission of experience are necessary for 
dialogue, that these several dimensions can in Christian terms be 
grounded in Father, Son and Spirit respectively, and that analogues to 
these groundings can be found in other faith traditions also. It seems then 
that Panikkar is right to suggest' that inter-faith dialogue in itself can be 
interpreted according to a trinitarian dynamic, in the sense. that these 
different forms of dialogue mutually require and support one another. 
Thus, the experiential dimension of dialogue considered on its own 
presents both opportunities and problems. The opportunities arise from its 
immense variety, which enables it to accommodate a richness of material 
witnessing to the mystery of divine presence in the world. The problems 
arise from the same source, for such data, to be of any interpretative 
value, need some criteria of intelligibility, order and discrimination: 
Without some discernible `signs' to recognise the work of the Spirit, we could be 
lost like a boat without a rudder in a sea of relativism. 2 
In other words, the experiential requires the rational. On the other hand, 
there are problems in any idea of purely rational dialogue based on the 
Logos alone: Christomonism will be caught in a contradiction between 
the universality to which it aspires and the limitations of its particularity. 3 
We saw how Tillich and Panikkar both seek to avoid this through a 
Trinitarian relocation of dialogue. Theologically, this involves the 
reinstatement of the Spirit's role called for by D'Costa: 
Pneumatology allows the particularity of Christ to be related to the universal 
activity of God in the history of humankind. 4 
' Cf above, p32. 
2 Samartha (1981), p74 - interestingly, in the same passage quoted above about the freedom of the 
Spirit as life. 
3 Congar (1986), pp113ü, acknowledges the charges of `Christomonism' levelled against the earlier 
declarations of Vatican 11, including Nostra Aetate. 
4 D'Costa (1990), p19 - this is No 2 of his `Five Theses'. 
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The logical and the peumatological, therefore, require one another, and 
this coheres with the insistence of Christian theology that the Persons of 
the Trinity are united in the way they relate to the world. While this does 
not at all imply a lack of differentiation between their roles, ' it does mean 
that the economies of Word and Spirit cannot be set in contradiction to 
each other: the Word prepares the way for the coming of the Spirit, and 
the Spirit declares the truth of the Word: 
I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you 
forever... The Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, 
will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you. 2 
Adopting Hans Urs von Balthasar's description of the Spirit as `the 
Unknown One beyond the Word', 3 Congar draws out its resonances for 
the Trinitarian circle: 
It indicates admirably the unity that exists between the two realities and the tension 
that accompanies that unity. It also points to the freedom and the mysterious 
activity that characterise the Holy Spirit. Finally, it suggests that he acts forwards, 
in a time or space that has been made open by the Word 4 
The application of this to the dynamics of dialogue can now be summed 
up as follows. Trinitarian doctrine supports a pattern of encounter in 
which, joined in a fundamental stance of openness to the abyss of the 
divine reality, people of faith share in the Spirit their experiences of the 
divine presence and in rational dialogue seek for deeper mutual 
understanding of the mystery of divine plenitude. Within this Trinitarian 
patterning of dialogue, all three aspects are distinct yet inseparable: the 
fundamental attitude of shared openness is the indispensable 
Though just such a confusion came to predominate in western theology through a bland application 
of the principle indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis ad extra which led to debates, for example, about 
whether one of the Persons other than the second could have become incarnate. This tendency is 
rightly criticised by Rahner in his insistence on the identity of the economic and the immanent 
Trinity - of above, p43. 
2 Jn 14.16,26. 
3 Von Balthasar himself repeatedly expresses an interest in the possibilities of inter-faith encounter at 
the level of spiritual experience. However, McGregor, pp208f, criticises von Balthasar for not 
taking this dialogue seriously in terms of what can actually be learnt from the spiritualities of other 
traditions, these protestations notwithstanding. 
4 Congar (1983), p33. 
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precondition; the confusing dynamism of shared experience is that which 
drives the process forwards; the challenging exploration of meaning in 
shared rationality is the necessary term of the whole. Shared communities 
of living provide the context within which the dialogical process 
develops; without that plenitudinal context, or without each of the other 
two strands, the three different aspects of dialogue will degenerate 
respectively into indifferent platitudes about the essential oneness of all 
religion, into the chaos of a syncretistic and consumerist marketplace of 
spiritual techniques, or into the aridity of sterile argumentation or lifeless 
exchange of information. We have argued for the validity of this pattern 
of dialogue from our historical examples of Neoplatonism and Islam both 
positively and negatively: positively, by drawing attention to places 
where dialogue developed creatively, and identifying the elements both in 
Christianity and in the other traditions which enabled that; negatively, by 
suggesting what aspects may have been absent when dialogue failed to 
develop. In the last section of this Chapter, we will try to sketch some 
ways in which a Trinitarian pattern of dialogue could be positively 
developed by Christians in relation to contemporary Islam and Hinduism. 
However, in order to justify calling such dialogue in any real sense 
`Trinitarian', it seems that we should be able in some way to extend the 
analogy from dialogical patterns to that reality to which the dialogue 
refers: that is, we should be able to recognise Trinitarian patterns in the 
plenitudinal analyses of other traditions. This therefore points us to the 
issue of analogical reference within inter-religious dialogue, which we 
will address in the next section. Again, we will begin from consideration 
of the historical examples of Christians encountering Neoplatonism and 
Islam, hoping to gain from them guidance for the contemporary dialogues 
with Hindus and Muslims. 
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2 The Trinitarian reference of dialogue 
(a) Analogical meaning in dialogue 
Syntax and meaning 
If our historical examples. suggest not only that dialogue can be patterned 
along Trinitarian lines, but also that there are elements in other faith 
traditions which would support such a patterning, then it is natural to ask 
whether in fact we may detect analogues to Trinitarian belief within the 
content of those traditions' accounts of divine plenitude. Of course, such 
an analogical analysis could only be one possibility among others. Just as 
the Trinitarian grounding of dialogue is a Christian reading of its 
dynamic, and others would want to advance different readings, ' so also a 
Trinitarian interpretation of divine plenitude would encounter other, non- 
Trinitarian interpretations from other faiths; but in that encounter it would 
itself be open to transformation through the openness of dialogue. 
It is far from uncontroversial to suggest that we can or should move in 
this way from Trinitarianism as a kind of syntax for religious discourse to 
Trinitarianism as also an account of the reference of that dialogue. An 
opposing view indeed holds that to suggest that the systems of different 
traditions can have a common reference point is fundamentally to 
misunderstand the nature of theological language. This should be 
construed as having a regulative function which cannot be divorced from 
the holistic context of a given faith wherein alone it is meaningful. Thus, 
according to this view, not only are the different visions of the divine 
indissolubly wedded to the totality of particular religions, but even within 
the field of one religion it is a mistake to objectify doctrinal statements 
For example, the contemporary Muslim scholar Mohamed Talbi develops a theory of dialogue 
based on the Qur'an and on Sufi theories which stresses the plurality of all faiths on the same level, 
while each is on its own seen as `the best' - he calls this `clean exclusivity' - Neider, p187. 
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into ontological claims about reality. Rather, doctrine primarily functions, 
as in the theology of George Lindbeck, as a grammar for the language- 
game of a given faith's discourse: 
Rule theory does not prohibit speculations on the possible correspondence of the 
Trinitarian pattern of Christian language to the metaphysical structure of the 
Godhead, but simply says that these are not doctrinally necessary and cannot be 
binding. ' 
O'Leary radicalises Lindbeck's approach2 and uses it to deconstruct the 
idea of God in the Christian encounter with other religions, particularly 
Buddhism. It is of interest to note a further aspect of his approach, 
namely the way in which the analysis of doctrine as `grammar' is 
associated with the insistence on a complete conceptual inseparability of 
Trinity from the Christ event: 
To keep open the perspectives of the New Testament a trinitarian theory is 
required, but it should be confined to a minimum and kept in the background. 
Some theologians see the mission of Jesus Christ as being primarily to disclose the 
mystery of the Trinity. This creates a distorted perspective on the event of 
salvation, of which the trinitarian doctrine is only a kind of syntax. 3 
We must repudiate this kind of approach for a number of reasons. It is 
contradictory of the programme we set ourselves in the first chapter, to 
investigate `trinitarian problems' in abstraction from the Christological 
setting from which they first arose. In terms of the grounding of 
dialogical patterns we discussed above, it suggests a limitation of the 
Logos to the particularity of Jesus, and thus a removal of the logical 
principle as a generator of rationality in dialogue. 4 Most importantly, it 
fails to account for the various correspondences identified in our 
historical examples -which do suggest real possibilities of Trinitarian 
analogies in other faiths. We may gather this evidence under four heads. 
I Lindbeck, p106. 
2 In particular, by insisting that any `speculative play' is not only unnecessary but actually 
illegitimate: any Trinitarian affirmations must be construed just as `negative rules of language, thus 
reducing still more their metaphysical appearance' - O'Leary, p89. 3 O'Leary, p217 - in the same passage, he talks of a `speculative idolatry of the immanent Trinity'. 
4 Above, pp9,304 respectively. 
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Firstly, theological systems can be seen as possible analogues to the 
Trinity when they appear to account for the same plenitudinal issues 
which in Christianity are accommodated by - Trinitarian doctrine. Such 
situations arise when Christians and others are responding to the same 
theological or philosophical pressures. So, for example, we saw how 
Plotinus and Origen both struggled to reconcile an inheritance of three 
archai with a growing insistence on one ultimately undifferentiated 
monad. Equally, St John of Damascus and his Muslim interlocutors were 
both attempting to define the status of the Word of God with respect to its 
Speaker. We also suggested that other parts of Christian theology itself - 
the scholastic doctrine of attributes or the hesychast account of energies - 
might be helpfully reconceived as Trinitarian analogues in the same way. 
Secondly, the analogical character of such theologies is more apparent 
when Christian and non-Christian writers use the same terminology in 
comparable ways, or express solutions in formulae showing clear verbal 
parallels. We saw instances of this in the patristic and philosophical uses 
of hypostasis, and in resonances between Trinitarian formulations and the 
phrase ld huwa wa ld ghayruhu by which Ash'arites sought to define the 
relationship of divine attributes to essence. Such linguistic common 
points are important not only evidentially, as showing common ground, 
but also practically, as creating a shared space for discourse. 
Thirdly, the existence of trinitarian analogues can be validated when they 
provide the basis for a dialogue on plenitudinal issues. We saw earlier 
how the actual development of such dialogues would be heavily 
conditioned by contextual and ideological issues separable from their 
ostensible theological reference. Nevertheless, our examples do provide 
evidence of historical situations marked by ideologies of competition and 
still more of partnership where such developments were actualised. 
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Finally, and most importantly, a strong case for trinitarian analogies can 
be made in terms of the checklist of six `problems' we defined in our first 
chapter - namely: plurality, personality, threeness, equality, necessity, 
and immanence. It is true that none of the possible non-Christian 
analogues we have considered displays all these characteristics. However, 
all of them do to some degree or another meet the first and the last 
conditions - that is, we have argued that among both Platonists and 
Muslims there are to be found accounts of the divine which acknowledge 
a genuinely immanent plurality. Moreover, we have seen that neither can 
full satisfaction of all the criteria be unambiguously attested of the 
Trinitarian systems of Christian theologians engaged in dialogue. For 
example, Origen certainly fails to meet the strict standards of a later 
orthodoxy in terms of Trinitarian equality, while the principles of both 
personality and threeness are problematic in the medieval Trinitarian 
apologetic with Islam. It would be unreasonable to expect a closer 
correspondence to our six points from non-Christian theologies than that 
found in Christian writers. Such Platonic and Islamic accounts, then, 
certainly appear to function as trinitarian analogues in a way comparable 
to those proposed by some Christians. 
There is therefore considerable empirical evidence pointing to the 
possibility of some interpretations of divine plenitude within other faith 
traditions which can be correlated in various ways with the Trinity. Such 
evidence in itself calls into question any simple dismissal of all 
possibility of Trinitarian analogies. To explore these possibilities further, 
we must develop a model of reference for plenitudinal language which 
can accommodate the issues mentioned above about the holistic character 
of different faiths, and the difficulties these imply in translating between 
the totalities of two or more religions. 
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Charity, humanity and theology 
One of the challenges in interpreting religious languages in dialogue 
arises from their character of `semantic holism' : they are systems within 
which `meaningful items must necessarily occur as part of some whole', 
and moreover `the meaning of each item is somehow bound up with, 
constrains and is constrained by the meanings of the other items'. ' If we 
are not to allow this holism to prohibit attempts at dialogue, we may 
perhaps gain some guidance for a suitable model of reference from the 
area of philosophical semantics dealing with `radical interpretation', the 
analysis of meaning across such boundaries of totalities. 
As a methodology for approaching the task of radical interpretation, 
Donald Davidson proposed what he called the `Principle of Charity'. 
Broadly, this means operating on the assumption that most people speak 
the truth most of the time, and so offering the kindest interpretation 
possible of what another is saying. More precisely, Davidson defines the 
Principle thus in the case of one person ('the linguist') encountering 
statements in a different language from another ('the alien'): 
The linguist will attempt to construct a characterisation of truth-for-the-alien which 
yields, so far as possible, a mapping of sentences held true (or false) by the alien 
onto sentences held true (or false) by the linguist ... we must maximise agreement, 
or risk not making sense of what the alien is talking about. 
This is clearly an attractive method for a dialogical situation. It rests on a 
belief in a shared human nature which coheres with the emphasis we saw 
earlier on partnership in community as the best context for dialogue. 3 it 
involves people of differing faiths in a commitment to listen carefully to 
what the other is saying, without distortion, and then to interpret it in 
terms as close as possible to their existing beliefs. 
Hale & Wright, p683. 
2 Davidson, p97. Hale & Wright, p677, summarise this as follows: `Interpretation must proceed in 
such a way that the judgements attributed to the others are, for the most part, true'. 
3 Macdonald & Pettit, p3 1; cf above, pp290,294. 
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Davidson's approach needs to be modified in two ways. As the 
`maximisation of agreement' on the part of the linguist apparently rules 
out the possibility of error by the alien, it has been proposed that the 
`Principle of Charity' should be replaced by a `Principle of Humanity' : 
The interpreter should not so much maximise agreement, whatever the cost, as 
minimise a certain sort of disagreement, specifically disagreement which we find 
unintelligible. ' 
This entails us in a commitment to interpret others as thinking and saying 
what we would have thought and said had we been in their circumstances, 
formed by the factors which formed them. Such a principle would affirm 
the emphasis on human partnership which underlies Davidson's model 
while at the same time creating a significant space for difference also. 2 
The other modification arises from Davidson's proposed `mapping' of the 
alien's thoughts onto our own, with the implication that `we already have 
pretty well all the thoughts there are to have'. 3 This suggests a regulative 
norm of interpretation operating from on high; but it has been 
convincingly argued that any methodological principle does not function 
in this way, but rather as simply a starting hypothesis for an encounter 
which must retain an element of unpredictability: 
However useful as a tip on how to start, neither Humanity nor Charity tells us 
where we shall end up. 4 
If we now turn more particularly to the area of inter-faith dialogue, we 
may see something akin to the Principle of Charity underpinning the 
`pluralist' theology associated with John Hick. Deeply committed to an 
assumption of fundamental agreement between different religions in their 
Macdonald & Pettit, p29, building on the earlier proposal of Grandy, p443, that `the imputed 
pattern of relations among beliefs, desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible'. 2 It is questionable whether this reading of Davidson is fair. Malpas, ppl56f, suggests that Grandy's 
criticisms are misconceived and unnecessary in that the two principles of charity and humanity 
differ only `in terms of emphasis'. Macdonald & Pettit, p31, describe Grandy's approach as a 
`refinement' of Davidson's. However, this does not affect the substantive point, of the need to 
create space for error. 
3 Heal, p 186. 
4 Ibid., p187. 
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role as salvific vehicles, this theology not only insists on the existence of 
one common referent for the diversity of faith languages, but also 
proposes that this referent lies beyond all such diversity in such a way 
that it can reconcile their apparent differences. Whether described as 
`Mystery', `Reality', `the Absolute', or whatever, this referent has a 
`residual depth' beyond the religions enabling their differences to be 
interpreted as so many partial efforts to express the inexpressible. ' 
Like Davidson, Hick is concerned to promote communication across 
totalities, but his model is open to similar philosophical criticism. The 
two points noted above with regard to Davidson would translate as 
follows. Firstly, a `pluralist' model could imply suppression of genuine 
plurality by denying ultimate difference between religions in its quest of 
maximal agreement. In terms of our grounding of dialogical patterns, 
while O'Leary's approach diminished the rational dimension, Hick's in 
turn appears to belittle the pneumatological through denying pluriformity, 
dynamism and opacity. 2 Secondly, this suppression is effected by the 
introduction of a supposedly neutral third factor above those proposed as 
ultimate by the religions themselves, in much the same way as 
Davidson's principle exalts prior knowledge over what can be glimpsed 
through encounter; it can thus inhibit genuine dialogical openness. 
Philosophically, then, we must seek a model of shared reference for 
plenitudinal language which safeguards dialogical openness and which 
interprets all faiths as attempts to deal with similar plenitudinal issues 
according to the particular constraints of their own contexts. To deliver 
our scheme of Trinitarian analogy, we must add to these philosophical 
considerations. the theological critique of Hick already outlined earlier. 3 
Cf Hick (1989); Hick and Knitter, passim. The term `residual depth' is from Samartha (1987), p76. 
2 Cf above, pp309,302ff. 
3 Chapter 1 above, pp54ff. 
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Plenitudinal analogies 
Theologically, the strategy of involving a mutually acknowledged 
dimension of `residual depth' as the meeting point of the faith implies a 
tertium quid above the God of each religion. But this idea can distort the 
structure of each theology - in the Christian case, we saw how it tended 
to modalism' - and is in any case contrary to the character of any given 
religion as being in itself a `concretion of the universality of meaning' : 
When we accept them [religions] on their own terms there is, strictly speaking, no 
specific in-between that could be claimed as common property of all religions. 
Therefore, each faith tradition will naturally understand its plenitudinal 
language to refer to the ultimate divinity as conceived within that 
tradition. For Muslims, this is the unparalleled monotheism of tawhid, 
`divine unity'. For Plotinus, it is the ineffably simple One. We will see 
that for Hindus it is nirguna brahman, beyond all distinctions. And for 
Christians, the referent of plenitudinal language is the Trinity. 
Our model of Trinitarian analogy in plenitudinal reference is therefore as 
follows. Trinitarian doctrine makes a claim about the structure of reality, 
that the ultimate referent of religious language is characterised by the 
patterns of Trinitarian diversity which mark the Christian understanding 
of God. As this is so in reality it is reasonable to expect some traces of 
such diversity to be found in other religious languages. Such traces are 
grounded both in the nature of God and concomitantly in human 
endeavours to express the dynamic of that nature; in those endeavours, 
people of different faiths are moulded by the circumstances of their own 
traditions. If aspects of Trinitarian patterning are not present, this absence 
too is grounded in the same nature of God, but in differing human 
DiNoia (1992), ppl5Of - cf above, p55. 2. Dupre, p261. That Dupre does not mean by this the absence of any referent whatever, however, 
seems to be shown by his later comment: `It is obvious that the tertium quid we have got to know in 
connection with dialogue must be `located' within, and not outside of, religion' (ibid., p264). 
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endeavours to express that. The zone of theological discourse where both 
this agreement and this difference is possible is 'plenitude": this refers to 
the underlying reality of God (interpreted by Christians as Trinity) in 
such a way as to make possible real space for a plurality of views. The 
pneumatological dimension of dialogue not only permits such plurality, 
but positively generates it. 
This model involves the holding together of dialogical and natural 
theologies in the simple sense that it presupposes no sharp distinction 
between the knowledge of God as Trinity and the knowledge of God in 
any other way. It, is through the event of Jesus Christ that Christians come 
to know the fullness of the Trinitarian patterning of the divine, but the 
reality of that patterning means that both in the systems of other traditions 
and in any knowledge of God accessible by other means that patterning 
may also be partly discernible by interpreting the plenitudinal dimension 
of the divine presence under constraints formed by the particular 
circumstances of the interpreters. 
Equally, according to such an understanding, people of other faiths will 
want to interpret the reference of plenitudinal language by their own 
criteria. For example, a Muslim may discern within Christian discourse 
the evidence of a pure monotheism overlain by Trinitarian obfuscations. ' 
A Neoplatonist or a Hindu may point to an ineffable Absolute beyond the 
personal distinctions of the Trinity. From a Christian point of view, 
though, what are the fundamental plenitudinal issues, interpreted in 
Christianity in Trinitarian terms, which might generate a Trinitarian 
analogy in the context of other faiths? 
This is related to the question, disputed among Muslims, of whether or not Christianity has been 
entirely abrogated by Islam. Those who see nothing but shirk in Christian Trinitarian doctrine will 
tend to emphasise its replacement by the later prophetic religion of pure tawhid; those who continue 
to trace a witness to monotheism within the Christian doctrine of God will acknowledge a `Qur'änic 
spirit of ecumenism' between the continuing Abrahamic monotheisms - Sachedina, p98. 
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It is important to recognise that candidates for such analogues can be 
found both within the `monadism' of the Greek or Hindu traditions and 
within the monotheism of Islam. There are fundamental differences 
between these two types; yet in both a similar pressure generates a 
trinitarian dynamic. In the case of Neoplatonism, we saw that the 
dialectic of transcendence and immanence was closely related to the 
reconciliation of unity and plurality. The central question here is: how is 
the simplicity of the inferentially established monad to account for the 
emergence of evident multiplicity? In Islamic theology, the fundamental 
plenitudinal dialectic - which could again be characterised as that of 
transcendence and immanence - arose from the related themes of the 
divine self-communication and the divine predications which that invites 
and validates. The important problematic for Muslims is therefore: how 
can the sole and unchallenged reality of God be defended while the 
reality of the access to the divine guaranteed by that communication and 
those predications is ensured? We will pursue the working out of these 
plenitudinal themes in more detail by looking at them in relation to our 
six Trinitarian characteristics. 
Moreover, while the two axes of simplicity-multiplicity and sovereignty- 
accessibility are parallel to one another, they operate in quite different 
religious and philosophical contexts. This means that Christian 
Trinitarian dialogue will develop facing in two directions, which in turn 
suggests the need for a further stage of dialogue, internal to Christianity, 
to establish the connections of differently modulated dialogical 
Trinitarian systems with one another and with the faith of the Christian 
community. This we shall address through looking at how that 
community can understand the challenge of witness in dialogue. ' 
1 Below, pp324ff. 
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(b) The Trinitarian interpretation of plenitude 
Plurality and immanence 
We begin by considering the first and the last of our six characteristics, 
plurality and immanence. We argued that Neoplatonism and Islam 
include elements which are strong candidates for Trinitarian analogues, in 
the sense that they display both of these characteristics; we shall see that 
this is true of Hinduism also. Any expressions of immanent plurality in 
the divine reflect the dynamic of divine plenitude within the 
circumstances of a given tradition; analysis of the importance accorded 
these two characteristics in the traditions may therefore indicate how 
useful those expressions are as resources for Trinitarian dialogue. 
While we have shown the undoubted existence of genuine plurality 
within Islam, we have also seen that acknowledgement of this is highly 
problematic for Muslims. This is because such plurality appears to 
infringe the fundamental Islamic principle of tawhid, `unity', and so 
evokes the fear of shirk: associating alongside God another being which 
could become an object of worship. Hence we noticed the importance for 
orthodox Muslims of ensuring that the entitative (and thus plural) status 
of the divine attributes did not permit the offering of prayer or worship to 
any of these entities. 
More generally, the combative assertion of any form of monotheism 
would be challenged by too open an acknowledgement of plurality, as the 
constituents of that plurality could immediately be seen as potential 
threats to the rights of the one true God. The plenitudinal tension of 
transcendence and immanence is here modulated by the assertion of 
monotheism into a distinctive set of questions: namely, how this free and 
unchallenged sovereignty of God is to be reconciled with the means of 
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access which His creatures have to Him, through the Word He has 
uttered, through the attributes by which they may speak of Him, and 
through the union with Him to which He invites them. 
Trinitarian dialogue with Islam can thus begin by addressing issues of 
plurality in the context of God's initiative to establish creaturely access to 
the divine life. We will take as a good starting-point here Karl Rahner's 
reflections on the ways in which Muslims and Christians understand the 
instantiation of this initiative in the actuality of human history. 
We observed a similar reluctance in Neoplatonism to admit our sixth 
characteristic: that plurality extends to the inner reality of the divine, the 
`immanent Trinity', and we shall find this same reluctance in Hinduism 
also. Plotinus' strategy for dealing with this was a system of graded 
divinity, with plurality utterly banished from the highest level. 
In the same way, in Hinduism, as in any tradition of `inferential 
monadism', suggestions of real divine plurality will be resisted in so far 
as they seem to undercut the ultimacy of a single principle of unity which 
at once explains and surpasses the multiplicity of phenomena. This theme 
of simplicity and multiplicity is the distinctive way for such traditions to 
modulate the plenitudinal tension of transcendence and immanence. 
So Christians engaged in Trinitarian dialogue with Hindus could follow 
either of two strategies. They could address that which is acknowledged 
in Hinduism to be the ultimate level of divinity, and seek to find traces of 
Trinitarian plurality there. Alternatively, they could look at instances of 
undoubted plurality within Hinduism, and seek to show that these should 
be accorded a greater sense of ultimacy within the tradition. We will 
explore both dialogical routes by looking in turn at plenitudinal 
dimensions of the Hindu divine `beyond form (nirguna)' and those 
`endowed with form (saguna)'. 
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We may pursue these lines of argument further in looking at the next two 
characteristics, personality and equality. In the case of Islam, there is no 
difficulty in ascribing personality to God as such; indeed, the constituents 
of plurality we identified - divine Word and attributes - are precisely 
those elements which support the expression of an integrated divine 
personality. The problem rather lies in the distribution of personality 
among those constituents: so, for example, the hypostatic, as opposed to 
merely entitative, status of the attributes, was a theme in the Arabic 
Trinitarian apologists strongly repudiated by their Muslim interlocutors. 
It is important to notice that these debates overlap with similar 
divergences over the status of personality within the Christian community 
itself. This is certainly true of the question of personalised divine 
attributes: Latin scholasticism was even less prepared than Islamic kaldm 
to entertain the possibility of hypostatisation. The same overlap can also 
be seen in the interpretation of Trinitarian dogma: Augustine's hesitation 
over the term personae, like his use of `psychological' analogies, is only 
one instance of a long-standing tradition in Christian Trinitarianism 
which tends towards uni-personality in God. In this respect, the inter-faith 
and intra-Christian dialogues about divine personality coalesce. 
If we ask about the reasons for wishing to distribute personality within 
God, we are brought to the limits of the conceptual separation between 
Trinity and Incarnation which we set up in Chapter 1. It is because Jesus 
as Word made flesh is a human person that the divine Word in 
Christianity may be conceived as personal. Dialogue with Muslims, for 
whom the character of the Qur'an as Word made book means that 
corresponding pressures do not apply, can therefore lead to more careful 
reflection on the importance and scope of such a conception. 
DL4LOGUE 321 
4.2. aoc 
A corresponding point can be made about the issue of equality with 
regard to the monadic traditions, which can be seen as arising out of the 
very way in which the theme of personality is handled there. There is no 
problem in Platonism about admitting a multiplicity of personalities as 
such - this is indeed a strategy adopted for accommodating polytheism. 
However, because even a single personality is regarded as infected with 
plurality through its composite character, this admission must be 
relegated to a lower level of divinity; a hierarchy is established, the 
highest rank of which transcends personality and all other distinctions. 
Again, to raise the issue of hypostatic co-equality with respect to this 
inter-religious context is to enter simultaneously into an internal Christian 
debate: Origen's struggles with the theme of subordination generated a 
major theological controversy within the Church. As with the question of 
hypostatic personality, the same plenitudinal issue is being addressed in 
the different traditions. 
This debate also cannot be isolated from reflection on the formative event 
of Christian faith. The pressure to establish equality within the Trinity as 
a matter of history sprang from the heart of the Christian narrative, in the 
soteriological perception that the work of re-creation could be 
accomplished only by one equal to the Creator; arguments subsequently 
adduced to establish the co-equality of the Spirit were closely parallel. ' 
When we come to consider dialogue with Hindus, we will encounter a 
theologically flexible tradition in which motifs of hierarchy and of 
equality are both present. Here also, engagement with the particularities 
of the tradition are important, for we will be able to point to ways in 
which the narrative (mythical) forms of Hindu faith support an account of 
equality which can challenge and deepen Christian understanding. 
' Cf above, ppl6lf on the problems this close parallelism causes for Gregory of Nazianzus 
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Threeness and necessity 
The two remaining characteristics - threeness and necessity - are linked 
by our model of referentiality: if we understand the reality of divine 
plenitude to which other traditions refer to be indeed the triune God, then 
it is worth asking, both whether a threefold patterning can be discerned 
within them, and also whether they convey the sense that such patterning 
could not be other than it in fact is. 
The evidence with regard to threefold structures seems rather ambiguous. 
On the one hand, we traced evidence of an archic triplicity in Plotinus and 
his precursors; in later Neoplatonism, a multiplicity of triads appears 
throughout an increasingly elaborate hypostatic system. Similarly in 
Hinduism we shall find triadic structures at many different levels. Within 
the Ash'arite doctrine of attributes, there is a tendency to invest three 
predicates in particular with a special cognitive status as logical 
presuppositions of the others. 
On the other hand, the boundary between Plotinus' second and third 
hypostases is rather vague, and of these two the second at times appears 
as a composite of the two dimensions of Being and Intellect, while the 
third occupies a middle rank between the divine and the sensible worlds. 
Threefold patterns in Hinduism occur within a rich and complex tradition 
also marked by many other types of grouping. In the Islamic case, there is 
no trace of triplicity in discussions of the Word; Muslim theologians have 
consistently repudiated any ontological limitation of the attributes to 
three; and the trio of logically primary attributes has to be set against the 
sevenfold list of Ash`arism. 
It seems reasonable therefore to suggest that a triadic patterning of the 
divine is latent within these traditions, but as one reading of the 
plenitudinal dynamic alongside others. The dialogical task, therefore, is to 
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engage with these latent structures, both in terms of their analogy to 
Christian triunity and also in terms of the part they play within their own 
traditions. Our model of reference provides that the traditions will 
themselves be conditioning factors in the interpretation of such structures. 
So from a Christian point of view, there will indeed be the expectation 
that `it should be possible to discern some semblance of triunity in all 
religious experience that is genuine'. ' From the Islamic point of view, by 
contrast, there will be the influence of a Qur'änically-motivated suspicion 
of those who say `God is three'. Again, within Hinduism, `threeness' 
may, for example, be interpreted as subsidiary to a bipolar view 
expressed in terms of gender differentiation. 
We can also ask whether the various plenitudinal structures in different 
traditions are inevitable consequences of their understandings of the 
divine. We saw in our, historical examples how the two axes of 
simplicity-multiplicity and sovereignty-accessibility generate plenitudinal 
dynamics within their respective traditions which also appeal to more 
generally available structures of rationality. In the case of Hinduism, we 
shall see that the fundamental tension of transcendence and immanence is 
worked out triadically in a more veiled way, through mythical structures 
which yet possess their own rationality. 
Thus some points of entry can be found for the Christian proposal that 
divine reality in some sense is Trinitarian of necessity. Yet in fact that 
view is of course itself based on the Christian community's confession of 
faith in God as Father, Son and Spirit. Our exploration of Trinitarian 
analogies will constantly need to re-connect with this confessional 
context; and this brings us to the question of how in dialogue Christian 
witness is made to the Trinitarian identity of God. 
1W Hill, p307. 
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Projective and connective witness 
The indivisibility of witness from authentic dialogue is a major theme of 
contemporary church statements, originating in attempts to reconcile the 
rival approaches of `mission' and `dialogue'. The `Commission on World 
Mission and Evangelism' of the World Council of Churches, meeting in 
San Antonio in 1989, for example, came up with the following formula: ' 
We affirm that witness does not preclude dialogue but invites it, and that dialogue 
does not preclude witness but extends and deepens it. 2 
If we ask specifically what witness might mean in the case of Trinitarian 
dialogue, our model of reference suggests that in the first place it could be 
described as `projective'. That is to say, it engages with the efforts of 
other faiths to interpret plenitudinal issues by sympathetically entering 
into the circumstances under which those interpretations take place. In 
particular, this engagement will be informed by the three attitudes which 
we identified as necessary for the Trinitarian grounding of dialogue. 
Firstly, witness will mean openness to God as Father, and so also to the 
dialogue partner as brother or sister. This openness, with its readiness to 
engage with others' viewpoints, may lead Christians into taking risks in 
sharing their vision of the divine - as with Origen, for example. The 
results may transgress parameters of orthodoxy, but they need to be seen 
within the overall motive of openness as itself a witness to the Trinity. 
Secondly, much Christocentric writing on `witness' in dialogue naturally 
interprets this as testimony to the particularity of the biblical event. So the 
passage above from San Antonio immediately follows this declaration: 
In Britain, cf also the last of the `Four Principles of Dialogue' (often reprinted, e. g. in Towards a 
Theology for Inter-Faith Dialogue): `Dialogue becomes the medium of authentic witness'. These 
`Principles' derive from a 1980 British Council of Churches Report Guidelines on Dialogue in 
Britain, which in turn owed its inspiration to the WCC's 1979 Guidelines - Kuin, p 183n62. 2 San Antonio Report, 1.27 - p32. Selvanayagam, pp108f, however, points out the problems that even 
the WCC has experienced in seeking practically to integrate mission and dialogue activities within 
its structures; more extensively, he describes realistically and graphically the gap between 
`missioners' and `dialogians' in ordinary church life in India -a picture sadly true elsewhere. 
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We cannot point to any other way of salvation than Jesus Christ. ' 
We saw how Trinitarian dialogue in some areas - `personality', `equality' 
- may point directly to the specific dimensions of the Christ event. In 
other areas of plenitudinal discourse, though, it seems possible to witness 
to a Trinitarian pattern without overt reference to Jesus Christ: John of 
Damascus' apologetic argument on the eternity of the Word, for instance, 
has as much strength for a Muslim account of inlibration as in a Christian 
context of incarnation. Rather, Trinitarian witness with regard to the 
second Person is shown in Christian commitment to that rationality which 
the Logos enables; again, within the dialogue this may well produce 
expressions which are objectively heterodox though contextually creative. 
Thirdly, witness, as it reaches beyond the capabilities of the individual in 
attesting the mysterious presence of the triune God, is `continuously 
2 dependent upon empowerment by the Spirit' . Pneumatology implies 
pluriformity, requiring the Christian to acknowledge the possibility of 
real difference in the other's experience and interpretation of plenitudinal 
reality. Trinitarian faith must thus be commended with a generosity 
which allows space for the integrity of difference: witness involves a 
humble admission of fallibility. 
So far, we have seen the need to recognise the context-dependence of 
authentic witness, and the paradoxical likelihood that it may increase the 
risk of formal error. Yet if dialogues in different contexts are to be 
mutually coherent, they clearly need in some way to be co-ordinated with 
one another and with the faith of the whole Christian community. While 
not negating the projective features outlined above, then, we need to set 
alongside them an understanding of witness as being also a connective 
activity within a wider field than that of particular dialogues. 
1 San Antonio Report, 1.26. 
2 Bosch, p116. 
DIALOGUE 326 
4-1. doe 
This wider field is `ecumenical', in that it provides a locus for the 
correlation of dialogue within the oikoumene through sharing in the 
universal Church. Christians are to be involved in a variety and 
pluriformity of Trinitarian dialogues which, as they engage with all the 
religious traditions of the whole human community, in principle interact 
with the experience of divine plenitude of the entire human family; in 
practice, we have taken two genres of religious tradition, the monotheistic 
and the `monadic', as representative of this universality. On this 
ecumenical field, witness as a connective activity carries over from the 
individual dialogues the projective senses of creativity, danger, and 
variety. Through mutual enrichment, the faith of the Church in Father, 
Son and Spirit is deepened and enlarged by being contextualised in a 
world of many different faiths. 
Connective witness implies the establishment of some parameters to map 
out discourse which can be owned by the entire Christian community as 
expressive of the plenitudinal reality of the triune God. The motivation 
here is not defensively to restrict the scope of individual dialogues - for 
that would negate the primary sense of witness as projective - but rather 
to ensure overall balance in the integration of those dialogues within the 
life of the Church. As we have analysed Trinitarian discourse in terms of 
plurality, personality, threeness, equality, necessity and immanence, it is 
to these sixfold characteristics that we will look to establish the 
parameters of connective witness. As confirmed by our historical 
examples, the projective aspect of witness means that we cannot expect 
all six markers to be unambiguously present in the contributions of 
Christians within the dialogical context. However, we can propose the 
following two conditions as criteria for assuring a connection between the 
faith of the Church and the dialogical witness of individual theologians. 
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Firstly, a significant number of the six Trinitarian characteristics should 
be unambiguously present in their theologies, and these should in 
particular include the first and the last: plurality and immanence. This is a 
sign that the theology concerned is fundamentally in touch with the 
Trinitarian reality of God. If either plurality or immanence were absent, 
there would be a lapse into unitarianism or modalism to an extent which 
actually disowned the Trinitarian analogies admitted in other faiths. 
Likewise, a theory of immanent plurality denying all other four 
characteristics could hardly count as an adequate witness to the Trinity. 
Secondly, in dimensions where orthodoxy is not formally maintained, 
there should still be evidence of wrestling with the characteristic 
concerned, as this too shows a real engagement with the Trinity in 
dialogical exploration. To take two examples: though doubtless 
subordinationist, Origen tried seriously to accommodate the soteriological 
impulse to equality; and though it may have been inadequate, the Arabic 
Christian theory of agdnfm showed a valiant effort to account. for 
hypostatic personality. On our criteria, therefore, both would be counted 
as Trinitarian witnesses vitally connected to the faith of the Church. 
Our two-stage model of witness is designed to foster humility, flexibility 
and experimentation for Christians engaged in Trinitarian dialogue with 
other traditions, while providing some means by which their contributions 
can be correlated ecumenically through an intra-Christian dialogue. This 
implies a theological approach in which creativity develops through 
dialogical involvement, and that creativity is then brought into intelligible 
order through the communion of the Church. We can see in this pattern 
another instance of the distinction but inseparability of pneumatological 
and rational impulses in dialogue; and this is what we might expect if the 
structure of plenitude underlying the Christian faith is really Trinitarian. 
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(a) Trinitarian dialogue between Christians and Hindus 
Threefold patterns in Hindu tradition 
Finally, we shall give some pointers to how a Trinitarian grounding and a 
Trinitarian reference might reshape contemporary dialogues with Hindus 
and with Muslims respectively. We may begin with the striking and 
recurrent tendency in the Hindu tradition to express the reality of God in 
threefold ways. The best-known example of this is the selection of three 
gods as in some way primary (trimürti); supporting this is a triple 
formulation of the divine roles in the cosmos (triguna); also significant is 
a tripartite analysis of the nature of the divine essence (sacciddnanda). 
We will consider the usefulness of each of these as dialogical resources; 
first, though, we must notice an interpretation of this Hindu prevalence of 
triplicity which, if accepted, would deny any serious dialogical potential. 
The anthropologist Georges Dumezil claimed, from study of the Vedas 
(the earliest surviving strata of Indian religion) that the various triads of 
the Hindu pantheon, though expressed mythologically and theologically, 
were basically phenomena arising from a tripartite division of society 
which could only be understood against a background of class struggle: 
L'Inde a mis les trois classes de la societe, avec leurs trois principes, en rapport 
avec des nombreuses triades de notions soit preexistantes, soit crees pour la 
circonstance. Ces harmonies, ces correlations importantes pour 1'action 
sympathique ä laquelle tend le culte, sont parfois d'un sens profond, parfois 
artificielles et pueriles. l 
We may link with Dumezil's approach other reductionist accounts of 
Hindu triads - for example, the analysis of the trimürti image as merely 
an attempt to hold together rival groups of worshippers of different gods. 
Such theses, if granted, would certainly be destructive of dialogue. The 
1 Dumezil, pp 19f -he then applies this critique specifically to the triguna theory (cf below, p335). 
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Hindu threefold patterns, far from providing an analogical basis for a 
common understanding of plenitude, would be indicative of an absence of 
that community which is a necessity for dialogue. ' Nor would there be 
any shared measures of rationality by which the dialogue could seek 
intelligibility. 2 
However, in an exhaustive examination of the Vedic evidence, Jan Gonda 
has shown that Dumezil's thesis does not meet the facts: 
In the Veda the number three as such, as a `holy', `typical', `favourite' number, 
was of a more fundamental significance and in any case of much greater frequency 
than the tripartite social division. 3 
Rather, he suggests that one important stimulus to triadic theologies in the 
Vedas lay in the association of different gods with the different cosmic 
zones of sky, air, and earth. We can perhaps see this approach as parallel 
to the transcendence-immanence dialectic of Greek philosophy. 5 
After the Vedas, moreover, Hindus developed further threefold patterns 
for the expression of devotion both in iconological conventions and in 
literary formats. 6 Whatever the sociological contexts out of which such 
patterns arose, they themselves soon became data 'for the development of 
new insights, based on acceptance of the theological given of a portrayed 
threefold structuring of divine plenitude. Discarding any reduction of 
such insights to the level of mere sociological metaphors, then, we must 
ask how far they witness to a Trinitarian pattern; the key theme here is the 
status of multiplicity in the face of powerful pressures to simplification. 
For Indian Christians, this is an acute issue, as many trace their faith to the wish to escape from the 
very Brabminical domination which Dumezil proposes as the real meaning of the triadic patterning. 
Z John Milbank's criticisms of dialogue, for example (above, p301) rely heavily on Dum&zil - 
Milbank, p185: `In the case of a contrast between the Hindu-Buddhist traditions and the Greek- 
Roman-Christian traditions ... one can observe, with the aid of the work of 
Georges Dumezil, how 
they diverge in offering completely different religio-political solutions ... 
The incommensurability 
of these solutions helps to reconfirm the futility of "dialogue"'. 
3 Gonda, p196. Cf also ibid., p206: `this [Dumdzil's] opinion is erroneous'. 
4 Ibid., p199. 
5 Above, pp69ff. 
6 Bhattacharya, p4, particularly insists on the conceptual continuity of these patterns with Vedic 
experience: `the idea of Trinity, in our opinion, is as ancient as the Vedas'. 
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The Vedic religion underlying later Hinduism was literally polytheistic in 
recognising a multiplicity of devas (a word cognate with the Greek Oeös). 
In the subsequent tradition, this was modified in a number of ways. 
At the level of philosophical reflection, the different gods came to be seen 
as so many manifestations of the one divine essence, or brahman. It is 
important to recognise that this process did not in general' seek to abolish 
the divine cults, but rather to assign them to a lesser place within an 
overall system centred on the ultimacy of undifferentiated divinity. Kling 
compares this to the `baroque' diversity of cults in Catholicism to argue 
that the distinction of `monotheism' and `polytheism' is unhelpful: ' 
If we understand "God" to be the highest and deepest principle of all, the very first 
'and very last reality in the world, then most of the Hindus are monotheists. In this 
sense, Hindus, too, believe in only one God: in the one primordial Brahma ... But 
if we understand "God" to be all those beings who are venerated through 
invocation, prayer, hymns, or the offering of gifts, then a great many Christians are 
polytheists. In this sense, the way they practise their religion shows that they 
actually believe in several "gods", however these may be called in Christianity. 3 
This observation points out a similar dynamic operating within the 
religious experience of the two faiths, though theologically analysed in 
very different ways. However, a closer conceptual parallel can be drawn 
between Hinduism and the Greek tradition examined in Chapter 2: at a 
philosophical level, both are examples of what we described as 
`inferential monadism'. 4 As in that case, then, we can expect issues of the 
ultimacy of any divine plurality to be critical in Hinduism. 
I An exception must be made in the case of 10-century reformist Hindu movements such as the 
Brahma Samaj which claimed that Vedic religion was an aniconic monotheism overlaid by 
subsequent idolatry. However, these movements themselves were heavily influenced by Christian 
missionary criticisms of traditional Hindu practice. 
2 It is interesting in this regard to note Lash's remark that the word `polytheism' was first coined in 
English (by Samuel Purchas in 1613) specifically as a conceptual link between Hindu cults and the 
`Papist' `worshipping of saints, images, and the host' (Lash, p15). 
3 Küng (1987), p260. 
4 Cf above, p56ff, for a discussion of this pattern of religious thought. 
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Another route leading to the discounting of plurality is the distinctively 
Indian devotional practice of the istadevatd, or `chosen god' - the 
selection of one divine being, to the practical exclusion of others, to be 
the object of worship and aspiration for an individual or family. This is a 
type of personal henotheism, yet in India exclusiveness of worship was 
not generally pushed to the monotheistic denial of the reality or propriety 
of gods other than one's own. ' Rather, alongside the istadevatd one had 
to make some allowance for the existence and cult of other deities. 
This gives the background to a further feature: the combination of 
different deities into composite forms. This could happen, for example, 
through assimilating the names of a cluster of gods with similar functions 
so that they were seen as just different manifestations of the same 
original; through retelling their myths to form new relationships between 
them so that, for instance, one became the offspring or the spouse of 
another; through combining their iconologies into a visual statement of 
the co-ordination or equivalence of their different forms. 
The second and third of these strategies, according to a generally received 
distinction, operate at the level of saguna ('with form') divinity, as 
opposed to the first, which speaks of brahman as nirguna (`formless', or 
`transcending form'). The precise import of this crucial distinction varies 
within the Hindu tradition, but in general the former refers to a level of 
discourse at which attributes can be freely applied to divinity, while the 
latter points to the ineffability of that which lies beyond all attribution. 
The question will then naturally arise for us, whether Trinitarian dialogue 
relates to either or both of these aspects of divinity. We shall look at each 
in turn. 
Cf Bowes, pp102: `The same god may be treated either polytheistically or monotheistically'. Yet in 
a parallel Indo-European context, and with the same basic Vedic pantheon, Zoroastrianism in Persia 
did develop into monotheism, proclaiming one divinity only as worthy of worship. 
DIALOGUE 332 
'- 
Plenitude beyond form: saccidänanda 
The search for Trinitarian analogies in the Hindu understanding of 
nirguna divine plenitude has concentrated on the Vedantic analysis of 
brahman as `being (sat)', `mind (cit)', and `bliss (dnanda)', the three 
combining to give the formula saccidänanda. This way of thinking is 
associated particularly with the school of Sankara, ' where it arose from 
Upanisadic descriptions of the Absolute as `reality, knowledge, infinity', 2 
3 and of brahman as `threefold' (trividham). Saccidänanda is considered 
to apply to brahman before any differentiation or appearance of form, i. e. 
in that nirguna aspect where it is `void of any of those characteristics to 
which speech applies'. 4 Such a formulation is possible, Sankara explains, 
because statements like `The Absolute is Reality' (or `Knowledge', or 
`Bliss') are not intended as positive `characterisations' of the divine, but 
rather as `definitions' in the negative sense that they exclude anything 
s else from the scope of ultimate divinity. Alston concludes from this that 
saccidimanda formulae as found in Vedanta must be interpreted in 
linguistic or strategic terms rather than as accounts of the ontological 
structure of the divine: 
We are not confronted with the statement that the Absolute has three separate 
characteristics, but with three separate statements of the nature of the Absolute. 6 
This might suggest negatively that sacciddnanda as a Trinitarian analogy 
would tend towards modalism; on the positive side, there seem to be 
unmistakable resonances with Augustine's Trinitarianism. 7 
' Alston, p170, states that the formula as such is first found in Sankara's disciple Suresvara. 
2 `Satyam, jndnam, anantam' - Taittirya Up. 2.1.1. For Sankara's doctrine of the Absolute as bliss, cf 
Alston, p221. Brhaddranyaka Up. 3.9.28 has brahman as 'consciousness-bliss' (vijndna, dnanda). 
3 Svetasvatara Up. 1.12. 
4 Senkara, Taittirya Bhi sya 2.1 -Alston, p 184. 
S Ibid., p178. A `characterisation (visesana)' can only be attributed to divinity in its saguna aspect; 
thus Sankara uses `definition (laksana)' in the negative sense we have described to preserve the ineffable transcendence of nirguna divinity. 
6 Alston, p173 - cf ibid., p171: Sankara's `doctrine must not be taken as an "ontology" ... but rather 
as a practical path ... in which all duality is eliminated from the student's experience step by step'. Above, ppl66ff: e. g. use of `psychological analogies' (cf Lash, p68); repetition of predicates ter. 
DIALOGUE 333 
a3A 
The first attempt to relate the sacciddnanda theory to the Trinity was 
made by the Hindu reformer Keshab Chandra Sen (1838-84), 1 who wrote, 
in an essay of 1882 entitled `That Marvellous Mystery - The Trinity' : 
The Trinity of Christian theology corresponds strikingly with the Saccidananda of 
Hinduism. You have three conditions, three manifestations of Divinity. Yet there is 
one God, one Substance and three phenomena. 2 
The tendency to modalism is certainly pronounced here, 3 but this was 
largely redressed in the Trinitarian theology of Keshab's follower 
Brahmabandhab Upadhyaya (1861-1907). Upadhyaya was a convert to 
Catholicism who sought to wed together. Thomist and Vedantic thought. 
His exposition of saccidänanda is most strikingly expressed in the `Hymn 
to the Trinity', which integrates biblical and Hindu imagery: 
I adore Being, Intelligence, Bliss, 
The highest goal, despised by the worldly, descried by the holy saints ... 
I adore the Father, Highest Lord, Unbegotten, 
The Rootless Principle of the Tree of Existence, who creates through Intelligence. 
I adore the Son, Uncreate, Eternal Word, Supreme, 
The Image of the Father, whose Form is Intelligence, Giver of Highest Release. 
I adore the Spirit proceeding from Being and Intelligence, 
The Blessed Creator, intense Bliss, the Sanctifier, swift in movement, 
Speaking through the Word, the Giver of Life. 4 
Upadhyaya rejected any analogues of the Trinity on a level lower than 
that of nirguna divinity; in particular, devotion to an istadevatd had to be 
left behind in the search for the ultimate reality of divinity. 5 This theme 
was maintained by the two French monks who developed the 
saccidänanda analogy in this century - Swamis Paramarupyananda [Jules 
Monchanin] and Abhishiktananda [Henri le Saux]. 6 
I Keshab's background was the Brahma Samaj (above, p330n1), but he moved steadily away from 
the unitarianism of its founder Ram Mohan Roy to an acceptance of a form of Trinitarian doctrine. 
Z `That Marvellous Mystery', p17 - quoted in Boyd, p35. 3 Cf Dupuis (1989), p25; Boyd, p35. 
Quoted in Thomas, pp101f. The hymn originally appeared in Upadhyaya's journal Sophia in 1898. 
Cf Boyd, p72: `anything connected with Isvara is definitely on a lower level than the highest 
religion'. Isvara in the advaitic system is the divine pictured with attributes (saguna) as a personal 
deity; in particular, God so understood corresponds to one's own istadevatd. 
6 Monchanin, for example, condemned `all attempts to find a meeting place for Christianity and 
Hinduism at the level of bhakti [devotion]'; he also explicitly correlated nirguna and saguna with 
the immanent and economic Trinity respectively - Boyd, p220ff. 
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What are the potential and the limitations of this analogy? Positively, the 
dialogue is rooted in the heart of both traditions, operating at a level of 
plenitudinal language accepted by both as referring to the ultimate reality 
of God (immanence). Within the framework of Hindu philosophy, the 
saccidänanda formula, though attested scripturally, is held capable of 
rational demonstration, so the theme of necessity is also present. ' While 
the threefold analysis of brahman in Vedanta is modalist in the sense that 
it is susceptible of linguistic analysis rather than a reference to 
ontological plurality, the Christian contribution to the dialogue consists 
precisely in proposing the distinctive hypostatic interpretations which are 
apparent in Upadhyaya's hymn. Of our other six characteristics, equality 
and threeness are unproblematic. 
For these reasons, certainly this approach will continue to play an 
important part in Trinitarian dialogue. However, the restriction of its 
reference to those dimensions of divine plenitude accepted by the Hindu 
tradition as nirguna leads to two serious, and interrelated, limitations. 
Firstly, the experiential foundation of this dialogue is effectively limited 
to an elite in either tradition who have the opportunity to pursue the 
arduous quest for the realisation of the truth of sacciddnanda found in 
meditation; yet our `lay' model argued that the experience in the Spirit of 
all God's people should count towards the explication of divine 
plenitude. 2 Secondly, within that lay experience, represented in Hinduism 
by rich strands of iconology, devotion, and mythology, the personality of 
the divine is prominent; yet personal features, as manifestations of `form', 
are not admitted to the nirguna level of divinity in Hinduism. For these 
reasons, alongside the saccidänanda analogy we must also consider the 
potential for Trinitarian dialogue of images of the divine as saguna. 
Monchanin called `India's Trinitarian theology' an exercise in `natural theology': Boyd, p220. 
2 Above, pp303f. 
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Plenitude with form: trimürti 
In Hindu religion since the early first millennium AD, the three gods 
Brahma, Visnu, and Siva have been singled out as a triad with `a status 
more exalted than the other gods'. ' Iconographically, this is represented 
by the trimürti, depicting the three gods in a united group, which is often 
referred to as `the Hindu trinity'. The sociological background to the 
selection of these three, and the assimilation of numerous other deities to 
one or other of them, is a complex and little understood matter, which is 
not directly relevant to our purposes; however, once the trimürti was 
established, it came to be expounded in terms of a theory of triguna. As 
the etymology suggests, this is effectively a doctrine of appropriation, 
which assigns to each of the three deities a particular `attribute (guna)' - 
we note that this locates this analogy clearly at the saguna level. These 
attributes - rajas ('active creation'), sattva ('passive maintenance'), and 
tamas ('destruction') respectively - are best described as functions of the 
deities in relation to the cosmos, and are assigned as follows: 
Brahman creates all living beings and inanimate matter; Visnu preserves them and 
bestows growth on them; at the end of an aeon Rudra [Siva] destroys creation. 3 
In fact, sattva was taken to involve a divine stance of detachment in 
contrast to the intimate involvement of tamas; at this level too therefore 
we can trace hints of the plenitudinal dialectic of transcendence and 
immanence. However, the simple equation of triguna and trimürti was 
not sustained in the Hindu tradition, as a result of three factors: the 
eclipse of Brahma; the magnification of Visnu and Siva; and the 
incursion of the mother goddess. 
I Bhattacharji, p357. 
Z Any such expression in western writing is usually followed by an immediate disclaimer such as 'but 
not a trinity in the Christian sense' (e. g. Blurton, p33). However, it is the possibilities of precisely 
this analogy which we are here exploring. 
3 Matsya Purdna 111.3-4 - Bhattacharji, p357. Cf also Bhattacharya, p5, who traces from an analysis 
of the iconology a link with the three life stages of the Hindu male: brahmachart ('student'), 
grhastha ('householder'), and sannydsf ('ascetic'), respectively. 
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The cult of Brahman as a personal god was never well-developed; indeed 
his presence in the trimürti may be a later representation in demiurgic 
form of an original abstract and neuter concept. ' In any case, he rapidly 
faded from prominence in the pantheon, either through reverting to a 
higher status as the substrate of nirguna divinity, or through conflation 
with Visnu, to whose functions he most closely approximated. 2 
At the same time, devotees of Visnu or Siva naturally exalted their own 
istadevatä, so that either of these came to be seen by them as the supreme 
divinity, with other members of the trimürti as his manifestations. In later 
Hinduism, even particular avataras (appearances in human form) of 
Visnu were exalted to this status, with the originally superior gods made 
derivative from the theophany. 3 Within this new configuration the triguna 
analysis still proposed a tripartite divinity, but this time with all three 
roles expressed as different manifestations of the same god; and a 
personalised form of divinity was now described as ultimate, thus 
questioning the sharp distinction of nirguna and saguna. 4 
The most dramatic transformation of the original trimürti, however, 
undoubtedly lay in the introduction of the mother goddess, known under 
various names linked by the generic theme of the feminine as divine 
power (sakti). 5 Although not incorporated into a unified iconography with 
Visnu and Siva, the cult of the goddess - Säktism - today represents the 
third major strand of Hindu devotion alongside Vaisnavism and Saivism: 
For all practical purposes, she has become a kind of "unofficial" theological and 
experiential replacement for Brahma of the traditional Trimürti. 6 
' Bhattachai ji, p342, quoting Max Müller: 'the universal force conceived as a personal god'. 
Z Ibid., pp343 (their relation is `ambiguous'), 352 ('their individual traits hardly distinguishable'). 
3 E. g. Brown, p152; he describes this theological attitude as `open sectarianism' (ibid., pp5Off). 
4 In the Brahmavaivarta Purdna, for example, Krsna, the supreme divinity, is described as being 
trigunät para ('beyond the triguna'), and this is associated with nirguna status - Brown, pp64lt 5 E. g. Sakti, Devi, Kali, Durgä, Rädhä, Prakrti, Laksmi, et al. Brown, p34, describes the Purdna as 
`gathering many ancient materials into a sort of encyclopaedia of goddesses' to give `a 
comprehensive theology of the Divine in its feminine manifestations'. 
6 Beane, p149. 
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Polytheism as a context for Trinitarian dialogue 
What is the potential for Trinitarian dialogue in bringing this complex 
mass of material together with the Christian devotional tradition? In terms 
of dialogical grounding, the context appears to be promising. Christians 
and Hindus can here draw on a range of spiritual experience accessible to 
all within their respective traditions; both face the same challenge of 
finding rational categories by which to interpret together the implications 
of their faith narratives, whether the history of the Christ event or the 
mythology of the epics and purdnas; either can recognise in the devotion 
of the other a fundamental openness to the divine. When we turn to the 
proposed plenitudinal reference of such a dialogue, though, a number of 
problems immediately present themselves. We will first deal with these, 
relating them to four of our six trinitarian characteristics, before going on 
to consider the mutual enrichment the dialogue could bring in 
understanding the other two dimensions of personality and equality. 
Most obviously, it could be argued that the Hindu tradition is simply too 
complex to lend itself to the identification of plausible Trinitarian 
analogies: not only the profusion of deities, but also the complexity and 
fluidity of the relationships between them mean that any selection of 
patterns of threeness is arbitrary. Against this, we noted earlier that all 
we need to establish as the grounds of a dialogue is the possibility of a 
threefold reading of the plenitudinal dynamic as one interpretation among 
others. ' That such patterns are in fact latent in Hinduism is clear from the 
way in which a triad of gods survives the substitution of Brahma by Devi. 
The complexity of the material also suggests another problem: given the 
exuberance of the theogonic myths of Hinduism, it seems difficult to see 
wherein the necessity of any trinitarian patterning would be located. That 
Above, p322. 
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is, if we are seeking analogies to the Trinity among the named gods of the 
Hindu pantheon, it would surely be contingently possible for the identity 
and number of these gods to be other than they are: there seems to be no 
element of justification from natural theology here. However, the 
narratives of myth themselves clearly have a deep structure of rationality, 
even if this is not expressed in discursive terms; the triguna theory, for 
example, shows the working out of an inner plenitudinal logic. 
A more serious argument from the Christian point of view appears to be 
the rejection, in the name of Trinitarian immanence, of any analogy 
located at the level of saguna rather than nirguna divinity. Catholic 
proponents of the saccidänanda approach insisted on the inadmissibility 
of devotional material in the dialogue, since Hindu philosophy would 
insist that beyond the personalised gods lay impersonal brahman. 
Applying this to the trimürti together with the divine essence which 
transcends it would lead to the conclusion: 
Elle est une quarternite subordinatienne plutät qu'une trinite. ' 
However, it is only on the terms of one strand in the Hindu tradition - the 
Vedantic - that the boundary of the nirguna and saguna zones is drawn 
where it is. Part of the dialogue, then, would involve questioning this line; 
we shall see that pressures for such a revision arise from within 
devotional Hinduism. 
The argument that no genuine plurality can be recognised in Hinduism in 
view of the emphasis on the non-differentiation of brahman begs the 
same question about the hierarchical orderings of personal and 
impersonal forms of divinity. Turning now to these issues of personality 
and equality, we shall use two examples to explore the ambiguity which 
they already have in the Hindu tradition. 
J Bayart SJ, `Le triple visage du divin daps l'hindouisme' (Nouvelle revue theologique, 60,3(1933), 
p240) - quoted in lash, p67n57. Bayart was sympathetic to the sacciddnanda analogy. 
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The triad of Visnu, Siva, and the goddess is variously conceived and 
extremely complex, with two aspects especially relevant to analogical 
Trinitarian questions of personality and equality: the relation of the 
individual figures to the primordial divinity; and the relation between 
male and female. We illustrate the complexity of the issues by referring 
to two puranic texts. The first describes the creativity of the goddess: 
The Devi who is unmanifested takes the three forms of Lakshmi, Mahäkäli, and 
Sarasväti, representing the räjasa, sättvika, and the tämasa attributes., 
Each of these forms then splits into a male and a female part, the male 
aspects being the gods of the trimürti. These gender-differentiated deities 
are then further intermingled through marriage: 
The mother of the universe, Mahälakshmi, ordered Brahman to take Sarasvati as 
his consort ... Rudra, that is Siva, married 
Gauri ... Lakshmi became herself the 
consort of Visnu. 2 
There is an ambiguity about the status of the goddess in this text: in one 
sense she is `unmanifested', `mother of the universe', i. e. the nirguna 
divinity; in another, she appears as herself in a threefold form answering 
to the triguna scheme. At both levels, the name (Mahä-)Lakshmi is used. 
Similar ambiguities are found in accounts of Visnu and Siva, who 
likewise are posited on a number of levels. The relation of male gods to 
female goddesses is described in two different ways: either as an 
impersonal process of emanation, which is linked in the tradition to the 
philosophical idea of the goddess as the saktl or `energy' complementary 
to the role of the corresponding god; or through a more personal 
metaphor of conjugality. We should also note that, though the overall text 
is set in a Säkta idiom, the relative status of gods and goddesses at the 
saguna level is marked by non-hierarchical equality. 
Mürkandcya purdna, quoted by Rao, p334. 
2 Ibid., p336. Confusingly, Rao explains that Gauri is now the feminine `part' of the original 
Sarasvati, while Sarasvati is the feminine `part' of the original Mahakäli. 
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Secondly, in a study of the Brahmavaivarta-purdna, Cheever Brown 
discusses further the relationship to ultimate divinity of a given god. In 
this text, Krsna (originally an avatar of Visnu) is accepted as supreme 
God. As such, he himself possesses both a nirguna and a saguna aspect: 
He who is nirguna is unstained, as he is not conjoined with the saktfs. 
Desiring to create, depending upon sakti, he who is nirguna becomes saguna. ' 
The level of `form' is here associated with differentiation into male and 
female polarities; it is also linked to the emergence of the triguna role. 
However, the devotional tradition in this case does not rest content with 
simply re-naming the ultimate divinity as Krsna. Rather, the personal 
characteristics associated in Vedanta with saguna divinity are still present 
at the highest level at which this God can be known. Particularly striking 
are verses which insist that brahman is to be conceived, not as an 
impersonal substance, but as attribution inhering in a person. The 
argument is presented as a debate between philosophy and devotion: 
Krsna, the self-willed, is both with form and without form. 
Yogins always meditate upon him as formless, as a mass of light. 
They call the Lord the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Atman. 
Vaisnavas, who are his devotees and possess penetrating vision, do not agree. 
They say, `How can there be light without someone possessing the light? '2 
In terms of the Hindu tradition itself, what is involved here appears to be 
a rewriting of the fundamental distinction between nirguna and saguna; 
Brown suggests that the former comes to mean `without negative 
attributes', rather than `without attributes at all' - which would then open 
the way for an acceptance of personality at the highest level of divinity. 3 
Similar dynamic transformations can be found throughout the tradition, 
and with regard to Siva and the goddess as well as Visnu and his avatars. 
I Brahmavaivarta-purdna 11.54.109 -C Brown, p64. 2 Ibid., 11.12-15 -C Brown, p70. The expressions translated `with form' and 'without form' arc, 
respectively, sdkära and nirdkara, which broadly correspond to saguna and nirguna. 
3C Brown, 5. It must be stressed that this is only one tendency within the lý y cy puranic text, which is 
itself open to conflicting interpretations: `[Krsna] is both nirguna in the Advaitic sense and 
somehow also endowed with auspicious qualities' (ibid. ). 
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In a dialogical context, not only does this example show the presence in 
the Hindu tradition of a valuation of personality much closer than the 
Vedantic to that of Trinitarianism; it also points to a recognition in 
devotional religion of the importance of a personal reference point for 
divine attributes. For example, the verse quoted above stresses the 
necessity of a subject in whom light should inhere; this strikingly recalls 
St Gregory Palamas' insistence on the `enhypostatic' character of the 
uncreated light of Tabor and other divine energies. ' Here, then, is one 
dimension of plenitudinal language in which Christians and Hindus can 
creatively engage in Trinitarian dialogue: through exploring the 
tendencies in devotional religion to insist on an enhypostatisation of 
ultimate divinity, they can witness in unexpected contexts to the abiding 
personal status of the Trinitarian hypostases. 
Such an exploration relates to the constituents of divine plurality not only 
considered individually, but also in their mutual inter-relationships. If 
enhypostatisation is considered in the context of male and female gods, it 
points to an inter-personal complementarity of roles appropriated to the 
two polarities, rather than to an impersonal or abstract metaphor of saktP- 
energy. Returning to our first text on the goddess, this suggests a 
preference for the marital images of relationship over the emanatory. 
Drawing attention to enhypostatisation will be a Christian contribution to 
the dialogue in witnessing to Trinitarian personality. Balancing this, the 
Hindu imagery which depicts infra-divine relations in engendered or 
frankly erotic terms can surely challenge Christians to reflect more deeply 
on the meaning of the Trinitarian perichoresis through witnessing to the 
characteristic of equality. Trinitarian dialogue here will not focus on the 
appropriateness or otherwise of applying gender distinctions to different 
1 Above, p285. 
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hypostases, so much as on analogies in the structures of relationships 
uniting personalised forms of divinity in the two systems. 
The relationship of male and female divinities in Hinduism is generally 
conceived in terms of equality. This is evidenced by the adaptation of the 
same texts to apply to both, ' by the alternate application of the same 
metaphors to the two, 2 and above all by most forms of the iconology of 
their relationship of loving union. This is very remarkable given the 
acutely subordinating pattern of marriages in traditional Hindu society; 
the resistance of spiritual insight to sociological preconception here 
surely shows a significant valuing of equality which can witness to real 
awareness of a Trinitarian pattern. 3 
The male-female relationship is further charged with a strong sense of 
complementarity, as the gender distinctions are used to highlight the very 
different roles which gods and goddesses enact: 
Devi was regarded as action incarnate, and of this world, rather than beyond it. 
Conversely, the male deities are assumed to be operating outside the web of 
constraints which characterise human existence. 4 
So the underlying plenitudinal dynamic of transcendence and immanence 
finds expression in this complementarity in a way comparable to, but 
more graphically expressed than, the Christian appropriation of divine 
actions to the several Trinitarian personae. 
Finally, the sexual polarity of god and goddess indicates the intensity, 
excitement and intimacy of their relationship. Despite the unfamiliar, and 
perhaps to some disturbing, imagery it can surely be possible for 
Christians to see in their passionate embraces a witness to that consuming 
love which through all eternity binds together Father, Son and Spirit. 
I E. g. Rocher, p171, on the (Sakta) DevIbhagavata and the (Vaisnava) Srimad Bhdgavatam. 
2C Brown, p131 (Krsna and Prakrti successively described as `supports' for one another), etc. 3 Beane, p266: `what is soteriologically perceived inside of the cultic realm of the goddess remains a 
startling improbability within the realm of the profane'. 
4 Blurton, p166. 
DIALOGUE 343 
4-3D 
(b) Trinitarian dialogue between Christians and Muslims 
Islam and Plurality 
As throughout history, so today also the doctrine of the Trinity presents a 
major challenge in Christian-Muslim dialogue. It is generally seen by 
Muslims as at least questioning the primary Islamic principle of iawhid, 
or in a more critical interpretation as actually constituting the grave sin of 
shirk. The latter accusation is directed not merely against the pseudo- 
trinity of `God, Jesus, Mary' apparently attacked by the Qur'än, l but also 
against the orthodox teaching of `three Persons in one substance', which 
seems to many Muslims sheer tritheism. 2 If, on the other hand, the sincere 
intention of Christians to maintain monotheistic faith is acknowledged, 
then the Trinity is often seen as being simply a puzzling logical error 
resting on the elementary mathematical mistake of assuming that three 
can equal one. By contrast: 
One of the most powerful theological arguments in favour of Islamic tawhid is that 
the muwahhid, or believer in the oneness of God, does not have to resort to an 
abandonment of logic to maintain his faith. 3 
We can identify two elements in Islamic thought which lie behind such a 
vigorous repudiation of trinitarian thinking. One is the interpretation of 
tawhid as ruling out in general any kind of plurality within God. The 4 
other is the denial of that Christian account of Jesus' divine sonship 
which led historically to Trinitarian doctrine. 5 It is important to separate 
out these two strands, as most. contemporary Christian response focuses 
on the latter to the neglect of the former, and this gives to the dialogue a 
rather. unhelpfully defensive character. 
' Cf above, p177. 
2 E. g., fora popular presentation, Haneef, pp183f, quoted above, p61. 
3 Cornell, p65. 
° Given special force by Qur'änic verses specifically repudiating threeness of God - cf above, p 176. 5 Cornell, p65: `It is possible to dispense altogether with theological arguments over the historical 
and metahistorical hypostases of Christ ... because the salvation perspective of Islam ... makes the 
salvific nature of Christ unnecessary'. 
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So, for example, Hans Küng responds to Muslim criticisms of the Trinity 
by insisting that Christians must go back to the biblical origins of their 
faith; doing so himself, he proceeds to deconstruct `metaphysical- 
ontological statements about God in himself and his inner-most nature' 
into statements about the revelation of the one God in the man Jesus of 
Nazareth! Similarly, Michael Scanlon insists that Christians return to the 
economic Trinity of the New Testament, where `we are presented with 
the evocative language of the symbol rather than with the literal language 
of the concept'. 2 Both Küng and Scanlon seek in particular to avoid the 
language of `three persons'. Criticising such reformulations as `an 
abandonment of the Christian dogma of the Trinity', Adolfo Gonzalez 
Montes yet remains in the orbit of specifically Christological discourse 
when he identifies Christ's divinity as `the issue Christian faith raises 
[which] remains in its core and intention irreducible to the Islamic view'. 
3 
However, we have explored the possibilities of Trinitarian dialogue in the 
wider field of plenitudinal patterns abstracted from specific contexts; in 
so doing, we have detected witness to a certain inner plurality in the one 
God of Islam, though this is not easily acknowledged by Muslims. To 
indicate a way in which this plurality might become a Christian-Muslim 
dialogical theme, we will take as starting-point a short but important 
paper by Karl Rahner in his Theological Investigations; 4 we will then 
suggest two directions in which Rahner's approach could be extended. 
Kling (1987), p120. 
Z Scanlon, p33. Though drawing on Rainier (cf below), Scanlon differs from him on the relation of 
economic to immanent Trinity. Rather than asserting identity, he writes that `the logic of faith here 
moves from actuality to possibility' (p35), and follows Piet Schoonenberg in denying actual pre- 
existence of the Logos before Jesus' human life. This suggests that God becomes the Trinity - but 
this is surely equally problematic from an Islamic viewpoint. Less nuanced is the view of Douglas 
Pratt, who asserts that `to talk in terms of the inner-trinitarian relations as constituting the essential 
life of God ... 
is to ontologize what is in essence [sic] a symbolic construct' (Pratt, p283). 
3 Gonzalez Montes, p73. 
`Oneness and Threefoldness of God in Discussion with Islam' (Theological Investigations XVIII). 
Scanlon draws on this essay, but develops Rahner's thought in a one-sided direction (n2 above). 
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Divine instantiation and hypostatic differentiation 
Rahner in this essay develops his Trinitarian theology for the context of 
dialogue with the monotheism of Islam, and to some extent Judaism. ' In 
contrast with the defensiveness of the writers noted above, he insists that 
Trinitarianism is not the `attenuation or obscuration' of true monotheism: 
This question as such could be put by Christianity:... whether these two world 
religions have not failed to achieve that elucidation and radicalisation of 
monotheism which finds expression precisely in the doctrine of the Trinity. 2 
Rahner then says that, rather than dealing with both directions of dialogue 
as this suggests, he will tackle only questions put to Christians by Islam. 
However, his essay is in four steps, which we label (a)-(ö); while (ß) and 
(8) concern Christian doctrine, (a) and (y) have wider application. 
(a) Rahner first advances the important thesis that all monotheism has 
what he calls an `incarnatory character'. The Christian confession of 
God's presence as a human being is an instance, of this, but more 
generally the insistence that the one God is truly active in any religion 
implies some specific actualisation of the divine: 
The concreteness of God who acts in history is meant to allow him to be present 
precisely in his sole real divinity itself. 3 
His explanation that this may involve a book (Islam) or a covenant 
(Judaism), as well as a person (Christianity) corresponds, for example, to 
the theme of `inlibration' in medieval accounts of the Qur' dn's status. 4 In 
light of this, the term `incarnatory' is confusing, and we shall prefer to 
speak more generally of `instantiation'. 5 
`For' this context, rather than `in' this context, because he himself admits that he is `not an expert 
on Islamic theology', and concludes that he has `not really carried out a dialogue ... 
but only 
indicated a few points ... 
[which] might perhaps be remotely useful for a real dialogue' - Rahncr 
(1983), pp106,121. In fact, the line of Rahner's theology can be traced back to his 1967 work The 
Trinity, though here the context leads him to develop new facets of his thought. 
2 Rahner (1983), p105. 
3 Ibid., p107. 
4 The term `inlibration' was coined by Wolfson - above, p224. 
5 This usage is suggested by Gonzalez Montes - p69: `It cannot be said that to accept any idea of 
incarnation would be completely incompatible with the Islamic concept of revelation, if by 
incarnation is understood the instantiation within history of divine revelation'. 
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(ß) Rahner next takes account of Islamic objections in voicing 
dissatisfaction with the formula of `three persons'. His language is 
guarded, for he accepts the terminology as `binding linguistic usage' for 
Catholics; but anxiety that the word may be misinterpreted in a tritheistic 
sense leads him to prefer `hypostases', which he glosses as `modes of 
subsistence'. ' We will return to the adequacy of this phrase for Christian 
witness, but here Rahner uses it dialogically to open up the Trinity. 
(y) This is accomplished by an analysis of the economy of `the history of 
revelation and salvation' in terms of a theological anthropology which 
speaks of both human `historicity' and `transcendentality'. We cannot 
enter into the details of the argument here, but it provides Rahner with the 
following important account of the economic Trinity: 
The unoriginated and permanently sovereign God is called Father; in his self- 
communication to history, Logos; in his self-communication to man's 
transcendentality, Holy Spirit. 2 
Rahner claims that his argument shows the christic and pneumatic `modes 
of factuality of God's presence in the world' to be distinct, mutually 
dependent, and themselves `God himself strictly as such'. His discussion 
throughout is in terms of the Christian understanding of God's revelation 
in Jesus of Nazareth, but there seems no reason why the same pattern of 
reasoning could not be applied to any `instantiation' of monotheism. The 
same general method might also deliver trinitarian analyses of God's self- 
communication independent of his particular system of anthropology. 
(8) Rahner finishes by employing his well-known axiom of the identity of 
the economic and the immanent Trinity to show that it is in fact orthodox 
Christian doctrine which he has formulated for this dialogical context. 3 
Rahner (1983), pp110-113. He here of course echoes the hesitations of Augustine (above, p167), 
and also appears close to Barth's Seinsweise. However, from The Trinity onwards he was careful to 
distinguish `modes of subsistence' from the Barthian formulation - cf Rahner (1967), p110. 2 Ibid., p115. 
3 Ibid., p118. Contrast this with the reductionist approaches of Scanlon and Pratt (above, p344n2). 
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As resources for dialogue with Islam, models like Rahner's are clearly 
very helpful through the careful way in which they raise the sensitive 
issue of plurality. Though Rahner does not develop this himself, his 
theology could provide not only suggestions for the reference of dialogue, 
but also a grounding of the dialogue process. ' Thus, the motif of an 
`incarnatory' or `instantiatory' aspect to be found in any monotheism 
could provide a category for the various structures of rationality by which 
each faith seeks intelligibility; at the same time, the experiential aspect 
would also be accommodated by pneumatology. However, there seem to 
be two ways in which his approach needs to be extended. One is to 
broaden the base of both rational and experiential grounding through 
inclusion of the shared patterns of access to the divine which reason and 
devotion find enabled in both faiths by the respective `instantiations'. We 
shall discuss this in relation to the divine attributes in dialogue. 
The other can be seen from considering again our set of six Trinitarian 
characteristics. Models like Rahner's can claim to engage faithfully with 
five of these. Thus, the explanation of plurality, restrained by Islamic 
suspicions of tritheism, generalises the plenitudinal differentiation 
implied by Muslim views of the Qur'än's status. Threeness is clearly 
proposed by the analysis of instantiation. Equality might be questioned 
in view of Rahner's apparent equation of the Father with the primordial 
God, yet is safeguarded by his insistence on the identity of the `modes of 
subsistence' with this God. Necessity is evident in the analytic structure 
by which Rahner justifies his trinitarianism. Immanence is guaranteed, 
despite Rahner's `modalist' language, by his axiomatic equation of the 
economic and the immanent Trinity. There remains personality, and here 
further discussion is needed as to the adequacy of Rahner's approach. 
1 Above, pp297ff. Cf the discussion of Rahner in M Barnes (1989), ppl47ff. 
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Personality in God 
We saw from our historical explorations that in orthodox Islam both the 
recognition of the Qur'an as divine Word and the acceptance of the other 
divine attributes did imply the subsistence in God of differentiable 
realities with entitative status. From a Rahnerian analysis of the divine 
instantiation in the revelatory event [a], this is precisely the result that we 
would expect in the case of the Qur'an; we shall argue below that similar 
arguments can be extended to the other attributes also. On this level, 
therefore, the language of hypostatic realities or modes of subsistence 
advanced by Rahner [ß] as a Trinitarian usage does appear to provide a 
suitable category for plenitudinal discourse which could be shared by 
Christians and Muslims. In fact, this corresponds to the idea of agänim 
which was advanced by the Arabic Christian theologians; we saw that 
Muslim rejection of this was a result more of the particular dynamics of 
the dialogue context than any inherent conceptual weakness. ' 
However, it is not clear that the definition Rahner gives, `modes of 
subsistence', is sufficiently rich in content to exhaust what Christians 
have understood `personality' to mean in the case of the Trinitarian 
hypostases. If we ask what kind of hypostases are those which constitute 
the Trinity according to Christian understanding, it seems that we must 
return to the instantiatory nexus from which that understanding derives, 
i. e. the event of Jesus Christ. This presents a question which has 
exercised the Church throughout history: namely, what analogy of the 
Trinity best does justice to the gospel story as this is received in the life 
of the Christian community. That story tells of the Son as a fully personal 
human who addresses the Father in prayer and serves Him in obedience, 
and through whom the Spirit is outpoured. It is not obvious that distinct 
1 Above, pp263ff. 
DIALOGUE 349 
4-3B 
`modes of subsistence' devoid of personality in the modern sense are an 
adequate interpretation of the hypostatic characters this story implies; 
without entering into this immensely complex debate, we must at least 
allow for the possibility of a `social' analogy in which Rahner's bare 
conceptual content for `hypostasis' is filled out with more personal 
characteristics. In the Islamic instantiation of divine presence through the 
Qur'an, by contrast, these narrative pressures to establish distinct 
personalities do not apply, and Rahner's simpler model may be adequate. 
What this suggests, therefore, is a Trinitarian dialogue at different levels. 
This has in any case been suggested apart from inter-faith encounter. For 
example, holding to a strongly `social' Trinitarian model of the `divine 
intersubjectivity' of `three centres of consciousness in community', ' Hill 
identifies three interrelated `phases' in an integral theology of the Trinity: 
First, unity as ground of the Trinity; secondly, the Trinity in itself as real plurality; 
thirdly, that plurality as personal. 2 
In the Muslim-Christian context, Rahner's interpretation of hypostases as 
modes of subsistence could help to move the dialogue from the first to the 
second of these phases, where it would relate to the witness to immanent 
plurality which we saw to exist within the Muslim tradition. 
At the third level, the key theme would be the interpretation of the 
specific instantiations of the divine accepted by either faith. This third 
level too would be an exercise in dialogue: Christians and Muslims alike 
would be looking together at the hypostatic implications of both the 
Christic and the Qur'änic event. Here we might expect real differences 
between the two faiths; at the same time, orthodox Muslim insistence on 
the uncreatedness of the Qur'an as the mode of God's instantiation 
resonates with orthodox Christian confession of Jesus as uncreated Word. 
1W Hill, p272. 
2 Ibid., p259. 
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Divine accessibility 
So far it would seem that the focus of the dialogue tends to be directed to 
rather distinctively Christian concerns, with the Muslim partners in a 
more responsive mode. This is because the principal theme we have 
identified is that of `personality', addressed in such a way that Christian 
usage functions as a subset of the more general hypostatic language 
available to both communities: 
In respect to theological dialogue between these two faiths the onus lies with the 
side holding the more complex construct to relate that back to the simpler and less 
complex, especially where the simpler motif is deemed to be contained within the 
complex. I 
However, the balance is redressed when we consider how our model of 
dialogue can be extended to another significant area relating to divine 
personality, namely the theme of the divine attributes. By this we mean 
all those aspects of the divine plenitude which guarantee that God is 
accessible to human beings, in the sense that He can be spoken of, prayed 
to and worshipped, and can become a focus of human love and union. In 
this area, the plenitudinal motifs recognised by Islam are in certain ways 
more complex than those in Christianity, at least in its western form. 
In the first place, the attributes in Islam are directly associated with the 
divine personality, as they are those features of divinity which enable the 
establishment of relationship between God and his creatures. Indeed, the 
importance of this enablement was one of the factors that led the 
mutakallimün to insist on the distinction of the attributes from the divine 
essence: otherwise, for example, instead of praying to the person of God 
as the knowing One the Muslim would be praying to that aspect of 
personality - knowledge - which enabled God to be the knowing One. 2 In 
' Pratt, p271. In fact, though, Pratt's understanding of `relating back' seems to be a deconstruction of 
Trinitarian doctrine arising out of a defensive attitude to Islam, rather than a genuinely dialogical 
engagement of the kind we have outlined - cf above, p344n2. Z Above, p240 and n5 on al-Ash`ari's argument in the Ibänah. 
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the western Christian tradition, by contrast, the relation between God and 
attributes has been conceived in more remote and abstract ways: in one 
direction, as predication substantialiter, applying the attributes to the 
divine essence common to all three persons; in the other direction, as 
`appropriation', the assignation of these essential attributes to particular 
persons `not as though asserting that they are proper to the persons but 
only to make the persons known'! 
The entitative depth and the mutual distinction of the attributes are also 
clearer in Islam than in Latin Christianity. While St Thomas, for example, 
rejects the radically apophatic approach of Maimonides, he does not 
follow the Ash'arites' strategy of positing a number of subsistent 
hypostases corresponding to the attributes; and his account of 
attributional plenitude, though rich, is not so exuberant as theirs. 2 
In relation to the attributes, the devotional tradition in Christianity - with 
the partial exception of hesychasm - is undeveloped as compared with 
Islam. In the latter, the linkage of the attributes (sifdt) with the names 
(asmä) means that the Ash'arite theory of attributional plurality is 
theologically tied to the rich spirituality of the recitation of the `Ninety- 
nine Beautiful Names of God'. The dynamic of this spirituality is 
explained by Burrell and Daher in their preface to al-Ghazäli's treatise: 
These names recall the attributes whereby God has made Himself known in 
revelation, and which also connect human expression with matters divine. So to 
recall God as `the merciful One' is to allude to those verses of the Qur'an where 
God is so named, as well as experiences of mercy we may have had. The 
connection between our experience and the reality of God's mercy may be tenuous, 
but the verbal connection provides a slender thread, at least, so that reciting these 
divine names allows us to bring God into our ambit. 
St Thomas, S. T. la 39,7 ad 1- `non ut eis esse propria, sed ad manifestandum personas'. O'Brien, 
p248, describes appropriation in St Thomas as `a rule for the application of names as a safeguard 
against introducing causality into the relationship between the persons'. Cf also above, p269. 
2 Above, pp270,274. 
3 Burrell and Daher, Preface, pvii. 
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This devotion, then, shows a deep engagement with the inchoate plurality 
of divine plenitude, though always within the parameters of tawhid. 
While Burrell and Daher rightly identify revelation as the locus where the 
names of God are known - Islamic orthodoxy was to limit the recognised 
asmd' to those given by divine `instruction (lawq f)" - the 
correspondence between these names and the divine attributes extends the 
discourse beyond the context of revelation to the knowledge of God 
which is in principle available through creation. These wider plenitudinal 
motifs also were to become the medium of Islamic devotional mysticism: 
Sufis speak of `Divine Names' meaning by that ... only an extension of the 
symbolism of the Qur'an. In the Qur'an God reveals Himself by His Names, just as 
He manifests Himself in the universe through His perfect Qualities. 2 
Muslims here agree with Christians in understanding the plenitudinal 
diversity of the attributes to be discoverable in principle by `natural 
reason' apart from revelation. 3 If a dialogue could be developed around 
the theme of attributes, then, this could supplement Rahner's approach of 
`instantiation' from a wider context, presenting Christians with a rich 
tradition of Islamic spirituality in a cosmic as well as a confessional field. 
Such a dialogue would be built on the insight that God's very 
accessibility, his susceptibility to predication and to devotion, raises the 
possibility of some measure of inchoate plurality within the divine 
plenitude. This quite broad application seems in fact to be inherent in 
Gimaret, pp37-50, shows how this thesis eventually won out over the alternative thesis of qiyds 
('analogy'), which would legitimate the application to God of any name corresponding to a quality 
which was appropriately ascribed to him: `Du moment qu'un nom convient ä tout autre que Dieu 
pour exprimer teile signification, on doit pareillement l'appliquer ä Dieu, de's lors que vaut 
dgalement pour Lui la signification correspondante' (ibid., p39). However, Gimaret also shows (a) 
that the division between proponents of qiyds and of tawgif did not correspond simply to that 
between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites, and (b) that `revelation' here cannot be limited to the Qur'an, 
but also includes the Sunnah - in fact, the enumeration of 99 names rests on a prophetic hadith. 
2 Burckhardt (1974), p57, drawing the analogy with divine energies in hesychasm - above, pp280ff. 3 Cf above, p268. It is possible to draw parallels between the giyds-tawgif debate (n2 above) and 
Christian discussions about the permissible scope of `appropriations': in contrast to Catholic 
appeals to `natural theology', Barth, p374, states as a `decisive eile' of evangelical dogmatics that 
appropriations are `authentic when they are taken literally or materially or both from Holy 
Scripture'. Here, as elsewhere (above, p230), his thought mirrors structures in Islamic orthodoxy. 
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Rahner's own reasoning when he repudiates the alternatives of `an 
abstract monotheism' and `a concealed polytheism' which he sees as both 
expressed in `a continual attempt to distinguish between the divine and 
the gods'. Rather, he grounds Trinity on the reality of divine accessibility: 
The religious monotheist, sustained by God's grace itself, has absolute confidence 
that the absolute God as such has come absolutely close to him. ' 
In terms of Hill's three phases noted above, this dialogue between 
Christians and Muslims would move between the first and second stages, 
which we might describe as pre- and proto-Trinitarian respectively. That 
is to say, it would seek to use the general category of hypostasis to take 
account of the plenitudinal richness of the one God as experienced and 
analysed through encounter with Him, rather than exploring the fully 
Trinitarian understanding of the hypostatic structure as personal. If it be 
asked how such a dialogue witnesses to the Trinity as such, a helpful 
parallel could be drawn with the formative Christian theological inter- 
action with similar hypostatic realities which occurred in the monotheistic 
matrix of New Testament Judaism. The relation of the Trinitarian 
personae to such figures as `Wisdom', for example, was notably fluid: 
In the literature of pre-Christian Judaism, wisdom, word, and, for that matter, spirit 
were near alternatives as ways of describing the active, immanent power of God. 2 
Rather than using such overlaps as a reason for reducing hypostatic 
language to a merely metaphorical level, 3 it is possible to see this 
confused context as that which expanded awareness of inner divine 
differentiation in such a way as to assist the eventual formation of 
Trinitarian doctrine. In just the same way, Christian-Muslim dialogue 
over the plenitudinal richness of God displayed through his accessibility 
could lead to a rejuvenated awareness of the Trinitarian reality today. 
I Rahner (1983), p117. 
2 O'Collins, p41, drawing on Dunn (1989), p196. Cf also Congar (1986), p16: `Wisdom was 
therefore also the Son, the Word, or the Spirit'. 
3 E. g.: `all three phrases are simply variant ways of speaking of the creative, revelatory or redemptive 
act of God' - Dunn (1989), p219. 
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(c) 
. 
Dialogue and Trinitarian theology: problem or resource? 
We began Chapter 1 by asking whether the doctrine of the Trinity was a 
problem or a resource for inter-faith dialogue. We have seen that, despite 
the problematic nature of some phases of the history of Trinitarian 
dialogue, the doctrine can indeed serve as a resource in two ways: 
through providing a grounding of the dynamics of inter-faith dialogue; 
and through analogical reference witnessing to traces of Trinitarian 
patterning in the accounts other faiths give of divine plenitude. We have 
also pointed to some ways in which this resource could usefully be 
developed in contemporary dialogues with Hindus and Muslims. 
However, the results of such dialogues are likely to be so disparate that 
we now need to reverse our original question and ask: is inter-faith 
dialogue a problem in the formulation of the Church's Trinitarian 
understanding, or can it also be a resource to assist a deeper development 
of that understanding? We may clarify first the senses in which dialogue 
poses a problem for Trinitarianism. 
Christians engaged in dialogue with Hindus and Christians engaged in 
dialogue with Muslims would be likely to emphasise very different 
aspects of Trinitarian faith, if the suggestions we outlined above were to 
be followed. Some of those differences would concern the character of 
the analogies or metaphors used in projectively witnessing to the Trinity 
- there is an immense contrast, for example, between vivid Hindu images 
of gods and goddesses in sexual complementarity and austere Muslim 
verbalisations of distinct divine attributes. There would therefore be first 
of all the problem of the radically disparate spiritual and aesthetic 
cultures with which Christians are dialogically engaged. 
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Alongside these difficulties, there would also be deep-seated divergences 
in the theological structures to which the two dialogues refer. For 
example, we suggested that one creative avenue for Christian-Hindu 
encounter would be to explore polytheistic imagery as a valid context for 
Trinitarian dialogue; yet this would inevitably appear to Muslims to be a 
confirmation of what they already suspected - that the doctrine of the 
Trinity is simply a case of inexcusable shirk. Conversely, in the 
Christian-Muslim context we pointed to the attributes as dialogical 
resources in their enablement of creaturely access to God at the highest 
level; but this in turn would seem to many Hindus to be a naive failure to 
appreciate the distinction of the saguna and nirguna levels of divinity. 
Yet surely through thinking of witness as a connective as well as a 
projective activity both these types of problem arising from dialogue 
could be revalued as resources for the development of Trinitarian 
understanding in the life of the Church. With regard first to disparate 
spiritual cultures, the model we developed of a Trinitarian grounding of 
dialogue could help to interpret an issue which has become a major 
challenge in contemporary Christianity, and which is by no means found 
only in the context of Trinitarian doctrine or inter-faith dialogue. 
This is the question of balancing the inculturation of the faith in specific 
contexts with the maintenance of a trans-contextual sense of catholicity. 
These two imperatives correspond in general in our dialogical model to 
the pneumatological affirmation of pluriformity and to the Christological 
quest for intelligibility respectively. So a Trinitarian pattern worked out 
with respect to religious pluralism could be applied more widely to other 
questions of diversity facing the Church: from the experience of inter- 
faith dialogue, Christians could appreciate how the doctrine of the Trinity 
could be applied as guidance in a range of cross-cultural situations. 
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As for the divergent theological references of the two dialogues, we may 
observe that a polytheistic context of Hindu-Christian encounter would 
most naturally generate witness to a `social' model of the Trinity, 
whereas the monotheistic emphasis of Muslim-Christian discussions 
would rather tend to favour `psychological' analogies. In other words, the 
two dialogues could be broadly aligned with the two approaches which 
have dominated Christian theology of the Trinity through the ages. 
Here again, inter-faith dialogue might cast some light on a significant 
issue within the life of the Christian Church. The co-existence in different 
traditions of the social and psychological analogies of the Trinity has long 
been felt as an intra-Christian tension, and has in our own time again 
become a major ecumenical challenge. It may be that the appearance of 
each of these Christian models in the dialogical contexts of encounter 
with different faiths could help Christians better to understand what are 
the contextual features within the life of the Church which led to one or 
other being favoured, when both are designed to provide witness to the 
same fundamental dynamic of plenitude. 
Thus the fruits of projective inter-faith dialogue with both Hindus and 
Muslims could connect creatively with the Trinitarian understanding of 
the Church, while the ecumenical witness of connecting the varied 
dialogical insights coming from two such very different and very lively 
traditions of contemporary faith would help Christians to maintain both 
depth and balance in the expression of their faith. In these ways, not only 
would the doctrine of the Trinity be a resource for inter-faith dialogue; 
that dialogue could in turn resource the Church's witness to the reality of 
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
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Additional Note `B' 
The Fifth Relationship According to David Lochhead's `Dialogical 
Imperative' 
Lochhead argues for a fifth category of inter-communal relationship alongside the 
four commonly occurring types which are characterised by ideologies of isolation, 
hostility, competition and partnership respectively (above, p290). This fifth type he 
calls the `dialogical relationship'. He describes it as a `categorical imperative' for 
Christians in the sense that it is an actualisation in the multi-faith situation of the 
dominical commandment to love. As such, it can have `no other purpose than itself; 
it makes no presuppositions about the truth or otherwise of the other community's 
view of reality; and it is characterised by `unconditional openness' (Lochhead, 
pp77fr). He concedes that Christians recognise and respond to this dialogical 
imperative only `infrequently, ambiguously and fragmentarily' (ibid., p81); 
nevertheless, it is for him the central paradigm of inter-faith relations. 
Since we have freely used his fourfold ideological analysis (above, pp290ff), it is 
important to explain why we differ from Lochhead on this point, preferring rather to 
see partnership as the, most fruitful relational context within which dialogue may 
develop. In fact, Lochhead himself seems to recognise the inherent plausibility of 
such a preference, in that his arguments for a fifth relationship are actually presented 
as arguments against the adequacy of the partnership model. 
Lochhead believes that religious communities who regard one another as partners will 
primarily be concerned in their meeting to find `common ground', and on the basis of 
that common ground to minimise or relativise their differences. He suggests that this 
model of dialogue is best described as `negotiation', which he views in a negative 
light. Methodologically, he objects to it because it prejudges (prior to dialogue) 
another faith as being essentially similar to one's own. He also warns against such a 
model on the grounds of Christian (and other faiths') integrity, because he feels that it 
inevitably runs the risk of syncretism (Lochhead, pp59-66). 
We shall question here two of his arguments: first, his negative evaluation of 
`negotiation' as a form of dialogue; and second, his suggestion that the establishment 
of `common ground' involves the relativisation of disagreement. A third related claim 
- that a relationship of partnership necessarily implies pre- or extra-dialogical 
prejudgments about the other's view of reality - is addressed in the body of our text 
(above, p297). 
Lochhead's understanding of authentic dialogue, which he locates in a context 
purified of the assumptions of any of the first four of his four ideological types, is 
heavily influenced by the theological idealism of Martin Buber: he transposes the 
application of Buber's model from the relationship of God and humanity to that of 
community and community (Lochhead, pp52ff). However, Buber's is surely too 
simple a model for the reality of most encounters, where in fact dialogues are marked 
by `suspicion of intentionality (one's own and the other's) ... each participant in any 
encounter comes heavily laden with presuppositions and previous contexts ... the movement in the transfer being performed is slippery' (Ward, p174). 
Graham Ward is here commenting on the use of the French verb negocier in the work 
of Jacques Derrida. Drawing attention to the word's mercantile associations, he 
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suggests that `negotiation' is in fact a usefully realistic term for theologians in any 
dialogical context; and it has recently been suggested that this usage can be 
appropriately applied to the inter-faith situation in particular (D'Costa (1998), p34n3). 
In other words, to recognise dialogue as a form of negotiation would in fact show the 
reality of engagement existing between communities. The `suspicion of intentionality' 
to which negocier alludes provides the initial context within which the atmosphere of 
dialogical openness is to establish itself. The practicality associated with negotiation 
is to be expected in any dialogue which has as a goal the establishment of shared 
action - which, we have argued, is important in inter-faith encounter (above, p298). 
Lochhead's second point is that the establishment of `common ground' in a 
partnership will involve the relativisation of disagreement. Yet this. need not be the 
case if the projected scope of the partnership is such as to sustain the acceptance of 
continuing and significant differences of opinion. This becomes clear if we consider 
the set of relationships which Lochhead understandably takes as illustrative of inter- 
religious partnerships: namely, the ecumenical movement within Christianity. It is 
surely significant that the particular ecumenical example which he discusses is that of 
the conversations which led to the merging of several denominations in 1925 to form 
the United Church of Canada (Lochhead, p24). But of course many other ecumenical 
conversations have not led, and were not realistically expected to lead, to organic 
unions of this kind. Rather, what they have typically involved is the delineation both 
of common ground and of areas of disagreement, in the hope that the result of such 
clarifications will be a deeper commitment to shared action on the basis of common 
ground and a further growth in understanding of the other at points of divergence. 
Similarly circumscribed partnerships coming together to enable shared action in many 
other situations likewise explicitly recognise space for difference. It is difficult to see 
how this could be described as the relativisation of disagreement, so again Lochhead's 
analysis seems to be unjustified. 
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